Foreign Affairs CommitteeWritten evidence from Paul Rogers, Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University
Summary Points
Radical Islamism in North and West Africa can be usefully analysed in the context of the wider al-Qaida movement.
The movement is far less structured as a hierarchical entity than a decade ago, but the idea of Islam under attack and needing violent purification remains potent.
The main region of current contraction for the movement is Afghanistan/Pakistan and the main region of expansion is Syria/Iraq.
North and West Africa, and particularly Nigeria, has the potential to become a further region of expansion.
Countering this should avoid a ready recourse to military responses and requires an understanding of the narrative embraced by Jihadists.
Introduction
1. In relation to extremism in North and West Africa, most recent attention has been on Mali and the French military intervention, but the issue of Islamist radicalism in northern Mali is one aspect of several developments across the region. These include low level but ongoing Islamist paramilitary activity in Algeria, a recent and substantial rise in such activity in Libya, and low level activity in Niger and Mauretania. Far more significant is the continued increase in activity by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria which is nationalist in orientation but has a loosely associated movement, Anasaru, which has transnational aspirations.
2. Moreover, all of these movements should also be seen in the context of the wider al-Qaida movement and its strong transnational perspective. While this movement was regarded until last year as being in serious retreat, this assumption should be treated with caution. Al-Qaida may no longer be a closely structured and integrated organisation but the idea is very much alive and retains a potency that may not be fully recognised.
The al-Qaida Context
3. The movement originally developed in the late 1980s among committed jihadists who had gone to the aid of the Mujahidin in Afghanistan in their rebellion against the Soviet occupiers. The expulsion of the Soviets and the subsequent collapse of the USSR were seen by some of the leadership as proof that a profoundly religious conviction was powerful enough to defeat a superpower. Al-Qaida then evolved into a transnational vision that superseded the more nationalist outlook of the Mujahidin and by the late 1990s was a transnational movement with some focus on bin Laden, Zawahiri and a small core centred once more in Afghanistan.
4. It had become an unusual eschatologically-orientated violent revolutionary movement opposing the many unacceptable Middle Eastern regimes of the “near enemy”, as well as Zionism and its backer—the “far enemy” of the United States. Common cause was also made with other Islamist movements whether in Chechnya, Kashmir, the Southern Philippines or Indonesia, but the key underlying factors were a puritanical religious underpinning and a timescale measured in many decades if not a century since it was rooted in an outlook that went beyond this earthly life. This is crucial to understanding the potency of the idea and makes al-Qaida a very unusual revolutionary movement.
5. Following 9/11, a vigorous and initially successful war on terror deteriorated into two hugely costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both could be seen by al-Qaida supporters as proof that Islam was under attack. Over the period 2001–6 al-Qaida affiliates were active in staging attacks in many countries including Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, Spain and the UK, as well as sustained violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. By the end of the decade, though, a combination of much-strengthened security measures in western states and intensive drone and Special Forces attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan had done much to degrade the al-Qaida movement. By 2010 there was a developing consensus among counter-terrorism analysts that al-Qaida was rapidly diminishing as a transnational threat.
The Al-Qaida Movement Now
6. This idea of a diminished movement has been undermined by recent developments in a number of countries.
7. Nigeria: Boko Haram continues to constitute a major threat to the Nigerian state, and the government responds primarily by the use of force. The activities of the Nigerian military have been particularly harsh, the recent killing of scores of civilians in the village of Baga being one example. There is little evidence that this approach is having a negative impact on support for the movement and while Boko Haram is primarily focused on the state, its offshoot, Anasaru, has a much broader transnational outlook which is closer to the al-Qaida vision. Ansaru’s recent kidnapping and killing of foreign workers has focused attention on what may be a trend towards making the whole of the Boko Haram movement more transnational.
8. Mali: There was some expectation that the French intervention would lead to a period of quiet during the hot season, with the confrontation developing later in the year, but in scarcely reported developments French and Chadian forces faced unexpected resistance from jihadist paramilitaries in February. Chadian troops lost 24 killed and around 50 wounded on a single day (22 February). Paramilitaries even infiltrated the town of Gao, there was a suicide bomb attack in Kidal, attacks in Timbuktu and a number of harassing attacks that contrast strongly with an expectation of jihadist paramilitaries restricted to a few remote mountainous areas. While French forces are remaining in the country, Chad is progressively withdrawing its forces and there are concerns about the competence of the Mali Army and of troops from other ECOWAS states.
9. Libya: One impact of the Mali intervention has been to encourage some Jihadist paramilitaries to return to Libya where they appear to be boosting Islamist paramilitaries that were severely controlled under the Gaddafi regime but have regained influence in the period of insecurity that has followed the termination of that regime.
10. Yemen and East Africa: Drone and Special Forces operations continue in Yemen but al-Qaida affiliates still control territory. In Somalia there has been some African Union success in expelling Islamists from Mogadishu, and Kenya troops control the southern border, but many parts of rural Somalia are untouched and remain in Islamist control. Meanwhile the “Swahili coast” of Kenya and Northern Tanzania retains a potential for violence as Islamist elements capitalise on a perception of marginalisation.
11. Syria and Iraq: In the context of Jihadist evolution, Syria and Iraq should now be taken together. In Syria the importance of the Jihadist paramilitary groups continues to grow. They tend to be more determined, more coordinated and more competent in urban insurgency, with a significant minority having previous combat experience, often against US forces in Iraq. Because of support from Iran, the Assad regime may last some time yet, possibly through this year. This gives even more time for Jihadist elements within the rebellion to consolidate their influence so that if the regime does fall they will have considerable power.
12. In Iraq, two related elements are important. One is that there have been numerous mass protests by Sunnis against the Shi’a-dominated Malaki government. These have been near-daily occurrences, especially in Anbar Province and have been hardly covered in the western media. In parallel with this has been an upsurge in violent paramilitary actions against the government by Jihadists embracing the al-Qaida vision. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) is a coalition of many of these groups which have collectively targeted government officials, police and security forces and Shi’a communities. The ISI regards Sunni politicians as having sold out to the Malaki regime. Significantly, some of the members within the coalition have very close links with the Syrian Islamist rebels, so that there is a seamless trans-border connection. The Syria-Iraq connection is probably the strongest current expression of the al-Qaida vision.
13. Elsewhere, and in addition to these major foci, the Caucasus region of southern Russia continues to experience the impact of the Caucasus Emirate insurgency and causes particular concern for the organisers on the forthcoming 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Islamist elements are active in other countries and there are regular arrests and trials of Islamists in some western countries, most notably France and the UK.
Overview—Motivations and Potential
14. Four aspects of the current evolution of Islamist paramilitaries are worth brief assessment in relation to developments in West and North Africa:
Distinctions may be made between orientations that are primarily nationalistic and state-centred, and those with a transnational orientation. The former include groups in Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali and Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the latter include Ansaru in Nigeria and elements in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Al-Qaida in Pakistan may be very limited in its capabilities and there have been arguments that the various offshoots and franchises are purely nationalistic but this is by no means the case—transnational elements continue and may even be intensifying.
The new social media were hugely important in propagandising the al-Qaida mission in the early 2000s, and remain important now. Would-be supporters across the world have continuing and ready access to information from all the zones of conflict listed above. What is crucial here is that the idea of a global struggle has become embedded within a small minority over the past decade and can be visualised even with reference to individual conflicts that are primarily state-centred. Thus suppression of Boko Haram may be an internal Nigerian matter but can be seen world-wide as one more example of the suppression of Islam.
The weight of opinion among counter-terror analysts is that there is little in the way of a causal link between poverty, marginalisation and Jihadist radicalisation. Recent analysis tends to challenge this and there is a strong case that while abject poverty alone may not inevitably be a factor, relative deprivation and marginalisation most certainly can be. This is certainly the case with Boko Haram in Nigeria and is also relevant among elements in Northern Mali.
World-wide patterns of economic growth over the past four decades have produced substantial increases in GDP but also a concentration of wealth in a minority of the population across the global south, but there is now a majority population benefiting from educational improvements and therefore knowledgeable of its own relative marginalisation. Revolts from the Margins is a term being used to characterise this dynamic and two of several expositions of this phenomenon are particularly significant. One is the element of radical Islam that benefits from this resentment and anger, and the other is the neo-Maoist movement as witnessed in Nepal and the Philippines but even more notably in the Naxalite rebellion in India. One has an eschatological dimension and the other does not. Which of these will be seen in the long-term as the more significant is not yet clear, but both should be seen, at least in part, as representing revolts from the margins.
The Impact of the War on Terror
15. From a western perspective, the response to the 9/11 atrocities involved an absolutely necessary war against al-Qaida and its Taliban hosts. More controversially this came to encompass regime termination in Iraq and, more recently, there has been regime termination in Libya. It is accepted that the response has not turned out as anticipated. Outcomes have included:
A 7-year war in Iraq resulting in an unstable and troubled country under heavier Iranian influence than before.
A 13-year war in Afghanistan with an uncertain outcome.
Over 200,000 people killed and 7.8 million refugees from the two conflicts.
An unstable post-conflict Libya.
Islamist activity in many countries including, most notably, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Mali and Nigeria.
A major internal conflict in Syria with potential for a serious regional impact.
16. Nevertheless, there is still the view that there have been few major attacks in western countries, even though the United States and its allies have suffered well over 6,000 deaths and at least 30,000 serious injuries to their military, as well as incurring costs in the trillions of dollars. With all its problems, the war is still deemed to have been necessary
17. From an Islamist perspective the view is rather different. Its motivation rests on a combination of a perceived need to radically purify Islam and a perception of Islam under attack. The latter is greatly aided by what are seen as violent and persistent western attacks against Islamic states, combined with continuing support for unacceptable regimes such as the House of Saud and Israel, making it essential that western dominance be resisted.
18. What is perhaps most important, and often least recognised, is that new social media and 24-hour TV news channels, make it possible for any actions in any one part of the Islamic world to be presented as yet further proof of a crusader conspiracy against Islam, with this powerful narrative persistently supported by apparently disparate events. Thus an armed drone strike in Pakistan, a Nigerian Army massacre of villagers, plans for a new US drone base in Niger or joint US/Israeli military operations are all seen as part of a wider pattern of western oppression, persistently spread through the new social media.
Policy Relevance
19. While al-Qaida as a movement may be diminished, as an idea it retains considerable potency. Its enduring strength lies partly as a means of responding to marginalisation and seeking purification of Islam but also by being reactive through violent opposition to western intervention. Such intervention might be seen in the west as entirely reasonable and proper. Indeed it may be seen as essential for western security, requiring military responses, yet the use of considerable military force over the past decade has not been as successful as anticipated.
20. In relation specifically to North and West Africa, it may be of value to pay more attention to the impact of military interventions on radicalisation within the region and among Diaspora communities in the West. It may, in particular, be useful to understand how radicalisation may relate to the impact of military interventions, especially with regard to the rapid spread of images and propaganda via new social media.
21. Given that the most significant Islamist element in the region is not to be found in Mali but in the Boko Haram/Ansaru complex in Nigeria, the UK might seek to use its influence with the Nigerian government to limit the current policy of reacting to the movement with considerable military force.
22. Finally, given the problems arising from the “boots on the ground” occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the current military direction is towards what has been termed “remote control” with a far greater emphasis on armed drones, Special Forces and privatised military companies. It is not clear that this will be any more successful than the approaches of the last decade or more.
Paul Rogers is Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University and a frequent contributor to www.opendemocracy.net. He is a regular lecturer at defence colleges, including the Royal College of Defence Studies and has previously given written and oral evidence to Select Committees on Foreign Affairs and Defence.
30 April 2013