Foreign Affairs CommitteeWritten evidence from Joliba Trust UK

Submitters

Christina Anderson is an advocacy specialist, working out of Geneva. She has supported African and UK NGOs in the development of advocacy strategies and research. She has researched issues of peace and democracy in Mali, the impact of war on children (for Tearfund UK) and the trafficking of illicit goods in Mali (for Joliba Trust UK).

Comments were added by Violet Diallo, and Caroline Hart for the Joliba Trust.

Summary

The heart of the current crisis affecting Mali and West Africa is illicit trade—mainly in drugs and tobacco. Illicit trade funds criminality, terrorism, and corrupts government and security sectors.

We must prioritise interventions that tackle illicit trade if we want a stable region. Any other interventions are like pruning the leaves of a weed, and leaving the roots untouched.

1. Drug Trafficking and Financing of Terror

1.1 A key driver of insecurity in the region is organised crime, especially the trafficking of illicit drugs. It finances terrorist networks and corrupts democratic structures and governments. A Wikileaks cable, published in The Telegraph on February 4 2011, quoted the FCO West African Team Leader as saying that narcotics trafficking was “the biggest threat to regional stability in West Africa”1 with specific regard to the possibility of increased terrorist funding in the Sahel and gang-style activity as seen in the Caribbean.

1.2 Since c.2000, West Africa has been steadily transformed into a major hub for smuggling Latin American cocaine into Europe,2 as well as the centre for logistics, command and control for Latin American drug cartels.3 The porous Sahelian national borders, the absence of state controls, and the historic networks and routes established by nomadic families across the Sahel-Sahara region provide the perfect conditions for trafficking illicit goods.

1.3 According to the 2013 UNODC Threat Assessment on Transnational Crime, the amount of cocaine transiting through West Africa has dropped to around 18 tons per year (versus its peak of 47 tons in 2007). This is worth around USD1.25 billion at wholesale in Europe, which provides substantial income to the people who facilitate its transit4. The UNODC in Dakar calculated that in 2012, around $500 million of this trade was either laundered or spent in West Africa.5 According to the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) a significant amount of the 25–30 tonnes of cocaine imported into the UK each year is conveyed by maritime vessels and air cargo couriers who transit via West Africa;6 northwest Mali is a key transit point for drugs heading to Europe.

1.4 Both Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) raise significant resources from the trafficking of illicit goods. US Drug Enforcement Administration says there is evidence that Latin American traffickers are collaborating with AQIM.7 They also allegedly receive funding from Qatari and Saudi businessmen.

1.5 In the past, AQIM simply charged traffickers for passing through territory it controlled. Western and Malian defence officials say that now, AQIM agents have notched up their engagement and offer armed escorts to drug convoys through the north, charging between 10–15% of the value of cocaine—hard currency that they use to buy arms and fund their recruitment program.8

1.6 Though it is clear that military intervention has disrupted drug transiting in northern Mali,9 the Islamists have used their time to forge close ties to many of the region’s drug lords. They have also gained valuable lessons on how to ship illicit goods around the globe undetected. This, according to some analysts, could be applied to large arms or nuclear material at some future point.10

1.7 Trafficking routes are flexible and adapt in response to law enforcement efforts and changing political environments. According to French criminologist Xavier Raufer “Since the first rumours of battle in Mali, drug logisticians have been thinking about new routes, have modified their journeys through the north of the country. New routes are already opening in Angola, DRC, the Great Lakes and Libya. The profits linked to cocaine trafficking are so big that longer routes and higher transport prices are not a problem.”11 This applies to criminal groups as much as AQIM and MUJAO, who are active across the Maghreb and can quickly put down roots in neighbouring Niger and Mauritania.

1.8 The UNODC reported in 2012 that there are perhaps 2.3 million cocaine users in West and Central Africa. The UNODC has raised concerns that the region’s role—particularly in processing cocaine—may be growing; evidenced by seizures of processing equipment for cocaine, ecstasy and methamphetamine.12

2. Contraband Tobacco

2.1 As relevant legal frameworks are inadequate or non-existent, transiting contraband tobacco to North Africa is easy low-risk work and has been practised much longer than transiting drugs. The UNODC calls it a “real goldmine, worth around USD 750 million per year”.13

2.2 Based on WHO figures, the UNODC estimated that in 2007, 21 billion illicit cigarettes were smoked in North Africa and 11 billion in West Africa. These are either branded cigarettes that are smuggled to avoid taxes in African countries or they are counterfeit cigarettes, made in China and Vietnam.14

2.3 A principal route to North Africa is via islands off Guinea, then northwards through Mali by road or by boat on the Niger river. Another important hub is Mauritania, which serves as a distribution point for Senegal, Morocco and Algeria.

2.4 AQIM also has links to transiting in tobacco, commanding a “tax” for the safe passage of cigarettes. Turf wars are as fierce as those over drugs, as AQIM factions compete with each other, with Tuareg tribes and with corrupt army and government officials. The cigarette smuggler with the moniker of “Mr Marlboro”—Mokhtar Benmoktar—masterminded the attack on the Algerian gas plant. He was a commander in Mali-based AQIM (reportedly killed in March 2013 by Chadian troops).

3. Trafficking and corrosion of democracy

3.1 In a straightforward case of greed or weakness in the face of vast sums of easy money, figures within government and the security sector have sought personal gain from active involvement in the drugs trade.

3.1 (a)Eg in 2007, lieutenant Colonel Lamana Ould Bou, a military intelligence officer with Mali’s Direction Generale de la Security Exterieure (DGSE) and a former member of the Front Islamique Arabe de l’Azawad (an Arab rebel movement in northern Mali) brokered the return of a cocaine shipment in exchange for cash.15

3.1 (b)Eg in 2009, the charred remains of a 727 aircraft bound from Venezuela were found on a remote private airstrip in Tarkint, northern Mali. Traces of cocaine were found and it was thought that 10 tons were offloaded before being set alight when it couldn’t take off. Tarkint’s mayor was widely suspected of involvement with drugs trafficking, to having close ties to both terrorists and government. It was he who negotiated the release of the UN diplomat kidnapped by Benmokhtar in 2008, who President Touré called “Mon Bandite.”16

3.1 (c)Eg evidence has emerged of the narcotics trade being re-routed through the Kayes region, following current military intervention. This is a region near the Mauritania border that has remained under government control and is therefore more stable. One Western expert stated that it was hard to imagine this happening without government acquiescence17. As it says in the UNODC report “smuggling is often accomplished not by stealth, but by corruption.”18

3.1 (d)Eg Malian soldiers were (allegedly) directly involved or complicit in at least two cocaine flights that landed in Mali during 2009 and 2010.19

3.2 The government has also allowed trafficking/transiting of illicit goods to take place in its territory as part of its security strategy. It has enabled them to “buy” political allegiance and militia support from groups who will manage Tuareg separatist insurgencies on its behalf or alongside Malian government troops.

3.2 (a)Eg the Mali government released people involved in the “Air Cocaine” debacle without charge: a French pilot, a convicted Spanish drug trafficker and the notorious northern Arab businessman Mohamed Ould Aiwanatt who—in exchange for his freedom—trained Arab militiamen to fight Tuaregs during the early 2012 unrest.

3.2 (b)Eg groups responsible for drug smuggling, lobbied the government for administrative control over ethnic groups: the Lamhar in the Gao region and the Berabiche in Timbuktu. 20

3.2 (c)Eg Arab businessmen from Timbuktu and Gao who were active in the trade of illicit goods, established their own militias, financed by Dina Ould Daya and Ouma Ould Ahmed. These were temporarily headed up by staff from the Malian army: Colonel Mohamed Ould Meydou and Lieutenant Colonel Bou.21

3.2 (d)US, French and Algerian diplomats have complained openly about the Mali’s government’s inaction on AQIM since 2006. Mali has been the recipient of millions of dollars in military aid from the US and EU to combat terrorism, but has little to show in the way of concrete action taken against AQIM.22

3.3 Collusion between political/security structures and organised crime shows how skin-deep Mali’s democracy is. Such collusion and corruption have eroded the government’s legitimacy at community level, and will make construction of legitimate democratic processes and systems difficult.

3.4 State complicity with organised crime enabled AQIM to grow and was a main driver of conflict in the north.23 Conflicts between competing smuggling networks have proliferated with the rise of drug transiting, which have fuelled intra-and inter-community tensions.24 Government rule depended on collaboration with criminal networks who became better armed, organised and powerful, and eventually tried to bite the hand that fed them.

4. Military intervention

4.1 The French are planning a gradual exit of 75% of their troops by the end of 2013. The Chadian President Idriss Deby has recalled 2000 Chadian troops, who provided critical expertise in fighting in the remote desert and mountainous regions, and who have suffered the highest number of military casualties (30 soldiers). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 7,000-strong AFISMA contingent that is working alongside the French force will likely be expanded into the fully-fledged UN stabilisation mission of 11,000 troops.

4.2 Analysts warn that cracks in the “peace” are accelerating. Speaking at UN Security Council in April, Mali’s U.N. ambassador, Oumar Daou, warned that “not all of Mali’s territory has been retaken from extremist armed groups and that they are resorting to new tactics, including laying landmines and conducting suicide and car bombs, in an effort to counter offensive by French and Malian forces.”

4.3 Key to establishing peace in Mali is the Political Process. Though the Malian interim government is meant to be following both political and military tracks to re-establish democracy, they—and international actors -have prioritised the military track in the push to restore territorial integrity.

4.4 A political process must address historic marginalisation of northern Malians from the political power and economic development enjoyed by the south. Northern Mali covers almost 70% of national territory, and is home to 10% of the Malian population. Soil fertility is poor, rainfall is low, water access is restricted and the region is prone to droughts. Agricultural GDP per capita is the lowest in Africa25. Despite gains from increased investment in the 1990s (some from government sources, most from private, NGO, and religious actors), it lags behind the south in terms of education, water and sanitation systems, road infrastructure and healthcare. Many livelihoods depended on tourism26, which halted following the insurgency.

4.5 With this degree of marginalisation AQIM and other terrorist groups can fulfil the state’s role and “win hearts and minds” through offering economic and social support.

A Mayor of a town near Timbuktu says:

“Here AQIM is not a jackal that is about to devour the nomads’ herds. AQIM does not pose a threat to the population and it has become a major force in the region. Its people have means. They get involved on behalf of the population in projects such as building wells and providing health care for nomads in the region. Many nomads think that AQIM and fraud are legal activities” 27

4.6 According to the UN Office of the high Commissioner for Human Rights AQIM pays up to $600, plus a monthly stipend, to parents for enlisting their children—some as young as nine—into their armies.28

4.7 The sums for funding the AFISMA military intervention from the EU (50 million euros) and Mali’s own military budget (153 million USD)29 are dwarfed by the monies gained through trafficking of illicit goods.

5. Recommendations

5.1 Drug smuggling in West Africa needs to be shifted from a marginal issue, to be recognised as a major security threat to UK and all other European nations and projects to combat it should be funded accordingly.

5.2 Greatly increase financial support to African-led initiatives that seek regional solutions to the problems and avoid problem displacement from one country to another

eg the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan, the UN West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) and expansion of its Transnational Crime Units beyond Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone

eg the Kofi Annan Foundation and the West Africa Commission on Drugs

eg the UNODC National Integrated Programmes for all the ECOWAS countries.

5.3 Expand SOCA (the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency) presence in West Africa to support law enforcement against traffickers.

5.4 Information exchange programmes between Central America and West Africa should be funded. After visits from Mexican officials to Ghana in 2009, with photos of the havoc that drug-cartels wreaks, Ghanaian authorities started to co-operate with international law-enforcement agencies.

5.5 UK should sign the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco, opened for signature in January 2013 and encourage West African states to do likewise. It should spearhead the development of international laws that oblige cigarette companies to monitor and trace product distribution and oblige them to deal with reputable agents from production to market.

5.6 The Political Process to reform in Mali must be scrutinised by the EU. DfID’s and EU’s Sahel strategies must ensure that aid is targeted towards programs in the north of Mali to stimulate development and economic growth and reclaim space taken by terrorist groups such as AQIM. Programs to strengthen civil society participation and community-level participation in anti-corruption programs and to generate income should also be funded and developed, in order to build a “bottom up” culture against corruption.

5.7 Recognise the impact and extent of organised crime on government and security sectors. Accompany the focus on strengthening the judicial and security sector with efforts to deal with criminal networks and to expose the corrosive links to government and military. The EU Training Mission (EUTM) and British military input should focus on this, as well as logistics and training.

5.8 Tie EU, DfID, UN development aid, capacity building support and military assistance to conditions of commitment from government and other stakeholders to combat crime.

30 April 2013