5 Conclusion
162. This report relates to a region
of great human diversity inhabited by hundreds of millions of
people. We have not sought to provide a comprehensive survey of
security issues in the region, nor a commentary on all the evidence
brought to our attention, but to set out the points of greatest
urgency. We do recognise that, if UK policy is to be effective,
it must be nuanced, and be tailored to specific circumstances;
a major challenge in countries as formidably diverse as, for example,
Nigeria or Mali. The dearth of diplomatic resources the UK generally
possesses in the region does bring into question how well placed
the UK is to meet that challenge. It is somewhat troubling to
acknowledge, in reviewing the evidence, gathered over the course
of the inquiry, that there are some significant gaps in information.
This relates particularly to the terrorist groups. We still know
little about the insurgency's leaders: in some cases we do not
know for certain if they are living or dead. We know relatively
little about how groups are organised, how strong or well-armed
they are; what their income is, and who their external supporters
are. We do know that they tend to thrive on the remote peripheries
of the region, which makes them hard to monitor and track, and
we have learned that gathering evidence about the groups by infiltrating
them is very difficult. The Government has itself acknowledged
that it is still learning about the region's complex dynamics
and that there are gaps in its knowledge.
163. Analysis and policy-making
about terrorism and insecurity in the areas covered by this report
suffers from a lack of information on some key issues. We consider
that increasing the gathering, and analysis, of information and
intelligence on terrorism in and around the Western Sahel should
be a priority for the UK Government and its international partners.
164. Islamist extremism is not a static
phenomenon. This report presents a snapshot view of the nature
of the terrorist threat in the Western Sahel-Sahara region in
2013-14. We cannot say with any certainty what the picture will
be like in, say, ten years' time. But we are certain that unless
there is concerted international action to address instability
in the region, and its root causes, the problem will still be
here. It may well be worse than before, and its effects may be
being felt far more widely across the world.
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