18 Launching the EU military operation
in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) and its status in
the CAR
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(35827)
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(b)
(35828)
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Council Decision on the launch of a European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA)
Council Decision concerning the Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Central African Republic on the status in the Central African Republic of the European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA)
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| Legal base | (a) Articles 42(4) and Article 43(2) TEU; unanimity;
(b) Article 37 TEU in conjunction with Article 218(5) and (6) TFEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EMs of 28 February 2014
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (35747) —: HC 83-xxxi (2013-14), chapter 14 (5 February 2014); HC 83-xxxv (2013-14) chapter 16 (5 March 2014)
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| Discussion in Council | 17 March 2014 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared; further information requested
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Background
18.1 The background to Council Decision 2014/73/CFSP
of 10 February 2014, establishing EUFOR RCA, is set out in our
Report under reference and in a separate Chapter of this Report.[66]
In sum, that Council Decision designated Major General Philippe
Pontiès as Operation Commander and Larissa as the EU Head
Quarters, and agreed a draft reference amount for the budget of
€39.6 million: EUFOR RCA (which stems from UN Security Council
resolution 2134 of 28 January) will provide temporary support,
for a period of up to six-months, to help achieve a secure environment
in the Bangui area. It will consist of up to a Battalion size
force to allow for adequate logistical support and force protection.
Within its area of operations, EUFOR RCA would contribute to international
and regional efforts, i.e., the AU peace-keeping force MISCA,
to protect the populations most at risk and to enable the free
movement of civilians, endeavouring to create the conditions required
in order to provide humanitarian aid for those who need it and
working alongside MISCA where possible to contribute to their
capacity, and also provide some advisory support.
18.2 Issues raised in that Report are considered
elsewhere in this Report. In brief, in clearing what became Council
Decision 2014/73/CFSP, the Committee noted previous discussion
with the Minister about instances that have illustrated that the
centrality of the SOMA/SOFA (Status of Mission/Forces Agreement)
to a mission's success, where effectiveness after launch has been
hampered by the time taken to complete the negotiations, or where,
after the event, the local authorities have failed to respond
appropriately. At that stage, the Minister had nothing to say
about the capacity of the authorities in the CAR — with
a fragile situation in the capital, fighting elsewhere in the
country and a dire humanitarian situation — to be an appropriate
counter-party. The Committee therefore asked him, in his next
Explanatory Memorandum (i.e., on the Council Decision to launch
the mission), to outline the situation on the ground — who
was now in power, with what sort of local support etc. —
so that the Committee could, it hoped, be assured that this was
not likely to be an obstacle to this Mission's operational effectiveness,
and that it could be fully operational from the outset.
18.3 However, on 21 February the Minister sent an
update on the negotiations and his response thus far to the concerns
raised by the Committee and its Lords counterpart. It is helpful
and comprehensive, and reassuring as far as it was possible to
be at this juncture. However, we note, the French Parliament
voted on 25 February to extend indefinitely the country's military
intervention in the CAR (via Operation Sangaris, some 1,600 French
troops have been deployed in the CAR since early December on a
mission to stem fighting between predominantly Muslim militants,
known as the ex-Seléka,[67]
and bands of Christian vigilantes, the Anti-balaka)[68]
and plans to increase it to 2,000 troops in the coming weeks.
Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault was quoted as telling lawmakers
moments before the vote "Everyone here knows our work isn't
done". The danger that we envisage, of course, is that
it never will be, or at least not anytime soon. We therefore
ask the Minister in a separate Chapter of this Report to provide
a detailed assessment of the political and military situation
in his next Explanatory Memorandum, and a clear exposition of
how EUFOR RCA will then fit into the solution to whatever challenges,
present and prospective, are then confronting the CAR authorities
and the response thus far of France and the AU; this to include
substantive information on the state of force generation (somewhat
vague thus far) and an indication of progress in responding to
the Russian permanent representative's observation at the time
the UN authorised this mission, i.e., agreeing operational aspects,
such as the division of labour, with the African Union peacekeeping
operation before EUFOR RCA begins operating.[69]
The draft Council Decisions
18.4 The Minister has also now deposited both the
Council Decision to launch EUFOR RCA and the Council Decision
embodying the Exchange of Letters between the European Union
and the Central African Republic on the status in the Central
African Republic of EUFOR RCA.
The Government's view
18.5 In his first Explanatory Memorandum of 28 February
2014, on the Council Decision launching the mission, the Minister
for Europe (Mr David Lidington) says:
"Given the rapidly deteriorating political,
security and humanitarian crisis in CAR, and the risk of spill-over
into the wider region through continued refugee flows, the quick
launch of EUFOR RCA remains crucial to effectively delivering
EU contribution to address the most pressing threats posed by
the actions of armed groups to the population, and to support
the return to a normal constitutional order and process, in coordination
with other international actors. Unless checked and reversed,
it could well lead to a situation where the disorder in CAR could
threaten not just the population but also the stability of neighbouring
countries. We are therefore committed to ensuring the Operation
launches as quickly and effectively while respecting parliamentary
scrutiny procedures.
"We expect the Council Decision to launch
EUFOR RCA to be adopted at the 17 March Foreign Affairs Council,
in order to allow the Operation to deploy as soon as possible
and then achieve Initial Operational Capability within 30 days
of mission launch. Once again, the timeline is tight, and therefore
we submit this Council Decision in draft although negotiations
are ongoing in Brussels. We continue to emphasise that final
Council Decisions must allow time for UK Parliamentary Scrutiny
and we have persistently set out in detail the process of our
Parliamentary Scrutiny timetable with EU partners. We will continue
to update the Committees.
THE SECURITY SITUATION
"The security situation in the Central African
Republic is still dire. Although the Africa-led International
Support Mission to CAR (MISCA) is making progress
in disarming militia and in calming areas of Bangui where the
situation remains tense, spikes of violence and incidents of reprisal
attacks by local self-defence ("anti-Balaka") groups
continue to flare up. This persistent insecurity deepens
the humanitarian crisis, which is further complicated by the tens
of thousands of refugees. The UN estimates that 838,000 people
remain displaced in Bangui and around the country, in addition
to the large number of refugees in neighbouring countries.
There is a real fear that the window for planting crops will be
missed by many communities which will result in worsening food
shortages over the coming twelve months.
"As the situation on the ground is still
so fragile, improved security and humanitarian access in CAR remain
key priorities for the UK and the rest of the international community.
Member States agreed to EU military action to address the continued
instability in CAR at the 20 January Foreign Affairs Council (FAC),
approving the Crisis Management Concept for an operation. The
UN Security Council Resolution 2134 on 28 January authorised EU
military action, providing the basis for the Council Decision
2014/73/CFSP on the establishment of EUFOR RCA (CD1), which was
adopted by the Council on 10 February 2014. The objective of EUFOR
is to address the instability in the short-term by providing essential
support to the country and to the AU.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING
"Operational planning is now near completion
and force preparations are underway: some forces are already in
country to facilitate this. This Council Decision agrees the Operational
Plan (OPLAN), the Rules of Engagement and the decision to launch
the Operation. These operational documents are necessarily Confidential
and set out more detail of how the Operation will be implemented.
Our previous EM of 30 January sets out the outline of the Operation.
Further to this EUFOR RCA will focus its activities on the airport
and two neighbouring districts. This would then free up resource
for MISCA and Op SANGARIS operations in the rest of Bangui, in
particular to secure the main transport route to Cameroon and
humanitarian lines of communication.
KEY TASKS
"The key tasks of EUFOR RCA are: stabilisation
through providing a safe and secure environment and safe areas
for vulnerable parts of the population; provision of security
at Bangui airport; supporting the provision of humanitarian assistance;
setting the conditions for handover to MISCA, including capacity
building and logistic support. The duration of the EUFOR mission
is limited to 4-6 months from the establishment of Full Operating
Capability Capability (FOC, which should be reached 30 days after
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is declared). This will provide
enough time to improve security in the area of operations, improve
the stability and freedom of movement for humanitarian actors
within the area of operations, and enable enough time for a transfer
of authority to MISCA before the end date, thus allowing for a
transition period for monitoring and mentoring. The end state
is the handover of EUFOR RCA's area of operations to MISCA within
6 months after the establishment of FOC. The exit strategy is
measured by the OpCdr[70]
against criteria of Security, Stability and MISCA's readiness
to assume responsibility: these will define mission success, although
mission termination is strictly bounded by the mandated end date
(FOC+6 months).
FORCE GENERATION
"Force generation is ongoing. The first
Force Generation Conference (FGC) was held on 25 February, at
which offers were received for approximately two-thirds of the
required personnel. France will provide the framework for the
force, as well as one of the four infantry companies (these troops
are already in CAR as part of the French Operation SANGARIS, but
will be transferred into the EU force). Other significant contributors
include Georgia (a further infantry company), Estonia, Romania,
and Spain. The European Gendarmerie Force is providing a Gendarme
company. While it is disappointing that this first Force Generation
Conference was not more successful, the result compares favourably
with previous operations. A further FGC takes place on 5 March.
Key areas of concern are Force enablers and logistic elements,
although some of these may be resolved by an ongoing Technical
Agreement between France and the EU which would see some assets
transferred from, or made available by, Op SANGARIS.
FUNDING
"Funding to cover the UK's 14.82% share
of common costs of EUFOR (an approximate £3.2 million) will
be provided from the Peace-keeping budget, which on current planning
has sufficient capacity to absorb this spend in the short term.
In addition to the significant UK contribution to the EU funding
to MISCA provided through the African Peace Facility (APF), the
UK is providing £2 million of bilateral support to the African
Union to cover some of MISCA's immediate shortfalls on basic costs
including food, fuel and water. The Prime Minister has also offered
further bilateral logistical support to France at the UK-France
Summit on 31 January, following on from the UK's previous provision
of three RAF C-17 flights to help with the rapid deployment of
equipment of French forces in support of MISCA in December 2013.
The French have indicated an interest in the additional C17 flights
and air-to-air refuelling assistance offered: UK personnel are
currently discussing with French counterparts to agree detailed
arrangements. As set out in previous letters, the UK is contributing
a military officer to assist with operational planning in the
Headquarters in Larissa, based on a longstanding commitment to
provide staff to the Operation Headquarters when a national headquarters
is activated for a CSDP operation.
TIMESCALE
"We are aware of the risks of the tight
timescale, and the need for prudent planning against the time
pressures. However, we believe the planned launch is broadly
realistic from an operational perspective, as is achievement of
IOC 30 days later. We are continuing to emphasise the importance
of risk management against an ongoing assessment of the situation
in CAR and encouraging Member States' force and logistics contributions,
including where we can help to facilitate this. We are working
to ensure the draft Council Decision includes a focus on reaching
Full Operating Capacity as quickly as possible to ensure EUFOR
can deliver impact as effectively and as quickly as possible on
the ground. The earlier CD already mandates a written report 3
months after launch which will measure progress against the mandated
tasks for the OpCdr.
CAPTURED INDIVIDUALS
"Discussion is currently underway in RELEX
on authorising the High Representative Ashton to open negotiations
with CAR in order to conclude a transfer agreement. This agreement
sets the framework to allow the Operation to transfer any captured
individuals (as they are authorised to do under the UNSCR) to
the CAR authorities. EEAS are hopeful this can be negotiated with
the CAR authorities rapidly, as it will need to be in place before
the IOC. We will write to you separately on this mandate and once
the decision adopting the agreement is issued as a depositable
document, we will subject to the usual scrutiny process.
LONG TERM PEACE
"Long-term peace in CAR will require a strong
and sustainable constitutional government. The Judicial System
in Bangui has now been re-launched, the local police have recently
made their first arrests since November, and the transitional
government in Bangui is working with the EU towards implementing
the political process, including the holding of free and fair
elections within the agreed timetable. However there is still
a very long way to go. To this end, we strongly supported efforts
to renew the mandate of the UN Peacebuilding Office in CAR (BINUCA)
through the UNSCR on CAR, adopted on 28 January 2014 and co-sponsored
by the UK. We secured a strengthened political mandate for BINUCA
to prepare for elections by February 2015, to promote and protect
human rights, and to support the stabilisation of the security
situation. We continue to work closely with partners to
promote the building of a sustainable government."
18.6 In his second Explanatory Memorandum of 28 February
2014, the Minister says that the draft Council Decision concerning
an exchange of letters between the EU and CAR on the status of
EUFOR RCA effectively approves the completion of the status of
Forces mandate with CAR authorities, thus enabling the start of
deployment of EUFOR RCA troops. He adds, by way of explanation,
that:
"The relevant EU working group (RELEX) began
negotiations on 28 January on a Council Decision authorising the
opening of negotiations with the CAR on the status of the operation
(SOFA). Following the adoption of a Decision by the Council on 10
February authorising the opening of negotiations, Baroness Ashton
negotiated an Agreement between the European Union and the
Central African Republic on the status of the EUFOR RC, on the
basis of the draft exchange of letters annexed in this Council
Decision. This Decision approves the exchange of letters and authorises
the President of the Council to designate the person empowered
to sign the respective letter in order to bind the Union."
The Government's view
18.7 The Minister comments as follows:
"Politically, the election of Catherine
Samba-Panza as Head of State of the Transition Government on the
20 January was a positive first step along the path to political
stability. Elected as a unifying figure, President Samba-Panza
has been chosen to guide the political process through to national
elections, at which she would not be eligible to run. She is non-partisan
and had a reputation of bringing consensus — this was the
mandate that had seen her elected in a process that was accepted
across the board as fair and transparent.
"On 24 January 2014, President Catherine
Samba-Panza wrote to Baroness Ashton stating that the provisions
of the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA SOFA from 16 April 2008 should serve as
the basis of the new EUFOR RCA SOFA, so as to allow agreement
with the shortest delay, and declared unilaterally that CAR would
grant the privileges and immunities of EUFOR TCHAD SOFA to EUFOR
RCA and its personnel. The draft letter from Baroness Ashton (annexed
to the Council Decision) outlines this proposal in detail and
asks President Samba-Panza to agree the final terms. This letter
will be approved and sent, following the adoption of the Council
Decision.
"The draft letter states that that the provisions
of the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA SOFA from 16 April 2008 will serve as the
basis of the new EUFOR RCA SOFA with three changes: that mentions
of EUFOR will be considered to refer to EUFOR RCA; that means
of transport will be considered as pertaining to the means of
transport owned by the EUFOR RCA force-supplying nations (in addition
to those provided by EUFOR RCA); and that the reference to the
UNSCR 1778 from 2007 will instead be understood as referring to
the UNSCR 2134 from 28 January 2014.
"We recognise that the launch of EU military
operations can be, and have previously been, hampered by the time
taken to complete negotiations with local authorities, particularly
if local authorities have limited capacity or effectiveness to
respond appropriately. However engagement with the transitional
government in CAR has, so far, proceeded smoothly. The French
have good access and a record of engagement with the Transitional
Government which had seen the French security mission signed off
by the CAR authorities in December, only a matter of days after
the initial request. We expect a similarly rapid response with
regards to EUFOR RCA SOFA."
18.8 The Minister concludes by noting that that,
given the fragile situation in the capital, the continued instability
and the dire humanitarian situation, both Council Decisions are
scheduled for adoption at the 17 March Foreign Affairs Council,
in order to allow the Operation to start deploying by the end
of March as a matter of urgency.
Conclusion
18.9 We are grateful to the Minister for his helpful
and comprehensive Explanatory Memoranda. We regard the information
contained therein as a sufficient response at this stage to the
points raised in connection with the first Council Decision.[71]
We nonetheless remain concerned at the inevitable dangers, in
the fragile situation that the Minister highlights — a "rapidly
deteriorating political, security and humanitarian crisis"
— of this Operation not being able to become genuinely operational
from the outset, and then becoming mired therein.
18.10 However, three months from launch, as the
Minister notes there will be an assessment by the Political and
Security Committee (PSC)[72]
of the Operation's progress. We presume that it will be caveated
in such a way that will prevent its being deposited: in which
case, we should be grateful if the Minister would provide us with
an unclassified summary and his views on it, and especially on
the capacity of the mission to fulfil its brief in the allotted
six months (see in particular "Key Tasks" in paragraph
18.5 above).
18.11 In the meantime, we clear these Council
Decisions.
66 See headnote. Back
67
Séléka was an alliance of rebel militia factions
that overthrew the Central African Republic government on March
24, 2013. Nearly all the members of Séléka are Muslim. Back
68
the term used to refer to the Christian militias formed after
the rise to power of the Seléka; Anti-balaka means "anti-machete"
or "anti-sword" in the local Sango and Mandja languages. Back
69
See (35747) - at chapter 16 of this Report. Back
70
Operations Commander. Back
71
See (35747) - at chapter 16 of this Report. Back
72
The committee of ambassador-level officials from national delegations
who, by virtue of article 38 TEU, under the authority of the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and
the Council, monitor the international situation in areas covered
by the CFSP and exercise political control and strategic direction
of crisis management operations, as set out in article 43 TEU.
The chair is nominated by the High Representative. Back
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