2 Countries of concern
5. The FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report
follows a similar pattern to that of recent years: commentary
on thematic issues, followed by portraits of human rights conditions
in certain countries where standards of human rights are of particular
concern to the FCO ('countries of concern'), together with an
account of the FCO's human rights work in those countries. In
this latest Report, the number of 'countries of concern' has decreased
by one, from 28 to 27 (listed below in Table 1): Chad has been
omitted.
Table 1: 'Countries of concern'
Afghanistan
Belarus
Burma
China
Colombia
Cuba
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
Eritrea
Fiji
Iran
Iraq
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
Libya
Pakistan
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
South Sudan
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Syria
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Yemen
Zimbabwe
|
Source: FCO Human Rights and Democracy Report
2012
Criteria for countries of concern
6. In the past, the FCO has given an indication
in only the most general terms of the criteria used to decide
which countries were to be designated as 'countries of concern'.
In its response to our Eighth Report of Session 2011-12, on the
FCO's human rights work in 2011, it said that the selection was
based on "a range of internal and external human rights reporting,
and after consultation with the FCO's ambassadors and high commissioners";
and it argued that it was "difficult to set out the criteria
for selection in much greater detail
because of the sensitive
nature of much of the material used in the assessment process".[2]
7. Whereas the denial of rights in certain countries
is manifest and so severe that there is widespread agreement that
the FCO is right to designate them as 'countries of concern',
there are a number of countries where the FCO has shown a reluctance
to take this step despite calls for it to do so. Human Rights
Watch identified Ethiopia, Rwanda, Bahrain and Egypt as four countries
which were not on the list but which it believed should be, and
it explained why in its written memorandum to us.[3]
These four countries have each been included by the FCO in the
2012 Report as "case studies": countries which the FCO
judges to be "on a trajectory of change with regard to human
rights". Most such case studies relate to countries where
the FCO views the trajectory as being "negative".[4]
For instance, the text of the case study on The Gambia, which
announced on 3 October that it would leave the Commonwealth, is
pessimistic: it refers to the resumption of executions in the
country, the President's zero tolerance of homosexuality, harassment
of the media and unlawful detentions, and it concludes that the
country consistently disregards its international human rights
obligations and that there is little sign of improvement.[5]
8. We expressed concern last year that the process
of identifying "countries of concern" becomes devalued
if political and strategic factors are allowed to colour decisions,
as we believed had happened in relation to Bahrain (which had,
as in this year's report, been treated as a 'case study' rather
than a 'country of concern'). We recommended that the criteria
for designating countries of concern "should be based purely
upon assessments of human rights standards and should stand up
to objective comparison", adding that "external factors,
such as strategic considerations or the UK's ability to influence
developments, should not be allowed to colour those decisions".[6]
9. Despite its warnings in previous years about
the difficulty of setting out criteria in detail, the FCO has
in fact done just that in the 2012 Human Rights and Democracy
Report, on page 120. It says that it drew on feedback from the
Committee and from the Secretary of State's Advisory Group[7]
in doing so. The new criteria are:
· The gravity of the human rights situation
in the country, including both the severity of particular abuses
and the range of human rights affected
· Whether a deterioration or improvement
in the human rights situation in the country would have a wider
impact in the region
· Whether the human rights situation
in the country has an impact on wider UK interests; and
· How active the UK is in the country
and our level of engagement there.
Assessments are carried out based on the first
criterion and refined further using the other three.
10. We asked the Rt Hon. Baroness Warsi, as Senior
Minister of State at the FCO and the minister with responsibility
for FCO policy on human rights, why the level of UK engagement
in a country should play a part in any assessment of human rights
standards there. She replied that
Our human rights work is not just about the
things that we are concerned about; it is also about the things
about which we can do something. Human rights in individual countries
is also about that individual country's journey in how they view
human rights and what they intend to do about it and how they
even recognise whether certain things are classified as human
rights.[8]
11. We agree that the FCO's human rights effort
and expenditure should be at least partly linked to its capacity
to bring about change; but we do not accept the logic of a situation
in which abuses might be equally severe in two countries, yet
one is designated as a country of concern because the UK is active
there, whereas the other is not, because the level of engagement
by the UK and its ability to bring about change are low. Nor do
we accept that the impact on wider UK interests is material to
such decisions. We welcome the FCO's decision to define more
clearly the criteria for designating 'countries of concern', although
we question why the extent of the UK's engagement in a particular
country or the impact of the human rights situation there on wider
UK interests should be regarded as factors in evaluating human
rights standards. We recommend that these criteria no longer apply.
12. There was not time within our inquiry to assess
the FCO's human rights policy in all 27 'countries of concern',
although the Department is to be commended for its authoritative
analysis of conditions in each one. The remainder of this chapter
is devoted to the UK's approach to improving human rights in just
three countries of concernSri Lanka, Burma and Russiawhere
concerns about human rights standards have been central to recent
major UK policy decisions.
Sri Lanka
13. The Government is clear that it has serious
reservations about the state of human rights in Sri Lanka. In
the 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, the FCO lists as its
concerns:
· Restrictions on freedom of expression
and opinion
· Attacks on, and intimidation of, journalists,
legal professionals, human rights defenders and others
· Lack of progress on post-conflict reconciliation
and the absence of an independent, thorough and credible investigation
into allegations of violations of international humanitarian and
human rights law by both sides during the military conflict
· Sri Lanka's decision to reject a large
number of recommendations at the UN Human Rights Council during
its Universal Periodic Review in November 2012.[9]
A number of these concerns were echoed in written
submissions to our inquiry from Redress[10]
and Amnesty International.[11]
THE 2013 CHOGM IN COLOMBO
14. The Government has come under pressure to
show its disapproval of the more repressive actions of the Sri
Lankan government by declining to attend the Commonwealth Heads
of Government Meeting to be held in Colombo in November 2013.
The Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, announced in September
2011 that he would not attend the Colombo CHOGM unless he saw
evidence of progress in human rights conditions in Sri Lanka.[12]
We recommended in our report on the Role and Future of the Commonwealth,
published in November 2012, that the Prime Minister "should
publicly state his unwillingness to attend [CHOGM] unless he receives
convincing and independently-verified evidence of substantial
and sustainable improvements in human and political rights in
Sri Lanka".[13]
15. There is scant evidence of progress in political
and human rights in Sri Lanka. Amnesty International told us in
May that "we continue to witness a deterioration of human
rights in Sri Lanka, including attacks on the judiciary and broader
civil society".[14]
On 31 August, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi
Pillay, issued a statement following a seven-day mission to Sri
Lanka, listing serious concerns about the treatment of human rights
defenders and the curtailment or denial of personal freedoms,
all of which suggested that the country was "heading in an
increasingly authoritarian direction". She also reported
that Sri Lankans who had spoken to her during the visit had been
harassed and intimidated by security forces.[15]
The FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report (published in
April 2013) spoke of "a number of negative developments"
in the country, where the human rights situation was already "of
serious concern".[16]
Nonetheless, the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Committee Chair
on 3 May to say that he and the Prime Minister would attend the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Colombo in November.
He said that "we will do so because of the importance of
the Commonwealth to the United Kingdom and to other members"
and he stressed that the UK would use the occasion "to highlight
the need for effective commitment to the shared values and human
rights for which the Commonwealth stands".[17]
16. We asked witnesses from Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch for their views on the Government's decision
to attend. Kate Allen, Director of Amnesty International (UK),
said that "we very much regret that decision",[18]
and David Mepham, UK Director of Human Rights Watch, regretted
that the Government had decided to attend at prime ministerial
level.[19] However,
neither argued specifically in favour of a boycott: given that
the decision had been taken to hold the CHOGM in Colombo, Ms Allen
argued that "we need to be using all mechanisms between now
and that meeting to put pressure on the Sri Lankan Government
in terms of its human rights record", and she recommended
that the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister should meet
representatives of NGOs and civil society in Sri Lanka and travel
to the north of the country.[20]
Mr Mepham expressed similar views.[21]
We note that the Prime Minister remains committed to attending
the CHOGM. However, we recommend that the Prime Minister should
obtain assurances from the Sri Lankan Government that people who
approach him to talk about human rights while he is in Sri Lanka
to attend the CHOGM do not face reprisals or harassment by security
forces.
17. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the Government's
decision, we do not believe that continuing discussion on whether
or not the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary should attend
the 2013 CHOGM in Colombo would necessarily be productive. Nor
do we believe that the question of the venue should be reopened
at this late stage: as the Foreign Secretary said in his letter
of 3 May to the Committee Chair, "there has been no widespread
support for a change in location of CHOGM, and there is concern
that the Commonwealth itself
should not be damaged, weakened
or undermined by divisions over the location of the Heads of Government
meeting".[22]
18. What concerns us now is how the Government
has come to find itself in this position, and whether the FCO
played its hand poorly, both in the discussions which led to the
decision that Sri Lanka would be the hosts in 2013 and subsequently.
We therefore wrote to the Foreign Secretary in May 2013, asking
specific questions about those discussions and the FCO's policy
at the time. He replied on 30 May, observing that:
· The Commonwealth Secretariat was responsible
for identifying the venue for each CHOGM, and it was for Commonwealth
Heads of Government to agree to either support or oppose the proposals;
· The UK had made it clear to the Commonwealth
Secretary-General both prior to and during the 2009 CHOGM in Port
of Spain that the UK would be unable to support Sri Lanka's bid
to host the 2011 CHOGM; and
· The decision to hold CHOGM in Sri Lanka
in 2013 had been taken at the Port of Spain CHOGM in 2009, as
part of a package which allocated the 2011 CHOGM to Australia
and the 2015 CHOGM to Mauritius. It was not conditional on specified
improvements in the standards of human rights in Sri Lanka.[23]
From this letter, it became evident that the FCO
had objected to Sri Lanka's offer to host the 2011 CHOGM, which
was subsequently offered to Australia, but not its offer to host
the 2013 CHOGM.
19. The Foreign Secretary also stated, in his
letter of 30 May, that "the Commonwealth is a consensus-based
organisation". We therefore asked Baroness Warsi, as Senior
Minister of State at the FCO, why the UK had not objected in 2009
to the decision that Sri Lanka would host the 2013 CHOGM. She
replied that "my understanding is that we did raise those
concerns, but the appetite at the Commonwealth meeting was not
such that it would prevent Sri Lanka from holding the Heads of
Government meeting". When we pointed out that decisions in
Commonwealth meetings were taken by consensus, she replied that
"yes they are, but not unanimously". Pressed further,
she explained that "you can have consensus without everyone
around the table having completely agreed to the situation".[24]
20. On the information available to us, the policy
followed by the FCO during discussions at the 2009 Commonwealth
Heads of Government meeting in Port of Spain on venues for future
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings seems to have been inconsistent.
The FCO objected to a proposal that Sri Lanka might host the 2011
CHOGM on human rights grounds but did not obstruct a proposal
that it might do so in 2013; nor did it insist that Sri Lanka's
right to host in 2013 should be conditional on improvements in
human rights. That approach now appears timid. The UK could and
should have taken a more principled stand in 2009, and should
have taken a more robust stand after the 2011 CHOGM in the light
of the continuing serious human rights abuses in Sri Lanka.
ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE OF SRI LANKANS
REMOVED FROM THE UK
21. Our report last year on the FCO's human rights
work considered allegations of torture within Sri Lanka, specifically
of Sri Lankan Tamils who had been returned from the UK following
an unsuccessful application for asylum. Under Article 3 of the
UN Convention Against Torture, signed by the UK in 1985, no state
party "shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite
a person to another state where there are substantial grounds
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture". If this had indeed been the case in relation to
people returned by the UK to Sri Lanka, there would be grounds
for arguing that the UK had acted in breach of its obligations
under the UN Convention Against Torture.[25]
22. Last year the Government acknowledged to us
that maltreatment and torture happen in Sri Lanka,[26]
and this year's Human Rights and Democracy Report notes that reports
of torture in the country continue.[27]
The Government has until recently maintained that it had no substantiated
evidence that people returned by the UK immigration authorities
to Sri Lanka had been maltreated.[28]
In a recent Country Policy Bulletin on Sri Lanka, the UK Border
Agency analysed allegations by a number of non-government organisations
of specific instances of torture, and it dismissed them for a
variety of reasons, concluding that no change in policy was warranted.
It reiterated that each case was considered on its merits and
that it did not believe that Tamils in general were at risk on
return to Sri Lanka.[29]
This view has been supported in a recent determination by the
Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber).[30]
We note from a response by the UK Border Agency in February 2013
to a Freedom of Information request by Freedom from Torture[31]
that 15 Sri Lankan nationals were granted refugee status in the
UK between May 2009 and September 2012 having been removed from
the UK on a previous occasion.[32]
While this indicates clearly that the Sri Lankans concerned were
deemed to be at risk if returned a second time to Sri Lanka, it
does not prove conclusively that they would have been at risk
when first returned (possibly several years previously), or that
they had suffered torture in the intervening period.
23. Unlike the 2011 Human Rights and Democracy
report, the 2012 Report does not mention allegations of torture
of migrants returned to Sri Lanka from the UK, and it does not
re-iterate the Government's view that there is no substantiated
evidence of torture of such people. David Mepham, UK Director
of Human Rights Watch, told us that he believed that this was
significant and that it showed that the Government "cannot
stand by" its view and had now recognised that the evidence
put forward by Human Rights watch and others was "credible".[33]
When we asked Baroness Warsi whether it was still the Government's
position that there were no substantiated allegations, she declined
to give a direct answer.[34]
We find it unsatisfactory that the Government should now be silent
on a matter of such significance. We recommend that the FCO,
in its response to this report, state whether it still holds the
view that there is no substantiated evidence of torture or maltreatment
of people who have been returned by UK immigration authorities
to Sri Lanka.
Assessment of risk
24. Scrutiny of individual asylum decisions by
the UK Border Agency, and of asylum policy, is not a matter for
this Committee. Our locus is the role of the FCO which, alongside
non-governmental organisations, the UN High Commission for Refugees
and news media, provides the Country of Origin Information Service
(part of the UK Border Agency until the UKBA's absorption into
the Home Office earlier this year) with information on potential
risk to people returned from the UK. That information is collated
and used to guide case officers considering asylum claims. The
FCO told us last year that it was "rigorous in its evaluation
of sources when offering advice on the human rights risks to the
UK Border Agency".[35]
25. During the course of our inquiry, the Upper
Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber) issued a long-awaited
determination on three appeals by Sri Lankans, one against refusal
of leave to enter the UK and two against decisions to remove to
Sri Lanka.[36]
The Tribunal found in favour of two out of the three appeals,
and it also concluded that there had been a significant change
in the Sri Lankan Government's approach, which now possessed "sophisticated,
extensive intelligence as to those who are seeking to destabilise
the unitary state, within the diaspora and in Sri Lanka itself".
The Tribunal found that this had implications for risk to those
returned from the UK, and it drew up new guidance on "at
risk" categories for return to Sri Lanka. The determination
itself replaces all previous Sri Lanka country case law in the
UK, and the Home Office has now published a revised Operational
Guidance Note, in line with the Tribunal's determination.[37]
26. It is a matter of concern to us that the
UK Border Agency's assessment of risk to Sri Lankans on being
returned from the UK to Sri Lanka, which will have been partly
based upon information provided by FCO staff in Sri Lanka, was
found by the courts to be flawed and in need of revision. The
FCO should examine whether it could have enabled the UK Border
Agency itself, rather than the courts, to have reached the conclusion
that a change to the guidance on risk was required. We also observe
that the FCO's Strategy on the Prevention of Torture makes no
mention of the UK's obligations under Article 3 of the UN Convention
Against Torture and how the FCO should play its part in ensuring
that these are met. We recommend that the FCO amend its Torture
Prevention Strategy accordingly.
Burma
27. Since we last reported on the FCO's human
rights work, EU Foreign Ministers have agreed to lift the economic
sanctions which had been imposed on Burma for many years, while
retaining in place the arms embargo. The EU Foreign Affairs Council
cited in support of its decision "the remarkable process
of reform in Burma", and it welcomed "the developments
towards democracy, a strong parliament, freedom of expression,
and the government's efforts against corruption, as well as the
efforts towards the release of remaining political prisoners".[38]
EU Foreign Ministers have since drawn up a Comprehensive Framework
document setting out the EU's policy on encouraging and supporting
reform in Burma over the next three years.[39]
28. The lifting of economic sanctions has not
commanded universal support. David Mepham, writing in The Guardian
on 23 April, argued that the UK and others had been "too
eager to laud the reforming achievements of the Burmese president
and too quick to surrender their leverage";[40]
and in evidence to us, he suggested that the move had been "premature"
and that it would have been better to wait for more progress in
certain areas, such as the release of political prisoners.[41]
We consider whether or not the decision to lift economic sanctions
was correct in paragraphs 35 and 36; but there is little dispute
that progress towards free elections and freedom of speech in
Burma has been truly remarkable.
Political prisoners
29. Many political prisoners have already been
released. One estimate, by the Assistance Association for Political
Prisoners Burma,[42]
suggests that 859 political prisoners have been released over
the last two years under nine separate amnesties and that around
160 remain in detention.[43]
President Thein Sein announced on 7 February 2013 that a committee
would be set up to review the cases of those political prisoners
still in detention.[44]
Baroness Warsi told us that the committee had held its first meeting
on 23 February, and she was encouraged to see that there was "a
strong range of independent voices" represented on it.[45]
During his visit to the UK in mid-July this year, President Thein
Sein announced that all detainees found to be political prisoners
would be released by the end of this year.[46]
This is a welcome statement, although much will depend on the
Burmese government's interpretation of the term "political
prisoner" and whether the releases will be unconditional.
The mandate of the review committee is not entirely clear, and
we note the statement by Tomas Quintana, the UN Special Rapporteur
on the human rights situation in Myanmar, that the committee "is
not working quite properly".[47]
We recommend that the FCO should press the Burmese Government
for a clear statement on what influence the committee set up to
review the cases of political prisoners in detention will have
on decisions on who qualifies as a 'political prisoner'; what
procedure, if any, there will be for challenging any decision
not to release a particular detainee on the grounds that he or
she is not a political prisoner; and whether releases will be
unconditional.
The Rohingya minority
30. Inter-communal violence between members of
the Buddhist and Rohingya Muslim communities in Rakhine State
flared in June and October last year, leading to over 100 deaths
and large-scale internal displacement.[48]
Human Rights Watch described what had happened as 'ethnic cleansing'
of Muslim Rohingya and accused Burmese officials, community leaders,
and Buddhist monks of organising and encouraging ethnic Arakanese
to conduct co-ordinated attacks on Muslim neighbourhoods and villages,
terrorising the population and forcing tens of thousands of people
to relocate. The evidence for the report was based upon visits
to attacked settlements as well as official and unofficial camps
for displaced persons; and Human Rights Watch interviewed Rohingya
and non-Rohingya Muslims and Arakanese who had suffered or witnessed
abuses, and organisers and perpetrators of the violence.[49]
The Government agreed that Human Rights Watch's report contained
"a number of disturbing and specific allegations, which we
believe are backed up by comprehensive evidence". It described
the report as "extremely credible",[50]
and the Minister told us that the UK Government had raised concerns
with the Burmese President, senior ministers and the opposition
leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, about what had taken place.[51]
31. The Burmese authorities established a Rakhine
Investigation Commission to examine the origins of the conflict
and to suggest measures to prevent further violence. The Commission's
report was published on 29 April and was endorsed by President
Thein Sein.[52]
While referring to the Rohingya as "Bengalis" throughout,
it accepted that "sectarian conflicts" had led to "192
deaths, 265 injured, and the destruction of 8,614 houses, turning
an estimated 100,000 into internally displaced people". It
recommended:
· Strengthening border security, both
on land and at sea
· Steps to ensure that communities on
both sides understood the laws of the land, and swift trial and
punishment for those who broke the law
· Implementation of non-mandatory family
planning programmes among the 'Bengali' population
· Better accommodation, sanitation and
food supplies for internally displaced persons
· An FM radio station and possibly a
TV channel broadcasting in the local language
· Initiation by the Burmese government
of a process for examining the citizenship status of 'Bengalis';
applicants for citizenship to be screened for their ability to
integrate into society; provision of information to applicants
about Myanmar national culture and practices
· Establishment of a Task Force of moderate
leaders from both communities, to engage in dialogue and build
mutual trust
· Regular and timely release of factual
information on events in Rakhine State, to address the spread
of inaccurate rumours.[53]
32. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
human rights situation in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana,
welcomed many of the Commission's findings, although he regretted
the absence of recommendations "to address impunity"
or to ensure that investigations were held into allegations of
violations targeting the Muslim community.[54]
Witnesses to our inquiry also had reservations: Kate Allen, Director
of Amnesty International (UK) said that the report had "not
been an effective one" and that it had not addressed the
actions of the "security presences" during the disturbances;
nor, she said, had it addressed the 1982 Citizenship Act,[55]
which introduced three classes of citizenship in Burma. Those
not holding full citizenship[56]
are denied certain rights, such as the right to own land or immoveable
property, the right to contest any elected post, and the right
to work for a foreign employer. Rohingya Muslims are not one of
the 135 recognised ethnic groups in Burma and do not in general
qualify for full citizenship. Many do not own identity cards,
rendering them effectively stateless.[57]
33. The Government, however, was not so critical
of the Commission's report. Baroness Warsi told us that the Government
had broadly welcomed the fact that the report had happened and
that the Burmese President had accepted its recommendations, although
it was "not content with how far the report went".[58]
In a supplementary memorandum, she added that the Commission had
"emphasised the importance of ensuring accountability";[59]
but it remains to be seen how much political will exists in Burma
to give effect to that accountability. We note that the EU Comprehensive
Framework for support for reform in Burma, agreed by EU Foreign
Ministers in July, states that the EU will press the Burmese government
to ensure the accountability of all those taking part in inter-communal
violence in the country.[60]
Some observers have pressed for an international process or mechanism
to investigate the disturbances in Rakhine State, but the FCO
told us that it believed that "a national process would be
more effective in furthering accountability than a UN-mandated
Commission of Inquiry into the situation in Rakhine State".
It added that the primary mechanism for UN engagement should be
through the UN Special Rapporteur, in monitoring and reporting
on human rights abuses in Burma.[61]
34. Shocking acts of violence against the Rohingya
minority have taken place in Rakhine State. The report of the
Rakhine Investigation Commission is only a preliminary step towards
bringing to justice those responsible for serious human rights
abuses. The FCO is right to encourage a national process for investigation
and prosecution of crimes in Rakhine State, but it should signal
that it does not rule out support for an internationally-led process
if the Burmese Government fails to show a serious intention to
act. We recommend that the FCO should urge opposition leaders
in Burma, as well as Government figures, to be more forthright
in condemning those responsible for the violence in Rakhine State
in 2012.
Conclusion on FCO policy on Burma
35. The question remains as to whether the UK
and its EU partner states were over-hasty in agreeing to lift
economic sanctions in April this year. Ministers maintained that
the lifting of sanctions had been done "with the advice of
Aung San Suu Kyi" and that engagement with the Burmese Government
was "the way forward".[62]
Mr Burt, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the FCO, has
cited Aung San Suu Kyi as saying "It is time we let these
sanctions go
we can't go on relying on sanctions forever
to aid the democracy movement".[63]
We note Kate Allen's observation that Amnesty International researchers
had been told during recent visits to Burma that "sanctions
did not cause Burma's economic decline, but relieving them could
help to build its economy".[64]
36. Baroness Warsi indicated to us that any attempt
to renew sanctions against Burma, rather than lift them (with
the exception of the arms embargo), could have been undone by
an objection from a single EU Member State, and such an objection
would have brought an end not just to the economic sanctions but
also to the arms embargo. The Minister told us that "we felt
that it was important for the arms embargo to remain, and therefore
reach consensus on the other sanctions still to have that level
of protection".[65]
Whatever the dynamics were at the April 2013 Foreign Affairs Council,
we are satisfied, on balance, that the decision to lift economic
sanctions against Burma in April 2013 was the right one. Serious
reservations remain about the continued incarceration of political
prisoners and the failure, so far, to bring to justice those responsible
for intercommunal violence; but the rate of progress in many areas,
such as elections and freedom of speech, has been remarkable,
and the Burmese government is to be commended for what it has
achieved. In order to ensure that progress is sustained, the UK
should be prepared to advocate re-imposition of economic sanctions
on Burma if undertakings by the Burmese government to improve
human rights standards in the country are not followed through.
Russia
37. The climate for civil society groups and activists
in Russia has undergone a marked deterioration over the last year
or so, with the passage of a series of laws apparently designed
to restrict their freedom of operation. These include:
· A law increasing the maximum fine for
individuals taking part in unauthorised assemblies from 2,000
roubles to 300,000 roubles (about £6,000), and from 5,000
to 1,000,000 roubles for organisers.
· A law banning "propaganda of non-traditional
sexual relations": this federal law was passed by the Russian
parliament in June 2013 and mirrors similar laws passed by local
legislatures in a number of Russian regions.
· A law imposing an obligation on NGOs
receiving overseas funding and involved in "political activities"
to register as "foreign agents" and to display the label
"foreign agent" on their websites and publications.
Foreign-funded NGOs are also required to submit quarterly information
about the purpose of their expenditure and the use of assets.
Failure to comply with the law is punishable by fines of up to
300,000 roubles (about £6,000), suspension of activities
of the NGO in question and a prison sentence of up to two years
for its leadership. Some NGOs have decided to comply; some have
decided no longer to accept foreign funding. At least one (Golos
- an election rights NGO) refused to register as a "foreign
agent" and its activities were duly suspended on 25 June
for six months.
· A law increasing regulation of the
internet, ostensibly to protect children from harmful content,
but with the potential to impose wider censorship.
· A law expanding the definition of treason,
to make it applicable to Russian citizens representing international
organisations
· A blasphemy law criminalising "public
actions expressing obvious disrespect toward society and committed
to abuse the religious feelings of believers".[66]
A law has also been passed banning the adoption
of children by same-sex couples in Russia and preventing residents
of foreign countries where same-sex marriages are permitted from
adopting Russian children.[67]
38. There has been widespread condemnation of
what is seen as a drive by those at the highest political levels
in Russia to use legislation to weaken civil society in the country.
David Mepham, UK Director of Human Rights Watch, described the
human rights climate in Russia as being "as bad as it has
been at any point in the post-Soviet period".[68]
A written submission from Pavel Khodorkovsky, son of the imprisoned
Russian businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky, reported his father
(currently held in a penal colony) as saying that
politically motivated pressure on public
organisations is unacceptable. It prevents the flourishing of
a civil society which is so essential for Russia's political,
economic and also social modernisation.[69]
Witnesses from both Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch told us that their offices in Russia had been
"inspected" and that although there had been no violence,
there was an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, which led to
a tendency towards self-censorship.[70]
We note that although the offices of the Alliance Francaise have
been raided and inspected, those of the British Council have not:
Lord Wallace told the House of Lords in June that the British
Council was doing its best "to operate in rather difficult
circumstances".[71]
39. The Government raises its human rights concerns
with the Russian government at various levels. Some concerns have
been raised by the Prime Minister directly with President Putin,
and a wide range of human rights issues were discussed at an official
level at the UK-Russia human rights dialogue in May this year.
Human rights, specifically the constraints upon NGOs, were also
raised by EU President Van Rompuy, Commission President Barroso
and the EU's High Representative, Baroness Ashton, during the
EU-Russia Summit held in Ekaterinburg in June.[72]
The Russian government's response at the Ekaterinburg Summit was
that checks on NGOs were in the interests of transparency, that
only two NGOs had been charged with violations of the new law,
and that none had been closed. When we met members of the International
Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma in December 2012, we were
told that the "foreign agents" law did not affect NGOs
which were involved in social and charitable work: rather, it
was directed at about 100 groups which were involved in political
work, such as encouraging regime change. That view has been contradicted
by Human Rights Watch, which has claimed that charities in apolitical
fields such as animal protection have been targeted.[73]
How should the UK apply pressure?
40. Amnesty International described the impact
of the annual UK-Russia Human Rights Dialogue as "unclear",[74]
and we asked the Minister what it had achieved. She replied that
she believed that it had a purpose, and that it was important
"to maintain a forum within which these discussions can be
had". She accepted that "we might not always be successful
in moving Russia", but she defended the Dialogue as an opportunity
"to push them and try and get some progress".[75]
A list of issues discussed during the Dialogue was provided by
the Minister in a letter to the Chair, following the evidence
session.[76]
41. While it may not be possible to identify clear
achievements from the UK-Russia Human Rights Dialogue, that does
not mean that it is worthless: it offers a regular channel of
communication and a chance for the UK to represent its concerns
formally in an atmosphere that is not overly politically charged.
It does however beg the question as to how much impact any bilateral
effort by the UKdiplomatic or otherwiseis likely
to have. David Mepham suggested to us that Russia was one area
where EU Member States could achieve more collectively than individually.
He referred to "a danger that Russia plays off different
members of the European Union, according to who is more sympathetic
or more critical".[77]
2014 Sochi Games
42. Some have suggested that collective pressure
might be applied by boycotting the 2014 Winter Olympic and Paralympic
Games in Sochi in Russia, in protest against the law banning 'propaganda'
relating to 'non-traditional sexual relations'. The Russian Deputy
Prime Minister, Mr Dmitry Kozak, has assured the International
Olympic Committee that Russia is committed to the provisions of
the Olympic Charter, under which any form of discrimination is
deemed to be incompatible with the Olympic movement.[78]
We note that the UK, Russia, Brazil and South Korea, as hosts
of the 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 Games respectively, issued a
Joint Communiqué in August 2012 recognising the Games as
a means to combat all forms of discrimination.[79]
The UK Prime Minister has rejected calls for a boycott of the
Sochi Games, saying that "I believe we can better challenge
prejudice as we attend, rather than boycotting the Winter Olympics".[80]
We agree. The 2014 Winter Games in Sochi provide a platform for
concerns about human rights in Russia to be voiced in a way which
is difficult for the host country to brush aside, and we do not
support a boycott.
Visa facilitation agreement
43. An opportunity for the EU to apply leverage
flows from Russia's desire for the relaxation of restrictions
for visas to visit Europe. Negotiations are well advanced for
a new visa facilitation agreement between Russia and Schengen
Area countries: this could allow up to 15,000 Russian officials
who hold biometric "service passports" to enter Schengen
Area countries without a visa. Under the terms of the UK's Schengen
opt-out, the UK is present at and able to contribute to discussion
of Schengen measures but cannot vote on them.[81]
44. We asked Baroness Warsi whether the UK had
expressed a view within the EU about the proposed visa facilitation
agreement with Russia. She replied that the UK had participated
in discussions, both in working groups and at the European Council,
and she subsequently wrote to the Committee Chair saying:
The UK is not part of Schengen, but we view
this in terms of the wider EU-Russia relationship. We do not play
an active part in formal negotiations, but we do discuss the importance
of the visa relationship with Russia with other EU member states,
and consider its implications for the UK. During these discussions
we frequently highlight with member states where the EU should
focus its efforts, including a firm approach on human rights.
When the EU's relations with Russia were discussed at the European
Council in March, the Prime Minister and other leaders agreed
the importance of the EU maintaining a unified approach with one
of its key strategic partners.[82]
This tells us remarkably little about the UK's
stance on the visa issue, but it does not suggest that the UK
has lobbied fellow EU Member States with any particular vigour
about the proposal. The proposed visa facilitation agreement
for Russian nationals to enter the Schengen Area offers a rare
opportunity for those EU Member States which are in Schengen to
apply collective pressure on Russia. While we recognise that the
UK has its own visa arrangements and, because it is not in Schengen,
is not in a position to block a decision by Schengen Area countries,
we encourage the FCO to put the case forcefully to fellow EU Member
States to either delay assent to the proposed visa facilitation
agreement or make it conditional upon evidence of an improvement
in human rights conditions in Russia.
2 Cm 8169, paragraph 39 Back
3
Ev 45-6 Back
4
Cm 8593, page 120 Back
5
Cm 8593, page 45 Back
6
Third Report from the Committee, Session 2012-13, HC116, paragraphs43
and 46 Back
7
The Foreign Secretary's Advisory Group on Human Rights was established
in 2010 to give the Foreign Secretary "the best possible
information about human rights challenges" and to enable
the Foreign Office "to benefit from outside advice on the
conduct of its policy". See FCO press release 11 November
2010. Back
8
Q 95 Back
9
See Cm 8593, page 221; also HL Deb 3 June 2013, cols WA 145-6
Back
10
Ev w8 Back
11
Ev 41-2 Back
12
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2011/09/110912_canada_commonwealth.shtml Back
13
Fourth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2012-13,
HC 114, paragraph 32 Back
14
Ev 42 Back
15
http://un.lk/news/opening-remarks-by-un-high-commissioner-for-human-rights-navi-pillay/#.UiGducpYM6Q.twitter Back
16
Cm 8593, page 221 Back
17
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/foreign-affairs/130503%20SoS%20on%20CHOGM.pdf Back
18
Q 37 Back
19
Q 40 Back
20
Q 38 Back
21
Q 40 Back
22
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/foreign-affairs/130503%20SoS%20on%20CHOGM.pdf Back
23
See Ev 61 Back
24
Q 132-4 Back
25
See Ev w55 Back
26
Third Report from the Committee, Session 2012-13, HC 116, Q123
of oral evidence; see also Sri Lanka Country Policy Bulletin published
by the UK Border Agency October 2012, para 13.1 Back
27
Cm 8593, page 225 Back
28
For instance FCO 2011 Human Rights and Democracy Report, Cm 8339,
page 329. Freedom from Torture chronicled recent statements to
this effect by the Government: see Ev w61 Back
29
Sri Lanka Country Policy Bulletin published by the UK Border Agency
October 2012, para 13.1 Back
30
Ev 61 Back
31
A UK-based human rights organisation dedicated to the care and
treatment of survivors of torture and organised violence Back
32
See http://www.freedomfromtorture.org/sites/default/files/documents/FOI%20Response.pdf:
figure rounded to the nearest 5 Back
33
Q 30 Back
34
Q 123-8 Back
35
Cm 8506, response to recommendation 17 Back
36
GJ and Others (post-civil war: returnees) Sri Lanka CG
[2013] UKUT 00319 (IAC): see http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/51da951c4.pdf Back
37
Ev 61 Back
38
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/136921.pdf Back
39
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st12/st12629.en13.pdf Back
40
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/23/burma-eu-too-quick-lift-sanctions Back
41
Q 46 Back
42
A human rights organisation based in Thailand working for the
release of political prisoners in Burma and the improvement of
prison conditions in the country Back
43
Ev 60 Back
44
Lords Hansard 25 February 2013 col WA 199 Back
45
Ev 60 Back
46
Ev 60 Back
47
http://www.dvb.no/dvb-video/quintana-talks-to-dvb/31812 Back
48
Cm 8593, page 133 Back
49
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/22/burma-end-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims Back
50
Adjournment debate, HC Deb 8 May 2013,col 123 Back
51
Q 145 Back
52
See Lords Hansard 17 June 2013 col WA4 Back
53
http://www.burmapartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/RecommendationEnglish-Version.pdf Back
54
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13280&LangID=E Back
55
Q 50 Back
56
I.e. those not able to prove that their ancestors were settled
in some part of the national territory before 1824 Back
57
See http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/burma-beyond-law.pdf Back
58
Q 147 Back
59
Ev 60 Back
60
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st12/st12629.en13.pdf Back
61
Ev 60 Back
62
HC Deb 23 April 2013, col 760 Back
63
HC Deb 8 May 2013 col 121 Back
64
Q 45 Back
65
Q 142 Back
66
See Cm 8593 pages 203-8; also http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR46/011/2013/en
and http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-signs-blasphemy-and-gay-propaganda-bills/482516.html Back
67
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/opinion/russias-anti-gay-crackdown.html Back
68
Q 54 Back
69
Ev w22 Back
70
Q 54 Back
71
HL Deb 12 June 2013, col 1601 Back
72
See letter of 2 August from Rt Hon. David Lidington MP, Minister
of State, FCO, to the Chairman: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/foreign-affairs/130802%20Lidington%20on%20EU%20Russia%20Summit%20June%202013.pdf Back
73
Ev w22 Back
74
Ev 42 Back
75
Q 156 Back
76
Ev 60 Back
77
Q 57 Back
78
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/olympics/23815190 Back
79
FCO Human Rights and Democracy Report 2012,page 20 Back
80
http://news.sky.com/story/1126956/sochi-olympics-boycott-call-rejected-by-pm Back
81
FCO written evidence to the Committee's inquiry into The future
of the European Union: UK Government policy, HC87-II, Session
2013-14, Ev 87 Back
82
Ev 60 Back
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