16 EU military operation in the Central
African Republic (EUFOR RCA)
| (35747)
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—
| Council Decision on a European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA)
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| Legal base | Articles 42(4) and Article 43(2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 21 February 2014
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| Previous Committee Report | HC 83-xxxi (2013-14), chapter 14 (5 February 2014)
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| Discussion in Council | 10 February 2014 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared (decision reported on 5 February); further information provided
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Background
16.1 Via Operation Sangaris, some 1,600 French troops
have been deployed in the CAR since early December on a mission
to stem fighting between predominantly Muslim militants, known
as the ex-Seléka, and bands of Christian vigilantes.
16.2 By the beginning of 2014, the humanitarian and
security situation in CAR remained extremely concerning.
Although the deployment of French and African Union (AU) forces
appeared to have stabilised the security situation in Bangui,
the capital city remained tense with sporadic fighting; in the
rest of the country, fighting continued in the west and north-west,
with most residents still too afraid to return to towns.
The numbers of Internally Displaced Persons was estimated at over
935,000 (out of a population of 4 million) with 512,000 in Bangui
alone (population 800,000). In sum, there was a considerable
humanitarian challenge.
16.3 We most recently reported on the first draft
Council Decision on 5 February 2014. We set out in that Report
the relevant conclusions of the January Foreign Affairs Council
and the background to UN Security Council resolution 2134.
Council Decision 2014/73/CFSP
16.4 The Council Decision (2014/73/CFSP) of 10 February
2014 established a European Union military operation in the Central
African Republic (EUFOR RCA). As well as designating Major General
Philippe Pontiès as Operation Commander and Larissa as
the EU Head Quarters, it also agreed a draft reference amount
for the budget of €39.6 million (through the ATHENA mechanism,
the UK would expect to pay a 14.82% share of the common costs,
which would equate to €5.8 million).
16.5 In our February Report we expressed our gratitude
to the Minister for the way in which the scrutiny process had
been handled thus far, given the pressures to press ahead as rapidly
as possible. No doubt he would be able to provide more detail
as the operational planning process was taken forward, particularly
with regard to any possible UK contribution and the final reference
amount.
16.6 As the Minister knew from previous discussion
with him, we have noted the extent to which, in many instances,
it is the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) that is central to
a mission's success — as evidenced by those in, e.g., Niger,
Mali and the Horn of Africa, whose effectiveness after launch
has been hampered by the time it has taken to complete the negotiations,
or other issues that have compromised effectiveness due to the
failure of the local authorities to respond appropriately. In
this instance, the Minister did not comment about the capacity
or inclination of the authorities in the CAR — with a fragile
situation in the capital, fighting elsewhere in the country and
a dire humanitarian situation — to be an appropriate counter-party.
The Minister rightly referred to the importance of a sustainable
political process.
16.7 We therefore asked the Minister, when he next
submitted an Explanatory Memorandum on this mission, to outline
the situation on the ground — who was now in power, with
what sort of local support etc. — so that we could, we hoped,
be assured that this was not likely to be an obstacle to this
Mission's operational effectiveness, and that it could be fully
operational from the outset.
16.8 At the same time, we asked the Minister also
to deal with the comment attributed to the Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation at the UN on 28 January 2014, after
the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2134 — that
he had urged the European Union to agree with the African Union
peacekeeping operation on operational aspects, such as the division
of labour, before its force began operating.
16.9 In the meantime, cleared the Council Decision.[59]
The Minister's letter of 21 February 2014
16.10 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
says that, as he was able to submit only an early draft of the
Council Decision for scrutiny, he is writing to update the Committee
on the final Council Decision following its agreement and address
some of the concerns we and our House of Lords counterparts have
raised.
16.11 The Minister continues as follows:
"UK objectives on the Council Decision to
establish EUFOR RCA were fully achieved at the RELEX negotiations;
we pushed to ensure the final Decision reflected a tightly focused
operation with a clear timeframe, mandate and scope. We successfully
built the following additions into the Decision:
— "That EUFOR RCA should deploy as
rapidly as possible to Full Operating Capability (FOC) to contribute
to the stabilisation of the situation;
— "That EUFOR RCA should conduct mandated
tasks with a view to a handover to AFISM-CAR within four to six
months from achieving FOC;
— "A financial reference amount of
€25.9 million for the common costs of EUFOR RCA. An additional
€3.7 million of common funding has since been allocated for
forces' accommodation; however the total figure is still a significant
reduction from the draft Reference Amount of €39.6 million;
— "A PSC[60]
assessment of progress three months after the Operation's launch."
16.12 More immediately, the Minister says:
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA)
"The focus in Brussels has now turned to the
formal planning process, which will include finalising the detailed
Operational Plan and closing the negotiations with CAR authorities
on the status of the operation (SOFA), which will necessitate
another Council Decision. A draft version of the SOFA was shared
with UK officials this week, in advance of discussions at RELEX
on Thursday 20 February. I am attaching the current draft to give
you an idea of direction of travel.
"We understand that agreeing the SOFA with CAR
authorities should progress smoothly. MISCA was launched only
two weeks after the UN Security Council Resolution mandating it.
On 24 January, President Catherine Samba-Panza wrote to Baroness
Ashton stating that the provisions of the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA SOFA
from 16 April 2008 should serve as the basis of the new EUFOR
RCA SOFA, so as to allow agreement with the shortest delay, and
declared unilaterally that CAR would grant the privileges and
immunities of EUFOR TCHAD SOFA to EUFOR RCA and its personnel.
FORCE GENERATION
"The formal planning process also includes the
start of force generation for EUFOR RCA. I am not in a position
to provide much detail as force generation is ongoing, with a
Force Generation Conference scheduled for 27 February. However
I understand that France, Estonia and Poland have all expressed
a firm interest, as has Georgia, and initial indications are that
the EU will manage to generate the expected number of forces.
COORDINATION WITH THE AU AND UN
"UK support has been focused on ensuring the
international community is co-ordinated and responding as effectively
as possible. In parallel, we have worked closely with the AU and
UN given that they are leading the international response. We
have also committed a substantial humanitarian aid package of
£15 million to CAR to support the UN and others to deal with
the humanitarian crisis.
"We continue to play our part in ensuring that
EUFOR RCA and the African-led International Support Mission to
CAR (MISCA) are equipped with the assets they need, and have already
supplied £2 million of bilateral support to MISCA, which
comes in addition to the EU funding provided through the African
Peace Facility (APF). As you are aware, the African Peace Facility
(APF), funded through the European Development Fund, was set up
to support peace and security on the African continent in the
framework of the EU-Africa Partnership. In November 2013, EU Member
States endorsed the EU Commission's recommended allocation of
€325 million to the APF in 2014. EU Member States agreed
to the payment of €50 million on 5 December from the 2013
APF allocation to cover MISCA costs of troop stipends, fuel and
provsions until 30 June 2014. The UK contribution to this is
14.92% through EU assessed costs. Because higher than expected
force levels were agreed by the AU, the EU is expecting a second
request for an additional €25 million of funding for CAR
to ensure that the MISCA mission can operate until the end of
June. The AU and UN also organised a donors' conference in the
margins of the AU Summit in Addis on 1 February to try to ensure
sustainable and predictable funding. The conference raised funding
pledges totalling $314 million.
UK CONTRIBUTION TO EUFOR RCA
"UK support now includes the provision of a
military officer to assist with operational planning in the Headquarters
in Larissa, based on a longstanding commitment to provide staff
to the Operation Headquarters when a national headquarters is
activated for a CSDP operation. The Prime Minister has also offered
further bilateral logistical support to France at the UK-France
Summit on 31 January, following on from the UK's previous provision
of three RAF C-17 flights to help with the rapid deployment of
equipment of French forces in support of MISCA in December 2013.
The offer of support includes logistical
lifts and air to air refuelling and the provision of subject matter
expertise on remotely piloted air systems.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CAR
"Politically, the election of Catherine Samba-Panza
as Head of State of the Transition Government on the 20 January
was a positive first step along the path to political stability.
Whilst the President's first priority is security, the EU are
continually engaging with the transitional government in Bangui
to work towards implementing the political process, including
the holding of free and fair elections within the agreed timetable.
However the main efforts driving political transition are channelled
through BINUCA, the UN Peacebuilding Office in CAR. BINUCA has
been mandated to focus on the implementation of the transition
process, including expediting the re-establishment of constitutional
order by identifying, facilitating and coordinating regular communication
between stakeholders. BINUCA is also providing strategic advice,
technical assistance, and support, to ready the political and
security context in the lead up to the elections. We strongly
supported efforts to renew BINUCA's mandate, and have recently
strengthened BINUCA's political mandate to prepare for elections
by February 2015, to promote and protect human rights, and to
support the stabilisation of the security situation.
PROCESS ISSUES
"As you are aware, we are still waiting on a
Council Decision to launch EUFOR RCA (CD2). We anticipated submitting
the first version of CD2 for Scrutiny this week, but have not
yet received a draft copy. My officials will submit both CD2 and
the Council Decision closing the negotiations on SOFA to you as
soon as possible, and ensure the points each Committee raised
are addressed in greater detail in the next EM.
"Finally, I would like to thank you and the
European Scrutiny Committee for considering the Council Decision
to establish EUFOR RCA with such urgency. We will be working to
another tight timetable for CD2, on which I would be grateful
for your continued understanding."
Conclusion
16.13 We look forward to receiving the further
draft Council Decisions in good time for any questions that may
continue to arise to be dealt with prior to adoption.
16.14 In the meantime, we thank the Minister for
this helpful and comprehensive update, which is reassuring as
far as it is possible to be at this juncture. However, we note
that, according to the Wall Street Journal, of 25 February:
"The French Parliament voted Tuesday to indefinitely
extend the country's military intervention in the Central African
Republic despite concerns that France is becoming bogged down
in the chaotic conflict between local vigilantes."
16.15 As the Wall Street Journal notes,
under France's constitution, the President needs parliamentary
backing to extend any military campaign beyond four months; thus,
the paper says, he has a freer hand in conducting the military
campaign and has already announced plans to boost French forces
to 2,000 troops in the coming weeks. Prime Minister Jean-Marc
Ayrault is quoted as telling lawmakers moments before the vote
"Everyone here knows our work isn't done."[61]
16.16 The danger, of course, is that it never
will be, or at least not anytime soon. We therefore look forward
to a detailed assessment of the political and military situation
in the Minister's next Explanatory Memorandum, and a clear exposition
of how EUFOR RCA will then fit into the solution to whatever challenges,
present and prospective, are then confronting the CAR authorities
and the response thus far of France and the AU.
16.17 In the meantime, we are drawing this letter
to the attention of the House because of the level of interest
in the situation in the CAR and the EU, the international community
and the Government's response to it.[62]
59 See headnote: HC 83-xxxi (2013-14), chapter 14
(5 February 2014). Back
60
The committee of ambassador-level officials from national delegations
who, by virtue of article 38 TEU, under the authority of the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and
the Council, monitor the international situation in areas covered
by the CFSP and exercise political control and strategic direction
of crisis management operations, as set out in article 43 TEU.
The chair is nominated by the High Representative. Back
61
See http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304834704579405261927493246?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702304834704579405261927493246.html. Back
62
Now also see (35823) - at chapter 17, and (35829) - at chapter
4 of this Report. Back
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