15 The EU and the Gulf of Guinea
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18099/13
JOIN(13) 31
| Joint Communication: Elements for the EU's Strategic Response to the Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea
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| Legal base | —
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 28 February 2014
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| Previous Committee Reports | HC 83-xxx (2013-14), chapter 7 (29 January 2014); also see (35595) — and (35696) 17859/13: HC 83-xxvi (2013-14), chapter 9 (8 January 2014)
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| Discussion in Council | 17 March 2014 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared; further information requested
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Background
15.1 This Joint Communication, Elements for the
EU's Strategic Response to the Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea
(a 6,000 km coastline from Senegal to Angola, including the islands
of Cape Verde and São Tomé & Príncipe,
covering two geographical, political and economic regions) sets
out an EEAS/Commission proposal for a "Comprehensive Approach"
to the primary challenges faced in the region, especially in the
maritime domain. It is designed to serve as the basis for a Strategic
Framework.
15.2 The Commission/EEAS posit three distinct types
of threat:
— those that take place uniquely at sea,
including illegal fishing, illicit dumping of waste, and piracy
and armed robbery at sea;[54]
— those that come from sea onto land, primarily
trafficking of narcotics, arms, counterfeit goods and, often in
the other direction, of human beings; and
— threats to sea-based economic activity
from land, particularly to the offshore oil and gas industry,
including hostage-taking, theft ("bunkering"), and criminal
acts in ports.
15.3 It proposes general areas for action rather
than specific programmes. It is based on three principles: partnership
with the countries and organisations in the Gulf of Guinea region;
a comprehensive approach integrating security, development and
governance issues; and applying lessons learned from other strategies.
15.4 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
described both the EU Comprehensive Approach (which is now the
keystone of CSDP, and the subject of a full-blown Commission Communication
that the Committee recently considered)[55]
and tackling maritime criminality in the Gulf of Guinea as UK
priorities. The analysis, conclusions and broad actions proposed
in the Joint Communication were in line with UK objectives and
he was content with them as a basis for the Strategic Framework.
15.5 The Minister also outlined some, "albeit
relatively minor", concerns, which related to some of the
content of the analysis, rather than the proposed areas for action:
· "The paper separates the maritime
threats into sections. We think this is somewhat arbitrary given
the linked nature of the threats and is inconsistent with the
holistic approach advocated in the paper;
· "The document suggests there is potential
for kidnapping attacks to develop into a piracy business model
similar to that seen in Somalia. There is no evidence to support
this assertion. Indeed, there are significant differences with
Somali-based piracy particularly the lack of governance and capability
in East Africa. We will seek to address this factual inaccuracy
in the paper. Other Member States share our analysis;
· "Greater emphasis should be given
in the Strategic Framework to encouraging the implementation of
the priorities outlined in the 'Code of Conduct Concerning the
Prevention and Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships
and Illegal Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa' which
was adopted by Gulf of Guinea Heads of State in Yaoundé
on 24-25 June 2013.
· "The communication is not specific
about linkages with the EU Horn of Africa[56]
and EU Sahel[57] strategies,
nor lessons learned in these regions. It is important to understand
how the Gulf of Guinea strategy will affect maritime resources
and policy making attention in the Horn of Africa. It would
also be useful for the document to discuss whether proliferation
and trafficking through the Sahel is fuelling extremism and violence
in the Gulf of Guinea."
15.6 The Minister aimed to strengthen these areas
through discussions at the COAFR Working Group on 22 January 2014
ahead of the Council Conclusions on 10 or 23 February and thereafter.
Our assessment
15.7 We were subsequently given to understand that
the timescale for further discussion was in fact somewhat more
elastic, and that the only actual deadline was agreement on the
Strategy prior to the 2-3 April Africa-EU Summit.
15.8 We therefore asked the Minister to write to
us once the document had been finalised, outlining the changes
that had been made and his views thereon, and prior to its adoption
as the new Strategy.
15.9 In the meantime, we retained the document under
scrutiny.[58]
The Minister's letter of 28 February 2014
15.10 The Minister says that his officials have been
"fully engaged throughout the process" and that the
concerns highlighted in his Explanatory Memorandum have been addressed
during the development of the strategy. The EU has, he says, "been
receptive to our concerns and has reflected them in the changes
to the document".
15.11 He says that the main points to note are as
follows:
· "It is particularly positive that
officials succeeded in softening the language regarding the possibility
of a new CSDP mission. We considered that the language in the
first draft of the strategy was too forward leaning on the prospect
of a new mission before sufficient work had been done to establish
the best way to support current programmes. The paper is now clear
that there are a number of options to be explored before a mission
is considered.
· "The link made in the first draft
between threats to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and
Somali piracy was inaccurate. The most recent draft now references
the lessons learned from the EU's Horn of Africa Strategy and
the comparison with Somali-style piracy has been removed.
· "States in the Gulf of Guinea are
showing increased political will to act and we consider that international
assistance should be coordinated in support of African leadership.
The strategy has now been altered to better emphasise that EU
activity should be in support of African leadership and implementing
2013's groundbreaking Yaoundé Code of Conduct.
· "The initial analysis separated maritime
criminality into three distinct threats, which we considered to
be misleading. The text has been altered to reflect the inter-linkages
between the crimes and promotes the holistic approach."
15.12 Overall, the Minister says:
"We continue to believe that this strategy is
a positive step for the EU as it seeks to address maritime insecurity
in the Gulf of Guinea through greater international co-ordination
and support to an African-led solution. This approach is consistent
with the UK's own Strategy to Address Maritime Security off Africa's
Western Seaboard, and will bring greater coherence to both the
EU and individual Member States' engagement in the Gulf of Guinea."
Conclusion
15.13 We note the reference to a proposed new
CSDP mission (the first bullet point above), since there was no
mention of one in the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum, and nor
can we find one in the document itself. It would seem that the
EEAS nonetheless sought to insert the idea in the Strategy paper
itself. However, we are reassured, for the time being at least,
in that it would seem that other (unspecified) options are to
be considered before any such proposal is taken forward.
15.14 We are content to clear the Joint Communication.
However, we should be grateful if, after the Foreign Affairs
Council, the Minister would provide the Committee with a copy
of the final Strategy Framework paper and of the Council Conclusions,
and any further views he may have as to how well they meet UK
objectives and concerns, and indicate the nature of the mission
proposed by the EEAS and what the other options referred to above
are.
54 The Commission/EEAS note that International law
differentiates between "piracy" - incidents which take
place in international waters - and "armed robbery at sea"
- incidents which take place in territorial waters. Back
55
See headnote: (35595) - and (35696) 17859/13: HC 83-xxvi (2013-14),
chapter 9 (8 January 2014). Back
56
Set out at the Annex to the 14 November 2011 Council Conclusions
on the Horn of Africa, which are available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126052.pdf. Back
57
Available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf. Back
58
See headnote: HC 83-xxx (2013-14), chapter 7 (29 January 2014). Back
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