Documents considered by the Committee on 5 March 2014 - European Scrutiny Committee Contents


15 The EU and the Gulf of Guinea

(35684)

18099/13

JOIN(13) 31

Joint Communication: Elements for the EU's Strategic Response to the Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea
Legal base
DepartmentForeign and Commonwealth Office
Basis of considerationMinister's letter of 28 February 2014
Previous Committee ReportsHC 83-xxx (2013-14), chapter 7 (29 January 2014); also see (35595) — and (35696) 17859/13: HC 83-xxvi (2013-14), chapter 9 (8 January 2014)
Discussion in Council17 March 2014 Foreign Affairs Council
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionCleared; further information requested

Background

15.1 This Joint Communication, Elements for the EU's Strategic Response to the Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea (a 6,000 km coastline from Senegal to Angola, including the islands of Cape Verde and São Tomé & Príncipe, covering two geographical, political and economic regions) sets out an EEAS/Commission proposal for a "Comprehensive Approach" to the primary challenges faced in the region, especially in the maritime domain. It is designed to serve as the basis for a Strategic Framework.

15.2 The Commission/EEAS posit three distinct types of threat:

—  those that take place uniquely at sea, including illegal fishing, illicit dumping of waste, and piracy and armed robbery at sea;[54]

—  those that come from sea onto land, primarily trafficking of narcotics, arms, counterfeit goods and, often in the other direction, of human beings; and

—  threats to sea-based economic activity from land, particularly to the offshore oil and gas industry, including hostage-taking, theft ("bunkering"), and criminal acts in ports.

15.3 It proposes general areas for action rather than specific programmes. It is based on three principles: partnership with the countries and organisations in the Gulf of Guinea region; a comprehensive approach integrating security, development and governance issues; and applying lessons learned from other strategies.

15.4 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) described both the EU Comprehensive Approach (which is now the keystone of CSDP, and the subject of a full-blown Commission Communication that the Committee recently considered)[55] and tackling maritime criminality in the Gulf of Guinea as UK priorities. The analysis, conclusions and broad actions proposed in the Joint Communication were in line with UK objectives and he was content with them as a basis for the Strategic Framework.

15.5 The Minister also outlined some, "albeit relatively minor", concerns, which related to some of the content of the analysis, rather than the proposed areas for action:

·  "The paper separates the maritime threats into sections. We think this is somewhat arbitrary given the linked nature of the threats and is inconsistent with the holistic approach advocated in the paper;

·  "The document suggests there is potential for kidnapping attacks to develop into a piracy business model similar to that seen in Somalia. There is no evidence to support this assertion. Indeed, there are significant differences with Somali-based piracy particularly the lack of governance and capability in East Africa. We will seek to address this factual inaccuracy in the paper. Other Member States share our analysis;

·  "Greater emphasis should be given in the Strategic Framework to encouraging the implementation of the priorities outlined in the 'Code of Conduct Concerning the Prevention and Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illegal Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa' which was adopted by Gulf of Guinea Heads of State in Yaoundé on 24-25 June 2013.

·  "The communication is not specific about linkages with the EU Horn of Africa[56] and EU Sahel[57] strategies, nor lessons learned in these regions. It is important to understand how the Gulf of Guinea strategy will affect maritime resources and policy making attention in the Horn of Africa. It would also be useful for the document to discuss whether proliferation and trafficking through the Sahel is fuelling extremism and violence in the Gulf of Guinea."

15.6 The Minister aimed to strengthen these areas through discussions at the COAFR Working Group on 22 January 2014 ahead of the Council Conclusions on 10 or 23 February and thereafter.

Our assessment

15.7 We were subsequently given to understand that the timescale for further discussion was in fact somewhat more elastic, and that the only actual deadline was agreement on the Strategy prior to the 2-3 April Africa-EU Summit.

15.8 We therefore asked the Minister to write to us once the document had been finalised, outlining the changes that had been made and his views thereon, and prior to its adoption as the new Strategy.

15.9 In the meantime, we retained the document under scrutiny.[58]

The Minister's letter of 28 February 2014

15.10 The Minister says that his officials have been "fully engaged throughout the process" and that the concerns highlighted in his Explanatory Memorandum have been addressed during the development of the strategy. The EU has, he says, "been receptive to our concerns and has reflected them in the changes to the document". 

15.11 He says that the main points to note are as follows:

·  "It is particularly positive that officials succeeded in softening the language regarding the possibility of a new CSDP mission. We considered that the language in the first draft of the strategy was too forward leaning on the prospect of a new mission before sufficient work had been done to establish the best way to support current programmes. The paper is now clear that there are a number of options to be explored before a mission is considered.

·  "The link made in the first draft between threats to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and Somali piracy was inaccurate. The most recent draft now references the lessons learned from the EU's Horn of Africa Strategy and the comparison with Somali-style piracy has been removed.

·  "States in the Gulf of Guinea are showing increased political will to act and we consider that international assistance should be coordinated in support of African leadership. The strategy has now been altered to better emphasise that EU activity should be in support of African leadership and implementing 2013's groundbreaking Yaoundé Code of Conduct.

·  "The initial analysis separated maritime criminality into three distinct threats, which we considered to be misleading. The text has been altered to reflect the inter-linkages between the crimes and promotes the holistic approach." 

15.12 Overall, the Minister says:

"We continue to believe that this strategy is a positive step for the EU as it seeks to address maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea through greater international co-ordination and support to an African-led solution. This approach is consistent with the UK's own Strategy to Address Maritime Security off Africa's Western Seaboard, and will bring greater coherence to both the EU and individual Member States' engagement in the Gulf of Guinea."

Conclusion

15.13 We note the reference to a proposed new CSDP mission (the first bullet point above), since there was no mention of one in the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum, and nor can we find one in the document itself. It would seem that the EEAS nonetheless sought to insert the idea in the Strategy paper itself. However, we are reassured, for the time being at least, in that it would seem that other (unspecified) options are to be considered before any such proposal is taken forward.

15.14 We are content to clear the Joint Communication. However, we should be grateful if, after the Foreign Affairs Council, the Minister would provide the Committee with a copy of the final Strategy Framework paper and of the Council Conclusions, and any further views he may have as to how well they meet UK objectives and concerns, and indicate the nature of the mission proposed by the EEAS and what the other options referred to above are.





54   The Commission/EEAS note that International law differentiates between "piracy" - incidents which take place in international waters - and "armed robbery at sea" - incidents which take place in territorial waters. Back

55   See headnote: (35595) - and (35696) 17859/13: HC 83-xxvi (2013-14), chapter 9 (8 January 2014). Back

56   Set out at the Annex to the 14 November 2011 Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, which are available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126052.pdf. Back

57   Available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf. Back

58   See headnote: HC 83-xxx (2013-14), chapter 7 (29 January 2014). Back


 
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Prepared 18 March 2014