Foreign Affairs CommitteeWritten evidence from Maurice Fraser, Senior Fellow in European Politics, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and Associate Fellow (Europe), Chatham House
Biographical Note
Maurice Fraser was Special Adviser to three UK Foreign Secretaries, 1989–95: Sir Geoffrey Howe, John Major and Douglas Hurd. He is Director of the LSE-Sciences Po European Double Master’s Degree programme and Director of the LSE European Public Lectures Series. He is a trustee and council member of several European think tanks and policy networks and is a regular commentator on European affairs in the international news media. He has recently conducted master classes on French politics for Whitehall departments and the BBC. He was made Chevalier de la Legion d’ honneur in 2008.
Key Propositions
1. The EU needs an institutional framework which enables it to improve the quality of its outputs and genuinely to add value.
2. The UK’s national interest remains in the promotion of a unitary model of European integration, with a complementary rather than an alternative role for “variable geometry”.
3. The UK has an interest in a strong European Commission that upholds the interests of the Union as a whole.
4. Whilst the assumption continues to take hold that monetary union requires fiscal union if it is to be sustainable, the appetite for far-reaching economic union in the eurozone is at present limited. The UK’s role should be to inject clarity and realism into such a discussion, in the interests of the EU as a whole.
5. Those who argue for political union to underpin economic union have yet to demonstrate how their proposed solutions would command legitimacy.
6. Institutional reform and public consent need to be pursued in tandem and not left entirely to post facto legitimation in the form of parliamentary ratification or a referendum.
7. The momentum behind EU enlargement has faltered, potentially irreversibly. Real effort will be needed just to keep the option on the table.
Argument
1. The EU needs an institutional framework which enables it to improve the quality of its outputs and genuinely to add value
This should be obvious but urgently needs restating. For all the soaring rhetoric of European construction, the fact is that the founding rationale of the EEC/EU was a practical and unsentimental one: it was to be an instrument for addressing collective action problems in those areas where solutions were beyond the reach of nation states acting on their own—principally cross-border issues such as the movement of people, goods, services and capital, but also those areas where collective action can yield significant economies of scale. On the whole there were few arguments about such public goods: the customs union, the common commercial policy, the competition policy and, later, the single market were win-win projects. To be sure, they produced negative externalities which required regulation. But the only losers were inefficient producers who had grown used to national protection.
This mission for the European Union is one which successive UK governments have sought to promote, with the accent on “outputs” and “deliverables”—the goods which make a real difference to the lives of Europe’s citizens. Far from being a minimalist “anglo-saxon” idea of Europe (mistakenly characterised as a glorified free trade area by some of Europe’s political and intellectual elites), this instrumental conception of the EU generates a rather long list of strategies requiring close cooperation, some best pursued intergovernmentally, others lending themselves to the Community Method. The list includes not only the dismantling of trade barriers but concerted action for dealing with cross-border crime, terrorism, migration flows, energy security, pollution and climate change.
This mission for the EU finds its legitimacy in the effectiveness of its outputs. But there are other lenses through which we look at the EU, and some of these are more problematic. One such lens is that of values, because the EU is a community not only of law but of values such as freedom (in the form of civil liberties) and democracy, originally enshrined not in the EEC/EU but in the Council of Europe—specifically in the European Convention on European Rights, though such rights now form part of the acquis communautaire. As with the original economic goods, these too were not zero-sum games: everybody could enjoy them. They are at the heart of Europe’s identity and are a key element of its attractiveness to others—its “soft power”. But, as a rationale for the EU’s institutional architecture, the “values vision” is deeply problematic, because, in its relentless attempts to lever up standards to a level which (to the minds of some at least) adequately expresses what it means to be a European, it falls foul of the decentralising principle of subsidiarity.
This has been most apparent under the heading of “Social Europe” and the recent concept of socio-economic rights. The UK’s objection to the Working Hours Directive is an example, as are some recent controversial rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. At best the “values” rationale of the EU is a distraction (no EU member state sends its young boys up chimneys); at worst, it takes the EU into unnecessarily contentious territory, alienating public opinion in some member states.
This is why the UK should press the case for an institutional architecture for the EU which enables it to realise its instrumental mission, concentrating on those (mostly cross-border) challenges of the 21st century which are evidently beyond the reach of nation states acting alone.
2. The UK’s national interest remains in the promotion of a unitary model of European integration, with a complementary rather than an alternative role for “variable geometry”
Successive British arguments have put the case for both unitary and flexible models simultaneously (and somewhat uneasily). While the flexible, decentralised and non-coercive character of variable geometry most closely reflects traditional UK concerns about sovereignty, concerns about marginalisation, loss of influence or potential vulnerability to caucusing by other member states has often impelled British governments to caution against fragmentation and the idea of a “hard core” Europe.
From a UK perspective, the most prudent course is to insist on the integrity of the acquis and the primacy of EU obligations over other political or legal instruments amongst Europeans, on the basis that the liberal economic character of the acquis, and the level playing-field it provides, serves the UK’s interests well. The demonstrable utility and moral capital which the EU has built over more than half a century should help ensure that Britain will find many allies for this argument. What is more, the unitary model has proven its ability to accommodate multiple forms of integration (Schengen, EMU, CFSP, aspects of JHA) outside its “core” competences and indeed has formalised arrangements for pioneer groups through the “enhanced cooperation” provisions of the Treaties. The UK needs to take care, however, to give convincing reasons when it calls for the exclusion of new areas of integration (such as those defined in the Fiscal Compact) from the EU treaties, and to learn better how to use the communautaire language of solidarity in the service of its national interests.
3. The UK has an interest in a strong European Commission that upholds the interests of the Union as a whole
Even before the economic crisis, it had become apparent that the power and influence of the European Commission had been waning. From a UK perspective as well as a European one, this is regrettable.
First, the Commission has responsibility for ensuring that the writ of EU law runs through the EU. (It was precisely to bolster the rule of law that the UK successfully proposed at Maastricht the power for the ECJ to impose fines.)
Second, the Commission has responsibility for safeguarding the interests of all the EU27. In any new institutional architecture for the EU, it will continue to perform this role, thereby helping to ensure that the UK’s keen interest in, for example, the single market and an effective competition policy, are safeguarded.
Third, the Commission has been a powerful force and ally for economic liberalism, structural reform and free trade. This is not widely understood by the British public; in the printed media at least, memories of the Delors Commission’s activist approach to social legislation die hard. But that chapter is closed and is likely to remain so, barring a seismic shift to the left in the Commission’s complexion over the next few years, which is improbable.
After a short-lived and unhappy flirtation in the early 2000s with a UK-France-Germany directoire—no longer an option in an EU of 27—the UK is now in a better position to understand, following its self-exclusion from the Fiscal Compact and the fears about marginalisation which this has raised, the need for allies in upholding the interests of the 27 and the integrity of an acquis which is broadly liberal in complexion.
4. Whilst the assumption continues to take hold that monetary union requires fiscal union if it is to be sustainable, the appetite for far-reaching economic union in the eurozone is at present limited. The UK’s role should be to inject clarity and realism into such a discussion, in the interests of the EU as a whole
Among many supporters of the “European project”, and indeed numerous “neutral” commentators, it has become a commonplace that, beyond the present eurozone crisis, a new system of economic governance going beyond the Fiscal Compact requirement of balanced national budgets, tight surveillance and automatic sanctions for excessive deficits, will be required. At present, however, against the background of painful fiscal retrenchment across the EU member states, there is little support for more ambitious ideas such as fiscal federalism in the form of a new dedicated budget for economic transfers, or for the mutualisation of existing debt in the form of Eurobonds (though the limited use of such bonds for new debt may yet prove acceptable to Germany).
We are still in an EU of nation states and, for as long as this remains the case, it would seem unlikely that the member states would fail to draw from the eurozone crisis the obvious conclusion that countries should in future avoid moral hazard and take full responsibility for their own economic management. As for the more radical ideas for European economic governance intermittently advanced by France (such as harmonisation of company taxes or of labour market regulations), these have attracted little support across eurozone members, given their potential to undermine the comparative advantage of many member states. Nor, crucially, are such ideas likely to be acceptable to Germany.
The UK’s role—from its position as a non-member of the eurozone but a significant economic and financial actor—should not only be to urge clarity in the Europe-wide debate about further economic integration but also to caution against a rush to political union which is not, of itself, required by the degree of economic integration which seems likely, in light of the limited provisions of the Fiscal Compact. (The legitimacy of such a political union is discussed at paragraph 5, below.)
It would not be in the UK’s interest to absent itself from such a debate, given its degree of economic interdependence with its eurozone and fiscal compact partners. But, to be effective, the UK’s contribution to the debate (however intergovernmentalist or “eurosceptic”) should be presented in a way which does not call into question its bona fides or its commitment to secure and build on the demonstrable achievements of the EU to date.
5. Those who argue for political union to underpin economic union have yet to demonstrate how their proposed solutions would command legitimacy
After decades of a progressive pooling of sovereignty through the extension of community competences, of the co-decision procedure for EU legislation, and of qualified majority voting (QMV)—developments which were widely taken as presaging a fuller “political union”—it now seems clear that policy integration in the EU has reached a plateau. Key areas of policymaking, such as health, education, welfare, pensions, law and order and defence, along with most areas of taxation, will remain matters of national competence, and there is no serious suggestion, even from federalists, that these should be revisited. (N.B. Whilst the communitisation in recent years of much EU activity under the heading of Justice and Home Affairs would appear to contradict the “plateau” theory, in fact this is one of the areas where the particular logic of collective action applies, consistent with the founding rationale of the EEC/EU—see paragraph 1, above.)
The absence from the European public space of most of the “high-salience” policy areas which touch directly on the lives of the citizen, with all the opportunities for political contestation and mobilisation which these present, is of major significance: it constitutes a potentially insurmountable obstacle to the ambition of building a legitimate political union on the foundations of a European “demos”. And it is by no means clear that proud and ancient nation states (with the possible exception of Germany) are yet ready to endorse the establishment of potentially competitive institutions with an equal claim to democratic legitimacy.
There are further reasons why a top-down or mechanistic pursuit of a European demos is likely to remain counter-productive. Ideas such as the direct election of the president of the European Commission by European voters, or even of the president of the European Council, run straight into a number of difficulties.
First, their adoption would require treaty change—a fraught and uncertain process, as European leaders have learned to their cost on many occasions over the last 20 years.
Second, the assumption that a democratically elected Commission or Council president would command functional (as opposed to titular) legitimacy rests on the heroic assumption that levels of allegiance and consent are unaffected by the geographical remoteness or cultural “otherness” of those who wield authority, even where democratically endorsed. It is asking a lot of people’s sense of European identity to suppose that a left-wing voter at one end of the European continent would comfortably accept decisions taken by a right-wing leader from the other end of the continent, and vice versa. There is a real risk here of jeopardising the cornerstone principle of democracy, namely, the willingness of a minority to be bound by the decisions of the majority.
Third, the well-documented and much-analysed decline in voter turnout at European Parliament elections reminds us of the inherent difficulty in building the legitimacy and credibility of a majoritarian institution which handles predominantly low-salience issues (even when its powers have steadily increased under successive treaties). It also illustrates the difficulties already experienced by the main actors and channels of contestation in any putative European demos: the pan-European party groups. Whilst the European People’s Party, the Party of European Socialists and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe are able to agree broad statements of principles and values, they find it much harder to achieve internal consensus around concrete policies from which European voters can be invited to make a clear and decisive choice. Furthermore, party labels can be misleading: it could be more logical for a supporter of free trade to vote for a Scandinavian social democratic MP than for a French centre-right MEP.
So it is by no means clear that European political parties are yet in a position to upload to the European level their national function of articulating clear policy options and aggregating voters’ choices. This is to say nothing of the lack of interest in politics shown by most citizens, most of the time, in well-ordered polities—let alone in European Parliament elections. And even if the political parties were more effective actors on the European stage, we are drawn inexorably to the conclusion that whilst the continuation, de minimis, of the present “passive consensus” within a full-fledged economic union looks very precarious, most of the innovations now being canvassed for addressing the even larger democratic deficit which would be opened up by full economic union risk disappointing expectations and alienating public opinion—thereby encouraging the centrifugal forces which such innovations were designed to reverse.
6. Institutional reform and public consent need to be pursued in tandem and not left entirely to post facto legitimation in the form of parliamentary ratification or a referendum
It is unrealistic and ultimately futile to posit any set of institutional arrangements as being appropriate for the UK independently of the likelihood of these securing public endorsement. For any new set of EU institutional arrangements to command public consent across the European Union and, more particularly, in the UK, with its particular concerns about sovereignty, the rationale of institutional reforms needs to be explained and set out in advance of the “end game” of treaty negotiations in an Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC). In the UK, this will require a degree of public information which successive governments have shirked, on the grounds that such activity could be seen as “propaganda”. This has led to the curious and regrettable situation in which one of the two central planks of UK foreign policy—membership of the EU (alongside membership of NATO)—has never been properly explained to British citizens—and this in spite of the fact that EU membership not only provides benefits for UK consumers but also creates rights for UK citizens.
To succeed in its objective, any public information campaign about the EU should explain the centrality of institutions and law in the European project, given the need to lock in the commitments of the member states and to prevent free-riding and cheating. Such an explanation should be intelligible and persuasive for British public opinion. Until now, however, the impression has been given that the customs union and single market provided by the EU can be guaranteed through self-policing. This is evidentially not the case—as the regular use of infringement procedures by the EU Commission and ECJ testifies. It needs to be explained.
7. The momentum behind EU enlargement has faltered, potentially irreversibly. Real effort will be needed just to keep the option on the table
A combination of enlargement fatigue, the distractions of the eurozone, concerns about uncontrolled migration and the social integration of minorities, and more general fears about the sustainability of the whole European project has chipped away at the EU’s most compelling narrative since the Single Market programme and risks undermining its international profile as an effective normative power. This presents a real obstacle to continued enlargement beyond Croatia and, possibly, Iceland.
For the Western Balkans, the accession process will be kept alive procedurally by the European Commission, which remains a committed but increasingly low-profile supporter of enlargement. If substantive progress is to be made, there is no substitute for high-level support from the member states and the public articulation of the case for a widening, outward-looking and inclusive EU, consistent with the principles of openness which historically have underpinned its success. But the reality is that none of the EU’s leaders now see any benefit in such an investment of political capital; indeed, it is striking how even the most enthusiastic supporters of EU enlargement, notably the UK, have largely dropped EU widening from their public discourse.
In order merely to retain a realistic medium-to-long term prospect of membership for aspirant countries, the UK government needs to explain why EU enlargement is a win-win scenario, not a zero-sum game; how the EU has built its success on an open and outward-looking mindset; how transitional arrangements can be put in place to ease problems of absorption and adaptation (as in Germany and Austria after 2004); and how stability and prosperity in the western Balkans, on the EU’s doorstep, is of vital interest to the EU’s existing members.
The case of Turkey, historically part of Europe’s “Other”, was more problematic even before EU accession negotiations stalled over Cyprus, European concerns about civil liberties and the treatment of journalists in Turkey intensified, and Turkey’s commitment to a western orientation began to look equivocal. The question of Turkey’s ultimate geopolitical choice (western, middle eastern, or eurasian/pan-turkic) is unlikely to be resolved definitively and is in any case simplistic: there is no reason why Turkey should not pursue several strategic vocations, whilst privileging its western one. But if Turkey’s EU accession is not to wither on the vine, the present stand-off will need to be overcome before its exclusion from the EU becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The case for Turkey’s EU membership remains compelling: it is in the EU’s interest that as important an economic player and commercial partner should join the EU (for the same reason it joined the customs union in 1995); that as influential and increasingly important a geopolitical player should join the EU (for the same reason it joined NATO in 1952); and that the EU should succeed in its mission of extending its norms and values beyond its present territorial confines.
29 May 2012