4 Interpretation of the Charter and
Protocol 30the views of expert witnesses |
74. We set out below a comparative summary of the
written and oral evidence given to the Committee by David Anderson
QC, Professor Paul Craig, Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott and
Martin Howe QC and of written evidence submitted by Andrew Duff
MEP, Dr Tobias Lock and Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (on behalf
of Policy Exchange).
Status, scope and legal effects
of the Charter
75. Professor Craig said that the Charter was self-consciously
drafted to be declaratory of existing rights, rather than constitutive
of new rights. Martin
Howe added that while many Articles of the Charter were based
on pre-existing legal provisions (such as the ECHR or EU secondary
legislation, for example, the Data Protection Directive), not
all were. This was
clear from the Preamble and underscored by the Explanations which
had set out the provenance of each right.
76. Dr Pinto-Duschinsky considered that the argument
that the Charter did no more than set out pre-existing rights
was one of several questionable arguments which was used to disguise
the Charter's impact on national sovereignty.
He said that the Charter had achieved more than symbolic significance
and, being broadly-worded, it would lead to an expansion of the
jurisprudence of the ECJ. This case law was more destructive of
national sovereignty than that of the ECtHR.
77. Professor Craig acknowledged that Article 51(2)
did not prevent the development of new rights on the basis of
existing competences (despite precluding the Charter as a legal
base for new rights),
but Dr Pinto-Duschinsky went further. He said that the argument
that Charter rights applied only to matters within the existing
competence of the EU (for example, the single market) was another
questionable way of concealing the Charter's effect on national
sovereignty. He thought the Charter would encourage a broadening
of the scope of ECJ decisions in the same way that the Interstate
Commerce Clause was used in the battle for civil rights in the
78. David Anderson and Professor Craig considered
that the Charter and its rights could act as interpretative devices
(with Martin Howe submitting that this was the Charter's sole
function prior to the Lisbon Treaty).
This occurred when, Professor Craig explained, the ECJ interpreted
EU action or Member State action that fell within the scope of
EU law, so ensuring that legislative provisions were read in a
way compatible with those rights.
79. The Charter, as held in RFU v Consolidated
(the Viagogo case) was, said David Anderson, directly effective
in national law,
though, as Professor Douglas-Scott commented, the Charter did
not state who might benefit from the Charter's rights (whilst
being clear on whom obligations were imposed). It dealt with this
on a case by case basis in each Article and the Explanations.
80. Given the visibility which the Charter lent to
these pre-existing rights, they were given greater force said
Professor Craig and,
submitted Martin Howe, were more readily deployable.
David Anderson acknowledged that some of the more obscure rights
had been given greater prominence by dint of their inclusion in
the Charter. He submitted,
together with Martin Howe, Andrew Duff MEP and Dr Lock that the
Charter also acted to invalidate or disapply EU and national rules
within the scope of EU law which were inconsistent with the Charter.
81. This effect on EU secondary legislation was illustrated
by Martin Howe with reference to the Test Achats
case. He explained how the derogation to the Directive on equal
treatment of men and women in the supply of services (which allowed
differentiation between the sexes where gender was a determinative
risk assessment factor) was invalidated for being incompatible
with Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter. This was, he said, a violation
of the sovereignty of Member States which had unanimously agreed
to the derogation; an extension of the scope of EU law; an unwarranted
transfer of power from the democratically-elected to the judiciary;
and a warning that opt-outs and derogations from EU law which
had been politically agreed could be undone by the ECJ.
Professors Douglas-Scott and Craig, and David Anderson, disagreed
with Martin Howe's interpretation of Tests Achats.
82. Martin Howe thought that the Charter had led
to a significant expansion of the scope of matters subject to
EU law and a corresponding reduction in Member State autonomy.
Both Martin Howe and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky believed that the
Charter had also led, as Martin Howe put it, to the "judicialisation"
of matters which should be reserved to national legislators.
Legislators, Dr Pinto Duschinsky said, were accountable to the
people and Parliament of the UK, unlike the ECJ when, as an international
court, it adjudicated on Charter rights. He added that with most
bills of rights there was a transfer of powers from legislatures
to judges, but this loss of democratic accountability could be
justified if the process had been sanctioned by a super-majority
of legislators following public debate and a system of legislative
checks and balances. This was not the case with the transfer of
powers to the supranational ECJ and arguably Parliament had only
ever agreed (at the time of the European Communities Act 1972)
to give such powers to the ECJ in single market matters.
Also, the content of Charter rights could be extremely vague,
according to both of these experts.
Martin Howe considered that such vaguely-drafted rights could
lead to a substantial expansion of discretionary and political
decision-making by the judiciary
and, in the view of both experts, increased legal uncertainty.
This uncertainty, Dr Pinto-Duschinsky said, was also due to Charter
rights being more extensive than ECHR rights, particularly in
the inclusion of social and economic rights and the unclear difference
between rights and principles. He also said that the Charter had
led to increased complexity of the European human rights regime,
with three separate competing constitutional courts for the UK:
the UK Supreme Court, the ECtHR in Strasbourg and the ECJ in Luxembourg.
Effect of Protocol 30application
of the Charter in the UK
83. All the experts agreed that Protocol 30 was not
an opt-out, with several considering that it was better described
as a clarification of the Charter. This was clear from the preamble
of the Protocol, said Professor Craig, and it was also clear that
Article 1(1) of the Protocol was merely declaratory of Article
51(2) of the Charter on the scope of its application in only reaffirming
Both he and David Anderson agreed that NS was therefore correctly
decided and Mostyn J was wrong.
Andrew Duff MEP, also referred to NS, specifically to the view
of Advocate General Trstenjak that the Protocol would only apply
restrictively if the Charter added new fundamental rights to the
EU legal order, that it did not limit the ability of the UK courts
to find domestic law incompatible with the Charter (nor did it
extend that ability by virtue of Article 1(1) of the Protocol).
He also said that the Charter Convention intended that all Member
States would respect the Charter
and a restrictive application of the Protocol would hinder uniform
application needed to ensure legal certainty and coherence across
the EU. Both
Andrew Duff MEP and Dr Pinto-Duschinksky pointed to the legal
uncertainty and political confusion caused by the Protocol.
84. David Anderson added that the Protocol had never
been sold as an opt-out by the Government
and Martin Howe said that it was surprising that it could have
been so considered by some.
Dr Pinto-Duschinsky said that the argument that the UK had gained
an "opt out" from the Charter was used by some to mitigate
the loss of national sovereignty.
Andrew Duff MEP commented that any presentation of the Protocol
to the British public as an "opt-out" from the Charter
had been an unhelpful example to others, with Poland and the Czech
Republic also having sought to limit the Charter's application
and Hungary having taken "a cavalier approach to the constitutional
norms of the EU".
85. However, some of the experts qualified their
overall view that the Protocol was not an opt-out. Both David
Anderson and Professor Craig considered that Article 1(2) safeguards
against new justiciable "solidarity" rights under Title
IV (between private
individuals, added Andrew Duff MEP). However, the extent of that
protection would, Professor Craig commented, depend on how the
wording in that Article, namely, "except in so far as Poland
or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in national
law" was interpreted by the ECJ.
However, in oral evidence Professor Craig was clear that
Article 1(2) provided a substantive safeguard:
there are certain rights or provisions within
Title IV, like Article 29, concerning the right to a free placement
service, and Article 31, which, in the absence of Protocol 30
Article 1(2), could or might be interpreted by the court as being
genuine rights. In relation to the UK, however, Article 1(2) of
Protocol 30 would prevent that interpretation from being applicable.
In that respect, my view is that Article 1(2) does add a substantive
impact in particular in relation to those parts of Title IV where
there is no condition of the right being found in a national law
86. Professor Douglas-Scott agreed that Article 1(2)
of the Protocol concerning those particular rights could be a
limited exception, but she added that, even if Article 1(2) had
this effect, it would not stop pre-existing EU fundamental rights
applying as general principles of EU law.
Dr Lock considered that the meaning of Article 1(2) was less
clear than Article 1(1) as there was currently no ECJ authority
on it, but there were three possible views: that it merely confirmed
that Title IV did not contain justiciable rights, only principles;
or that any rights as such could only be invoked if first implemented
at national level; or that it only affirmed that Solidarity rights
existed as general principles (he preferred the second view).
87. Professors Douglas-Scott and Craig both thought
Article 2 could add a further safeguard.
Professor Douglas-Scott said that where Charter provisions refer
to both EU and national law, and there is a conflict between the
two, Article 2 appeared to confirm that national law would have
Craig thought the emphasis on UK or Polish national law could
be relevant where a majority of Member States had recognised the
right or principle in questioneven in such circumstances
Article 2 clarifies that it should not be justiciable in the UK
or Poland. This
is consistent with the explanation provided by Lord Goldsmith
that Article 2 was intended to make clear that where reference
is made to national laws and practices, it is for the UK to identify
what those national laws and practices are.
88. Even if Protocol 30 had constituted an opt-out,
both Dr Lock and Andrew Duff MEP pointed out that rights under
the Charter would still be applicable in the form of general principles
of EU law (by virtue of Article 6(3) TEU).
Article 51 and the Fransson case
89. Both David Anderson and Professor Douglas-Scott
commented on the importance of the interpretation of the phrase
in Article 51(1) of the Charter "only when implementing Union
law". David Anderson said it was "central to the balance
of competences between the Member States and the EU".
Professor Douglas-Scott said that it could be seen as an
intention to limit the scope of the ECJ's right of review; the
previous iteration in the negotiations had been "when acting
within the scope of European Union law".
However, the Explanations stated that the requirement to
respect fundamental rights "defined in the context of the
Union", including the Charter, "is binding on the Member
States when they act in the scope of Union law".
90. There was some difference of views about the
interpretation by the ECJ in Fransson of whether "when
implementing EU law" meant "acting within the scope
of EU law". Dr Lock and Martin Howe considered that
this was an expansive interpretation
and Dr Lock considered that the meaning of "implementing
EU law" was still not entirely clear.
Mr Howe commented that Viagogo showed that even where the
proceedings in question had "nothing to do with the EU or
EU law", the Charter would apply if legislation of an EU
origin was involved. He added that Fransson represented
"a naked grab of territory by the ECJ" because in its
wake even "a peripheral or tangential element of EU law",
such as the harmonisation of some elements of national tax law
by VAT Directives in that case, could result in the Charter's
Craig and Dr Lock referred to the role that the German Constitutional
Court had played in relation to Fransson. Dr Lock thought
that the potential for that Court to reject the ECJ ruling as
ultra vires could influence future interpretation of the Article
Craig referred to the German Constitutional Court's criticism
of Fransson, which he said was based on an argument advanced
by Advocate-General Cruz Villalón that the relevant Swedish
law had not been enacted to implement the VAT Directive and therefore
fell outside of the scope of Article 51. He added that although
there would inevitably be differences of view as to whether a
Member State was "acting within the scope of EU law",
the determinative issue was not whether a national law had itself
been enacted to implement an EU instrument but whether it was
being used to implement the obligations flowing from the instrument.
In Fransson, he considered that it clearly was and to hold
otherwise would mean that the Charter would not be applicable
if a Member State chose to meet its obligations through existing
legal provisions rather than enacting new, discrete provisions.
He considered that the interaction between the national law and
EU law was not in some way merely incidental in Fransson
as a penalty regime for VAT evasion was clearly central to this
primary EU revenue base.
91. In any case, Professor Craig argued that a broad
reading of the Article 51(1) formulation was supported by the
Explanations and the wide interpretation given to fundamental
rights as EU general principles by the ECJ. He said that it would
be anomalous for the Charter to be interpreted less widely.
Professor Douglas-Scott and Andrew Duff MEP considered that the
Fransson interpretation reflected pre-Charter fundamental
rights case law.
However, the Professor added that it was interesting to note the
basis on which Advocate-General Cruz Villalón's arguments
David Anderson considered that when the Supreme Court in Viagogo
interpreted the Article 51(1) formulation to mean "within
the material scope of EU law"
it took a conventional course and suggested that the UK Government
was not concerned by this approach because it did not intervene
in Fransson to argue for the narrower formulation of "when
implementing EU law". He thought that it remained to be seen
if Fransson could mark the beginning of competence creep
but considered that the language of the judgment indicated that
this would be, at most, of a modest nature. He also pointed to
the many cases where the ECJ had rejected an application for judicial
review on the grounds of Charter infringements.
Professor Douglas-Scott made a similar point:
I think that the courtsboth the European
Court and national courtshave been willing to throw out
Charter-based claims where the Charter is clearly not applicable,
and the Charter will not be applicable where the action does not
fall within the scope of EU law. For example, we have had cases
where applicants have tried to plead road rage claims based on
the Charter, and those have failed; cases where Ryanair have tried
to rely on the Charter and those have failed. It will not be available
in quite a number of cases.
92. Dr Lock said that, in the wake of Fransson,
the Charter was only justiciable in the UK courts where the
UK had acted within the scope of EU law; it could not, however,
be invoked in cases concerning purely domestic situations.
Likewise, it seemed that Scottish courts could only find that
an Act of the Scottish Parliament was ultra vires because
it was incompatible with the Charter where EU law was applicable.
Principles v rights
93. All the witnesses agreed in oral evidence that
the distinction between a "principle" and a "right"
in the Charter was unclear, and as yet without guidance from the
ECJ. David Anderson expressed the point clearly:
I agree that the distinction between "right"
and "principle" was intended to be significant, as one
sees from Article 52(5) and from the explanations, which one must
take into account according to the Treaty. I also agree that the
distinction, as it appears from the Charter and from the explanations,
is entirely confusing, not least because the first of the three
examples given in the explanations of a principle is the so-called
rights of the elderly. That is not a very promising starting point.
As proof of this, we asked the witnesses to say whether
Article 29 of the Charter, which states that "Everyone has
the right to a placement service", was a principle or a right.
David Anderson thought it might be a principle, Professor Craig
a right. We asked
a similar question on Article 33(1) of the Charter, which states
that "The family shall enjoy legal, economical and social
protection". Professor Craig thought it would probably be
regarded as a principle "[b]ut until it is adjudicated upon
by the European Court of Justice, we will not know".
94. All witnesses agreed that Article 52(5) and the
relevant Explanations made clear that a principle could not be
a free-standing right under the Charter; in other words, it needed
to be implemented in EU or national law before it could become
justiciable. However, that was not to say a principle could not
be used by the ECJ as a strong interpretative device. Professor
Craig said as follows:
The only point I would add is that, even in relation
to those Charter rights that are deemed to be principles, one
should not imagine that that precludes all forms of judicial oversight.
The actual idea of a principle being distinct from a right does
not preclude a court taking cognisance of such a principle in
an action for judicial review, either under Article 263 or under
Article 267 of the Treaty, and using that principle as a strong
interpretative device when construing the legality of whatever
issue is before it. Even when the court does come around to delineating
more specifically the Charter rights that are only principles,
one should not conclude that they will be devoid of legal impact.
Martin Howe went further, saying that a principle
could be used as a basis either for interpretation or for striking
down a measure.
Title IV "Solidarity"
95. David Anderson said that the UK's concerns over
the Charter had been most acute in relation to these 12 rights
of a social or economic nature. He considered that there were
some unclear limits on the enforceability of these rights in Article
52(5) of the Charter but that Article 1(2) of the Protocol provided
"strong protection" against the creation of free-standing
rights in Title IV.
Dr Lock agreed, saying that the UK may have successfully opted
out of this Title in so far as it contained rights.
Professor Douglas-Scott thought that although the scope of Article
1(2) was unclear, in the absence of an ECJ ruling on its interpretation
it was arguable that it confirmed the status quo that economic
and social rights were not directly enforceable.
Andrew Duff MEP added that solidarity principles must already
be the subject of national legislation in order to be justiciable.
He considered that the application of solidarity principles would
be unlikely to overturn established principles of British labour
law or pay, social security and employment policy. This was because
they would only become relevant in the context of EU legislation
and there were already specific Treaty limits on EU legislation
on matters of pay, the right of association, the right to strike
and impose lock-outs or in relation to Member States establishing
social welfare systems.
Horizontal application of the
96. The Charter could be applied between individuals,
agreed Professors Craig and Douglas-Scott.
This was to be expected as most systems of bills of rights involved
horizontality, but the issue in EU law could be complex, cautioned
As Professor Douglas-Scott explained, it was possible for the
Charter to be applied horizontally in a number of different ways,
not all of them corresponding to direct enforceability of Charter
Rights. She noted, however, that some Articles were not capable
of horizontal effect because they were addressed to the EU institutions.
Professor Craig explained that it was very unlikely that the ECJ
would interpret the Charter to enable individuals to rely on it
directly against other private parties as such an interpretation
jarred with the language of Article 51 (Advocate General's Trstenjak's
view in NS) and would be opposed by some national courts.
However, he considered that particular Charter rights corresponding
with rights found in the Lisbon Treaty might have horizontal impact
because those Treaty provisions had been interpreted in this way
by the ECJ. He also thought that there was scope for indirect
horizontal application, where Charter rights were used as interpretative
devices when construing private law principles in tort or contract
or statutes affecting private relations. This was because the
Charter obligations were imposed on national institutions including
the courts. David
Anderson agreed that "Member States" in Article 51 of
the Charter included the national courts of Member States.
There was therefore a similarity between the effect of the Charter
on UK courts and section 6 of the HRA, which states that courts
are public authorities and are therefore bound by the requirements
of the HRA. Whilst others were more sanguine, Martin Howe was
particularly critical of the consequences of indirect horizontal
application under section 6 of the HRA:
What has happened is this has been used as an
argument to introduce horizontality, most notably in the context
of the creation of a new, horizontal right to privacy, which Parliament
itself has never decided to create through, among other things,
the argument that, since the court is itself bound by Section
6 of the Human Rights Act, the court must adapt substantive doctrines
of common law that apply as between citizens in order to create,
in effect, new rights. Therefore, the act, in effect, has binding
effects on private citizens, through that gateway, as well as
on public institutions. Certainly, one can see a road for a parallel
chained logic in the application of the EU Charter.
97. When we asked Professor Douglas-Scott about the
AMS case, she commented that:
Those who would prefer not to see a horizontal
effect of the Charter might be quite comforted by the court's
recent judgment, because they did not find a horizontal application
of the Charter in that particular case. They did not find that
the provision in the Charter could be used to super charge, as
it were, a Directive that also covered the relevant law in that
field. They found that the provision of the Charter was not sufficiently
specific to give rise to a directly enforceable right that could
be used in a horizontal situation between two private parties.
In that respect, they did not go as far as the judgment of the
Advocate General in the AMS case, nor did they continue down the
line of some of their previous case law in Mangold and
Kücükdeveci, where they seem to admit some sort
of horizontal effect of general principles of law.
98. She considered that Benkharbouche appeared
to be the first case in which Charter rights had been actionable
in a UK dispute between private parties (ever since the ECJ's
decision in Kücükdeveci, such rights could be
enforced directly against private individuals). She explained
that the UK statute in question was disapplied to the extent that
it was incompatible with the Charter rights relating to aspects
of the employment claims falling within the scope of EU law.
99. Professor Craig added that in the AMS
case the ECJ did not conclude that other Charter provisions could
not have a horizontal impact; the ECJ was "leaving the door
quite wide ajar in relation to Charter rights that they think
are suitable and complete, and therefore susceptible to horizontality."
Parallels with the application
of the ECHR
100. Professor Craig said that Mostyn J had been
wrong to think that the Charter and ECHR had the same scope: the
Charter was drafted to cover broader rights than the ECHR.
Andrew Duff MEP agreed and said that the Charter was a wider binding
instrument than the ECHR at the level of the EU and the Explanations
were very useful for interpreting rights and principles in the
Charter that went beyond the ECHR. He said that the Charter would
remain as part of British domestic law even if the HRA was repealed.
Professor Douglas-Scott added that there was also a risk that
the scope of the Charter might be interpreted more broadly than
101. Andrew Duff MEP thought that given the close
association between the ECHR and the Charter, "it is paradoxical"
that these comparable European instruments had been treated in
very different ways by the then Government (and Parliament).
They had chosen to give direct effect to the ECHR through the
HRA, but had sought to "blunt and obscure" the effect
of the Charter by insisting on Protocol 30.
He also thought that the interpretation of ECHR rights by the
ECJ, as general principles of EU law under Article 6(3) TEU, would
be more consistent than that of the more diverse ECtHR itself;
and any inconsistency as between the two courts would be resolved
by EU accession to the ECHR (which had been required by the UK
in return for agreeing to give the Charter legal status). It was
not in the interests of British citizens to be isolated from the
benefits of that development, in his view.
102. Dr Lock commented that since the Charter could
only be invoked before the UK courts where the UK was "implementing
EU law" and not in purely domestic situations, such a restriction
meant that the Charter could not be viewed as a bill of rights
or easily compared to the HRA regime.
Also, the obligation on every court to disapply UK primary
law which was incompatible with the Charter should be contrasted
with the more limited power of only the higher courts merely
to issue a "declaration of incompatibility" under the
HRA regime: this was recently illustrated in Benkharbouche.
The Charter in the future
103. Professor Douglas-Scott referred to the recommendation
of Advocate-General Sharpston in Zambrano (which the ECJ
did not follow), that to advance "an ideal of consistent
interpretation of fundamental rights", they should apply
in all areas of EU competence, irrespective of whether it had
actually been exercised.
The Advocate General accepted though that this would be a bold
step for the ECJ and that it would introduce an overtly federal
element into the structure of the legal and political system,
as the US's Supreme Court had done between the wars.
104. Martin Howe and Dr Pinto-Duschinsky both suggested
that the problems created by the Charter, in particular, in the
latter's view, the primary and essential question of the "supremacy
of the UK Supreme Court" in matters concerning the Charter,
should be addressed as part of the UK's renegotiation of its EU
Howe considered that the UK could request that the Charter ceased
to apply to the UK with "flanking measures" being required
to prevent its "indirect application" via the EU doctrine
of general principles.
105. Andrew Duff MEP considered that there was a
need for uniformity of international human rights norms, particularly
in the context of the EU and the Charter. The Charter had been
underestimated in Britain but valued in other Member States as
a "key part of the constitutional order of the Union",
of wider application than the ECHR and setting a uniform standard
of rights across the Union for the benefit of EU citizens "which
is the highest in the world".
In the interests of "legal certainty and political solidarity"
the UK should withdraw from Protocol No 30 at the next available
ordinary revision of the EU Treaties.
106. Martin Howe concluded in his written evidence
that it was wrong to assume that the effect of the Charter was
only to inhibit EU organs and that it demonstrably could affect
Member States by expanding the scope of EU law and therefore diminishing
the autonomy of Member States. He went on to say that:
the only effective way of curtailing the use
of the Charter as an instrument for expanding EU competences is
to ensure that the courts of the United Kingdom, and those courts
alone, are responsible for ensuring the compliance of the authorities
with fundamental rights. [...] This outcome might be effectively
achieved by a restructuring of the European Communities Act 1972.
Scope for opting out of the Charter
in the UK
107. We put the following question to the four expert
witnesses who gave evidence to the inquiry:
In your view, would the following provision of
primary legislation suffice to disapply the application of all
EU fundamental rights in the UK, whether derived from general
principles of EU law, legal bases within the EU Treaties, or the
Charter? The following provision of primary legislation would
be as follows:
"Notwithstanding any provision of the European
Communities Act 1972, none of the rights, freedoms or principles
referred to in Article 6(3) of the Treaty on European Union, or
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, or
deriving elsewhere from within the EU Treaties, or otherwise determined
by the Court of Justice, shall form part of the law applicable
in any part of the UK."
- All agreed that this would amount to a direct
conflict with EU law, leading no doubt to infringement proceedings
against the UK, although constitutionally it would be possible
by seeking an express amendment to the European Communities Act
1972. Several questioned why the UK would want to opt out from
the Charter, given that it is primarily aimed at restraining the
power of the EU institutions. Professor Craig mentioned that the
UK would still be bound by Article 6(3) of the TEU, which ensured
that the pre-existing EU fundamental rights expressed as general
principles of EU law would continue to apply in the absence of
the Charter. He,
like others, thought that the UK has no right, unilaterally, to
alter the terms of its membership of the club, unless by withdrawing
from the EU. David
Anderson thought that the proposed provision was "wildly
uncertain in its scope". It appeared to him to apply to all
rights, freedoms or principles deriving from the EU Treaties and
he wondered if it was intended as an opt-out from the entirety
of European law.
59 Professor Paul Craig (CFR0006) para 4(3) Back
Martin Howe QC (CFR0008) para 2 Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0006) para 4(3) Back
Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (CFR0005) para 5 Back
Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (CFR0005) para 6 Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0006) para 4(5) Back
Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (CFR0005) para 7 Back
David Anderson QC (CFR0003) para 1, Professor Paul Craig (CFR0006)
para 4(6) Back
Martin Howe QC (CFR0008) para 3, page 3 Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0006) para 4(6) Back
 UKSC 55;  WLR (D) 342 Back
David Anderson QC (CFR0003) page 2, para 3 Back
Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott (CFR0002) para B4 Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0006) para 4(4) Back
Martin Howe QC (CFR0008) page 2, para 2 Back
David Anderson QC (CFR0003) para 20 Back
David Anderson QC (CFR0003) para 1, Martin Howe QC (CFR0008)
para 2, Andrew Duff MEP (CFR0007) para 3, Dr Tobias Lock (CFR0001)
para 24 Back
Martin Howe QC (CFR0008) pages 2-4, para 3 Back
Q35 [Douglas-Scott, Craig, Anderson] Back
Martin Howe QC (CFR0008) para 1 Back
Martin Howe QC (CFR0008) para 1, Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky
(CFR0005) paras 1, 14 Back
Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (CFR0005) paras 1, 14 Back
Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (CFR0005) para 3, Martin Howe QC
(CFR0008) para 2 Back
Martin Howe QC (CFR0008) para 2 Back
Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (CFR0005) paras 3-4, Martin Howe QC
(CFR0008) para 2 Back
Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (CFR0005) paras 3-4 Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0004) para 15-16 Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0004) para 22, David Anderson QC (CFR0003)
para 9 Back
Andrew Duff MEP (CFR0007) paras 26-27 Back
Andrew Duff MEP (CFR0007) para 9 Back
Lord Goldsmith made a similar point: see the BIICL Speech, page
Andrew Duff MEP (CFR0007) para 30, Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky
(CFR0005) para 4 Back
David Anderson QC (CFR0003) page 1, para 4 Back
Martin Howe QC (CFR0008) page 5, para 5 Back
Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (CFR0005) para 5 Back
Andrew Duff MEP (CFR0007) para 12 Back
David Anderson QC (CFR0003) para 18, Professor Paul Craig (CFR0006)
para 2(3) Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0004) para 14 Back
Q42 [Craig] Back
Q42 [Douglas-Scott] Back
Dr Tobias Lock (CFR0001) paras 10-13 and summary Back
Q45 [Craig; Douglas-Scott] Back
Q45 [Douglas-Scott] Back
Q45 [Craig] Back
Lord Goldsmith QC (CFR0009) para 32 Back
Dr Tobias Lock (CFR0001) para 8, Andrew Duff MEP (CFR0007) para
See our analysis of Fransson in chapter 6, paras 126-132,
and our conclusions. Back
David Anderson QC (CFR0003) para 11 Back
Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott (CFR0002) para B2 Back
2007/C 303/02 Back
Martin Howe QC (CFR0008) page 4, para 4, Dr Tobias Lock (CFR0001)
para 20 Back
Dr Tobias Lock (CFR0001) paras 15-22 Back
Martin Howe QC (CFR0008) para 4 Back
Dr Tobias Lock (CFR0001) para 22 Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0006) para 1(1)-(6) Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0004) para 1(3) Back
Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott (CFR0002) para B2 and Andrew
Duff MEP (CFR0007) para 5 Back
Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott (CFR0002) para B2.1 Back
David Anderson QC (CFR0003) para 12 Back
David Anderson QC (CFR0003) para 15 Back
Dr Tobias Lock (CFR0001) paras 14, 19 and summary Back
David Anderson QC (CFR0003) paras 16-17 Back
Dr Tobias Lock (CFR0001) summary Back
Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott (CFR0002) paras A3.1-3.4 Back
Andrew Duff MEP (CFR0007) paras 20, 28 Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0004) para 12, (CFR0006) para 3(4), Professor
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott (CFR0002) paras C2-6 Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0006) para 3(2) Back
Q40 [Douglas-Scott] and Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott (CFR0002)
paras C1 and C6 Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0006) paras 3(1)-(4) Back
Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott (CFR0002) para C5 Back
Professor Paul Craig (CFR0004) para 25 Back
Andrew Duff MEP(CFR0007) para 4 Back
Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott (CFR0002) para A 3.4 and conclusion Back
Andrew Duff MEP(CFR0007) para 17 Back
Andrew Duff MEP (CFR0007) paras 14, 15, 16 Back
Dr Tobias Lock (CFR0001) para 16 Back
Dr Tobias Lock (CFR0001) paras 23-25 Back
Professor Sionaidh Douglas-Scott (CFR0002) para B 3.2 Back
Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (CFR0005) para 13 Back
Martin Howe QC (CFR0008) para 6 Back
Andrew Duff MEP (CFR0007) para 8 Back
Andrew Duff MEP (CFR0007) para 32 Back
Martin Howe QC (CFR0008) para 6(2) Back
Q51 [Craig] Back
Q52 [Craig] Back
Q54 [Anderson] Back