Foreign Affairs CommitteeWritten evidence from Human Rights Watch
Summary
Human rights violations in China are severe and systematic. Despite the recent change of leadership at the top of the Chinese Communist Party, the government remains an authoritarian one-party state, responsible for large-scale human rights abuses and the denial of many fundamental freedoms.
The FCO and the UK government assert that “they consistently raise human rights concerns with the Chinese leadership, both publicly and privately”, and that rights concerns are an important element in the UK bilateral relationship with China. Human Rights Watch believes that these claims, particularly with respect to public diplomacy, are an overstatement. There have been many recent public statements on China made by UK Ministers that omitted any reference whatsoever to human rights issues. This includes statements on UK/China relations made by David Cameron on 8 February 2013 and Nick Clegg on 11 February 2013. A substantial William Hague statement on UK/China relations on 27 July 2012 also failed to make a single reference to human rights concerns. Even if concerns are being expressed privately, our view is that the effectiveness of this will be reduced by the failure to combine it with regular and robust expressions of public concern.
The FCO does document the human rights situation in China fairly comprehensively, for example in the recent China country chapter of the 2012 Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy, and UK ministers and the Ambassador and staff in Beijing do raise specific human rights issues with Chinese Ministers and officials. This is welcome. But to be true to their public rhetoric about the importance and centrality of human rights to the UK government’s foreign policy, they should press human rights issues, publicly and privately, and with greater consistency and assertiveness, at the very highest levels of the Chinese government. It should also press these concerns through the European Union and the United Nations.
1. The human rights situation in China—key issues of concern
Although China has undergone rapid economic modernisation over the last three decades, and this has led to significantly improved living standards for many Chinese people, the government remains highly authoritarian and repressive, responsible for large-scale and wide-ranging rights violations and the denial of many fundamental freedoms.
2. Human Rights Defenders in China regularly face police harassment, house arrest, short-term detention, “re-education through labour”, forcible commitment to psychiatric facilities, or imprisonment on criminal charges. A high-profile figure like Nobel Peace laureate Liu Xiaobo is serving an 11-year sentence for “incitement to subvert state power”, while his wife, Liu Xia, has been held under house arrest in Beijing since December 2010. The UK government should continue to press these cases, and the plight of the much wider group of Chinese activists—less well known—but equally or even more harshly treated by the authorities. Despite their precarious legal status and surveillance by the authorities, civil society groups continue to try to expand their work. An informal but dedicated network of activists monitor and document human rights cases under the banner of a country-wide weiquan (rights defence) movement. These rights activists and defenders face a host of repressive state measures. The FCO is currently reviewing its approach to supporting human rights defenders around the world. There are many human rights defenders in China for whom the UK government can and should speak out.
3. Legal reforms were effectively stalled under the Hu-Wen leadership and the government rejects judicial independence. Forced confessions under torture remain prevalent and miscarriages of justice frequent due to weak courts and tight limits on rights of the defence. In March 2012, the government adopted comprehensive revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL). These changes legalise the power of the police to place “state security, terrorism, and major corruption” suspects in detention in a location of the police’s choice, outside of the formal detention system, and for up to six months. These measures put suspects at risk of torture while giving the government a justification for “disappearance” of dissidents and activists. China is also thought to continue to lead the world on executions. The exact number remains a state secret but experts estimate it to be around 5,000 to 8,000 a year. China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1998, but has not in the past 15 years taken steps towards ratification.
4. Freedom of expression is severely restricted in China. Sina Weibo, the largest of China’s social media microblog services, gives 300 million subscribers space to express opinions and discontent to an extent previously unavailable. But like all online content, Weibo is subject to strict scrutiny and manipulation by China’s sensors. Alternative social media operations, including Twitter, YouTube and Facebook are blocked. At least 27 Chinese journalists were serving prison terms in 2012, and journalists who report on sensitive topics can suffer physical violence. The Chinese government also seeks to extend its stringent controls on freedom of expression overseas, including on one occasion in 2012 to the UK. In March, the Chinese government successfully pressured the organisers of the annual London book fair to exclude any dissident or exiled Chinese writers from the list of official participants. It is not clear to what extent the UK government was involved in this process. It certainly did not make any public statement in defence of those writers critical of the Chinese government, or champion their right to participate.
5. Freedom of religion is heavily restricted in China, with religious worship only possible in officially approved mosques, churches, temples and monasteries, and with religious appointments and publications all subject to government review. Unregistered spiritual groups such as Protestant “house churches” are deemed unlawful and the government subjects their members to fines and prosecutions. The Chinese government classifies the Falun Gong—a meditation-focused spiritual group banned since July 1999—as an “evil cult” and arrests, harasses and intimidates its members.
6. Health and disability rights—The Chinese government remains hostile towards claims for compensation stemming from the 1990s blood scandal in Henan province. In August last year, baton-wielding police beat several members of a group of 300 people with HIV/AIDS protesting in Zhengzhou. The crowd was protesting the government’s refusal to pay compensation to those infected with the virus via government-organised mass blood plasma sales in Henan province in the 1990s. The government’s National Human Rights Action plan (2012–15) commits the government to greater protection from widespread heavy metal pollution, yet no redress or medical attention has materialised for children poisoned by lead in Henan, Yunnan, Shaanxi and Hunan in recent years. Although it is a party to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities CRPD), China’s protections for disabled people remain inadequate, with ongoing abuses and the denial of services.
7. Women’s reproductive rights are curtailed under China’s abusive family planning regulations. The government continues to impose administrative sanctions, fines and coercive measures, including forced abortion.
8. Tibet—The situation in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the neighbouring Tibetan autonomous areas of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan provinces remains tense following the massive Chinese government crackdown on popular protests there in 2008, and the introduction of measures designed to place all Tibetan monasteries under the direct control of government officials who will be permanently stationed there. The government has yet to indicate that it will accommodate the aspirations of Tibetan people for greater autonomy, even within the narrow confines of the country’s autonomy law on ethnic minorities. In the course of 2012, 72 Tibetans self-immolated. Chinese security forces maintain a heavy presence and the authorities continue to tightly restrict access and travel to Tibetan areas, particularly for journalists and foreign visitors. Arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and torture in custody remain widespread. As part of its drive to build “a New Socialist countryside” on the Tibetan plateau, the Chinese government continues to implement large development programmes, designed to re-house or relocate up to 80% of the rural population. The damaging effects of this policy are the focus of a new Human Rights Watch report, published this month. The relocation policies have been carried out—contrary to Chinese government claims—with no effective choice and without genuine consultation of those affected, while compensation mechanisms are opaque and inadequate. Pastoralists deprived of their traditional livelihoods face declining living standards and increased dependency on government subsidies. We were disappointed by William Hague’s rather supine statement on Tibet on 18 June, in response to a parliamentary question, in which he referred very generally to “well established positions on human rights”, but then chose to add, more specifically, “we also understand Chinese sensitivities and concerns about Tibet”. Clearly these “sensitivities” cannot justify or excuse China’s highly repressive actions in Tibet. William Hague might have made that point explicitly in his answer.
9. Xinjiang—Under the guise of counterterrorism and “anti-separatism”, the Chinese government maintains a pervasive system of ethnic discrimination against Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, and sharply curbs religious and cultural expression. An atmosphere of fear among the Uighur population contributes to growing ethnic polarisation. Factors contributing to this include the omnipresence of the security forces, the recent history of disappearances and an overtly politicised judiciary.
10. Hong Kong—Civic groups and the public have challenged the Hong Kong government on rights issues. Hong Kong authorities appear unwilling to deviate much from pro-Beijing interests. They have not moved towards universal suffrage as mandated by the territory’s mini-constitution, and have shown weakness in safeguarding the territory’s autonomy, civil and political freedoms and the rule of law.
FCO/UK Policy on Human Rights towards China—HRW’s Critique
11. The China chapter of the 2012 FCO Human Rights and Democracy report says that “the UK government’s approach to human rights in China is one of constructive long-term engagement, to support modernisation and internal reform”. It further says that the (UK/FCO) “approach is delivered through three main pillars: high-level lobbying and engagement, the bilateral human rights dialogue and financial support to projects in-country”.
12. Consistency and centrality of human rights promotion in FCO/UK policy towards China—FCO and the UK government assert that “they consistently raise human rights concerns with the Chinese leadership, both publicly and privately”, and that rights concerns are an important element in the UK bilateral relationship with China. Human Rights Watch believes that these claims, particularly with respect to public diplomacy, are an overstatement. There have been many recent public statements on China made by UK Ministers that omitted any reference whatsoever to human rights issues, which undermines the claim that rights issues are raised consistently. This includes statements on UK/China relations made by David Cameron on 8 February 2013 and Nick Clegg on 11 February 2013. A substantial William Hague statement on UK/China relations on 27 July 2012 also failed to make a single reference to human rights concerns. Even if concerns are being expressed privately, our view is that the effectiveness of this will be reduced by the failure to combine it with regular and robust expressions of public concern.
13. The UK/China Human Rights Dialogue—The China chapter of the FCO Human Rights and Democracy Report gives a generally upbeat account of the role of the UK/China Human Rights Dialogue and the various issues that the UK has raised through this process. While supportive of the principle of dialogue, Human Rights Watch is concerned that the UK/China Human Rights Dialogue appears to have delivered very little tangible improvement. The chapter notes that the 2012 meeting in Nanjing was the 20th round of the Dialogue. But what is there to show for all of those hours of discussion? FCO Ministers and officials should be pressed on this point. We are also concerned that the existence of the Dialogue allows Ministers to say that human rights issues are being dealt with there, as opposed to being raised in meetings between foreign ministers or heads of state.
14. Democracy and elections—The China chapter notes that “the 18th Party Congress in November did not signal any movement towards representative democracy”. But the fact that the Chinese people had absolutely no say in the selection of the country’s new leaders was conspicuous by its absence in the official UK government response to the leadership change in China.
15. Freedom of expression and assembly—The China chapter says that these issues were raised regularly in 2012, including at the inaugural People to People Dialogue in April. But no detail is provided as to which issues were raised or even who was involved in this People to People Dialogue.
16. Refugees and asylum seekers—The FCO report states that in August 2012 “around 1,000 Kachin refugees were returned to Burma”. Human Rights Watch’s figures suggest that the number of Kachin returned at that time was closer to 4,000.
17. Hong Kong—In the FCO report it says the Foreign Secretary “looked forward to further substantive progress towards full universal and equal suffrage for elections in 2017 and 2020”. We believe this to be highly optimistic. Our assessment is that progress on the expansion of the suffrage is at a standstill or moving backwards. Nor do we see much evidence of positive UK engagement on the issue.
18. The European Union—The China chapter of the FCO report makes no mention whatsoever of the role of the European Union in pressing human rights concerns with the government of China. This is a serious omission given the potential leverage that would result from all 27 EU member states acting collectively on these issues.
19. The United Nations—there is similarly no reference in the chapter to the role of the United Nations, although China should be raised at the next session of the UN Human Rights Council and although China undergoes its Universal Periodic Review in October this year. China’s bid for re-election to the Council in November creates an ideal opportunity for UK human rights diplomacy.
Recommendations
Human Rights Watch urges the FCO and the UK government as a whole to:
Press human rights issues, publicly and privately, and with greater consistency and assertiveness, at the very highest levels of the Chinese government. This should include speaking up for specific human rights defenders, but also across the range of human rights concerns listed in this submission.
Set out clearer benchmarks for the UK/China Human Rights Dialogue, so that it is possible to judge the efficacy of this Dialogue in advancing human rights objectives. This also applies to the EU/China Human Rights Dialogue, the latest meeting of which was a major disappointment.
Support EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) conclusions on China, so as provide a strong and common message to China of the importance attached to human rights by all EU member states.
Use the next session of the UN Human Rights Council and China’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) to press for real progress by China on a range of human rights concerns.
For more Human Rights Watch reporting on China, please visit:
http://www.hrw.org/asia/china
26 June 2013