Foreign Affairs CommitteeWritten evidence from the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)

The following is a small sample of recent articles and papers published on key issues facing Mali at present. The paper is submitted by the Mali Programme at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). The Mali Programme has recently been developed by IIED with the view to contributing to UK and international thought on a resolution to the current Malian crisis in the context of wider instability in the Sahel, and the subsequent reconstruction of the Malian State.

The articles below are intended to highlight the following issues:

1.Human Rights Abuses

2.Commission for National Dialogue and Reconciliation

3.Drug trafficking

4.Elections

1. Human Rights Abuses

http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/07/mali-all-sides-must-abide-laws-war
Human Rights Watch—07.05.13

In accordance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law, the Malian government is obligated to ensure that human rights laws are upheld by all sides in the current conflict. Since the conflict began in early 2012 abuses have been widespread on all sides:

Rebel groups have committed violence against the Malian army.

The MNLA has been reported to have committed acts of sexual violence and pillaging.

Fundamentalists committed severe human rights abuses against civilians during their occupation of the north.

The Malian army has committed numerous violent acts of reprisal including summary executions, torture and disappearances.

The majority of these incidents are yet to be investigated and the Malian soldiers in question have yet to be held accountable for their actions. Human Rights Watch (HRW) proposes that the Malian government immediately respond by ensuring sufficient numbers of gendarmes to police the areas of conflict, questioning detainees and responding to human rights abuses by soldiers. HRW also proposes a staffed 24 hour hot-line to facilitate receiving and monitoring reports of abuse. It is vital that these issues are responded to immediately, in order to minimise further abuses which risk exacerbating ethnic tensions in an already disparate population.

2. Commission for National Dialogue and Reconciliation

http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/timoth%C3%A9e-labelle/malis-reconciliation-attempt
Timothée Labelle, openDemocracy—29.04.13

Such Commissions based on the Truth and Reconciliation models (TRCs) have the potential to ensure a longer lasting peace in conflict ridden countries such as Mali. In order for this to be achieved in Mali, the following issues should be taken into consideration:

1.The Commission has been established whilst conflict is still occurring and IDPs and refugees are still in their host communities/countries. If the refugees return after the reconciliation process has taken place, it is likely to destabilise the situation once again. In order to reach long-lasting reconciliation therefore, the TRC must extend the boundaries of their enquiries to include all Malians in the surrounding regions.

2.UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) published two reports in late February 2013, which highlighted the severe destabilisation of children’s education in Mali since the conflict began and the issue of gender-based violence, sexual exploitation and child recruitment. When looked at in the context of increasing food insecurity throughout the Sahel, there is a vital need to protect women and children.

3.The Commission could grant impunity for small offenses. However, the guidelines for offences dealt with by the Commission and those to be dealt with externally in the judicial system must be laid out clearly and coherently.

4.All fundamentalists captured must remain part of the reconciliation process to ensure the Commission is as inclusive as possible at all times.

5.The Commission must remain independent from the Malian government to avoid politicisation. It would be useful to have other safeguards in this respect, perhaps the UN PeaceBuilding Commission could act as a monitor.

6.The Commission should address the root issues of the conflict, rather than simply the human right violations which stem from it. There is a danger of recurrent violence if the dissatisfaction of the Tuareg population and intense poverty of the Malian people is not addressed.

7.It is vitally important that the international community aid and support the activities of the Commission to prevent and monitor any reprisal violence which occurs as a result of testimonies.

8.The Commission must work as part of the wider political process in Mali. If successful, it would reinforce and provide much needed stability for the Malian government, particularly in the northern region.

3. Drug Trafficking

(i)Cocaine flows through Sahara as al-Qaida cashes in on lawlessness

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/02/cocaine-flows-through-sahara-al-qaida
Afua Hirsch, the Guardian—02.05.13

Over the last decade the geographical nature of the Sahel and its lax border controls have allowed Islamic fundamentalism and cocaine trafficking to flourish. Alongside what appears to have been a deeply corrupted previous government, high levels of youth unemployment and poverty, the drug trafficking industry has become a fundamental part of the Malian economy. The traffickers have developed ways and means of ensuring their loot reaches the other side undetected and thus vast networks have developed throughout Mali and the Sahel. It is evident that drug traffickers living in Timbuktu are widely known and their identities are no secret. The root causes for Malians risking their lives to traffic cocaine must be addressed in order to put an end to the route through Mali.

(ii)Drugs: the new alternative economy of West Africa

http://mondediplo.com/2013/02/03drugs
Anne Frintz, Le Monde Diplomatique–February 2013

The geographic position of West Africa has made the region a vital hub for the trafficking of drugs between South America and Europe. Criminal networks are taking advantage of the corruption, instability and poverty rife in the region. It has become apparent that the drugs trade forms a major part of the economics of West Africa and particularly the state of Mali. After the Boeing 727 incident, it is evident that corruption is endemic throughout Mali’s government. The drugs trade has created links in Mali between criminals, militants and government officials who all receive a cut of the profits in return for their compliance. It is particularly associated with the pre-coup government of former President Amadou Toumani Toure, who would instruct army officials to turn a blind eye to the traffickers. Toure had used drugs money to combat the threat of Tuareg separatists by financially supporting Tuareg opposition groups. However, this strategy failed when Tuareg elements returned from Libya along with an influx of arms after the fall of the Gaddafi regime.

West Africa controls between 12% and 25% of European demand for drugs. With porous borders, regional instability, cheap logistical costs and corruption at almost all levels, it forms a considerable portion of the economics of the region. Criminals take advantage of the ethnic and cultural networks across the Sahel in order to ferry the drugs in many forms across the region. When AQIM and MUJAO took control of almost all of northern Mali, they were able to demand their own share of the profits either by taking toll money or by supplying protection.

A weak state is certainly necessary for trafficking the level of drugs which pass through West Africa. Equally, without a reliable network of government officials there to allow you safe passage, the trafficking would be extremely difficult. High level alliances are vital to the survival of the trade. For example, after the coup in April 2012, the trade went fairly quiet due to the chaos and disorder resulting from the putsch.

4. Elections—July 2013

(i)Mali’s July Elections: Between democracy and war

http://www.polity.org.za/article/malis-july-elections-between-democracy-and-war-2013–03–27
Kutloano Tshabala, Consultancy Africa Intelligence—27.03.13

Since the coup d’etat of 2012 and the subsequent outbreak of conflict, Mali’s democratic credentials once held in esteem by the international community have come under severe scrutiny. In this paper, the author posits that Mali was never a true democracy and so, in attempting to “restore” democracy now, it is unlikely to bring about peace and unification.

Despite having the characteristics of a democratic state, Mali lacked the implementation of certain key features; whilst there was economic growth, the country gradually lost sight of its democratic values and disillusionment spread with the distribution of political power across the country. Former President Amadou Toumani Toure used coercion and corruption in politics to restrict the formation of a legitimate opposition and elections were characterised by boycotts, low turnout and lack of credibility. It is hard to therefore state that Mali has been truly democratic in the past.

The international community, particularly the African Union and ECOWAS have split their Malian objectives into two phases: firstly to regain control of the northern territory by military force in order to unify the State, and secondly to begin democratic elections in July 2013. The international community has put great emphasis on holding democratic elections as a way of restoring political stability, legitimacy and peace. The debate within the interim government, Malian people and international community over the timing of elections serves to reinforce the question over whether elections should take place as early as July, when there is such little consensus.

Currently, the main issues surrounding the elections are: relationships between political parties, the limited electoral register, refugees and the illiteracy amongst many of the communities in Mali. According to the author, the following three conditions must be met in post-conflict countries prior to the commencement of an electoral process:

1.Security, to include progress in rebuilding the army and police force.

2.Adequate administrative and communication infrastructures.

3.A functioning and legitimate justice system and police force to provide accountability.

As such, Mali partially fulfils the first but remains distinctly behind on the second and third.

There are two issues here:

The power struggle could simply be perpetuated as the election fails to address the root causes of all previous Tuareg rebellions.

The inadequate time allowed for establishing the necessary institutions and electoral mechanisms.

The international community and interim Malian government must address the following issues in order for the July elections to fulfil their objectives:

1.The securitisation and unification of the Malian State.

2.Consolidation of existing mechanisms despite their inadequacy.

3.Ensure the process is as inclusive as possible.

4.Educate the public in the political process.

(ii)Mali’s coup, one year on

http://bridgesfrombamako.com/
Bruce Whitehouse, Bridges from Bamako Blog—22.03.13

The Malian fall from democratic grace in March 2012 is, in hindsight, less of a surprise when the situation is examined in greater detail. Consider the following warning signs:

Voter turnout was consistently the lowest in West Africa since the democratic process began in 1992. There appeared little representation of the Malian population throughout the country in the officials who were elected and according to surveys conducted, dissatisfaction with the idea of democracy was increasing as a result.

The growth of criminality and subsequent lack of trust in the ability of Malian police and authorities to provide safety and justice.

The Tuareg rebellion has historically been a concern in Mali with its root causes stemming further back than the fall of Gaddafi and the returning Tuareg population.

If President Toure had continued with elections as previewed in 2012, a new government might have been able to survive the difficulties it faced at the time and thus prevent the military coup.

If these signs had been noticed, the events of the past year may even have been avoided.

In a poll taken in Bamako last month most Malians feel not only unrepresented but also alienated from the political process. In a recent interview with Radio Deutsche Welle, the ringleader of the 2012 coup Captain Amadou Sonogo categorically states he will not stand in the forthcoming elections, but adds that if he were to stand, his popularity amongst Malians would certainly make him favourite. It is hard to believe that whatever the outcome, Sanogo will take a back seat.

If the elections are to have a chance at success, it is vital that the interim government and international community understand that they must first address the root causes of the March 2012 coup in order to ensure history does not repeat itself.

(iii)Azawad trumps Mali elections

http://www.dw.de/azawad-trumps-mali-elections/a-16697552
DW—26.03.13

The reporter speaks to several Tuareg citizens who fled to the South Mentao refugee camp in northern Burkina Faso after the coup last year. The first is a mother of three who explains that as she sees it, to be part of a Tuareg clan is to be part of the MNLA; they are one and the same. She says that if Bamako was to strike a deal with the MNLA, she would return home immediately (it is clear that the deal she is referring to is independence and formation of a State of Azawad). In Bamako many Tuareg have distanced themselves from the MNLA aware of the intensifying racial discrimination taking place in the north; it is unclear who the MNLA actually represent.

Speaking to Oumar ag Sidi, spokesman for the refugees at the camp, many Tuareg still hold out hope of an independent Azawad. He is sceptical of the impact of elections in July, explaining that for people like him they will not make a difference. He says he speaks for many like him who do not believe in a unified State of Mali and do not wish to be part of it. He explains that violence and discrimination suffered by many in Mali have meant that they feel alienated from an electoral process which they do not wish to be part of. He does not care who is elected, since he is not a Malian citizen, but a citizen of Azawad. For the mother of three, at this time when basic needs are not accounted for, elections are not a high priority.

5. Mali: what we must get right before world’s attention falls elsewhere

http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/feb/19/mali-worlds-attention-elsewhere
Jeremy Konyndyk, Poverty Matters Blog—19.02.13

In January/February the French intervention in Mali was covered comprehensively by the international media. However the focus has now shifted and Mali is descending back into media darkness. The challenges represented in Mali have deep roots and cannot be overcome by military means alone. It is important that these issues are faced before the international focus moves away from Mali and the Sahel:

1.Access. The conflict has allowed little movement between north and south, so it is vital that the access routes are open in order to unify the communities on each side.

2.Aid. The role of aid must be reconsidered in Mali with emphasis to be placed on “resilience”. In a region hit by considerable droughts and economic fluctuations, the international community must be prepared to invest in building resilience in such vulnerable countries. Traditional development aid has not been able to overcome the root causes of the issues faced over the last couple of decades across the Sahel. International donors are currently piloting a reliance-orientated aid approach which attempts to build countries capability to anticipate and deal with shocks.

3.UN Peacekeeping mission. Often Stabilisation is contingent on effective governance and in Mali, the government is notably weak and holds little authority. The majority of AFISMA countries who have contributed troops to Mali have little or no experience in Peacekeeping missions. Dialogue between northern communities and the interim government must be paired with local peace-building initiatives in order to build trust. Grass-roots peace-building and effective resilience will be key to overcoming the challenges faced in Mali and must be addressed immediately whilst Mali is still high on the international agenda.

Please find news from sources living in Mali. For security reasons the information has been edited to ensure the anonymity of the sources and people it describes.

Update from a Field office in Mali—29 March 2013 and 22 April 2013

Drugs/conflict funding is not even beginning to be sorted and remains a major issue despite French claims they have redirected some of this.

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder following the conflict is extremely prevalent. The hospitals in Bamako are asking for help from a Psychiatrist with how to deal with this. Women who have had their children taken by Jihadists are suffering from terrible trauma.

The child soldiers remain in detention in Mopti. This will not be helping their rehabilitation to normal life again when they are finally released. We don’t know what conditions they are in, but they may be very bad. The boy interviewed by Lindsey Hilsum (Channel 4 News) is still being held and has become an icon for state injustice amongst young people including in the south

People involved in the fighting are finding it hard to get back to normal, and some are now involved in violent robberies.

Pilot radio/mobile phone/media programme “Getting Back to Normal in Konna” is getting underway. The programme will initially focus on traumatised children and the collection of small arms.

In Mopti things are calm at the moment. A lot of the French are leaving but they have made a base in Kidal (the Malian army are not allowed to go there at the moment, but they may go to help recover MNLA arms). The major problems seem to be mines which have been planted by MUJAO, Ansar Dine and AQIM which are causing a lot of problems One exploded in Douentza in the field office’s area and killed someone. With Mali being so vast, and with a mobile population, the mine problem is worrying.

24 April 2013

We have heard from a Tuareg source living in the Timbuktu region that people are feeling “trop fatigués maintenant”. They comment that the situation has reached serious proportions; many in the community have died through a combination of starvation and illness.

Timbuktu is still with only one out of four power companies in operation and that very sporadically, partly due to the continuing scarcity and price of diesel. There are huge fears there that insurgents will be able to enter the city with impunity under the cover and security of darkness.

9 May 2013