Foreign Affairs CommitteeWritten evidence from Professor Pauline Schnapper, Sorbonne Nouvelle University, Paris
Pauline SCHNAPPER, Professor of British Studies at the Sorbonne Nouvelle University, Paris. I have been doing research on the UK and the EU since I completed a PhD in International Relations at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po Paris) in 1997, having spent two years at St Antony’s College, Oxford. I published among other books and articles: La Grande-Bretagne et l’Europe: le grand malentendu (Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2000) and British Political Parties and National Identity: A Changing Discourse (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2011).
Summary
The decision of the present government to reject the fiscal stability pact signed by the other 26 EU members in December 2011 was unprecedented.
It has led to Britain being isolated in the EU, which cannot be in its long-term interest.
The EU has actually evolved in a “British” direction in the last 15 years, a fact often overlooked in the public debate.
The UK government should not let itself be drawn, for party political reasons, into an even more remote corner but play a full part in EU developments which are clearly in the national interest, such as CFSP, the single market, the future EU budget, etc.
1. The refusal of the coalition government to sign the fiscal stability pact agreed by the other 26 European Union member-states in the midst of a major economic crisis during the December 2011 European Council marks a turning point in the British engagement in Europe, with potentially long-lasting consequences. The obvious risk is that Britain will find itself isolated and incapable of exercising influence in an organisation which weighs heavily on its economy and provides it with an opportunity to increase its clout on the world scene.
2. It was the first time that a British government chose not to opt out from some aspects of a treaty but completely withdraw from a negotiation since it joined the EC in 1973. Neither Margaret Thatcher nor John Major had in effect adopted such an empty chair policy in spite of their reservations, to say the least, towards plans for further integration in the 1980s and early 1990s. They always chose, whatever the rhetoric, to try to influence negotiations from the inside, hoping thus to advance what were defined as British interests—the single market, deregulation, reform of the CAP, etc.
3. Arguably, David Cameron was in a different situation last December since the UK is not part of the eurozone and therefore not as directly affected by measures destined to help resolve the crisis as eurozone members. In theory it also pursues an independent monetary and budgetary policy, with no obligation to follow rules that apply to others. The well-known truth is, as acknowledged by David Cameron and William Hague themselves, that the British economy is totally interdependent with that of the eurozone countries and that it is definitely not in the British interest to see the eurozone collapse—whatever the gleeful predictions of some eurosceptics. It could therefore have been argued that the national interest made it imperative to sign the treaty. The other argument used, that the treaty failed to protect the interests of the City of London, “threatened” by new regulations, was also debatable. On the one hand it is not obvious that the interests of the City totally overlap with the interests of the British economy as a whole, as underlined at the time by some British business worried about British isolation in Europe. Secondly, it is not certain either that EU plans for financial regulation are contrary to British consumers’ interests. There should at least have been a debate on whether obsession with the protection of interests of the City can become counter-productive.
4. It is clear therefore that the decision to stay out of the treaty was taken not so much for economic reasons as for party political ones, which raises once again the issue of British euroscepticism, in its different guises, and the constraints it imposes on governments. There is still a widely shared perception in the UK that membership of the EU is a pragmatic adaptation to international economic pressures but that it fundamentally undermines the sovereignty of Westminster and the identity of Britain. In this view membership offers some advantages, such as access to a wide and expanding market conducive to growth, but the scope of the EU, or at least of Britain’s involvement to it, should be curtailed. The EU is seen as an obstacle to the UK’s full enjoyment of the benefits of globalisation and open markets. The Conservative party has entrenched this “soft” euroscepticism in its DNA since the late 1990s, while some in the party as well as its direct competitor in the electoral field, UKIP, campaign for a complete withdrawal from the EU. I do not believe that it is a reasonable reflection of the situation Britain finds itself in as a member of the EU.
5. The reality of the EU is much more complex than this vision suggests. Eurosceptics ignore the fact that the EU has actually become much closer to the model that they favour than it was 20 years ago and that the federal dream is to a large extent dead. The European Union is now much more intergovernmental, in spite of or thanks to enlargement, than federalists hoped for. In institutional terms, this evolution can be traced back to the Nice treaty (2000), when big EU countries, including Britain, secured a majority of votes in the European Council, thus preventing a coalition of small countries from potentially outvoting them in the future. Voters throughout Europe have become much more wary of European integration, for both good and bad reasons, as illustrated in opinion polls, European Parliament elections and referendum results, which imposes heavy constraints on what all governments are ready to accept in the EU. Britain is not alone in resisting moves towards more integration—France under Presidents Chirac and especially Sarkozy has reasserted the importance of intergovernmentalism in the EU, contributing to a weakening of the Commission. Britain is therefore less “different” than its politicians think from a new mainstream Europe.
6. In the midst of the sovereign debt crisis, it is difficult to assess the future for Britain in the EU. Provided the whole euro project does not collapse, more budgetary and tax integration is likely in the eurozone. This deepening of integration among some member states should not push Britain even further to the margins than it already dangerously is. In a European Union which would become de facto multi-tier, Britain should remain a central player in all the other crucial sectors dealt with at the EU level. This includes the Common Foreign and Security Policy, where the UK is a crucial player and has a vital interest in improving the efficiency of the current system, if only for economic reasons. Bilateral cooperation with France, however positive, will not be enough to reduce costs and improve European defence within NATO. The CFSP offers an opportunity to encourage other EU members, notably Germany, to improve burden-sharing. It also includes cooperation in the former “third pillar”, home and justice affairs, where Britain has enjoyed the “best of both worlds” (to use Andrew Geddes’ phrase) in being able to opt in or out of EU directives. British input into the EU will also be necessary in decision-making about the budget and single market issues in general if the government is to push the EU towards Britain-friendly policies.
7. The long-term economic and political interests of Britain and Europe in general require continued engagement in the EU, not the dogmatic opposition to anything European, based on an outdated vision of an illusionary “superstate”, which is too often heard in the British media and on some Parliamentary benches. The British government should acknowledge how much the EU has changed since the 1990s and the extent to which the debate about sovereignty is out of step with a globalised world in which individual European nations are not major players. The debate about organising a referendum on whether to stay in the EU is equally surreal—leaving aside the debate about the merits of referenda in general in solving complex issues—when considered within the global environment. This is marked by the relative decline of “the West”, the rise of emerging countries and an economic crisis unprecedented since the 1930s. In this context Britain’s active participation in the EU is more necessary than ever.
30 May 2012