Conclusions and recommendations
The link with extremism
1. Addressing
terrorism in the Western Sahel-Sahara region comprehensively means
addressing the environmental conditions that are allowing it to
grow: poverty and inequality, corruption and mis-governance, the
pressure of fast-growing populations on depleting natural resources,
insufficient cross-border co-operation, and the spread of extremist
ideology. This is a huge task requiring international co-operation
across a number of disciplines. We see signs that development
and investment challenges are beginning to be addressed, but are
concerned that co-operation on security matters should not be
neglected. (Paragraph 29)
2. We
recognise that the UK Government has sought to secure international
co-operation, for instance through the communiqué agreed
at the 2013 G8 summit. We recommend that the UK Government, in
its response to this report, outlines how it proposes to maintain
momentum on this issue over the remainder of this Parliament,
particularly in relation to security and intelligence co-operation.
(Paragraph 30)
The jihadist takeover of northern
Mali
3. The
UK Government was right to back France's intervention in Mali
in January 2013, and to provide practical assistance. France's
intervention was justified and necessary: the threat to the whole
country appeared credible, given the state of the Malian military
and the lack of a regional response. The intervention also helped
prevent the humanitarian catastrophe beginning to unfold in northern
Mali from significantly worsening. It is too early to say whether
Mali is now "safe": this in any case requires more than
military intervention, but we can say that Operation Serval was,
in military terms, a success. (Paragraph 42)
Algeria: the attack at In Amenas
4. The
UK's ability to respond independently to the hostage crisis at
In Amenas, Algeria, in January 2013 was limited, given the
nature of the Algerian state. However, it is evident that, at
the moment of crisis, the channels of communication that the UK
wanted to access were not available, indicating that there is
an ongoing need to develop key relationships at political and
diplomatic levels. We accept that this will be challenging. We
note that the FCO has taken steps to ascertain whether there are
lessons to be learned from the attack, and is working closely
with industry to ensure better co-ordination and information-sharing
on security matters, in order to ensure that British expatriate
workers are as safe as possible. We urge the Government to ensure
that this includes contractors and subcontractors of companies,
as well as employees. (Paragraph 48)
5. We
note that the UK Government expressed confidence in 2013 that
it would in due course secure more information from its Algerian
counterparts on the circumstances surrounding the mission to recover
the plant from the terrorists. We would be grateful for an update.
(Paragraph 49)
Nigeria
6. The
UK Government wants Nigeria to defeat terrorism, but has concerns
about assisting the Nigerian military. We fully understand the
Government's dilemma but consider it important that the UK do
whatever it can, consistent with its respect for human rights
values, to assist Nigeria in its battle against Boko Haram's uniquely
repellent brand of extremism. We ask the Government to be mindful
of the importance of effective counter-terrorism co-operation
between the two countries, given our strong diaspora links with
Nigeria, and of the possibility of Nigeria eventually seeking
security assistance elsewhere, perhaps from countries with far
fewer scruples than the UK has. We note that the UK Government
provides training and assistance to other armies in the developing
world and seek clarification from the Government that it is satisfied
that its position is entirely consistent. (Paragraph 63)
Wider lessons from recent events
7. We
agree with the UK Government that parts of North and West Africa
have become a new frontline in the contest with Islamist extremism
and terrorism. (Paragraph 65)
8. However,
we have encountered limited evidence thus far to confirm the Prime
Minister's concerns that the empty quarters of the region have
become a "magnet for jihadists". (Paragraph 66)
9. The
threat from terrorism to people in many parts of the Western Sahel-Sahara
region is immediate, frightening and real. The prospect of another
extremist "takeover" of territory somewhere in the Western
Sahel cannot be ruled out. However, it is important to maintain
a sense of proportion about the scale of the military threat the
extremists pose. The precedent of Mali in 2013 suggests that they
would struggle to hold territory in the face of any Western-led
intervention. We are aware of no evidence that extremists in the
region yet pose an "existential threat" to the West.
(Paragraph 72)
10. UK
interests in parts of North and West Africa are vulnerable to
terrorism and will continue to be for the foreseeable future,
whatever the level of UK engagement in counter-terrorism. It is
possible that greater engagement might lead to increased targeting
of UK interests, and citizens. However, we agree with the Prime
Minister that UK and Western disengagement from the region, and
failure to seek to address terrorism and its causes, would in
the longer term carry greater risks for the UK. (Paragraph 80)
11. We
urge the UK Government to remain vigilant on the issue of possible
radicalisation within North and West African diaspora communities,
bearing in mind that dialogue and positive engagement with these
communities could also contribute to an effective counter-terrorism
strategy. (Paragraph 81)
12. The
UK's policies on non-payment of ransom money to terrorists may
have helped protect vulnerable UK citizens abroad. We acknowledge
the Prime Minister's global leadership in seeking to eradicate
ransom payments. Countries that continue to flout the ban on payments
are guilty of strengthening the terrorists' hand. The UK should
continue to discreetly but firmly press its allies to end this
practice. (Paragraph 82)
The UK's diplomatic resources: rhetoric
versus reality
13. Recent
events underline the difficulty of monitoring events in the Western
Sahel-Sahara region, anticipating crises, and responding to them
as they unfold, particularly when diplomatic resources are limited.
They also underline that, whilst the Sahara may be a departmental
barrier within the FCO, it is not one for terrorists. The UK Government
should reflect on weaknesses in analysis that the events appear
to have exposed, and how these might be rectified at departmental
level. This applies particularly in relation to intervention in
Libya in 2011: considerable resources were expended ensuring that
military goals were successfully achieved (for which the Government
deserves credit), but there was a failure to anticipate, and therefore
mitigate, the regional fallout from the intervention, which has
been enormous and, in some cases, disastrous. (Paragraph 99)
14. Looking
to the future, the UK's very limited diplomatic resources in and
around the Western Sahel will make it difficult for the Government
to achieve its ambitions to be more intensively involved in the
region and to help shape events as they unfold. The Government
should consider increasing its resources in the region and its
reserves of specialist knowledge. If not, it should scale back
its ambitions—and its rhetoric. (Paragraph 100)
15. We
suggest that the UK Government contemplate an enhancement of its
diplomatic profile in Francophone parts of the Western Sahel-Sahara
region. This would be consistent with the Government's commitment
towards greater engagement with the region. It would appear that
a raised UK profile in the region would be welcomed and it seems
probable that the UK may be able to offer advice and assistance
in a way that some other countries could not. Far from raising
the risk of the UK and France wastefully "doubling up"
diplomatic resources, we suggest that it will increase opportunities
for the two countries to work together fruitfully on security,
development and political co-operation in the region, as they
have been doing in Mali. (Paragraph 103)
Key partnerships for the UK
16. There
is a need for a step-change in the co-ordination of international
efforts to combat insecurity, and the drivers of insecurity, in
and around the Western Sahel. We propose that the UK Government
press its international partners for agreement to a common security
and stability policy for the Western Sahel. Lead responsibility
for securing implementation of the policy should rest with a tripartite
leadership of France, the UK and the US, supported by others,
including the European External Action Service. (Paragraph 110)
17. There
is an emerging pattern of evidence of the UK and its main partners
being unsighted by events in and around the Sahel region. The
international community's successive failure, in Mali and in the
Central African Republic, to anticipate events and to respond
to them speedily as they unfolded, is worrying. We accept that
the UK was not the only country to be unsighted by events and
acknowledge that its diplomatic resources in both countries are
light. We recommend that the UK Government seek to raise at international
level the need for more effective early warning systems in and
around the Western Sahel region. (Paragraph 115)
18. Renewed
proposals within the African Union for a standby military force
are welcome, and we would support the UK and its international
partners seeking to assist in building capacity. It is reasonable
to assume that it will be some time before there are wholly African
solutions to African problems of equivalent scale to those in
Mali and the Central African Republic. This places an onus on
the UK and its international partners to ensure that contingency
plans are in place to deal with future crises. (Paragraph 119)
19. Algeria
and Morocco are both key to delivering increased stability in
the Western Sahel-Sahara region, and effective bilateral relations
with both countries are essential. Partnership with Algeria does
present some challenges, particularly in relation to Algeria's
security and intelligence services, but we believe that a constructive
and effective relationship can be maintained if the UK is realistic
in its aims and maintains its red lines on issues of particular
importance such as respect for human rights. We note encouraging
signs that Algeria is willing to engage with the UK on a more
open basis than it perhaps did in the past. (Paragraph 126)
20. Conflict
over the Western Sahara issue has had a toxic effect on regional
co-operation in North-West Africa, including on security issues.
The intensification of the terrorist threat in the region, combined
with the gradual generational shift in political leadership, may
present an opening for new approaches to resolving the conflict
to be tested. We would encourage the UK Government to explore
options for helping to bring the different sides together. (Paragraph
127)
Development aid, foreign policy and
fragile states
21. We
agree with both the aims of the UK Government's Building Stability
Overseas strategy to integrate foreign, security and development
policies, and the premises that inform it. (Paragraph 129)
22. We
invite the Government to comment on whether its bilateral aid
programme for Nigeria is making satisfactory progress against
goals set out in the Building Security Overseas strategy and,
if so, how this progress has been measured. We also suggest that
the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, in its work evaluating
DFID's approach to anti-corruption, treat DFID's work in Nigeria
as a case study. (Paragraph 133)
23. We
draw these remarks to the attention of the International Development
Committee. (Paragraph 134)
24. We
note that the opportunity is currently open to debate the purpose
and definition of overseas development assistance, and that the
UK Government will be a contributor. We would invite the UK Government
to consider whether the current definition has the effect of restricting
or preventing the development of aid programmes based around delivering
increased security. We also invite the Government to respond to
evidence we received during the inquiry that countries of the
Western Sahel would welcome non-military development assistance
to help strengthen their borders against terrorism and trans-national
organised crime. We draw these views to the attention of the International
Development Committee. (Paragraph 138)
25. We
are supportive of signals from the UK Government that it is considering
an extension of its programme of offering military training to
vulnerable countries. We see this as a practical way for the UK
to help bolster security and stability in fragile states. We also
see it as naturally complementary to programmes to develop improved
governance delivered through development aid packages. We are
mindful that, in undertaking any such work, it is necessary to
be realistic, as success in transmitting values and standards
is not assured. We would welcome an update on UK Government policy
on the future of the EU Training Mission in Mali. (Paragraph 145)
26. The
crisis in Mali raises questions about the administration of development
aid in fragile countries. There is evidence that development aid
appears to have become part of the problem rather than part of
the solution in Mali, inhibiting the development of responsive
and responsible government and entrenching corruption in its political
culture, in a manner inconsistent with the Government's Building
Stability Overseas Strategy. We are also concerned to ensure that
development aid programmes in Mali and elsewhere are better monitored
in future. Mali remains a fragile democracy affected by internal
political tensions, as well as the threat of terrorism. (Paragraph
151)
27. We
consider that the FCO has a role in relation to monitoring these
projects alongside DFID, particularly where (as in Mali) DFID
does not have a direct bilateral relationship with the country
concerned. We also suggest that the Independent Commission for
Aid Impact, in its work evaluating DFID's funding of multilateral
aid and the scaling up of aid spending, consider treating Mali
as a case study. (Paragraph 152)
28. We
draw these comments to the attention of the International Development
Committee. (Paragraph 153)
29. There
is clear evidence that high population growth in the developing
world is often linked to political instability and to the spread
of radical or extremist views. We suggest that recent events in
the Western Sahel may provide further evidence of that correlation.
While we are concerned that DFID do not acknowledge this link,
we commend the UK Government for prioritising increased access
to family planning in the developing world and call on it to ensure
that the issue remains on the international agenda. (Paragraph
158)
30. We
urge the UK to press for greater clarity from the EU on its policies
for handling increased migration to Europe from Sahelian countries,
and in particular on whether, when potential immigrants are located
on boats in the Mediterranean, they are turned back or ushered
to safety. (Paragraph 161)
Conclusion
31. Analysis
and policy-making about terrorism and insecurity in the areas
covered by this report suffers from a lack of information on some
key issues. We consider that increasing the gathering, and analysis,
of information and intelligence on terrorism in and around the
Western Sahel should be a priority for the UK Government and its
international partners. (Paragraph 163)
| 
