House of Commons - The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa

The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents

3 The main events of 2012-13 and the UK Government's response to them

32. In this chapter, we discuss the three main terrorist events mentioned in paragraph 1, and consider the UK Government's initial decisions taken in response to them, starting with its decision to support intervention in Mali.

The jihadist takeover of northern Mali

33. Mali, a landlocked country of 15.5 million people five times bigger than the UK, comprises two unequal "halves" joined at a narrow central waist. Southern Mali is where the vast majority of the population live, around the capital Bamako. Most southern Malians are black Africans, of various ethnic groups. Northern Mali covers a larger area, but is very thinly populated, being mainly desert or mountain. In the north, Arabs and Tuaregs live in a sometimes uneasy coexistence with black African peoples. Discontent with rule in faraway Bamako has simmered in the north, amongst Tuaregs especially, ever since independence from France in 1960.[56]

34. Mali's crisis began with a coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012. The coup leaders were apparently angry that the President had failed to put down a Tuareg rebellion in the north and was neglecting the army. The country then sank into political chaos. By April, Tuareg militants had proclaimed an independent state in northern Mali. Splits soon emerged between Islamist and non-Islamist elements amongst the rebels. The arrival on the scene of al Qaeda-aligned jihadists decisively tipped the balance, and by June extremists were in complete control of the north. They set about creating a totalitarian Sharia state; music and dancing were banned; dissidents were beaten; transgressions were punished with stoning or amputation;[57] and much of the region's Sufi patrimony was destroyed.[58] The takeover exacerbated a refugee crisis already unfolding following the Tuareg rebellion. Hundreds of thousands fled: Tuaregs and Arabs mainly to neighbouring countries, and black northern Malians to the south of Mali.

OPERATION SERVAL

35. Whilst the crisis unfolded, Mali's army stalled, apparently incapable of launching a credible mission to recover its own territory. Mali's neighbours—partner countries in ECOWAS,[59] the regional body in West Africa for economic and security co-operation—also hesitated.[60] When we met ECOWAS's military and political leadership in Abuja, Nigeria, they told us that this was because they considered it necessary to receive an unambiguous request for military assistance from the interim Malian government, and this had never come. In late December 2012, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 2085, mandating an African-led international force to intervene in northern Mali, but the African Union was still months away from being able to put troops on the ground.

36. On 9 January 2013, a sudden push southwards by the jihadists appeared to open up the possibility of the entire country falling. Two days later, at the invitation of Mali's interim government, France intervened militarily, with logistical support from the UK, in an operation codenamed Operation Serval. Some 3800 French troops were deployed, along with units of the French Air Force, and with military support from some African countries, especially Chad. Within less than a month, the extremists had been routed from all the main population centres in the north, and central authority had been restored.

MALI TODAY

37. Following the recovery of the north, the emphasis has shifted to restoring normality and political stability to all of Mali. Progress has been made: a new President and National Assembly have been elected, and the flow of development aid from donor countries has begun to be restored. Under pressure from France and other Western countries, the Malian government has also agreed to talk to non-Islamist Tuareg militants about the possibility of decentralising some power, on condition that they acknowledge Mali's territorial sovereignty. A commission for dialogue and national reconciliation has also been set up. An EU Training Mission is working with the Malian army to make it more effective and professional. However, major challenges remain, particularly in relation to the north, where hundreds of thousands of people remain displaced.[61] We heard in Mali that many are very reluctant to return to the north, because of the fear of ethnically-based reprisals from the army or police or from local militias.[62] Pockets of insurgency remain in the north, and we are concerned to note that, since we drew evidence-taking on this inquiry to a close, unrest and violence there has been growing.[63] We understand that some of this may be linked to a loss of momentum in talks between Tuareg leaders and the Malian government and some to extremists apparently beginning to regroup. We should add that when we visited Mali we gained the impression that the division between Islamist and non-Islamist Tuareg militants may not always be clear-cut on the ground.

THE MILITANT GROUPS IN NORTHERN MALI: AQIM AND MUJAO

38. Three groups jointly controlled northern Mali. One, called Ansar Dine, appeared to be mainly the outfit of a local clan leader, committed to establishing an Islamist Tuareg state in northern Mali. It allied initially with the main non-Islamist Tuareg separatist movement, the MNLA, before switching to the jihadists.[64] It has since split, with factions claiming to have renounced extremism.[65] The two other movements had, and have, wider ambitions:

· Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), originating in the defeat of Islamists in the Algerian civil war of the 1990s. A few survivors regrouped, rebranding around 2006-7 as AQIM, and pledging loyalty to the al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan. AQIM has long had cells in northern Algeria but has been gaining strength further south; in desert regions of Algeria, Libya, Niger and Mali.[66] AQIM are known to be involved in smuggling, extortion and kidnapping,[67] and many of its leaders are understood to have married into desert clans, cementing their position in the community, and enabling them to key into lucrative local trade and trafficking networks.[68] We have also heard of some evidence that AQIM have been bankrolled by rich foreign sympathisers.[69] AQIM appear to see themselves as the natural leadership of the jihadist movement in North and West Africa;[70]

· The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (usually known by their French acronym MUJAO), which originated in 2011 as a West African splinter group from AQIM, dissenting at the dominance of AQIM's mainly Algerian Arab leadership. MUJAO appears to be strongest in Mauritania, Mali and Niger and its main income may be hostage-taking; it is thought to have made tens of millions of dollars from ransoming captured Westerners.[71] Documents recovered following the recovery of northern Mali show AQIM rebuking MUJAO for an over-zealous application of Sharia in the areas the latter controlled.[72]

THE UK'S SUPPORT FOR OPERATION SERVAL

39. The UK Government supported France's intervention, diplomatically and practically. The UK loaned two C-17 cargo planes to provide logistical support, as well as a detachment of around 20 technical personnel. This was later augmented by a Sentinel R1 aircraft sent to Dakar, Senegal, with supporting ground crew and technical support staff of about 70 people.[73] The UK's decision was taken swiftly, in response to the sudden, unexpected move south by the jihadists, which in turn provoked a rapid French response. In May 2013, we asked our first set of witnesses whether Operation Serval would turn out to be a success.[74] At that point, the terrorists appeared to have been routed, but there was still guerrilla fighting in some areas, and uncertainty as to how solid France's military gains would turn out to be. Some commentators had argued that the intervention, and the UK's support for it was a tactical error.[75] Our witnesses answered that it was too early to say whether the intervention would succeed, and arguably this remains the case: Mali remains a tense country with a number of security and political problems.[76] France has not yet been able to effect a drawdown of troops from Mali as scheduled, several informal deadlines having come and gone.[77] The longer it has stayed, the more France has been drawn into domestic political conflict and lost popularity,[78] as we noted at first hand when we visited in June.

40. None of these factors should obscure Operation Serval's success as a military operation: it routed the jihadists from their northern stronghold, with limited loss of civilian life.[79] Despite a worrying rise in recent guerrilla attacks, gains have been held: territory has not leaked back to the jihadists. This has provided the space for Mali to begin the journey back to stability and democracy. The rapid recovery of the north also saved the people of northern Mali from continuing jihadist rule and helped reduce, if not arrest, the humanitarian crisis beginning to unfold in the north.

41. In calculating whether to intervene in January 2013, France would have had to have taken into account how serious a prospect there was of Bamako falling to the jihadists. Given that the total number of Islamist militants in Mali may never had exceeded three of four thousand, this would appear prima facie unlikely, and we heard evidence that the jihadists may not actually have intended to march all the way to the capital.[80] On the other hand, in early January France was taking a decision in real time about an unpredictable enemy, against a backdrop of political infighting in Bamako and splits in the Malian army. We should add that those of us who visited Bamako were informed of intelligence that there were Islamist sleeper cells in Bamako and other southern cities.

42. The UK Government was right to back France's intervention in Mali in January 2013, and to provide practical assistance. France's intervention was justified and necessary: the threat to the whole country appeared credible, given the state of the Malian military and the lack of a regional response. The intervention also helped prevent the humanitarian catastrophe beginning to unfold in northern Mali from significantly worsening. It is too early to say whether Mali is now "safe": this in any case requires more than military intervention, but we can say that Operation Serval was, in military terms, a success.

Algeria: the attack at In Amenas

43. Five days after France launched Operation Serval in Mali, news emerged that the vast Tigantourine gas facility in Algeria had been overrun by terrorists. The facility, which is run jointly by BP, Statoil of Norway, and the Algerian state-owned Sonatrach company, is responsible for around 10% of Algeria's gas production, and is situated in a remote desert area in the south-east of the country, near the small town of In Amenas. The terrorists, numbering around 40, targeted the approximately 135 foreign workers based at the plant, seeking to take as many as possible hostages. Barely 24 hours after the capture of the plant, the Algerian government launched a military operation on the site. The siege ended around two days later with the plant recovered and most or all of the militants captured or dead. Forty workers were left dead, including six UK citizens.

BELMOHKTAR, THE SIGNED IN BLOOD BRIGADE AND AL MURABITUN

44. The self-proclaimed mastermind of the attack—though it appears he did not personally take part—was Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former AQIM battalion leader. Connected through marriages to various Tuareg clans, Belmokhtar is thought to have made millions of dollars from kidnapping, weapons dealing and smuggling.[81] He split from AQIM in 2012, following clashes with its leaders, founding a breakaway group: the Signed in Blood Brigade. It has been suggested that the group's goals in launching the attack may have been twofold: to blow the plant up, thus creating the propaganda "spectacular" that would prove the group's, and Belmohktar's, credentials as new and serious jihadi "players" to doubting former associates; and to escape to Libya or Mali with as many hostages as possible.[82] Reports[83] that Belmokhtar had been killed in Mali in April 2013 appear to have been unfounded. A person claiming to be him claimed responsibility online for masterminding two suicide attacks in Niger in May 2013. In August 2013, there was a further announcement on the internet that the Signed in Blood Brigade and MUJAO had merged into a new group: Al Murabitun, its name an echo of a much older jihadist movement in north-west Africa,[84] committed to waging jihad "from the Nile to the Atlantic".[85] The group has issued threats since its formation, expressly singling out France as a future target for its campaigns because of its involvement in Africa, but appears to have not yet staged any major attacks.

45. Government ministers we met in Algiers attributed the crisis to a decrease in security along Algeria's southern and eastern borders, following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, and the uprising in northern Mali. (In Amenas is some 30 kilometres from the frontier with Libya and it would appear that the attack was launched from across the border.[86]) This is also one of the main conclusions of a report commissioned by Statoil, which provides a comprehensive analysis of the crisis.[87] The report's other main conclusion, expressed in somewhat coded language, is that the performance of the Algerian military and gendarmerie, who were formally responsible for protecting the outer perimeter of the site, fell short of what the managers of the plant could have expected: they failed first to detect the attack and then to respond to it before the attackers had entered the perimeter.[88] We understand that the Algerian Government's main practical response has been to step up security in the south, including in relation to large hydrocarbon sites.[89] We also understand that formal inquiries by the Algerian authorities into the attack are continuing, and that in due course there will be a trial of surviving terrorists.[90]

UK RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

46. The evidence we have received about Algeria's security service presents it as a tough, secretive, and practically autonomous body, hardened by the bloody experience of the 1990s civil war, that would always be likely to deal with domestic terrorist incidents on its own uncompromising terms.[91] It appears that the UK and other foreign governments caught up in the crisis were in essence bystanders not only to the attack itself, but also to the Algerian response. We note reports of the UK Government being frustrated at a lack of communication from the Algerian Government prior to the military operation being launched,[92] but in his 21 January statement to the House, the Prime Minister said that he understood the challenges that the Algerian Government had faced in responding to the attack, and that responsibility for the deaths lay squarely with the terrorists. He also committed the UK to deepening its counter-terrorism co-operation with Algeria in future.[93]

47. The survivors of the crisis and relatives of the deceased whom we met told us that they felt that many of their questions about the crisis had not been answered. They expressed concerns that the UK would put future co-operation with Algeria ahead of asking awkward questions about how the authorities had dealt with the crisis. We do understand these views, but the bulk of the evidence we have received leads us to believe that efforts by the UK to put pressure for answers on the Algerian authorities are unlikely to be successful, and may even be counter-productive.[94] The Secretary of State told us in correspondence that the UK Government had open channels of communication with the Algerian authorities about the incident and that he was hopeful that the Algerian authorities would provide more information once their investigations were at a more advanced stage. He also said that the FCO had responded to the events at In Amenas by seeking to make available to companies, employees and contractors travel advice that was more context-specific, and by pursuing deeper engagement on security issues with companies working in at-risk areas that employ British nationals, or take on British contractors. We note from our meeting with victims and survivors that a number of UK nationals working at In Amenas did not have a direct contractual relationship with BP.[95]

48. The UK's ability to respond independently to the hostage crisis at In Amenas, Algeria, in January 2013 was limited, given the nature of the Algerian state. However, it is evident that, at the moment of crisis, the channels of communication that the UK wanted to access were not available, indicating that there is an ongoing need to develop key relationships at political and diplomatic levels. We accept that this will be challenging. We note that the FCO has taken steps to ascertain whether there are lessons to be learned from the attack, and is working closely with industry to ensure better co-ordination and information-sharing on security matters, in order to ensure that British expatriate workers are as safe as possible. We urge the Government to ensure that this includes contractors and subcontractors of companies, as well as employees.

49. We note that the UK Government expressed confidence in 2013 that it would in due course secure more information from its Algerian counterparts on the circumstances surrounding the mission to recover the plant from the terrorists. We would be grateful for an update.

Nigeria

50. Nigeria is split along its middle between a mainly Christian south and a mainly Muslim north. In the middle belt and in the larger cities, there are mixed populations where relations between Christians and Muslims have sometimes been tense, sliding occasionally into rioting and murder. Islamist political movements made their first appearance in northern Nigeria in the 1970s, since when demands for a more Islamic public sphere in the region have grown.[96] Following the restoration of civilian rule in 1999, every northern state adopted Sharia. Community relations in mixed areas have in general worsened since the restoration of civilian rule. Interlocutors in Nigeria put this down to a number of factors. These included the irresponsible behaviour of some politicians seeking to mobilise particular voting blocs, or of local media in the way they reported stories; perceptions of an increasing gap in economic performance between north and south;[97] and, in the religious sphere, a growing tendency for more strident voices—on both sides—to drown out the voices of moderation. Some people also referred to a lack of shared social space between Christians and Muslims, leading them to lead separate lives, even where communities lived alongside each other, and a lack of real opportunities for young people in the social as well as the economic sphere.

BOKO HARAM EMERGES

51. Since 2009, this escalation in tensions has been accompanied by a campaign of terror propagated by the extremist Boko Haram group. The movement (whose name is usually translated as "Western education is forbidden") emerged in around 2001, in the mainly Kanuri-speaking north-east; the cradle of Islam in Nigeria, but today one of the country's poorest regions.[98] Boko Haram rejects everything "Western" as sinful, and shuns contact with anyone not acting in accordance with its strict interpretation of Islamic law. Accordingly, it rejects the Nigerian state. Its main political aim appears to be to impose a literalist form of Sharia, although whether this is a local or global cause is unclear.[99] Some of our Nigerian interlocutors suggested that Boko Haram was an essentially nihilist organisation with no coherent political agenda, whose main aim was simply to spread terror.[100]

52. Initially Boko Haram focussed on teaching and preaching, but in 2009, amidst concerns that it was arming and becoming a security risk, the Nigerian government arrested its leadership. Riots broke out across the north-east, with hundreds killed. Boko Haram's then leader, Mohammed Yusuf, died in police custody. This marks the point of Boko Haram's transformation into an overtly terrorist paramilitary movement.[101] Since 2009, it has killed thousands, targeting churches, schools, government buildings, and the UN office in Abuja, as well as soldiers and police officers. It is thought that health workers administering the polio vaccine who were assassinated in February 2013 were killed by Boko Haram,[102] whilst more recently there have been reports of Christian women and girls being captured, forcibly "converted" to Islam, and married off to Boko Haram militants.[103] It is Christians in vulnerable areas who have been disproportionately targeted, but members of northern Nigeria's Muslim elites, and ordinary Muslims connected however remotely with the state apparatus, have also been attacked and killed. As a military movement, Boko Haram is understood to be loosely organised,[104] meaning that in some cases attacks attributed to "Boko Haram" may not have been carried out at the direct behest of the leadership. It has cells scattered across Nigeria, but the main concentration is in the north-east.

ANSARU

53. In around 2011, Boko Haram suffered a split, with the formation of Ansaru,[105] following apparent disagreements over tactics, and possible ethnic tensions between the mainly Kanuri-speaking leadership and Hausa-speaking followers.[106] Ansaru claims to be aligned with the global jihadist movement and is thought to be linked to al Qaeda,[107] but appears to lack the same depth of grassroots support as Boko Haram. Its main activity so far has been taking Westerners hostage.[108] Ansaru's activities have also included raids on prisons to free Boko Haram captives indicating that the two groups are not completely estranged.[109]

THE STATE OF EMERGENCY

54. By 2012, there were reports of swathes of the north-east becoming no-go areas beyond the control of state and federal authorities,[110] of a step-up in Boko Haram's military capacity, and of it beginning to take on army targets directly.[111] In May 2013, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in three north-eastern states, sending thousands of troops into the region. The state of emergency was renewed in November 2013. The Government's official message is that the army is winning, although the lack of objective information from the frontline makes this difficult to verify.[112]

55. When we visited Nigeria in early September, senior counter-terrorism officials in the federal government told us that Boko Haram had been pushed out of the towns and cities into the bush, that many of its senior leaders had been killed, and that its communications systems had been disrupted. The military experts told us that there were probably still a few thousand active partisans in the north-east, and we viewed video footage (which we understood to be recent) of a Boko Haram gathering in the bush numbering in the low hundreds. The officials told us that, despite recent advances, Nigeria would still welcome military assistance from the UK and others to help to finish the job. At a meeting with the Governor of Borno state, epicentre of the current violence, he alleged that a failure by the Cameroonian Government to protect its border with Nigeria from Boko Haram infiltration had enabled the movement to create a new safe haven in Kanuri-speaking parts of Cameroon's far north, beyond the reach of the Nigerian military. Recent news report indicate increasing evidence of Boko Haram infiltration of northern Cameroon.[113]

56. Until recently, Boko Haram had tended to be assessed as a cult-like body operating outside the jihadist mainstream, but the counter-terrorism experts we met told us of increasing evidence of contact between Boko Haram and other extremist groups, and that Boko Haram's military tactics were increasingly convergent with those of the wider al Qaeda movement.[114] The movement also appears to have begun kidnapping Westerners for ransom,[115] and the experts told us that this may have been as a direct result of an instruction from al Qaeda to diversify tactics and raise more money for jihad.

57. A December 2013 UN report[116] estimated that Boko Haram had killed over 1200 soldiers and civilians since the state of emergency commenced. In mid-January 2014 President Jonathan sacked the chief of defence staff, and the heads of the army, navy and air force, and has referred to a culture of competition between the security forces leading to "obvious lapses" in their performance.[117] It is very concerning to note that, as we publish this report, there seems to have been a further escalation of violence over recent weeks, with horrifying reports of well-armed militias roaming the north-east and murdering hundreds of people in raids. These include scores of children at a boarding school and worshippers attending their local church. Increasingly, doubts are being aired in public by political and civic leaders about whether the current military strategy is working.[118] When we visited the country, we were made aware of growing concerns about the state of the military. With some 80,000 serving personnel, the Nigerian armed forces are the largest in West Africa, but numbers are not large relative to the country's massive population and its security challenges, and we heard of perceptions that the forces' performance is in long-term decline and that there is a lack of leadership. The Nigerian air force is considered to be in a particularly weak state, with much of the fleet not currently operational.

THE UK RESPONSE

58. The UK Government has made very clear that it is a firm supporter of the Nigerian Government, and the Nigerian people, in their fight against extremism. We know that both countries value the bilateral relationship, and wish it to remain strong. Given the strong diaspora links between the two countries (discussed later in this chapter), it is particularly important that the UK has Nigeria's trust and co-operation on counter-terrorism. We are aware that the UK Government has expressed uncertainties or reservations, in private and public[119] about some aspects of Nigeria's counter-terrorism policy. One concern is that the federal government may have underplayed social and economic elements—what we labelled in Chapter 2 the environmental factors that may lead to instability—in its approach to counter-terrorism.[120] Some of our witnesses expressed very similar views.[121] Another concern that we are aware of is as to the conduct of the Nigerian security forces in tackling extremist violence. We understand that the UK Government is very concerned not only that some civilians may be being mistreated, but that a narrative of police and army heavy-handedness (or worse) towards ordinary people in the north and north-east risks playing into Boko Haram's hands. We are aware of very serious concerns relating to the ethics and conduct of elements within the Nigerian army, including allegations of torture and extra-judicial killing.[122]

59. Having visited Nigeria, and spoken to a range of Nigerians from different backgrounds and walks of life, we now understand even more clearly the nature of the battle in which the Nigerian government is engaged. Boko Haram's methods are repellent even by the extreme standards of modern Islamist terrorism. In Abuja, the briefing we received from counter-terrorism experts provided a chilling insight into the tactics, beliefs and mindset of Boko Haram militants. It also included a showing of a Boko Haram propaganda video that left us in no doubt as to the cult-like violence and sadism of the movement's hardcore. It was particularly distressing to see very young children being indoctrinated into, and participating in, the movement's brutalising and murderous activities.

60. However, we also understand the UK Government's reservations. Although we accept that all regions of Nigeria are challenged, it does appear that northern Nigeria needs major social and economic interventions, over the long-term, to address issues such as poor educational outcomes and a lack of jobs and foreign investment. Nigerian federal government representatives told us that the UK and Nigeria are essentially in agreement on this issue, referring to the three pillars of President Jonathan's northern strategy which, alongside the security crackdown provided via the state of emergency, also comprise the offer of dialogue with those willing to renounce violence (through the body known as the Amnesty Committee, which we met in Abuja), and various interventions to benefit the northern economy and public services.

61. The UK's reservations in relation to the Nigerian security services have led it to take a very cautious response to requests for military assistance and training. We understand that this has left the Nigerian government frustrated. Alongside the very understandable human rights concerns, it appears that the UK Government is anxious about the possibility of advice and training given in good faith being subsequently misused in a field setting, and of the British officer who provided the training becoming implicated. We sought clarification from the FCO when they gave evidence, especially in view of the fact that the UK Government has provided recent military training and assistance to countries such as Libya, Afghanistan and Kenya. The FCO confirmed that their military assistance was more limited than the Nigerian government wished. Simon Shercliff, Head of the Counter-Terrorism Department told us that:

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62. Mark Simmonds MP, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the FCO, sought to stress that the UK was nevertheless "doing a lot" to assist Nigeria in counter-terrorism, listing matters including advice on counter-terrorism strategies, anti-terrorist finance training, and judicial training.[124]

63. The UK Government wants Nigeria to defeat terrorism, but has concerns about assisting the Nigerian military. We fully understand the Government's dilemma but consider it important that the UK do whatever it can, consistent with its respect for human rights values, to assist Nigeria in its battle against Boko Haram's uniquely repellent brand of extremism. We ask the Government to be mindful of the importance of effective counter-terrorism co-operation between the two countries, given our strong diaspora links with Nigeria, and of the possibility of Nigeria eventually seeking security assistance elsewhere, perhaps from countries with far fewer scruples than the UK has. We note that the UK Government provides training and assistance to other armies in the developing world and seek clarification from the Government that it is satisfied that its position is entirely consistent.

Wider lessons from recent events

64. Some wider points can be made from considering all three events in the round. These relate to the four main premises on which the Prime Minister's statement of 21 January 2013, and the FCO's evidence to this inquiry have essentially rested; that there has been a geographical shift in the global contest with Islamic extremism towards parts of North and West Africa; that this is an increasing threat to UK interests; that this requires increased diplomatic, security and economic engagement from the UK and its partners; and that a failure to increase engagement would carry greater risks.

THE FRONTIER HAS SHIFTED

65. Essentially, none of the evidence we received dissented with the proposition that there had been a partial shift in the extremist battleground towards parts of North and West Africa where state authority is weak.[125] The evidence we gathered on our visits to Algeria, Mali and Nigeria, and our discussions with politicians, military figures, academics, and civic leaders, further confirmed that these countries are, in different ways, confronting a new, or re-invigorated, challenge from violent extremism. We agree with the UK Government that parts of North and West Africa have become a new frontline in the contest with Islamist extremism and terrorism.

A MAGNET FOR JIHADISTS?

66. However, we have encountered limited evidence thus far to confirm the Prime Minister's concerns that the empty quarters of the region have become a "magnet for jihadists". It has been established that at least two Westerners were involved in the attack at In Amenas,[126] and on our visits we encountered anecdotal evidence of South Asians, East Africans and Gulf Arabs being involved in some groups. However, the great majority of militants appear to be from within the region or, in the case of Nigeria, from within one part of the country.[127] We note that, at the time when he spoke, the Prime Minister may not have anticipated the extent to which the Syrian civil war would continue to draw in jihadists from around the world, perhaps diverting them from battlefields elsewhere. Should the Syrian civil war, one way or another, be resolved, we cannot predict where some jihadists might go next.

THE SCALE OF THE THREAT

67. It is more difficult to express a clear view on the scale of the extremist threat. In effect, this amounts to speculating on what would constitute a worst-case scenario were extremism left unchecked. No one we took evidence from considered that terrorists were likely to pose a serious threat to Algeria's current apparently stable form of government.[128] At most, it might lead to some power seeping back to more authoritarian elements within government, at the expense of the liberalising forces that have been quietly at work in the country in recent years. Similarly, in Nigeria, no one we spoke to considered the state, or national unity, to be directly under threat.[129] The risk was more insidious: that Boko Haram's campaign was destroying the authority of the state in large parts of the country, that vigilante justice was filling the vacuum, and that the campaign itself, and the state's response to it, might further erode relations between the Christian and Muslim "halves" of Nigerian society. We should add that there were some people in Nigeria who informed us that the security situation in the north-east was not the most critical issue facing the country and that it was more important, for example, to deal with corruption or the country's creaking infrastructure.

68. In the case of Mali, an al Qaeda-ruled rump state was a reality for some months, and some of our witnesses considered that Mali's neighbours were potentially vulnerable to a similar fate. Niger and Mauritania were singled out, and Mali itself was not yet seen as being out of the danger zone.[130] It is reasonable to assume that an Islamist statelet somewhere in north-west Africa would be a centre of smuggling, people trafficking and kidnapping; activities that already go on in the region. It may have some limited strategic importance, especially if it sat on valuable natural resources.[131] A rump state would have the potential to disrupt or destabilise its neighbours[132] and—although this point is speculative—launch attacks on more distant enemies.

THE EFFECT OF INSTABILITY IN LIBYA

69. Another country that our witnesses saw as very endangered was Libya. The country's domestic politics continue to be chaotic, civic institutions are weak, and terrorist groups are organising openly, particularly in and around the eastern city of Benghazi.[133] Given the UK's recent history of involvement in Libya, including military intervention in 2011, we decided that the domestic political situation in the country merited further consideration as a stand-alone issue, and we have agreed to take separate evidence on this issue, on 25 March 2014.

70. It has been widely agreed during this inquiry that the ongoing crisis in Libya has also destabilised a far wider area and, in so doing, strengthened the extremists' hand.[134] We discuss the extent to which this was anticipated by the FCO in the next chapter. Three main regional consequences have been identified as flowing from the crisis in Libya, all of which have been factors in the events covered in this chapter:

· A failure to secure the Gaddafi regime's arms caches after the regime fell has led to a proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and some heavier artillery, across North and West Africa, and indeed elsewhere. In Nigeria, we were informed that Libyan small arms had even ended up in the hands of Boko Haram militants, thousands of miles from where they originated;

· Many of the thousands of armed African mercenaries that the Gaddafi regime is known to have hired over the years left Libya hurriedly after the regime collapsed. The mainly Tuareg mercenaries who left for northern Mali helped catalyse the Tuareg uprising which led to the 2012 crisis in the country. It appears that some mercenaries then went on to ally with the jihadist cause;[135]

· Libyan border security and control over remote areas has sharply declined. It has become much easier for extremists both to settle in southern Libya and to make raids across the border.[136]

MILITARY STRENGTH OF EXTREMISM IN THE REGION

71. The success of the extremists in Mali appears to have owed as much to political opportunism as to military might. They seized the moment to capitalise on political chaos in the south, and made alliances of convenience with disgruntled elements in the north. However, they do also appear to have been well-armed and supplied: those of us who attended a briefing given by a French military commander at the October 2013 NATO Parliamentary Assembly were concerned by evidence of the advanced state of the logistics and materiel that he showed they had left behind in northern Mali.[137] That said, Operation Serval was able to quite quickly reverse the gains made by the extremists and only began to encounter greater difficulty when conflict entered a guerrilla stage. This indicates that extremists' main strength continues to be in asymmetrical warfare and that where military success brings greater exposure they are perhaps weakened. There is also reason to believe that the extremists might have struggled to maintain unity: recovered documents and public statements by groups show that they are prone to personality clashes and splits over tactics; between "ultras" and (in relative terms) pragmatists, and between local and global agendas.[138]

72. The threat from terrorism to people in many parts of the Western Sahel-Sahara region is immediate, frightening and real. The prospect of another extremist "takeover" of territory somewhere in the Western Sahel cannot be ruled out. However, it is important to maintain a sense of proportion about the scale of the military threat the extremists pose. The precedent of Mali in 2013 suggests that they would struggle to hold territory in the face of any Western-led intervention. We are aware of no evidence that extremists in the region yet pose an "existential threat" to the West.

THREAT TO UK INTERESTS IN THE REGION

73. The UK's strongest regional links are with Nigeria. There are cultural ties, through the English language, the Commonwealth, and the colonial past. In terms of trade, Nigeria ranked 30^th in UK exports in 2011-12 and the UK currently does more business with Nigeria than with any other sub-Saharan country apart from South Africa. The UK's commercial interests are mainly found in the south: in the oil-rich Delta region (where Royal Dutch Shell is one of six companies licensed to operate) and the city of Lagos. Morocco, Algeria and Libya respectively ranked 47^th, 65^th and 84^th for UK exports in 2011-12.[139] It was clear from our visit to Algeria that both sides are keen to grow both the business and the diplomatic relationship. The UK's commercial relations with Francophone countries of the Western Sahel are negligible.

74. We note evidence that regional instability will exert upward pressure on energy prices.[140] The UK would appear to be relatively vulnerable to any price rises: in 2012, Nigeria provided 12% of the UK's crude oil imports and Algeria 6%.[141] (Despite having enormous reserves, Nigeria has practically no gas industry and Algerian gas exports to the UK are small, although we understand that there are moves to increase them.)[142] Nigerian crude oil comes from the largely Christian Delta region. The Delta region is already very vulnerable to serious organised crime, although not currently terrorism; to that extent, any such upward pressure may therefore have already been priced in.

75. There was general agreement from those providing evidence that an increased UK security profile in the region does carry the risk of making more vulnerable our interests in the region, and our citizens.[143] In a few cases, especially kidnappings of Britons, the risk has already crystallised at the UK's current level of engagement, and clearly British expatriate workers are potentially at risk.[144] We did not take formal evidence on the size of UK expatriate communities in the region, but understand that in general they are very small. There are some 40,000 British passport holders living in Nigeria, most, we understand, of Nigerian origin.[145] However, we are not aware of evidence that, because of this factor alone, they are more vulnerable to terrorism or kidnapping than other Nigeria residents. We note the UK Government's policy of refusing, under any circumstances, to pay or permit payment of ransom money to terrorists. It is of course not possible to make any direct correlation but, as some evidence has noted,[146] significantly fewer British nationals have been kidnapped than nationals of some other European countries.

76. In relation to well-publicised claims by Mohktar Belmohktar that the attack at In Amenas was payback for Western intervention in Mali, which were dismissed by the Prime Minister at the time, the evidence we have received has corroborated the Prime Minister's view. This is on the ground that the attack, which happened less than a week after the launch of Operation Serval, would have taken weeks to plan.[147]

THREATS TO THE UK ITSELF

77. The FCO's written evidence stated that the terrorist groups at large in North and West Africa currently do not have the capacity to pose a threat to the UK mainland. This view was essentially not disputed during our inquiry.[148] This may be an issue of priorities as well as capacity: it appears that, despite the rhetoric of global jihad, most extremists in the region are, at present, more concerned with fighting local wars than with taking the battle to the UK, or to anywhere else in Europe. The Rt Hon Hugh Robertson, Minister of State at the FCO, told us he accepted the proposition that if groups were to unite, this might extend their reach, and may require the UK Government to revise its assessment.[149]

78. We sought views during the inquiry of the risk of diaspora communities in the UK becoming radicalised should the UK become more engaged in counter-terrorism activities in North and West Africa. The general view was that there was a latent risk,[150] but that the existence of diaspora communities also offered opportunities for the UK. For example, written evidence from two counter-terrorism experts argued that there was a need for the UK Government to engage more actively with North and West African communities in the UK, through existing strategies such as "Prevent."[151] The evidence argued that, if engaged with positively, diaspora communities could be an intelligence asset, and could help protect UK interests; and that without such engagement, there would be a risk of a reprise of the "home grown" terrorism the UK experienced in the 2000s, but this time with African-British rather than South Asian-British protagonists.[152]

79. According to the FCO's written evidence to the inquiry, the number of Moroccans, Algerians and Libyans in the UK each numbers around 20,000.[153] By far the largest diaspora community of any country considered in this report comes from Nigeria, although we were perturbed to note wide discrepancies in estimates of its size, with the FCO putting it at 190,000[154] and a witness, Virginia Comolli, putting it at around half a million. (It may be that the discrepancy is partly explained by the latter figure including British-born UK citizens of Nigerian extraction.) Ms Comolli informed us that the vast majority of British Nigerians were southern Christians, disproportionately from middle class backgrounds, and were relatively well integrated.[155] The shocking murder which occurred at Woolwich in May 2013, whilst we were gathering evidence for this inquiry, and which involved two individuals seeming to come from the background Ms Comolli describes, does underline the importance of the UK's intelligence services remaining discreetly vigilant in relation to radicalisation within West African diaspora communities.

80. UK interests in parts of North and West Africa are vulnerable to terrorism and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, whatever the level of UK engagement in counter-terrorism. It is possible that greater engagement might lead to increased targeting of UK interests, and citizens. However, we agree with the Prime Minister that UK and Western disengagement from the region, and failure to seek to address terrorism and its causes, would in the longer term carry greater risks for the UK.

81. We urge the UK Government to remain vigilant on the issue of possible radicalisation within North and West African diaspora communities, bearing in mind that dialogue and positive engagement with these communities could also contribute to an effective counter-terrorism strategy.

82. The UK's policies on non-payment of ransom money to terrorists may have helped protect vulnerable UK citizens abroad. We acknowledge the Prime Minister's global leadership in seeking to eradicate ransom payments. Countries that continue to flout the ban on payments are guilty of strengthening the terrorists' hand. The UK should continue to discreetly but firmly press its allies to end this practice.

56 Ev w23 (Guy Lankester); Ev w30 (Joliba Trust) Ev w32-33 (Dr Benjamin Zala and Anna Alissa Hitzemann) Back

57 "Mali Crisis: "Gao protests 'stop hand amputation", BBC News Online, 6 August 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19155616 Back

58 "Mali: Islamists destroy more holy Timbuktu sites, Reuters: 1 July 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/01/us-mali-crisis-idUSBRE8600EC20120701 Back

59 ECOWAS's full name is the Economic Community of West African States Back

60 Q 36 (Jon Marks) Back

61 The UN High Commission for Refugees (http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e484e66.html )has estimated that, as of December 2013, there were 165,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Mali, mainly around Bamako, just under half of whom were being assisted by the UNHCR. This is down from over 350,000 earlier in the year. The UNHCR does not appear to have a single statistic to denote refugees from Mali, but, as of December2013, the total number of Malian refugees in neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger was estimated at 160,000. This is only slightly lower than the UNHCR's mid-2013 figure. We were informed in Mali that most IDPs are black Africans from the north, whereas many or most Malian refugees are Tuareg. This appears to corroborate evidence that Tuaregs are more wary of returning to their homes in the north than non-Tuaregs. Back

62 See also Ev w21 (Guy Lankester) Back

63 Report of the 7095^th meeting of the UN Security Council, 16 January 2014http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7095.pdf Back

64 Burkina Faso Official Goes to Islamist-Held Northern Mali in Effort to Avert War, New York Times, 7 August 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/world/africa/burkina-faso-official-visits-mali-in-effort-to-avert-war.html Back

65 Mali's Ansar Dine Islamists 'split and want talks', BBC News Online, 24 January 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21180766 Back

66 Q 43 (Jon Marks) Back

67 Q 140 (Virginia Comolli) Ev w 9 (Dr Sajjan Gohel); Ev w13 (Dr Claire Spencer) Back