12 EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina
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| Draft Council Decision amending Council Decision 2011/173/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
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| Legal base
| Article 29 TEU; unanimity
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| Deposited in Parliament
| 5 March 2014
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| Department
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration
| EM of 6 March 2014
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| Previous Committee Report
| None; but (34725) —: HC 86-xxxiv (2012-13), chapter 12 (6 March 2013) and (33742) —: HC 428 liv (2010-12), chapter 14 (14 March 2012); also see (32579) —: HC 428-xx (2010-11), chapter 8 (16 March 2011); and (31859) —: HC 428-i (2010-11), chapter 66 (8 September 2010) and (30489) —: HC 19-xiv (2008-09), chapter 11 (22 April 2009); also see (32951)—: HC 428-xxxii (2010-12), chapter 17 (6 July 2011)
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| Discussion in Council
| Before 22 March 2014
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| Committee's assessment
| Politically important
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| Committee's decision
| Cleared; further information requested
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Background
12.1 The internationally brokered Dayton
Peace Agreement ended the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH).[37] It established
BiH as a state comprising two Entities, each with a high degree
of autonomy: the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation (FBiH).
12.2 The Agreement also designated the
Office of the High Representative (OHR) as the chief civilian
peace implementation agency in BiH, to oversee the implementation
of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement on behalf of the
international community. He or she is also tasked with co-ordinating
the activities of the civilian organisations and agencies operating
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[38]
12.3 The Peace Implementation Council
(PIC SB) — 55 countries and international organisations
that sponsor and direct the peace implementation process —
oversees all this. On a day-to-day basis, a Board of Principals,
chaired by the HR, serves as the main coordinating body. Its permanent
members are OHR, EUFOR, NATO HQ Sarajevo, OSCE, UNHCR, EUPM (EU
police mission) and the Commission. International financial institutions
such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UNDP are also regular
participants. At the outset the HR (or ICR = International Civilian
Representative) was "double-hatted" as EU Special Representative
(EUSR).
12.4 In 2011, these arrangements were
changed. The EUSR also became head of the EU delegation; Peter
Sorensen, previously EUSR and EU Head of Delegation in Macedonia,
was appointed to this role. Valentian Inzko (previously also
EUSR) remained as ICR.
12.5 The longstanding goal has always
been for BiH to work its way towards European accession. But
things have not gone according to plan. The BiH authorities need
to: deliver five objectives (well established, approved by the
PIC SB and all previously recognized by BiH authorities as obligations)
revolving around creating a sustainable, multi-ethnic, democratic,
law-based State; and fulfil two conditions — signing a Stabilisation
and Association Agreement (part of the normal accession process,
achieved in 2008) and a positive PIC SB assessment based on full
compliance with the Dayton Agreement. The PIC SB has regularly
reviewed progress on this 5+2 agenda at its meetings since February
2008:
"While progress has been made in
some areas, chronic disagreement among the main political parties
has produced gridlock that has prevented the full implementation
of the agenda."[39]
12.6 As our 2012 Report explains in
detail,[40] against this
background, the incentives provided by the EU accession process
(pre-accession funding, the SAA) was reinforced by the possibility
of imposing restrictive measures, such as travel restrictions
and asset or funding freezes, against local political troublemakers.
The draft Council Decision
12.7 This draft Council Decision renews
these "contingency" restrictive measures for a further
12 months, until 22 March 2015; and thus continues to provide
for the extension of restrictive measures against:
"persons whose activities undermine
the sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order and
international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, seriously
threaten the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina or undermine
the Dayton/Paris General Framework Agreement for Peace and the
Annexes thereto."
12.8 As hitherto, these measures consist
of a freezing of funds and economic resources of those persons
listed in the annex to the CFSP Decision; and no persons are currently
listed under these measures.
The Government's view
12.9 The Minister for Europe (Mr David
Lidington) continues to advocate "the strongest possible
'EU toolbox' in BiH", and therefore to support restrictive
measures as part of a broader comprehensive EU strategy and as
an important lever alongside other EU instruments and the monitoring
and support provided by EUFOR Operation Althea. He argues that
recent protests across BiH, some of which turned violent, demonstrate
that the BiH public is dissatisfied with the inaction of BiH's
political leaders to implement the reforms necessary to advance
BiH on its Euro-integrationist path; and says restrictive measures
will be an important asset as "part of an EU response to
leaders who might attempt to use the protests to incite further
unrest and ethnic tensions, rather than address the demands of
the population for reform." Against this background, he
sees the ability to impose restrictive measures as important in
ensuring that "BiH is faced with the right balance between
incentives and deterrents". Although the EU does not currently
deploy them, the Minister says:
"widespread knowledge of the
existence of restrictive measures can be seen to be important
in encouraging Bosnian leaders to stimulate reforms and make progress
towards EU and NATO integration, whilst serving as a deterrent
to those who may wish to undermine BiH stability and territorial
integrity."
12.10 Most immediately, the Minister
notes that General Elections are scheduled for October, and comments
thus:
"Campaigning before previous
elections has featured a rise in secessionist rhetoric from some
politicians, who seek to shore up their voting base through undermining
the credibility of BiH. It will be important for the EU to maintain
an effective deterrent against this as the elections draw near."
Conclusion
12.11 A year ago, we noted that,
after the second meeting
of the High-level Dialogue on the Accession Process (HLDAP) with
BiH in Sarajevo on 27 November 2012, attended by the leaders
of the main BiH political parties and himself, the Commissioner
for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan
Füle, noted that many political,
economic and social reforms would be needed in the next years
in the framework of European integration, and that the BiH
representatives had not been
able to honour the main commitments they had taken on themselves
at the first dialogue meeting in June in Brussels. The picture
that emerges from the third round, on 10 October 2013, is, if
anything even more dispiriting.
12.12 Commitments undertaken by the
political leaders and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
the June 2012 Roadmap, and most recently in the declaration signed
on 1 October 2013, have still not been met. The SAA process was
endangered; so, too, the provision of present and future IPA funding.[41]
The Sejdic-Finci case continues to cast a shadow over the whole
process.[42]
12.13 Given the centrality of the
western Balkans in the EU's enlargement strategy, we again draw
the renewal of these "contingency" measures to the attention
of the House.
12.14 We also now clear the document.
12.15 The Minister notes that EU
partners have agreed that the continued role of sanctions measures
within the EU's wider BiH strategy should be assessed before next
year's rollover. We therefore ask the Minister to inform the
Committee of the outcome of the review and his views thereon,
prior to submitting any further Council Decision — especially
if the outcome is a recommendation not to renew these contingency
measures.
37 See http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380
for full information on the GFAP. Back
38
See http://www.ohr.int/ for full information about the OHR. Back
39
See http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=46773
for full details. Back
40
(33742) -: HC 428 liv (2010-12), chapter 14 (14 March 2012). Back
41
See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-874_en.htm for
full details. Back
42
Dervo Sejdiæ and Jakob Finci,are citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, as well as prominent public figures. But Sejdiæ
is of Roma origin and Finci is Jewish and according to the Bosnian
Constitution only "constituent peoples" (Bosniacs, Croats
and Serbs) and not "others" can be elected in the House
of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly and the Presidency.
Following the launch of legal procedures on the matter, the European
Court of Human Rights issued a ruling in the Sejdiæ-Finci
case urging Bosnia and Herzegovina to review its electoral legislation
in order to ensure the respect of equal rights for all citizens.
On 2 December 2013, Commissioner Füle said in a statement:
"After around 16 hours of talks with the leaders of seven
main political parties from Bosnia and Herzegovina, I can announce
some positive progress. Here in Prague, we continued our consultations
on the implementation of the Sejdiæ-Finci ruling: in particular
the election of the Delegates of the House of Peoples and the
members of the Presidency. I am glad that the leaders were able
to tentatively agree on the composition and method of the selection
of Delegates for the House of Peoples. We have also achieved some
important progress on the main principles for the election of
the members of the Presidency. Now, it is necessary that the political
leaders remain committed and continue their efforts to find the
solution on the last remaining element for the election of the
Members of the Presidency." See http://www.neurope.eu/article/sejdi%C4%87-finci-ruling-bosnia-and-herzegovina-representatives-agree-electoral-changes
for full information. Back
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