House of Commons - The FCO's human rights work in 2012

The FCO's human rights work in 2012 - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents

2 Countries of concern

5. The FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report follows a similar pattern to that of recent years: commentary on thematic issues, followed by portraits of human rights conditions in certain countries where standards of human rights are of particular concern to the FCO ('countries of concern'), together with an account of the FCO's human rights work in those countries. In this latest Report, the number of 'countries of concern' has decreased by one, from 28 to 27 (listed below in Table 1): Chad has been omitted.

Table 1: 'Countries of concern'

Afghanistan
Belarus
Burma
China
Colombia
Cuba
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
Eritrea
Fiji
Iran
Iraq
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
Libya
Pakistan
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
South Sudan
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Syria
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Yemen
Zimbabwe

Source: FCO Human Rights and Democracy Report 2012

Criteria for countries of concern

6. In the past, the FCO has given an indication in only the most general terms of the criteria used to decide which countries were to be designated as 'countries of concern'. In its response to our Eighth Report of Session 2011-12, on the FCO's human rights work in 2011, it said that the selection was based on "a range of internal and external human rights reporting, and after consultation with the FCO's ambassadors and high commissioners"; and it argued that it was "difficult to set out the criteria for selection in much greater detail … because of the sensitive nature of much of the material used in the assessment process".[2]

7. Whereas the denial of rights in certain countries is manifest and so severe that there is widespread agreement that the FCO is right to designate them as 'countries of concern', there are a number of countries where the FCO has shown a reluctance to take this step despite calls for it to do so. Human Rights Watch identified Ethiopia, Rwanda, Bahrain and Egypt as four countries which were not on the list but which it believed should be, and it explained why in its written memorandum to us.[3] These four countries have each been included by the FCO in the 2012 Report as "case studies": countries which the FCO judges to be "on a trajectory of change with regard to human rights". Most such case studies relate to countries where the FCO views the trajectory as being "negative".[4] For instance, the text of the case study on The Gambia, which announced on 3 October that it would leave the Commonwealth, is pessimistic: it refers to the resumption of executions in the country, the President's zero tolerance of homosexuality, harassment of the media and unlawful detentions, and it concludes that the country consistently disregards its international human rights obligations and that there is little sign of improvement.[5]

8. We expressed concern last year that the process of identifying "countries of concern" becomes devalued if political and strategic factors are allowed to colour decisions, as we believed had happened in relation to Bahrain (which had, as in this year's report, been treated as a 'case study' rather than a 'country of concern'). We recommended that the criteria for designating countries of concern "should be based purely upon assessments of human rights standards and should stand up to objective comparison", adding that "external factors, such as strategic considerations or the UK's ability to influence developments, should not be allowed to colour those decisions".[6]

9. Despite its warnings in previous years about the difficulty of setting out criteria in detail, the FCO has in fact done just that in the 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, on page 120. It says that it drew on feedback from the Committee and from the Secretary of State's Advisory Group[7] in doing so. The new criteria are:

· The gravity of the human rights situation in the country, including both the severity of particular abuses and the range of human rights affected

· Whether a deterioration or improvement in the human rights situation in the country would have a wider impact in the region

· Whether the human rights situation in the country has an impact on wider UK interests; and

· How active the UK is in the country and our level of engagement there.

Assessments are carried out based on the first criterion and refined further using the other three.

10. We asked the Rt Hon. Baroness Warsi, as Senior Minister of State at the FCO and the minister with responsibility for FCO policy on human rights, why the level of UK engagement in a country should play a part in any assessment of human rights standards there. She replied that

Our human rights work is not just about the things that we are concerned about; it is also about the things about which we can do something. Human rights in individual countries is also about that individual country's journey in how they view human rights and what they intend to do about it and how they even recognise whether certain things are classified as human rights.

11. We agree that the FCO's human rights effort and expenditure should be at least partly linked to its capacity to bring about change; but we do not accept the logic of a situation in which abuses might be equally severe in two countries, yet one is designated as a country of concern because the UK is active there, whereas the other is not, because the level of engagement by the UK and its ability to bring about change are low. Nor do we accept that the impact on wider UK interests is material to such decisions. We welcome the FCO's decision to define more clearly the criteria for designating 'countries of concern', although we question why the extent of the UK's engagement in a particular country or the impact of the human rights situation there on wider UK interests should be regarded as factors in evaluating human rights standards. We recommend that these criteria no longer apply.

12. There was not time within our inquiry to assess the FCO's human rights policy in all 27 'countries of concern', although the Department is to be commended for its authoritative analysis of conditions in each one. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the UK's approach to improving human rights in just three countries of concern—Sri Lanka, Burma and Russia—where concerns about human rights standards have been central to recent major UK policy decisions.

Sri Lanka

13. The Government is clear that it has serious reservations about the state of human rights in Sri Lanka. In the 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, the FCO lists as its concerns:

· Restrictions on freedom of expression and opinion

· Attacks on, and intimidation of, journalists, legal professionals, human rights defenders and others

· Lack of progress on post-conflict reconciliation and the absence of an independent, thorough and credible investigation into allegations of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law by both sides during the military conflict

· Sri Lanka's decision to reject a large number of recommendations at the UN Human Rights Council during its Universal Periodic Review in November 2012.[9]

A number of these concerns were echoed in written submissions to our inquiry from Redress[10] and Amnesty International.[11]

THE 2013 CHOGM IN COLOMBO

14. The Government has come under pressure to show its disapproval of the more repressive actions of the Sri Lankan government by declining to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting to be held in Colombo in November 2013. The Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, announced in September 2011 that he would not attend the Colombo CHOGM unless he saw evidence of progress in human rights conditions in Sri Lanka.[12] We recommended in our report on the Role and Future of the Commonwealth, published in November 2012, that the Prime Minister "should publicly state his unwillingness to attend [CHOGM] unless he receives convincing and independently-verified evidence of substantial and sustainable improvements in human and political rights in Sri Lanka".[13]

15. There is scant evidence of progress in political and human rights in Sri Lanka. Amnesty International told us in May that "we continue to witness a deterioration of human rights in Sri Lanka, including attacks on the judiciary and broader civil society".[14] On 31 August, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, issued a statement following a seven-day mission to Sri Lanka, listing serious concerns about the treatment of human rights defenders and the curtailment or denial of personal freedoms, all of which suggested that the country was "heading in an increasingly authoritarian direction". She also reported that Sri Lankans who had spoken to her during the visit had been harassed and intimidated by security forces.[15] The FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report (published in April 2013) spoke of "a number of negative developments" in the country, where the human rights situation was already "of serious concern".[16] Nonetheless, the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Committee Chair on 3 May to say that he and the Prime Minister would attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Colombo in November. He said that "we will do so because of the importance of the Commonwealth to the United Kingdom and to other members" and he stressed that the UK would use the occasion "to highlight the need for effective commitment to the shared values and human rights for which the Commonwealth stands".[17]

16. We asked witnesses from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for their views on the Government's decision to attend. Kate Allen, Director of Amnesty International (UK), said that "we very much regret that decision",[18] and David Mepham, UK Director of Human Rights Watch, regretted that the Government had decided to attend at prime ministerial level.[19] However, neither argued specifically in favour of a boycott: given that the decision had been taken to hold the CHOGM in Colombo, Ms Allen argued that "we need to be using all mechanisms between now and that meeting to put pressure on the Sri Lankan Government in terms of its human rights record", and she recommended that the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister should meet representatives of NGOs and civil society in Sri Lanka and travel to the north of the country.[20] Mr Mepham expressed similar views.[21] We note that the Prime Minister remains committed to attending the CHOGM. However, we recommend that the Prime Minister should obtain assurances from the Sri Lankan Government that people who approach him to talk about human rights while he is in Sri Lanka to attend the CHOGM do not face reprisals or harassment by security forces.

17. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the Government's decision, we do not believe that continuing discussion on whether or not the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary should attend the 2013 CHOGM in Colombo would necessarily be productive. Nor do we believe that the question of the venue should be reopened at this late stage: as the Foreign Secretary said in his letter of 3 May to the Committee Chair, "there has been no widespread support for a change in location of CHOGM, and there is concern that the Commonwealth itself … should not be damaged, weakened or undermined by divisions over the location of the Heads of Government meeting".[22]

18. What concerns us now is how the Government has come to find itself in this position, and whether the FCO played its hand poorly, both in the discussions which led to the decision that Sri Lanka would be the hosts in 2013 and subsequently. We therefore wrote to the Foreign Secretary in May 2013, asking specific questions about those discussions and the FCO's policy at the time. He replied on 30 May, observing that:

· The Commonwealth Secretariat was responsible for identifying the venue for each CHOGM, and it was for Commonwealth Heads of Government to agree to either support or oppose the proposals;

· The UK had made it clear to the Commonwealth Secretary-General both prior to and during the 2009 CHOGM in Port of Spain that the UK would be unable to support Sri Lanka's bid to host the 2011 CHOGM; and

· The decision to hold CHOGM in Sri Lanka in 2013 had been taken at the Port of Spain CHOGM in 2009, as part of a package which allocated the 2011 CHOGM to Australia and the 2015 CHOGM to Mauritius. It was not conditional on specified improvements in the standards of human rights in Sri Lanka.[23]

From this letter, it became evident that the FCO had objected to Sri Lanka's offer to host the 2011 CHOGM, which was subsequently offered to Australia, but not its offer to host the 2013 CHOGM.

19. The Foreign Secretary also stated, in his letter of 30 May, that "the Commonwealth is a consensus-based organisation". We therefore asked Baroness Warsi, as Senior Minister of State at the FCO, why the UK had not objected in 2009 to the decision that Sri Lanka would host the 2013 CHOGM. She replied that "my understanding is that we did raise those concerns, but the appetite at the Commonwealth meeting was not such that it would prevent Sri Lanka from holding the Heads of Government meeting". When we pointed out that decisions in Commonwealth meetings were taken by consensus, she replied that "yes they are, but not unanimously". Pressed further, she explained that "you can have consensus without everyone around the table having completely agreed to the situation".[24]

20. On the information available to us, the policy followed by the FCO during discussions at the 2009 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Port of Spain on venues for future Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings seems to have been inconsistent. The FCO objected to a proposal that Sri Lanka might host the 2011 CHOGM on human rights grounds but did not obstruct a proposal that it might do so in 2013; nor did it insist that Sri Lanka's right to host in 2013 should be conditional on improvements in human rights. That approach now appears timid. The UK could and should have taken a more principled stand in 2009, and should have taken a more robust stand after the 2011 CHOGM in the light of the continuing serious human rights abuses in Sri Lanka.

ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE OF SRI LANKANS REMOVED FROM THE UK

21. Our report last year on the FCO's human rights work considered allegations of torture within Sri Lanka, specifically of Sri Lankan Tamils who had been returned from the UK following an unsuccessful application for asylum. Under Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture, signed by the UK in 1985, no state party "shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture". If this had indeed been the case in relation to people returned by the UK to Sri Lanka, there would be grounds for arguing that the UK had acted in breach of its obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture.[25]

22. Last year the Government acknowledged to us that maltreatment and torture happen in Sri Lanka,[26] and this year's Human Rights and Democracy Report notes that reports of torture in the country continue.[27] The Government has until recently maintained that it had no substantiated evidence that people returned by the UK immigration authorities to Sri Lanka had been maltreated.[28] In a recent Country Policy Bulletin on Sri Lanka, the UK Border Agency analysed allegations by a number of non-government organisations of specific instances of torture, and it dismissed them for a variety of reasons, concluding that no change in policy was warranted. It reiterated that each case was considered on its merits and that it did not believe that Tamils in general were at risk on return to Sri Lanka.[29] This view has been supported in a recent determination by the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber).[30] We note from a response by the UK Border Agency in February 2013 to a Freedom of Information request by Freedom from Torture[31] that 15 Sri Lankan nationals were granted refugee status in the UK between May 2009 and September 2012 having been removed from the UK on a previous occasion.[32] While this indicates clearly that the Sri Lankans concerned were deemed to be at risk if returned a second time to Sri Lanka, it does not prove conclusively that they would have been at risk when first returned (possibly several years previously), or that they had suffered torture in the intervening period.

23. Unlike the 2011 Human Rights and Democracy report, the 2012 Report does not mention allegations of torture of migrants returned to Sri Lanka from the UK, and it does not re-iterate the Government's view that there is no substantiated evidence of torture of such people. David Mepham, UK Director of Human Rights Watch, told us that he believed that this was significant and that it showed that the Government "cannot stand by" its view and had now recognised that the evidence put forward by Human Rights watch and others was "credible".[33] When we asked Baroness Warsi whether it was still the Government's position that there were no substantiated allegations, she declined to give a direct answer.[34] We find it unsatisfactory that the Government should now be silent on a matter of such significance. We recommend that the FCO, in its response to this report, state whether it still holds the view that there is no substantiated evidence of torture or maltreatment of people who have been returned by UK immigration authorities to Sri Lanka.

Assessment of risk

24. Scrutiny of individual asylum decisions by the UK Border Agency, and of asylum policy, is not a matter for this Committee. Our locus is the role of the FCO which, alongside non-governmental organisations, the UN High Commission for Refugees and news media, provides the Country of Origin Information Service (part of the UK Border Agency until the UKBA's absorption into the Home Office earlier this year) with information on potential risk to people returned from the UK. That information is collated and used to guide case officers considering asylum claims. The FCO told us last year that it was "rigorous in its evaluation of sources when offering advice on the human rights risks to the UK Border Agency".[35]

25. During the course of our inquiry, the Upper Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber) issued a long-awaited determination on three appeals by Sri Lankans, one against refusal of leave to enter the UK and two against decisions to remove to Sri Lanka.[36] The Tribunal found in favour of two out of the three appeals, and it also concluded that there had been a significant change in the Sri Lankan Government's approach, which now possessed "sophisticated, extensive intelligence as to those who are seeking to destabilise the unitary state, within the diaspora and in Sri Lanka itself". The Tribunal found that this had implications for risk to those returned from the UK, and it drew up new guidance on "at risk" categories for return to Sri Lanka. The determination itself replaces all previous Sri Lanka country case law in the UK, and the Home Office has now published a revised Operational Guidance Note, in line with the Tribunal's determination.[37]

26. It is a matter of concern to us that the UK Border Agency's assessment of risk to Sri Lankans on being returned from the UK to Sri Lanka, which will have been partly based upon information provided by FCO staff in Sri Lanka, was found by the courts to be flawed and in need of revision. The FCO should examine whether it could have enabled the UK Border Agency itself, rather than the courts, to have reached the conclusion that a change to the guidance on risk was required. We also observe that the FCO's Strategy on the Prevention of Torture makes no mention of the UK's obligations under Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture and how the FCO should play its part in ensuring that these are met. We recommend that the FCO amend its Torture Prevention Strategy accordingly.

Burma

27. Since we last reported on the FCO's human rights work, EU Foreign Ministers have agreed to lift the economic sanctions which had been imposed on Burma for many years, while retaining in place the arms embargo. The EU Foreign Affairs Council cited in support of its decision "the remarkable process of reform in Burma", and it welcomed "the developments towards democracy, a strong parliament, freedom of expression, and the government's efforts against corruption, as well as the efforts towards the release of remaining political prisoners".[38] EU Foreign Ministers have since drawn up a Comprehensive Framework document setting out the EU's policy on encouraging and supporting reform in Burma over the next three years.[39]

28. The lifting of economic sanctions has not commanded universal support. David Mepham, writing in The Guardian on 23 April, argued that the UK and others had been "too eager to laud the reforming achievements of the Burmese president and too quick to surrender their leverage";[40] and in evidence to us, he suggested that the move had been "premature" and that it would have been better to wait for more progress in certain areas, such as the release of political prisoners.[41] We consider whether or not the decision to lift economic sanctions was correct in paragraphs 35 and 36; but there is little dispute that progress towards free elections and freedom of speech in Burma has been truly remarkable.

Political prisoners

29. Many political prisoners have already been released. One estimate, by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Burma,[42] suggests that 859 political prisoners have been released over the last two years under nine separate amnesties and that around 160 remain in detention.[43] President Thein Sein announced on 7 February 2013 that a committee would be set up to review the cases of those political prisoners still in detention.[44] Baroness Warsi told us that the committee had held its first meeting on 23 February, and she was encouraged to see that there was "a strong range of independent voices" represented on it.[45] During his visit to the UK in mid-July this year, President Thein Sein announced that all detainees found to be political prisoners would be released by the end of this year.[46] This is a welcome statement, although much will depend on the Burmese government's interpretation of the term "political prisoner" and whether the releases will be unconditional. The mandate of the review committee is not entirely clear, and we note the statement by Tomas Quintana, the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, that the committee "is not working quite properly".[47] We recommend that the FCO should press the Burmese Government for a clear statement on what influence the committee set up to review the cases of political prisoners in detention will have on decisions on who qualifies as a 'political prisoner'; what procedure, if any, there will be for challenging any decision not to release a particular detainee on the grounds that he or she is not a political prisoner; and whether releases will be unconditional.

The Rohingya minority

30. Inter-communal violence between members of the Buddhist and Rohingya Muslim communities in Rakhine State flared in June and October last year, leading to over 100 deaths and large-scale internal displacement.[48] Human Rights Watch described what had happened as 'ethnic cleansing' of Muslim Rohingya and accused Burmese officials, community leaders, and Buddhist monks of organising and encouraging ethnic Arakanese to conduct co-ordinated attacks on Muslim neighbourhoods and villages, terrorising the population and forcing tens of thousands of people to relocate. The evidence for the report was based upon visits to attacked settlements as well as official and unofficial camps for displaced persons; and Human Rights Watch interviewed Rohingya and non-Rohingya Muslims and Arakanese who had suffered or witnessed abuses, and organisers and perpetrators of the violence.[49] The Government agreed that Human Rights Watch's report contained "a number of disturbing and specific allegations, which we believe are backed up by comprehensive evidence". It described the report as "extremely credible",[50] and the Minister told us that the UK Government had raised concerns with the Burmese President, senior ministers and the opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, about what had taken place.[51]

31. The Burmese authorities established a Rakhine Investigation Commission to examine the origins of the conflict and to suggest measures to prevent further violence. The Commission's report was published on 29 April and was endorsed by President Thein Sein.[52] While referring to the Rohingya as "Bengalis" throughout, it accepted that "sectarian conflicts" had led to "192 deaths, 265 injured, and the destruction of 8,614 houses, turning an estimated 100,000 into internally displaced people". It recommended:

· Strengthening border security, both on land and at sea

· Steps to ensure that communities on both sides understood the laws of the land, and swift trial and punishment for those who broke the law

· Implementation of non-mandatory family planning programmes among the 'Bengali' population

· Better accommodation, sanitation and food supplies for internally displaced persons

· An FM radio station and possibly a TV channel broadcasting in the local language

· Initiation by the Burmese government of a process for examining the citizenship status of 'Bengalis'; applicants for citizenship to be screened for their ability to integrate into society; provision of information to applicants about Myanmar national culture and practices

· Establishment of a Task Force of moderate leaders from both communities, to engage in dialogue and build mutual trust

· Regular and timely release of factual information on events in Rakhine State, to address the spread of inaccurate rumours.[53]

32. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, welcomed many of the Commission's findings, although he regretted the absence of recommendations "to address impunity" or to ensure that investigations were held into allegations of violations targeting the Muslim community.[54] Witnesses to our inquiry also had reservations: Kate Allen, Director of Amnesty International (UK) said that the report had "not been an effective one" and that it had not addressed the actions of the "security presences" during the disturbances; nor, she said, had it addressed the 1982 Citizenship Act,[55] which introduced three classes of citizenship in Burma. Those not holding full citizenship[56] are denied certain rights, such as the right to own land or immoveable property, the right to contest any elected post, and the right to work for a foreign employer. Rohingya Muslims are not one of the 135 recognised ethnic groups in Burma and do not in general qualify for full citizenship. Many do not own identity cards, rendering them effectively stateless.[57]

33. The Government, however, was not so critical of the Commission's report. Baroness Warsi told us that the Government had broadly welcomed the fact that the report had happened and that the Burmese President had accepted its recommendations, although it was "not content with how far the report went".[58] In a supplementary memorandum, she added that the Commission had "emphasised the importance of ensuring accountability";[59] but it remains to be seen how much political will exists in Burma to give effect to that accountability. We note that the EU Comprehensive Framework for support for reform in Burma, agreed by EU Foreign Ministers in July, states that the EU will press the Burmese government to ensure the accountability of all those taking part in inter-communal violence in the country.[60] Some observers have pressed for an international process or mechanism to investigate the disturbances in Rakhine State, but the FCO told us that it believed that "a national process would be more effective in furthering accountability than a UN-mandated Commission of Inquiry into the situation in Rakhine State". It added that the primary mechanism for UN engagement should be through the UN Special Rapporteur, in monitoring and reporting on human rights abuses in Burma.[61]

34. Shocking acts of violence against the Rohingya minority have taken place in Rakhine State. The report of the Rakhine Investigation Commission is only a preliminary step towards bringing to justice those responsible for serious human rights abuses. The FCO is right to encourage a national process for investigation and prosecution of crimes in Rakhine State, but it should signal that it does not rule out support for an internationally-led process if the Burmese Government fails to show a serious intention to act. We recommend that the FCO should urge opposition leaders in Burma, as well as Government figures, to be more forthright in condemning those responsible for the violence in Rakhine State in 2012.

Conclusion on FCO policy on Burma

35. The question remains as to whether the UK and its EU partner states were over-hasty in agreeing to lift economic sanctions in April this year. Ministers maintained that the lifting of sanctions had been done "with the advice of Aung San Suu Kyi" and that engagement with the Burmese Government was "the way forward".[62] Mr Burt, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the FCO, has cited Aung San Suu Kyi as saying "It is time we let these sanctions go … we can't go on relying on sanctions forever to aid the democracy movement".[63] We note Kate Allen's observation that Amnesty International researchers had been told during recent visits to Burma that "sanctions did not cause Burma's economic decline, but relieving them could help to build its economy".[64]

36. Baroness Warsi indicated to us that any attempt to renew sanctions against Burma, rather than lift them (with the exception of the arms embargo), could have been undone by an objection from a single EU Member State, and such an objection would have brought an end not just to the economic sanctions but also to the arms embargo. The Minister told us that "we felt that it was important for the arms embargo to remain, and therefore reach consensus on the other sanctions still to have that level of protection".[65] Whatever the dynamics were at the April 2013 Foreign Affairs Council, we are satisfied, on balance, that the decision to lift economic sanctions against Burma in April 2013 was the right one. Serious reservations remain about the continued incarceration of political prisoners and the failure, so far, to bring to justice those responsible for intercommunal violence; but the rate of progress in many areas, such as elections and freedom of speech, has been remarkable, and the Burmese government is to be commended for what it has achieved. In order to ensure that progress is sustained, the UK should be prepared to advocate re-imposition of economic sanctions on Burma if undertakings by the Burmese government to improve human rights standards in the country are not followed through.

Russia

37. The climate for civil society groups and activists in Russia has undergone a marked deterioration over the last year or so, with the passage of a series of laws apparently designed to restrict their freedom of operation. These include:

· A law increasing the maximum fine for individuals taking part in unauthorised assemblies from 2,000 roubles to 300,000 roubles (about £6,000), and from 5,000 to 1,000,000 roubles for organisers.

· A law banning "propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations": this federal law was passed by the Russian parliament in June 2013 and mirrors similar laws passed by local legislatures in a number of Russian regions.

· A law imposing an obligation on NGOs receiving overseas funding and involved in "political activities" to register as "foreign agents" and to display the label "foreign agent" on their websites and publications. Foreign-funded NGOs are also required to submit quarterly information about the purpose of their expenditure and the use of assets. Failure to comply with the law is punishable by fines of up to 300,000 roubles (about £6,000), suspension of activities of the NGO in question and a prison sentence of up to two years for its leadership. Some NGOs have decided to comply; some have decided no longer to accept foreign funding. At least one (Golos - an election rights NGO) refused to register as a "foreign agent" and its activities were duly suspended on 25 June for six months.

· A law increasing regulation of the internet, ostensibly to protect children from harmful content, but with the potential to impose wider censorship.

· A law expanding the definition of treason, to make it applicable to Russian citizens representing international organisations

· A blasphemy law criminalising "public actions expressing obvious disrespect toward society and committed to abuse the religious feelings of believers".[66]

A law has also been passed banning the adoption of children by same-sex couples in Russia and preventing residents of foreign countries where same-sex marriages are permitted from adopting Russian children.[67]

38. There has been widespread condemnation of what is seen as a drive by those at the highest political levels in Russia to use legislation to weaken civil society in the country. David Mepham, UK Director of Human Rights Watch, described the human rights climate in Russia as being "as bad as it has been at any point in the post-Soviet period".[68] A written submission from Pavel Khodorkovsky, son of the imprisoned Russian businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky, reported his father (currently held in a penal colony) as saying that

politically motivated pressure on public organisations is unacceptable. It prevents the flourishing of a civil society which is so essential for Russia's political, economic and also social modernisation.

Witnesses from both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch told us that their offices in Russia had been "inspected" and that although there had been no violence, there was an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, which led to a tendency towards self-censorship.[70] We note that although the offices of the Alliance Francaise have been raided and inspected, those of the British Council have not: Lord Wallace told the House of Lords in June that the British Council was doing its best "to operate in rather difficult circumstances".[71]

39. The Government raises its human rights concerns with the Russian government at various levels. Some concerns have been raised by the Prime Minister directly with President Putin, and a wide range of human rights issues were discussed at an official level at the UK-Russia human rights dialogue in May this year. Human rights, specifically the constraints upon NGOs, were also raised by EU President Van Rompuy, Commission President Barroso and the EU's High Representative, Baroness Ashton, during the EU-Russia Summit held in Ekaterinburg in June.[72] The Russian government's response at the Ekaterinburg Summit was that checks on NGOs were in the interests of transparency, that only two NGOs had been charged with violations of the new law, and that none had been closed. When we met members of the International Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma in December 2012, we were told that the "foreign agents" law did not affect NGOs which were involved in social and charitable work: rather, it was directed at about 100 groups which were involved in political work, such as encouraging regime change. That view has been contradicted by Human Rights Watch, which has claimed that charities in apolitical fields such as animal protection have been targeted.[73]

How should the UK apply pressure?

40. Amnesty International described the impact of the annual UK-Russia Human Rights Dialogue as "unclear",[74] and we asked the Minister what it had achieved. She replied that she believed that it had a purpose, and that it was important "to maintain a forum within which these discussions can be had". She accepted that "we might not always be successful in moving Russia", but she defended the Dialogue as an opportunity "to push them and try and get some progress".[75] A list of issues discussed during the Dialogue was provided by the Minister in a letter to the Chair, following the evidence session.[76]

41. While it may not be possible to identify clear achievements from the UK-Russia Human Rights Dialogue, that does not mean that it is worthless: it offers a regular channel of communication and a chance for the UK to represent its concerns formally in an atmosphere that is not overly politically charged. It does however beg the question as to how much impact any bilateral effort by the UK—diplomatic or otherwise—is likely to have. David Mepham suggested to us that Russia was one area where EU Member States could achieve more collectively than individually. He referred to "a danger that Russia plays off different members of the European Union, according to who is more sympathetic or more critical".[77]

2014 Sochi Games

42. Some have suggested that collective pressure might be applied by boycotting the 2014 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games in Sochi in Russia, in protest against the law banning 'propaganda' relating to 'non-traditional sexual relations'. The Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Dmitry Kozak, has assured the International Olympic Committee that Russia is committed to the provisions of the Olympic Charter, under which any form of discrimination is deemed to be incompatible with the Olympic movement.[78] We note that the UK, Russia, Brazil and South Korea, as hosts of the 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 Games respectively, issued a Joint Communiqué in August 2012 recognising the Games as a means to combat all forms of discrimination.[79] The UK Prime Minister has rejected calls for a boycott of the Sochi Games, saying that "I believe we can better challenge prejudice as we attend, rather than boycotting the Winter Olympics".[80] We agree. The 2014 Winter Games in Sochi provide a platform for concerns about human rights in Russia to be voiced in a way which is difficult for the host country to brush aside, and we do not support a boycott.

Visa facilitation agreement

43. An opportunity for the EU to apply leverage flows from Russia's desire for the relaxation of restrictions for visas to visit Europe. Negotiations are well advanced for a new visa facilitation agreement between Russia and Schengen Area countries: this could allow up to 15,000 Russian officials who hold biometric "service passports" to enter Schengen Area countries without a visa. Under the terms of the UK's Schengen opt-out, the UK is present at and able to contribute to discussion of Schengen measures but cannot vote on them.[81]

44. We asked Baroness Warsi whether the UK had expressed a view within the EU about the proposed visa facilitation agreement with Russia. She replied that the UK had participated in discussions, both in working groups and at the European Council, and she subsequently wrote to the Committee Chair saying:

The UK is not part of Schengen, but we view this in terms of the wider EU-Russia relationship. We do not play an active part in formal negotiations, but we do discuss the importance of the visa relationship with Russia with other EU member states, and consider its implications for the UK. During these discussions we frequently highlight with member states where the EU should focus its efforts, including a firm approach on human rights. When the EU's relations with Russia were discussed at the European Council in March, the Prime Minister and other leaders agreed the importance of the EU maintaining a unified approach with one of its key strategic partners.

This tells us remarkably little about the UK's stance on the visa issue, but it does not suggest that the UK has lobbied fellow EU Member States with any particular vigour about the proposal. The proposed visa facilitation agreement for Russian nationals to enter the Schengen Area offers a rare opportunity for those EU Member States which are in Schengen to apply collective pressure on Russia. While we recognise that the UK has its own visa arrangements and, because it is not in Schengen, is not in a position to block a decision by Schengen Area countries, we encourage the FCO to put the case forcefully to fellow EU Member States to either delay assent to the proposed visa facilitation agreement or make it conditional upon evidence of an improvement in human rights conditions in Russia.

2 Cm 8169, paragraph 39 Back

3 Ev 45-6 Back

4 Cm 8593, page 120 Back

5 Cm 8593, page 45 Back

6 Third Report from the Committee, Session 2012-13, HC116, paragraphs43 and 46 Back

7 The Foreign Secretary's Advisory Group on Human Rights was established in 2010 to give the Foreign Secretary "the best possible information about human rights challenges" and to enable the Foreign Office "to benefit from outside advice on the conduct of its policy". See FCO press release 11 November 2010. Back

8 Q 95 Back

9 See Cm 8593, page 221; also HL Deb 3 June 2013, cols WA 145-6 Back

10 Ev w8 Back

11 Ev 41-2 Back

12 http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2011/09/110912_canada_commonwealth.shtml Back

13 Fourth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2012-13, HC 114, paragraph 32 Back