Conclusions and recommendations
Broader context: UK ties with the Gulf
1. The
Gulf is a region that remains important to the UK's defence interests
and offers substantial commercial opportunities. The UK has benefited
from its historical links with the Gulf States, including with
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The UK's long-standing relationships
in the Gulf place it in a good position to extend and benefit
from these ties in the coming years. (Paragraph 12)
2. The UK is correct
to prioritise its Gulf relations, which remain key to the UK's
national interests. We are satisfied that the Gulf Initiative
is being appreciated by the UK's partners in the Gulf. It is largely
a re-branding exercise, but that does not invalidate its worth
as a signal of the UK's commitment to the region. However, we
find no conclusive proof of neglect by previous governments. (Paragraph
18)
3. The Arab Spring
in 2011 revealed some of the differences between the UK and the
Gulf with regard to differing domestic governance systems and
approach to the revolutions. The Government had to reassure its
old allies in the Gulf of its reliability while simultaneously
pressing them more urgently for change and reform. In this context,
the Government's emphasis on gradual reform based on participation
and consent is a realistic approach, though the Committee believes
the FCO should continue to monitor the effectiveness of its policy
closely. (Paragraph 26)
Bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia
4. The
UK-Saudi relationship continues to be important for the UK. We
have no reason to suspect that the failure so far to establish
a formal 'Strategic Partnership' indicates that the friendship
between the UK and Saudi Arabia has suffered. It appears that
practical reasons have prevented progress. However, we agree with
the Government's original position that structured relations can
provide a useful forum to enhance co-operation on common interests
and to raise issues of concern, and the lapse of regular annual
talks is therefore regrettable. The FCO should include the reinstatement
of talks via a strategic partnership, or the reinstatement of
the Two Kingdoms Dialogue, as a goal in its business plan and
should continue to represent the benefits of such structured talks
to the authorities in Saudi Arabia. (Paragraph 34)
5. Evidence of negative
perceptions of the UK among young Saudis is deeply concerning,
particularly in a state in which over 60% of the population is
under 30 years old. It is difficult with so little evidence to
draw conclusions as to the reason for the low level of trust in
the UK, but we recommend that the Government set out in response
to this report any research it has conducted on the public perception
of the UK in Saudi Arabia, and its views on the reasons for the
poor public perception of the UK. (Paragraph 39)
6. We recommend that
the Government make public engagement with the wider Saudi population
a priority for its digital diplomacy team in the Gulf and Embassy
in Saudi Arabia. The Government should also set out in response
to this report its public engagement strategy, including the steps
it is taking to engage with Saudi youth on social media, how it
is representing the UK to the younger generation in Saudi Arabia,
and what staff and resources it is dedicating to this task. (Paragraph
44)
7. The work of the
British Council is particularly useful in Saudi Arabia as it is
one of the only channels of direct contact between the UK and
Saudi public. As a provider of valued language training services,
it is able to co-operate with and support the Saudi authorities
at the same time as engaging directly with the Saudi public and
promoting a positive image of the UK. (Paragraph 45)
8. The growing Saudi
market and the Saudi government's spending plans offer huge opportunities
for British businesses across a wide range of sectors. Given the
large-scale opportunities available, we see no reason why the
UK should not set ambitious targets for growth in UK-Saudi trade
and investment. (Paragraph 56)
9. We recommend that
the Government facilitate a leading role for British businesses
in international consortiums to bid for projects in Saudi Arabia.
In its response to this report, the Government should set out
what resources it is dedicating to this task. (Paragraph 57)
10. We recommend that
the Government assess whether it would be beneficial to lower
the costs of its introduction services to British businesses for
a temporary period in order to boost the UK's participation in
the Saudi market, particularly for small and medium sized enterprises.
(Paragraph 59)
11. The current visa
regime is a significant source of difficulty and inconvenience
for both Saudi and British businessmen and undermines the UK Government's
stated priority of increasing trade with Saudi Arabia. The improvement
of the visa terms would be of benefit to both states and we are
disappointed that the UK has not managed to secure reciprocal
terms for its business visas. We recommend that the Government
make improving the visa regime a priority in its discussions with
the Saudi government when seeking to establish a strategic partnership.
(Paragraph 62)
12. Saudi Arabia is
an important buyer for the UK defence industry, and defence sales
are important to the overall UK-Saudi relationship. The UK provides
valued training alongside its defence sales that is beneficial
to both UK and Saudi forces. With other competitors in the market,
there is little to suggest that ending the UK's defence sales
would have any effect on overall defence sales to Saudi Arabia,
or that it would give the UK additional leverage to effect positive
improvements. The government must adhere strictly to its existing
policy to ensure that defence equipment sold by UK firms are not
used for human rights abuses or internal repression. In its response
to this report the Government should provide further evidence
that it is doing so in practice, including any evidence gathered
by end-use monitoring. (Paragraph 78)
13. Saudi Arabia continues
to be a vital but complicated counter-terrorism partner for the
UK and wider international community. Counter-terrorism co-operation
has proven to be of great and practical benefit to both sides
and has been instrumental in protecting British lives and interests.
However, Saudi Arabia is part of the problem as well as part of
the solution. We recommend that the Government make it a priority
to engage with its counter-terrorism partners in Saudi Arabia
to improve the monitoring of the funding flowing from Saudi Arabia
to organisations with an extremist message so that it can be more
effectively disrupted. The Government should also encourage Saudi
Arabia to ensure that its legitimate promotion of religious values
does not inadvertently contribute to the furtherance of extremism,
especially with regard to states in North Africa that have been
particularly vulnerable to the influence of extremist groups,
as well as in states in other regions such as Pakistan, Bangladesh
and Indonesia. (Paragraph 85)
14. Given that the
Saudi government does not acknowledge that torture is ever used
by its officials, we would welcome further information on the
safeguards the UK government has put in place to ensure that intelligence
shared by Saudi Arabia does not result from torture. Counter-terrorism
is an area in which Saudi authorities appear to be willing to
be innovative and to co-operate with international partners. The
UK should build on this co-operation to support improvements in
standards and best practice. The British Embassy in Riyadh should
pursue the chance offered by Saudi authorities to attend a counter-terrorism
trial and the Government should update the Committee in its response
to this report. (Paragraph 87)
15. We were surprised
and disappointed by Saudi Arabia's decision to reject a non-permanent
seat on the United Nations Security Council. We believe that Saudi
Arabia's concerns are best expressed from a position on the Council
within the UN system. The Government should encourage its counterparts
in Saudi Arabia to re-engage with the UN Security Council on these
important regional issues. (Paragraph 92)
16. Saudi Arabia is
an important regional partner, which is taking an increasingly
active international role. It shares many of the UK's goals in
the region and it is important to work closely with Saudi Arabia
on these shared outcomes. However, the government should be vigilant
with regard to where Saudi Arabia's promotion of religious values
may have a destabilising effect in the long-term, and must take
steps with its international partners to discourage this policy,
or to mitigate its effects. (Paragraph 96)
17. Although there
is a long way still to go in bringing stability to Yemen, this
is a good example of UK-Saudi co-operation to try to bring stabilization
and to promote development in a country that is key to Saudi Arabia's
interests. As such, it could act as a model of high-profile and
substantial British support for locally-led solutions to regional
problems. (Paragraph 100)
18. The UK and Saudi
Arabia share immediate and critical concerns with regard to Iran's
nuclear programme and its interference in states in the region.
It will be important for the Government to work closely with Saudi
Arabia on engaging with Iran as a more constructive regional player.
Saudi Arabia provides vital support for international action via
sanctions. Saudi Arabia's broader rivalry with Iran on ethnic
and religious lines is a cause for concern, but the Saudi leadership
has shown itself willing to act as a pragmatic and useful foreign
policy partner in containing the Iranian threat to regional and
international security. (Paragraph 104)
19. Saudi Arabia has
been a strong voice in the Gulf and Arab world in support of international
action on Syria. The UK and Saudi Arabia share a deep concern
about the conflict, a desire for a political solution, and the
requirement for an international multilateral response. (Paragraph
108)
20. We note the reported
supply of arms by Saudi Arabia to groups in Syria; the Government
should set out in its response to this report its assessment of
the situation and the actions it is taking to monitor any groups
that are receiving funding and arms from Saudi Arabia, and its
efforts to engage with the Saudi authorities regarding any concerns
about those groups. (Paragraph 109)
21. Given the UK's
close relationship with both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the Government
should engage with Saudi Arabia on the UK's efforts to promote
the reform process in Bahrain and an inclusive and substantive
National Dialogue. (Paragraph 115)
22. Despite some recent
improvements, the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia remains
very poor. The absence of civil and political rights and the use
of extreme punishments with inadequate judicial safeguards remain
of deep concern, as do the rights of women and minorities. We
recognise and welcome the significant steps that have been taken
toward improved rights and freedoms, particularly with regard
to women's rights, but this has started from a very low base.
(Paragraph 125)
23. Although we recognise
and are concerned about the poor human rights record in Saudi
Arabia, we are unconvinced that constant and severe public criticism
by the UK Government would result in anything other than disengagement
by the Saudi side. This would achieve none of the UK's goals and
could result in a worsening situation in Saudi Arabia. However,
it is important that the UK maintain credibility at home and abroad
with regard to its human rights work. (Paragraph 133)
24. Democratic governments
such as the UK face a challenge in trying to reconcile their liberal
constituencies at home with the need to maintain relationships
with undemocratic and conservative regimes that are important
to our interests on a regional and global level. We understand
that to encourage a Government such as that of Saudi Arabia toward
reform, a combination of private and public pressure is required.
By their very nature, private conversations are difficult to explain
publicly. However, we are particularly concerned that some witnesses
not only disagreed with UK policy but appeared to disbelieve the
Government's account of its private conversations with Saudi Arabia
on reform. The Government appears to have a credibility problem
and must do more to explain its policies and consider where it
can point to specific progress as a result of its human rights
work. We recommend that the Government consider what confidence-building
measures it could put in place, such as supporting access to Saudi
Arabia for NGOs and journalists, and conduct a review of what
information it is able to make available either to NGOs or in
the public domain. (Paragraph 134)
25. The UK is well-placed to
provide legal and judicial reform assistance and we recommend
that the government make this constructive contribution a focus
of its human rights work with Saudi Arabia. Despite
the considerable challenges, promising steps appear to have been
taken toward providing constructive assistance but these must
be converted into solid and reportable programmes. The UK should
also encourage the development of Saudi Arabia's consultative
systems, and we particularly welcome initiatives such as parliamentary
exchanges in this regard. (Paragraph 135)
26. The UN provides
an important forum for constructive discussion of Saudi Arabia's
progress and continuing challenges. Saudi Arabia's Universal Periodic
Review is an opportunity for the UK to make clear its concerns
about and support for progress on reform and human rights in Saudi
Arabia. Following Saudi Arabia's Universal Periodic Review in
October, the government should encourage Saudi Arabia to engage
constructively with the United Nations. (Paragraph 138)
Bilateral relations with Bahrain
27. The
UK's two recent ambassadors to Bahrain have taken different approaches
to their work in response to the situation in Bahrain at the time
of their tenure. We commend the energy that both former Ambassador
Jamie Bowden and current Ambassador Iain Lindsay have brought
to this role in a difficult situation. (Paragraph 157)
28. The aggressive
manner in the way that the Bahraini security forces handled events
in 2011 has deeply damaged Bahrain's international reputation,
and complicated its relationships with Western governments, including
the UK. Bahrain's failure quickly to implement the important and
practical recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission
of Inquiry has created further difficulties in its relationship
with the UK, and has squandered the good faith and goodwill that
the BICI could have helped to restore. (Paragraph 160)
29. In our view the
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry made sensible recommendations
and the Bahrain government's failure to implement them fully is
inexplicable. If it had done so, if would have been easier for
the international community as a whole to engage with the Bahraini
leadership. (Paragraph 161)
30. The Government
was correct to take a firm line in 2011 urging an end to the unacceptable
violence and expressing its deep concern to the Bahraini authorities.
The Government's efforts to re-establish close relations since
2011 appear to have been successful, and the UK is now well placed
to help Bahrain as it shapes its future. The Government must,
however, continue to monitor its policies in respect to Bahrain
closely. (Paragraph 162)
31. While criticism
of the UK in Bahrain is not new, it is a cause of concern. The
UK's high profile in Bahrain is an asset for the UK that can be
used to influence and support Bahrain's reform, but it also makes
British actions and statements a target for scrutiny and criticism.
Given the detailed attention that statements and actions by the
British Embassy receive, the UK must be extremely careful about
the message it sends to the broader public in Bahrain and internationally
as it positions itself as a "critical friend" to Bahrain.
We conclude that the UK Government is correct to try to use its
high profile and influence to good effect to support evolutionary
reform in Bahrain and to act as a critical friend. (Paragraph
167)
32. The British Council
provides a valuable vehicle for the promotion of British values
and the provision of useful skills in Bahrain. We particularly
welcome its commitment to learning and debate, which is a critical
service in a society that appears to be becoming more divided.
We recommend that in response to this report the Government provide
details on what skills training the British Council is providing
in Bahrain in order to enhance their students' skills to participate
more effectively in the political process of evolutionary reform
and change. (Paragraph 170)
33. The UK is well
placed to capitalise on its business reputation in Bahrain as
it begins large-scale infrastructure spending. (Paragraph 175)
34. The Government
should not grant any licence that could contribute to internal
repression and should make decisions on other export licences
on a case-by-case basis, ensuring the strict implementation of
existing policies. The Government should provide in response to
this report further evidence that it is adhering in practice to
its own strict policies with regard to British defence equipment
sold to Bahrain including any evidence gathered by end-use monitoring.
(Paragraph 180)
35. Both the government
and the opposition in Bahrain view UK defence sales as a signal
of British support for the government. The UK Government should
take this into account when considering high-profile sales, such
as the Eurofighter Typhoon, to Bahrain. (Paragraph 181)
36. Bahrain provides
the UK with an immensely valuable home in the Gulf and the defence
co-operation is mutually beneficial. Ending defence co-operation
and naval basing in Bahrain and seeking a substitute would be
an extremely costly and difficult step. (Paragraph 192)
37. We recommend that
UK-supplied training, delivered in the UK or Bahrain, should always
include human rights elements, and that the Government should
set out in response to this report the elements included in its
each of the training programmes provided to Bahrain that cover
rights, the rule of law and the correct use of force. (Paragraph
193)
38. We are disappointed
that the Government has provided so little detail to Parliament
and this Committee on its most recent defence accord with Bahrain.
It was predictable that Bahrain would consider it a public signal
of support and, if the Government did not mean it to send this
message, it would have been more sensible to have immediately
released information about the Accord and the UK's reasons for
agreeing it at this time. We understand that the Government does
not publish Defence Accord Agreements but in its response to this
report, the Government should consider what, if any, further information
it could release about this Defence Accord and the UK's reasons
for signing it at this time. (Paragraph 194)
39. Bahrain's implementation of the BICI recommendations has been disappointingly slow and has further damaged its international reputation. Swift implementation of the recommendations would have gone a long way toward preventing the breakdown in trust and fracturing of opposition in Bahrain. (Paragraph
200)
40. We are particularly
concerned by recent reports that the Bahraini authorities have
banned political groups from having unrestricted access to diplomats.
In its response to this report the Government should provide its
assessment of the situation including information on whether it
has affected any of the Embassy's meetings, along with any representations
it has made to the authorities to lift the ban. (Paragraph 201)
41. We conclude that
the Government is right to pursue a strategy of engagement with
Bahrain and to demonstrate the benefits of a reforming, moderate
approach. However, British engagement and support should not be
unconditional in the face of continued violations and slow implementation
of reforms. There is a danger to the UK's credibility if it allows
itself to become associated with the problems in Bahrain rather
than solutions. (Paragraph 210)
42. We recommend that
the UK seek to meet members of the opposition groups whenever
possible, and advocate on behalf of international and British
NGOs for access to Bahrain. In its response to this report, the
Government should set out the meetings held with Bahraini NGOs
and opposition figures in the last 12 months, and the steps it
has taken to improve NGO access to Bahrain. (Paragraph 211)
43. We recommend that
the Government make securing an invitation to the UN Special Rapporteur
on torture a priority in its next Joint Working Group with the
Bahraini authorities. (Paragraph 213)
44. The UK is right
to be understanding of Bahrain's dilemmas. For its region, prior
to the protests it was liberal and reforming, and there is not
an easy answer to its internal political issues. However, many
of Bahrain's problems are of its Government's own making. The
UK must press with greater urgency and force for Bahrain to implement
the BICI reforms, engage seriously in dialogue and welcome UN
mechanisms in order to re-establish good faith in its intentions.
If there is no significant progress by the start of 2014, the
Government should designate Bahrain as a 'country of concern'
in its Human Rights Report. (Paragraph 214)
45. We conclude that
Bahrain is subject to intense pressure from other states in the
Gulf, which have strong and opposing interests in what happens
in Bahrain. The UK Government should work to improve the international
context in which Bahrain seeks a national reconciliation. Regional
players must be involved in the reform and reconciliation process
if it is to have any chance to succeed. The sectarian element
to Bahrain's troubles are a complicating factor, but also make
Bahrain's reconciliation even more of a prize: if these communities
can find a way to reconcile and work together then it will be
an example in the region. (Paragraph 219)
FCO resources in the Gulf
46. We
welcome the Government's efforts to improve the FCO's Arabic language
skills in the Gulf, in particular by designating more posts as
'speaker slots'. However, it appears that 25% of staff in those
speaker slots have low levels of Arabic proficiency, and 40% have
not reached the required standard for their grade, undermining
the effect of this policy. For reasons of public diplomacy (to
local television interviews, for example), as well as to demonstrate
respect for the partner state, it is important that high-level
FCO diplomats speak Arabic even in those states where they can
manage in English or with a translator. In this context, we welcome
the re-opening of the FCO's language school, fulfilling a pledge
made by the Foreign Secretary in 2011. (Paragraph 226)
47. We understand
that it will take time to re-build Arabic language capacity, particularly
at the senior levels of the FCO, but we believe that it is important
that the Government demonstrate its commitment to the goal of
improving language skills at all levels of the FCO and incentivise
FCO staff to learn Arabic. We recommend that the FCO set a timeframe
in which it expects to make a minimum level of Arabic language
skills mandatory for those who wish to be appointed to senior
diplomatic posts in the region. (Paragraph 227)
Future of UK-Gulf relations
48. The
UK must make the most of what it can offer the Gulf: an established
partner with understanding of the region, and a bridge to the
larger powers of the United States and European Union. (Paragraph
231)
49. The UK will have
to work harder in future to maintain its influence and secure
its interests in the Gulf. The Government should ensure that it
does not lose its current momentum and should be willing to dedicate
further staff and other resources to this important region. (Paragraph
231)
50. The Government
should set out in its response to this report how the FCO is contributing
to the Prime Minister's review of UK-Gulf relations, and what
will be made public as a result of this review. (Paragraph 231)
51. The Government
must make the UK's public profile and reputation a more central
part of its work in the Gulf, and ensure that constructive relationships
are built with a wide cross-section of society, if it is to remain
a principal partner in the future. (Paragraph 232)
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