2 Broader context: UK ties with the
Map supplied by FCO
7. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are members of a
group of six oil-producing monarchies that border the Gulf, known
as the Gulf States. In the context of the Arab Spring, which brought
about a renewed focus on the UK's approach to supporting human
rights and democratic reform, our witnesses considered that the
Gulf States were particularly challenging for FCO policy. Although
their domestic situations vary, some Gulf States are among the
least democratic in the world, and they generally have poor or
very poor human rights records. However, most are also wealthy
and influential, and vitally important to many of the UK's interests
in the region.
8. In many ways, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are
at opposite ends of the spectrum among the Gulf States: Saudi
Arabia is the largest oil-producer in the Gulf and indeed the
world, and accounts for over 20% of the region's GDP,
while Bahrain has comparatively few natural resources and is the
Gulf's smallest economy. In this chapter, we consider the UK's
broad approach to the Gulf region as a context for looking at
its relationship with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in detail.
Historic ties with the Gulf States
9. The UK has a unique history of close relationships
with Gulf rulers and involvement in Gulf affairs including, in
different ways, with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The region became
important to the UK in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
as the UK established and protected its global trading network
and, eventually, its empire. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE
all became British Protectorates during the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, ceding to the UK control of their foreign affairs
in return for guaranteeing their security. Connections were also
established with Oman and Saudi Arabia, and by the early twentieth
century the UK had become the pre-eminent Western power in the
Gulf. The Second World War and end of the British Empire had inevitable
consequences for the UK's influence in the region, and the UK's
role as a principal power and guarantor of security in the area
was eclipsed by the United States and the Gulf States' own growing
power. Britain withdrew from its remaining commitments in regions
east of Suez in 1971, and the Gulf now comprises six independent
and wealthy states with considerable regional power of their own.
10. The FCO told us that the Gulf had mattered
to the UK for generations, and described the UK's relationships
in the Gulf as "among our most enduring in the world".
Britain's long history of involvement in the region has advantages
and disadvantages. Jane Kinninmont warned that some elements of
ruling families who felt they were disadvantaged by British influence
still harboured "resentments",
and several witnesses considered that in the wider society there
existed an exaggerated sense of the UK's ongoing influence and
power, and a perception that "behind the scenes there may
still be Brits pulling strings".
This latter point is particularly true in Bahrain, which remained
a British Protectorate until 1971 and is where the UK (arguably)
continues to exert the most influence in the Gulf. However, the
fact that the Gulf wasn't directly colonised was generally thought
to have resulted in a more mutually respectful relationship between
elites than has been the case elsewhere, 
and the UK now has a valuable legacy of close ties with a number
of Gulf rulers. For
the Gulf monarchies, the history of bilateral relations between
our two states is also a personal, and recent, history of their
families and states. Throughout the whole of Britain's relations
with Saudi Arabia since its formation in the 1930s, it has been
ruled by the current King's father and brothers. In Bahrain, one
of our witnesses reminded us that the British adviser was effectively
one of the most powerful men in the Kingdom until 1957, within
the living memory of some of the members of the current royal
family. Witnesses also noted a sense in the Gulf of the UK as
an experienced and knowledgeable partner, particularly in comparison
with other Western states (such as the US). Professor Rosemary
Hollis indicated that there was an element of flattery to this,
but Neil Partrick said "The clich is, 'You understand us.
You have been around roughly for 150 years'".
11. The UK's relationship with the Gulf is not
merely historical but reflects ongoing and, in some cases, growing
British interests in the region. As one of the most prosperous
areas in the world, located in the heart of the Middle East, with
over 160,000 British nationals living and working in the Gulf,
the region is important for all three of the FCO's key objectives:
protecting the UK's security, supporting British nationals overseas,
and promoting the UK's economy. The Gulf States are particularly
important to the UK in the following fields:
The UK has defence cooperation arrangements with all six Gulf
States which between them provide bases for the Royal Navy and
the Royal Air Force, and there is typically at least one Royal
Navy frigate or destroyer based in the Gulf, as well as Royal
Navy mine hunters.
The Gulf States are important counter-terrorism partners, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are founding members of the Global Counter-Terrorism
Forum (GCTF), an informal, multi-lateral 'platform' for sharing
counter-terrorism expertise and enhancing international cooperation;
and the UK and UAE co-chair the GCTF's Countering Violent Extremism
(CVE) working group, which aims to strengthen measures and discuss
best practice, and collaborate on a CVE Centre of Excellence.
- Energy security: as
the home of 55% of the world's proven oil reserves and 45% of
its proven gas reserves, the Gulf is critical to global energy
security and market stability.
- Trade and investment:
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given its natural resources, the Gulf
region has a combined GDP of £1.3 trillion and an average
annual GDP growth of 5.4% over the last five years. It is now
the UK's seventh largest export market, which the Government pointed
out, was "larger than India, Russia and Mexico combined".
In addition, the region is home to 27% of the world's sovereign
wealth and has increased its investments in the UK over the last
few years through high-profile ventures such as the London Bridge
skyscraper The Shard, and the London Gateway Port Project.
12. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain fit into this mixture
of interests in different ways: Saudi Arabia is very important
to defence, counter-terrorism, energy security and trade, though
it is far less well represented with respect to inward investment
into the UK than some of its neighbours in the Gulf, such as Qatar
and the UAE. In contrast, Bahrain is the smallest economy and
partner for UK trade and investment in the Gulf, but by merit
of its location in the Gulf and its willingness to host UK and
US naval assets, it is vitally important to the UK's interests
in defence and energy security. The
Gulf is a region that remains important to the UK's defence interests
and offers substantial commercial opportunities. The UK has benefited
from its historical links with the Gulf States, including with
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The UK's long-standing relationships
in the Gulf place it in a good position to extend and benefit
from these ties in the coming years.
UK Government policy: renewing
13. On taking office in 2010, the Foreign Secretary
announced his intention to reinvigorate bilateral ties with the
Gulf States, which
he considered to be "obvious examples" of states with
which Britain has historic ties, and could "do more."
This commitment to the Gulf is part of the Government's broader
efforts to promote closer bilateral relationships between Britain
and the major emerging global markets, and to place greater emphasis
on the UK's historic partnerships as part of a distinctive and
long-term British foreign policy.
The FCO's subsequent May 2011 Business Plan contained plans to
re-launch UK engagement with the Gulf States by establishing "strategic
relationships" with all six states, strengthening regional
security and improving commercial, economic, cultural and educational
ties. It has succeeded
in doing so with five of the six Gulf States; only Saudi Arabia
has not signed a dialogue or joint working agreement (see chapter
3 for more details).
14. The Government also launched a cross-departmental
'Gulf Initiative' in 2010. The Gulf Initiative does not have dedicated
staff or published strategy, but acts as a statement of intent
and an overarching framework for the UK's renewed effort toward
the Gulf. It has a relatively small budget of approximately £98,000
to fund related projects, for instance to support ministerial
bilateral meetings; to support a Commercial Diplomacy project
to promote UK companies in major industrial centres in South and
West Saudi Arabia; and the help fund the position of the "Defence
Special Adviser to the Middle East" when his work is in support
of FCO objectives in the Gulf.
This is unlike the FCO's Arab Partnership Initiative, (now called
Arab Partnership), which has a dedicated staff and a multi-million
pound fund for projects jointly administered with DfID, although
there is some overlap between the two (see paragraph 20 for Arab
Partnership funding for projects in the Gulf).
15. The Government has pursued improved diplomatic
ties by increasing the number of high-level ministerial visits
to and from the region, and by establishing working groups that
offer guaranteed opportunities for ministerial-level dialogue.
The Government has also said it intends to become the Gulf's commercial
'partner of choice', and it has set ambitious trade targets, including
the doubling of trade with Kuwait and Qatar by 2015. The UK Trade
and Investment (UKTI), the Government's trade promotion body,
has a Middle East Taskforce focused on the high growth markets
of the Gulf (UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar) and Egypt, and the Prime
Minister has led two trade delegations to the region in the last
three years. Cultural exchange projects have included the British
Museum's Hajj exhibition, as well as the Qatar-UK 2013 'Year of
Culture', which aims to forge new partnerships in the arts, education,
sport and science.
Significant outward and inward visits 2010-2013
|Outward (to Gulf)
||Inward (from Gulf)
|Over 230 outward visits by ministers from all government departments since 2010, including:
- Four visits to the Gulf by the current UK Prime Minister since 2010
- State visit by Her Majesty the Queen in November 2010 to Oman and the UAE
- Visit by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales and the Duchess of Cornwall in March 2013 to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar and Oman.
|Over 100 inward visits from "senior Gulf interlocutors", including:
- Inward visit by His Highness the Emir of Qatar in October 2010
- Inward visit by His Highness the Amir of Kuwait in November 2012
- Inward visit by the President of the United Arab Emirates in April-May 2013.
- Inward visit by the King of Bahrain in November 2012 and August 2013.
16. The Government told us that the Gulf Initiative
was showing "clear results" in its effort to reverse
neglect of the UK's relationships in the Gulf in previous years,
and that "increased UK engagement has been noticed and welcomed
by our key contacts in the region at the highest levels."
The FCO told us that the UK's bilateral trade with the Gulf had
increased by 39% over the last two years, from £21.5 billion
to £29.8 billion.
The then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Alistair Burt MP, the Minister with responsibility for the Middle
East and North Africa, acknowledged that diplomats in the Gulf
under previous governments were "giving absolutely 100% of
their best" but said that the word neglect had "popped
up" anecdotally on visits to the region, and the Government
had felt that there was more that could be done through increased
visits "and more we could do to give a sense that traditional
partners were as important now and in the future as they had been
in the past."
The then Lord Mayor of London, Roger Gifford, provided support
for the Government's position, writing that
until the last Government was elected in 2010, the
Lord Mayor was the only person on Ministerial level who visited
the Gulf on a regular basis. Since then the number of Ministerial
visits has grown and, whilst this has challenged Posts, it has
been appreciated greatly by the rulers and governments of the
17. All of our witnesses agreed that ministerial
and royal visits were appreciated in the Gulf. Chris Doyle said
that visits mattered, particularly at the current time: "They
want to see top-level royals and top-level Ministers coming to
see them, nurturing that relationship. It is a time when they
feel they need reassurance." 
However, witnesses cast doubt as to the claim that the UK had
previously neglected the Gulf, and the perception that the relationship
had significantly improved under the Gulf Initiative. Dr Neil
Partrick said he had been "struck by the Conservative Opposition's
concern about giving more attention to a relationship that they
felt was neglected. I don't think that the leaders of the GCC
actually did feel neglected [
] I do not think that the UK
Government has a lot of catching up to do."
Former ambassadors Sir Roger Tomkys and Robin Lamb also felt that
there had been continued diplomatic effort throughout the period,
and Jane Kinninmont saw "a fair amount of continuity. The
Saudi King's only state visit to the UK was under the previous
18. The UK is correct to prioritise
its Gulf relations, which remain key to the UK's national interests.
We are satisfied that the Gulf Initiative is being appreciated
by the UK's partners in the Gulf. It is largely a re-branding
exercise, but that does not invalidate its worth as a signal of
the UK's commitment to the region. However, we find no conclusive
proof of neglect by previous governments.
The UK's support for reform and
human rights in the Gulf
19. Upon taking office in 2010, the Government
emphasised human rights as a central pillar of its foreign policy.
During one of his key speeches in 2010 that set out the UK's foreign
policy direction, the Foreign Secretary said:
Our foreign policy should always have consistent
support for human rights and poverty reduction at its irreducible
core and we should always strive to act with moral authority,
recognising that once that is damaged it is hard to restore.
The Arab Spring revolutions that began the following
year led to a renewed focus on the UK's approach to supporting
human rights and democratic reform, particularly in the Middle
East and North Africa. The FCO told us that it had adopted a "values-based
approach" to the Arab Spring, and highlighted a speech made
by the Prime Minister to the Kuwait National Parliament in February
2011, at the height of the Arab uprisings. The Prime Minister
spoke about previous UK foreign policy and the Government's new
For decades, some have argued that stability required
highly controlling regimes, and that reform and openness would
put that stability at risk. So, the argument went, countries like
Britain faced a choice between our interests and our values. And
to be honest, we should acknowledge that sometimes we have made
such calculations in the past. But I say that is a false choice.
As recent events have confirmed, denying people their
basic rights does not preserve stability, rather the reverse.
Our interests lie in upholding our valuesin insisting on
the right to peaceful protest, in freedom of speech and the internet,
in freedom of assembly and the rule of law. But these are
not just our values, but the entitlement of people everywhere;
of people in Tahrir Square as much as Trafalgar Square.
The Prime Minister went on to offer "a new chapter
in Britain's long partnership with our friends in this region".
20. The FCO created the Arab Partnership in 2011,
which it says constitutes the FCO's "strategic response to
the Arab Spring". It is backed by the Arab Partnership Fund
(APF) which will spend £110 million over 2011-15 on relevant
projects in Arab states. Of this, £40m is administered by
the FCO's Arab Partnership Participation Fund (APPF), which funs
projects in the Arab world, including the Gulf, that support political
participation; freedom of expression and public voice; and good
|Arab Partnership Participation Fund funding to Gulf States 2011-2013
|Bahrain||Good Governance: Run by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP) & OPCAT
Supporting the ratification and implementation of Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) in Bahrain, by sharing best practice, raising awareness and facilitating development of independent monitoring of detention.
|1yr £30,000 |
|Kuwait ||Political Participation: Run by Ittejahat for Studies and Research (working with Gallup)
Developing national opinion polling and research by establishing a professional independent unit to provide decision-makers with accurate data.
|1yr £40,000 |
|Oman ||Public Voice: Run by Twofour54/ Thomson Reuters Foundation
Supporting Oman's Shura Council by strengthening communication skills of MPs and Parliamentary staff, to improve communication between parliament and the media.
|1 yr £55,077
|Good governance: Run by: British Council and the Bar Council Human Rights Committee
Providing peer support and advice to lawyers, prosecutors, parliamentarians and law students/ academics to strengthen rule of law and principles of human rights
|2 yrs £213,561
|In addition, Bahrain is one of the states in receipt of funding for two multi-state programmes on Good Governance (by Transparency International) and Anti Corruption (by the John Smith Memorial Trust), worth a total of £2.5 million. There have been no Arab Partnership funding programmes in Saudi Arabia.
A CHANGE OF POLICY TOWARD GULF STATES?
21. The Arab Spring caused Gulf rulers to be apprehensive
about the revolutions' potential for destabilising the region
and empowering their domestic and external opponents, and increased
their sensitivity to perceived criticism of how they deal with
dissent. Our witnesses provided us with little to suggest that
the Gulf as a whole was in the process of reform, and Jane Kinninmont
told us that "if anything, political rights for nationals
have been reduced in the last two years across the board in the
Gulf, with more criminalisation of dissent."
Freedom House, an American NGO, provided support for this. Its
2013 Freedom in the World report observed that "The
past several years, and the past year in particular, have featured
a steady decline in democratic institutions and in some cases
an increase in repressive policies among the Persian Gulf states."
The following chart shows declines in freedom rankings in the
last few years in four of the six Gulf States (higher numbers
denotes less free):
[Freedom House has published this annual comparative
assessment of political rights and civil liberties for the last
39 years. Each country is assigned two numerical ratingsone
for political rights and one for civil libertiesbased on
a 1 to 7 scale. Underlying those ratings are more detailed assessments
of country situations based on a 40-point scale for political
rights and a 60-point scale for civil liberties. For comparison,
the UK has been ranked as '1: Free' on the Freedom House Rankings
22. Freedom House assigns its rankings on a scale
of 1 to 7, with 1 as the most free and 7 as the least. Every year,
each country is assigned a numerical rating on this scale for
its political rights and for its civil liberties.
This chart shows that Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are now the two
lowest-ranking states in the Gulf (Bahrain is matched by the UAE,
both ranked at '6' in 2012-3). While Saudi Arabia has been consistently
below all the other Gulf states and has received the lowest possible
ranking for its civil and political rights throughout the majority
of the last thirteen years due to its long-term lack of democracy
and human rights, Bahrain was for seven years second only to Kuwait
in its freedoms, but has dropped significantly since 2009. The
Freedom House reports for this period attribute Saudi Arabia's
low scores to restrictions on political representation and opposition;
the media; freedom of religion, expression and assembly; and women's
rights. It further registers concerns about corruption, the lack
of an independent judiciary, torture, and discrimination.
In contrast, Bahrain was considered 'Partly Free' in 2003-9 (the
only Gulf State aside from Kuwait to achieve this), reflecting
several years of political reform in the early 2000s, which saw
the Islamist opposition party Al Wefaq win elections to the Lower
House of the National Assembly in 2005. From 2007-8, Freedom House
began to register concerns about a government crackdown on opposition
figures and the use of force to disperse protests, as well as
growing sectarian tension. In 2010 it downgraded Bahrain to 'Not
Free', and in 2012 it further lowered its ratings in direct response
to the violence and repression of the Bahraini authorities in
responding to the protests.
23. Our witnesses told us that the Western response
to the Arab Spring had also caused Gulf rulers concern and apprehension
about the steadfastness of their allies.
Neil Partrick said that former Egyptian President Mubarak had
been a personal friend of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and his
downfall had been seen by some as the result of machinations by
Western governments which were perceived to have 'abandoned' former
allies and embraced Islamist groups that were regarded as threatening
by some states in the Gulf. He said that as a result, the UK in
particular was no longer seen as "a kind of cavalry waiting
to come over a hill".
24. The Government considered the events of the
Arab Spring to be "game-changing" and "the key
strategic development since the launch of the [Gulf] Initiative."
It told us that it had "therefore adjusted the HMG approach
to reflect lessons so far, with emphasis on supporting long-term
political and economic reform across Gulf States".
Partly to alleviate concerns in the Gulf about the UK's enthusiastic
welcome for reform elsewhere in the region, the Government put
emphasis on its commitment to long term reform and respect for
different approaches. Mr Burt said: "The UK government is
very clear in its condemnation of violence and its insistence
on upholding the rule of law and individual rights, but it is
also clear that there is no blueprint for legitimately governing
a country and no one-size-fits-all model."
On a visit to the UAE in November 2012, the Prime Minister expanded
on the UK's attitude toward reform in the Gulf states:
My country very strongly believes that giving people
both a job and a voice is vital for creating stable, prosperous
societies, and we have a history of supporting human rights around
the world. Now that does not mean that we preach or lecture; different
countries take different pathways to becoming more open societies.
We should be respectful of the different journey that countries
are taking. We should be respectful of different traditions, different
But I do think that standing up for human rights
and standing up for the right of people to have a job and a voice
around the world is important, and I think this is a discussion
that our countries can have. 
The Prime Minister emphasised the importance of discussing
difficult topics between close partners, but said it should not
be "a relationship based on lecturing or hectoring."
Rather than advocating a direct move to an electoral democracy,
the Prime Minister spoke about the need for the "building
blocks of democracy and open societies", including courts,
the rule of law, and a "proper place" for the military.
25. The FCO drew our attention to the Prime Minister's
speech as an indication of its approach, and reiterated the UK's
commitment to long-term reform in the Gulf, emphasising legitimacy,
participation and consent as vital elements of a governing model:
It is in our fundamental national interest to see
stable and open societies emerge across the Middle East over time.
The Arab Spring has confirmed that long-term stability requires
legitimacy derived from citizen participation and consent. However
it is for each country in the region to develop a model that reflects
its own unique historical and social context and gives every citizen
a stake in the political and economic life of their countries.
It is not for us to dictate change in any country in the region.
With regard to both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, we
identified four key underlying elements to the Government's approach:
- An assessment that both states
are heading in the right direction, in difficult circumstances.
Alistair Burt, then Minister with responsibility for the Middle
East and North Africa, told us that "In both Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain we are dealing with countries that are edging, in
different ways, towards reform."
- A conviction that it is not the UK's place to
dictate change to states with different histories and cultural
traditions, even if it had the capacity to do so.
- A belief that the UK's leverage to effect change
in the Gulf is limited, and best achieved by working within the
system of the other state.
- An understanding that with respect to both states,
private pressure from the UK can sometimes be more effective than
Within this broader context, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
have very different domestic situations with regard to human rights
and reform. While Saudi Arabia was commonly seen as one of the
least democratic states in the world, prior to 2011 Bahrain was
seen as a reforming state and a progressive one, relative to its
Gulf neighbours. On this basis, the UK has adopted a strategy
of engagement with both states - offering a combination of support,
training and private discussions on human rights issues; alongside
some public criticism and pressure in certain circumstances. The
balance between these approaches differs in accordance with the
Government's understanding of its influence and the most effective
means to effect improvements. This will be examined in greater
detail in the bilateral relations section of this report.
26. The Arab Spring in 2011
revealed some of the differences between the UK and the Gulf with
regard to differing domestic governance systems and approach to
the revolutions. The Government had to reassure its old allies
in the Gulf of its reliability while simultaneously pressing them
more urgently for change and reform. In this context, the Government's
emphasis on gradual reform based on participation and consent
is a realistic approach, though the Committee believes the FCO
should continue to monitor the effectiveness of its policy closely.
5 Speech by HRH Prince Turki al Faisal for the Henry
Jackson Society at the House of Commons, 'A Saudi Perspective
on a Changing Middle East', 12 September 2013. Back
Before becoming the United Arab Emirates on its independence from
the UK, the UAE was known as the Trucial States. Back
Ev 133 Back
Q 4 Back
Q 4 Back
See, for instance, Q4 and Q 193 Back
See, for instance, Q69 and Q 193 Back
Q 75 Back
Q 4 Back
Speech by the Foreign Secretary William Hague, 'Britain's Foreign
Policy in a Networked World', 1 July 2010, London. Published on
FCO website: www.gov.uk Back
Interview with the Foreign Secretary, 17 June 2010, Al Jazeera.
Published on FCO website: www.gov.uk Back
"Foreign Secretary visits Bahrain", FCO announcement,
10 February 2011 Back
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Business Plan 2011-15, May 2011,
p.7 and p.19 Back
Information provided by the FCO, October 2013 [not published] Back
The figures of 160 outward and 100 inward visits were provided
in the FCO's written submission in November 2012. It can be assumed
that these numbers will have increased since then. Back
Second Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2012-13,
British Foreign Policy and the 'Arab Spring', HC80 Ev 81 Back
Ev 134 Back
Q 381 Back
Ev 124 Back
Q 69 Back
The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC): a regional organisation comprising
the six Gulf States. Back
Q 3 Back
Q 3 Back
Speech by the Foreign Secretary William Hague, 'Britain's Foreign
Policy in a Networked World', 1 July 2010, London. Published
on FCO website: www.gov.uk Back
APPF spending in the Gulf States is capped at £250,000 per
annum in line with the FCO's Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)
commitments. See FCO, Arab Partnership Programme Approach 2011-15 Back
FCO, Arab Partnership Programme Fund: Project list FY 12/13.
Q 16 Back
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2013:Democratic Breakthroughs
in the Balance: Selected data from Freedom House's annual survey
of political rights and civil liberties. www.freedomhouse.org
Underlying the Freedom House ratings are more detailed assessments
of country situations based on a 40-point scale for political
rights and a 60-point scale for civil liberties. The Report explains:
A 'Free' country is one where there is open political competition,
a climate of respectfor civil liberties, significant independentcivic
life, and independent media.A'Partly Free'country is one in whichthere
is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. Partly
Free states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption,
weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and a political
landscape in which a single party enjoys dominance despite a certain
degree of pluralism. A 'Not Free' country is one where basic political
rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically
Freedom House, Freedom in the World database on Freedom House
website, at www.freedomhouse.org Back
See, for instance, Q 177 Back
Q 8 Back
Second Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2012-13,
British Foreign Policy and the 'Arab Spring', HC80, Ev 81 Back
Q 379 Back
Q&A with Prime Minister David Cameron, 5 November 2012, Zayed
University, Abu Dhabi. www.gov.uk/government/speeches Back
Ev 133 Back
Q 425 Back