|
A new frontline of violent extremism has opened up in the Western Sahel-Sahara region of Africa. Jihadists have put down roots in remote or marginalised areas, taking advantage of weak or non-existent state and security institutions, lucrative local criminal networks, and public disillusionment and anger with the corruption and mis-governance of political elites. In Libya, Mali and Nigeria the threat is currently greatest, but all countries in the region are at risk. Concerted international co-operation is required to address this threat: there need to be robust security responses, but also large-scale political and economic interventions to address the underlying causes of instability. The improvement of the region's governance must also be a priority. The world is waking up to the need for action, but effective co-ordination is still badly lacking, with insufficient clarity over where responsibility lies.
The UK Government has set out a bold vision to increase its political, security and economic engagement with the region, on the ground that failing to engage more would put the UK's long-term interests at greater risk. We agree, but the current mismatch between the Government's ambitions and its scant diplomatic resources in the region is vast and irreconcilable. The Government should consider enhancing its diplomatic presence in the Western Sahel and the Maghreb, within the tight financial constraints that the FCO is currently forced to operate in. It should also avoid inflated rhetoric and be realistic in its aims, focussing on what the UK does best. We do believe that the UK has a vital role to play in the region, because of the UK's strong links with some countries and (despite the current low diplomatic profile) its hard and soft power strengths. We consider that the UK Government should press for agreement at international level of a common security and stability policy for the region, with lead responsibility for securing its implementation resting with a tripartite leadership of France, the UK and the US.
France was right to intervene in Mali in 2013 and the UK was right to support it and offer practical assistance. The intervention helped arrest a potential humanitarian disaster in northern Mali and may have saved the whole country from a jihadist takeover. However, there remain very significant obstacles ahead in Mali's path back to peace. Lessons also need to be learned from the crisis. The West seemed to turn a blind eye to events in the country, failing to spot the warning signs until it was too late; a pattern repeated more recently in the Central African Republic. The UK and its allies need to examine their early warning systems for the region. There was also a failure by the UK Government to anticipate the full effects of the Gaddafi regime's collapse on its Saharan neighbours, and therefore to try to mitigate them. This has been a costly error. A common thread in UK policy appears to be a weakness of analysis in relation to crises straddling North Africa and West Africa: the Sahara may form a departmental barrier within the Foreign Office, but it is not one for terrorists. The UK Government must look to accumulate deeper reserves of specialist expertise and knowledge about the Western Sahel-Sahara region if its aspiration of more effective engagement is to become a reality.
Development aid has a key role in combating regional instability and the lure of extremism, but has not yet helped the Western Sahel-Sahara region anything like as much as it should. In Mali, the West may even have inadvertently let development aid become part of the problem rather than part of the solution, by contributing to a culture of irresponsible and corrupt governance that may have undermined respect for democracy. The Foreign Office should make it more of its business to ensure that development aid programmes in the region are robust and on track, even in countries where the UK does not have a bilateral aid programme.
Population pressures in the Western Sahel are enormous and it concerns us that politicians in the region may not see addressing them as a priority. We fear that if nothing is done, the problem of illegal immigration into Europe—and the tragic events that tend to go with it—will continue to increase. We also see evidence of a link between rapid population growth and political instability. We believe that the UK Government should continue to impress on its international partners the need for international action to extend the availability of family planning in the Western Sahel.
Regional co-operation exists in the region, and can be built upon, but effective co-operation is hampered by countries' lack of resources and weak peripheral security (particularly in West Africa) and by regional rivalries (particularly in the Maghreb). Proposals for an African Union standby force are welcome but a wholly African solution to African security problems is still some years away. Until then, the UK and its international partners must look for ways to help fill the gap. Accordingly, we welcome indications from the UK Government that it proposes to extend its programme of military training missions to assist countries in the developing world. We acknowledge the very difficult choices the UK faces in determining how much military assistance to give Nigeria in its battle against terrorism. On the one hand, there are well documented concerns relating to the conduct of the Nigerian security forces. On the other hand, in the Boko Haram movement, Nigeria faces a ruthless, brutal enemy, and trusting relations and effective counter-terrorism co-operation between the UK and Nigeria are important, in view of our growing economic and diaspora links. We consider that the UK Government should provide as much security and intelligence assistance as is consistent with its human rights values.
Other key bilateral partners in the region include Algeria and Morocco. Effective co-operation between the two countries is vital, but the relationship has been badly frayed by their decades-long stand-off over the Western Sahara territory. We foresee a possible window of opportunity ahead to begin mending relations between the two countries and would encourage the UK Government to explore ways of helping repair the relationship.
Islamist extremism is not a static phenomenon. Unless there is concerted international action to address instability in the Western Sahel-Sahara region, and its root causes, the problem will not go away. Indeed, the contagion of instability may well spread, with its effects being felt more widely across the world.
|
