Extremism and political instability in North and West Africa

Written evidence from Dr. Sajjan Gohel , International Security Director, Asia-Pacific Foundation

Libya And The Cyrenaica Blowback

Dr. Sajjan Gohel is currently, International Security Director for the Asia-Pacific Foundation (APF) which is an independent security and intelligence think-tank based in London. The APF provides analysis on a variety of security and terrorist related issues and is regularly consulted by various government and military departments and media organisations both domestic and foreign including BBC, ITN, Sky News, CNN, ABC, NBC, MSNBC, CTV and CBC. Sajjan is also a regular speaker at international conferences on terrorism and security issues.

Sajjan has been part of the APF team that contributed written testimony and oral evidence for the United Kingdom Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Commons on topics including ‘Foreign Policy Aspects Of The War Against Terrorism’, ‘Terrorism in South Asia’ and ‘Global Security: Afghanistan’ and ‘The UK’s Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan And Pakistan.’

In March 2005, Sajjan was asked by the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHCR) to produce an assessment on Lebanon and the security concerns after the killing of prominent Lebanese politician Rafik Hariri.

In 2005, Sajjan formed part of a European Union high-level working group to discuss the terror threat in the region and to produce a working paper for then European Union counter-terrorism chief, Gijs De Vries.

Sajjan serves as a visiting lecturer and teacher to the London School of Economics (LSE); the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany; the NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara, Turkey and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

Sajjan also part of the ‘Partnership for Peace Consortium: Combating Terrorism Working Group’ organised by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO. Sajjan is also on the editorial review board for the journal ‘Combating Terrorism Exchange’ (CTX) at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Sajjan, received his BA (Hons) in Politics from Queen Mary, University of London. Sajjan has also obtained a Master's (MSc) in Comparative Politics from the LSE and a PhD at the LSE entitled, ‘Insurrection of the Ideologues : The Evolution Of Egyptian Islamist Radical Thought From Hasan al-Banna to Ayman al-Zawahiri.’

Summary

· In term of instability in North Africa, Libya will preoccupy the international community in the short-term.

· The legacy of the country's civil war has led to an exponential growth in weapons-smuggling and a proliferation of irrepressible militias.

· The epicentre of the problems is located in the eastern region of Cyrenaica and its capital Benghazi. What transpires in Benghazi vibrates throughout Libya. Benghazi has long been a bastion of radical militant activity even during the height of Colonel Mu'ammar Qaddafi’s reign.

· Libya is facing a challenging point in its history and is currently standing at the crossroads with significant security challenges that could have severe ramifications across several countries and regions with potential blowback into western Europe including into the United Kingdom.

· The blowback may not always originate in Libya but could travel indirectly from events in Mali and Algeria. The 23rd April, 2013, bomb blast in Tripoli against the French Embassy is a case in point. The attack is seen as a reprisal by Libyan militants for the decision by Paris to extend its military involvement in Mali.

· The 11th September, 2012, attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, which killed U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and 3 other Americans, was an incident waiting to happen and cannot be seen in isolation but as part of a series of attacks in Benghazi that illustrate the wider security problems.

· The desecration of British war graves in a military cemetery and the attack on the British ambassador to Libya’s convoy in Benghazi in 2012 highlights the different outlook that separates Libya's Islamist militias from secular groups. While mainstream units regard Britain as an ally, thanks to the role that NATO played in the revolution that toppled Qaddafi, some Islamist groups view Britain and the west as the enemy.

· In addition to attacks against diplomats and NGOs, throughout 2012, there were also a series of assassinations in Cyrenaica that targeted army officials who had sometimes held prominent positions under the Qaddafi regime.

· Even though the protesters who initially rose up against Qaddafi in mid-February 2011 originated from Cyrenaica, much of the security apparatus set up in the wake of his ousting ended up being dominated by western militias, based in the Tripolitania region and as a result eastern mistrust of western intentions still lingers.

· The issue of federalism and local autonomy have remained subjects of great sensitivity that will become even more critical when they are discussed in the framework of the country's draft constitution in December 2013.

· Cyrenaica accounts for nearly 80 % of the country’s oil production and armed militias in that part of the country have already illustrated the ability to shut down production as leverage over the central government in Tripoli.

· In Libya, the issues of security and regionalism are also intrinsically linked to the role Islam should play in defining the country's post-Qaddafi identity. Most Libyans expect and want Islam to play a role in political life, but opinions vary widely as to exactly what this means.

· Some of Cyrenaica's most notorious Islamists have given up their military struggle and formed political parties instead, thus accepting for now the rules of the democracy. However, some militias are directing unsanctioned security arrangements in some Cyrenaican cities. A few retain affiliation with al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

· There is a belief that AQIM fighters have obtained weaponry from plundered Libyan military stockpiles. The Algerian, Malian, and Chadian governments continue to express concern about the potential for instability in Libya which could weaken security along Libya’s long borders and allow AQIM operatives and criminal networks to move more freely.

· Despite a significant rise in the number of Islamists across the nation, and particularly in Cyrenaica, religious militancy does not seem to reflect the Libyan people's wider religious or political objectives. In the July 2012 landmark parliamentary elections, Libyans largely supported moderate parties and candidates, reversing a regional trend in support of Islamists who fared quite poorly.

Introduction

1. In term of security challenges in North Africa, Libya will most likely preoccupy the international community in the short-term. Despite the success of the country's July 2012 parliamentary elections, which witnessed a high turnout rate and took place relatively peacefully, the legacy of the country's civil war has led to an exponential growth in weapons-smuggling, a proliferation of irrepressible militias and an ever-widening sphere of anarchy and insecurity in its south. All these elements contribute to regional instability.

2. The epicentre of the problems is located in the influential eastern city of Benghazi where militancy is on the rise. Of all the sub-regions in North Africa and the Sahel, the largest potential for blowback into Western Europe is what emanates from Benghazi and the eastern province it is located in, Cyrenaica. The insecurity in this region can have negative repercussions for British interests in North Africa as well as potentially harming national security at home.

3. What transpires in Benghazi vibrates throughout Libya. Stretching from the coastal town of Sirte to Egypt and southward to the Saharan border with Chad, the Cyrenaica region comprises a population of 1.6 million which is less than a third of the Libyan populace. [1] Ethnically, the area is divided between a largely urban Arab population spread among towns in the mountainous coastal region and a more rural, black minority tribe, the Tabu, which populates the south. The region is home to several hundred tribes. Nearly every tribe in the east has linkages elsewhere in Libya, to the extent that Cyrenaica is sometimes referred to as a symbol of the entire country.

4. The blowback into western Europe may not always originate in Libya but could travel indirectly from events in Mali. The 23rd April bomb blast in Tripoli that destroyed half of the French Embassy is a case in point. The explosion injured two French guards, one critically. The attack is seen as a reprisal by Libyan militants for the decision by Paris to extend its military involvement in Mali. [2] France sent troops there in January 2013 after an uprising in the north started by the ethnic Tuaregs threatened to engulf the entire nation. Although the French operation pushed them out of the northern cities, this inadvertently compounded problems elsewhere as militants dispersed into northern Africa including aligning with cadres in the Cyrenaican cities of Benghazi and Derna.

2012: The Warning Signs

5. However, the warning signs have been there for a while. The 11th September, 2012, attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, which killed U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and 3 other Americans, was potentially an incident waiting to happen. [3] It’s often a neglected issue that Benghazi is in the heart of Cyrenaica which has long been a bastion of radical militant activity even during the height of Colonel Mu'ammar Qaddafi’s reign. The US Consulate attack cannot be seen in isolation but as part of a series of attacks in Benghazi that illustrate that city and its wider area poise a major security concern and challenge.

6. In March 2012, video footage emerged of war graves in a British military cemetery in Libya being destroyed by what appears to be a militia forces. The video, shot by the militia themselves, shows more than 30 armed men kicking down the gravestones of British servicemen while comrades use sledgehammers to break the cenotaph. The cemetery, near Benghazi, holds the remains of more than 100 British and Commonwealth servicemen who fought for Field Marshall Montgomery's Eighth Army in the Second World War. In the video few of the militia make any attempt to disguise their identities, apparently unconcerned about being held to account. [4]

7. The cemetery attack underlined at the time the different outlook that separates Libya's Islamist militias from secular groups. While mainstream units regard Britain as an ally, thanks to the role that NATO played in the revolution that toppled Qaddafi, Islamist groups view Britain and the west as the enemy. Since then there have been a series of attacks against international organizations, NGOs and foreign government personnel.

8. On 22nd May, 2012, a rocket-propelled grenade hit the offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Benghazi, leaving a small hole in the side of the building but causing no casualties; [5] on 10th April, 2012, a home-made bomb was thrown at a convoy carrying the head of the United Nations mission to Libya but no one was hurt; [6] on 11th June, 2012, two British bodyguards were injured in an attack on a convoy in Benghazi carrying the British ambassador to Libya, Dominic Asquith. A rocket-propelled grenade hit the car carrying the consular team's security escort. [7] The attack came days after the US mission was targeted in Benghazi when a bomb was thrown at the front gate of the US diplomatic mission in the city. [8] That incident took place after Washington's announcement of the death of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a Libyan, who was an al-Qa’ida deputy and ideologue in Pakistan. Al-Libi had been killed in a drone strike on 4th June, 2012. [9]

9. Even though the protesters who initially rose up against Qaddafi in mid-February 2011 originated from Cyrenaica, much of the security apparatus set up in the wake of his ousting ended up being dominated by western militias, based in the Tripolitania region, often distrusted by the inhabitants of Benghazi, Cyrenaica's restless capital. Following the toppling of Qaddafi, temporary political appointments were widely perceived in Benghazi as regional favouritism towards Tripolitania. This changed in October 2012 when the country's Prime Minister, Ali Zeidan, appointed Mohammed Mahmoud Al-Bargati as Defence Minister and Ashur Shwayel as Interior Minister, both from Benghazi. However, eastern mistrust of western intentions still lingers. [10]

10. The issue of federalism and local autonomy have remained subjects of great sensitivity that will become even more critical when they are discussed in the framework of the country's draft constitution in December 2013. Even though there are some militias who reject the legitimacy of central state institutions in their entirety, they do not represent the majority views of Cyrenaica's inhabitants. However, they do form a boisterous and potentially threatening coalition.

11. Therefore, the level of autonomy that will be ceded to Libya's regions in the country's next constitution will play a major role in determining the extent to which central state institutions will have in a security presence at the local level. Questions also remain about the sharing of oil revenues. Oil was and will remain an essential ingredient in the process of political, economic and social transformation in Libya.

12. Cyrenaica accounts for nearly 80 % of the country’s oil production and armed militias in that part of the country have already illustrated the ability to shut down production as leverage over the central government in Tripoli. [11] If there cannot be consensus, then this has the potentially of problems spilling over violently.

13. In Libya, the issues of security and regionalism are also intrinsically linked to the role Islam should play in defining the country's post-Qaddafi identity. This aspect has especially strong roots in Cyrenaica. Benghazi's poorest districts have also witnessed the rise of militant Islamism over the past decades. Its Laythi neighbourhood, has been dubbed ‘Little Kandahar’, an ironic reference to the conservative city in southern Afghanistan identified as the spiritual centre of the Taliban militia. [12]

14. In addition to attacks against NGOs and diplomats, throughout 2012, there were also a series of assassinations and attacks in Cyrenaica that targeted army officials who had sometimes held prominent positions under the Qaddafi regime before hurriedly defecting during Libya's revolution. Mohammad al-Hassi, a former colonel who was in charge of internal security in Derna, and Abdelfattah Younes, Qaddafi's former interior minister who had resigned to become the leader of the rebel resistance in Benghazi, were both assassinated by militants in Cyrenaica. Al-Hassi had been expected to become the head of the Dernah branch of the Ministry of Interior’s new security force, the Supreme Security Committees (SSCs). [13]

A History of Resistance

15. Historically, Cyrenaica has been the centre of a very particular combination of tribal and Islamic political culture. The ferocious and well-organised guerrilla campaign by the Cyrenaican tribes against Italian colonial rule (1912-1942) led by national hero ‘Umar al-Mukhtar who fought the Italian colonialists in the 1920s, forms part of a history of resistance and separate identity from the rest of Libya. During the period of the Sanussi monarchy under King Idris (1951-1969) the tribes of Cyrenaica enjoyed to all intents and purposes cultural and political autonomy. This legacy of uniqueness continued to be of influence in the political history of Libya. [14]

16. Despite the dominance of tribal kinships, Cyrenaican uniqueness has largely urban origins especially in its capital of Benghazi with a steep tradition in education. Added to this is the city’s fundamental role in many of the country’s defining events. The fabled anti-colonial fighter Umar al-Mukhtar is buried just south of the city in Suluq. The former monarchy had its seat in Benghazi until 1954, and the city is where Qaddafi launched his 1969 revolution. Much of this influence, hails from Benghazi’s familial linkages to the rest of the country, particularly in Misrata, Nafusa, Zawiya, Zintan Zuwara, and even in the neighbourhoods in Tripoli of Tajura, Suq al-Juma’a, and Fashlum. [15]

17. Since Qaddafi seized power in a military coup in 1969, militant Islamists in Libya, like the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya al-Muqatila, or LIFG) portrayed him as an apostate and declared an ‘all-out jihad’ against his regime. A prolonged armed confrontation soon ensued, extracting a high price from both sides. [16] This perhaps may seem ironic as Libya itself sponsored left-wing and Marxist terrorist groups in the 1980s.

18. Although some of the prominent officers of the revolution in 1969 like Abd el-Fatah Younis or Suleiman Mahmud Obeidi were from Cyrenaica and became notable figures for the regime, the region always remained volatile and restive. Qaddafi’s attempts to co-opt the younger generation as forces of the revolution never fully succeeded. Resistance from tribal, urban and Islamic oppositional movements from the 1980s began in Cyrenaica.

19. By 1987, the potential threat to Qaddafi’s regime had started to surface. On 17th February 1987, the Libyan authorities executed nine men, including three soldiers, in Benghazi, for allegedly belonging to radical extremists. They had been accused of treason and plotting bombings and assassinations of Libyan figures and Soviet experts working in the country. Unprecedented was the official acceptance that an Islamist opposition had infiltrated the army. The authorities used televised executions to warn Libyans against disloyalty to Qaddafi’s ‘Green Revolution’. [17]

20. In the summer of 1995, armed clashes broke out between Islamists and security forces in Benghazi. The confrontation escalated when Islamists attacked several police stations, killing several officers. The LIFG lost several members. [18]

21. More violence erupted in the autumn of 1995 between Islamists and the local authorities in Benghazi, resulting in scores of fatalities. At the same time, in Derna, an industrial port between Benghazi and Tobrouk, there was a growing sense of religiosity which provided fertile ground and an Islamist insurgency was rapidly gaining traction before being ruthlessly crushed by Qaddafi's forces. [19]

22. In its second communiqué of the year, the LIFG implemented a two pronged campaign of propaganda and ‘jihad operations’. It appealed to ‘every employee of the regime apparatuses’ to join its ranks, likening its role to that played by Libya’s national hero, ‘Umar al-Mukhtar. Basing its activities in Cyrenaica, the LIFG declared that ‘jihad is alive and well in the land of ‘Umar al-Mukhtar’, thereby attempting to utilize the national symbol to attract popular support for their battle ‘against [the people’s] enemy’, the Qaddafi regime. [20]

23. In April 1996 militants attacked Libyan police guarding the Egyptian consulate in Benghazi, killing two police officers. This time, however, an emerging Islamist group, the Islamic Martyrs Movement (IMM – Harakat al-Shuhada al-Islamiyya), led by Mohammed al-Hami, led the operation. Also in April 1996, the LIFG targeted police stations in Benghazi, and seized weapons from their armoury. [21]

24. On May 31st 1998, Qaddafi was travelling in east Libya en route to Egypt and was reportedly wounded in a gunfire attack and did not arrive in Cairo as scheduled. The incident occurred near Sidi Khalifa, 30km east of Benghazi, a stronghold of the LIFG. [22] In a telephone call to the London-based Arabic daily, al-Hayat, the IMM claimed to have ambushed the Libyan leader. Several days later, however, the LIFG also claimed responsibility for the attack. In the immediate aftermath, the regime pursued a ruthless crackdown on Islamist elements in the Benghazi area, involving some 300 arrests, mostly of university students and staff, physicians and engineers. [23]

The Cyrenaica Militias

25. Some of Cyrenaica's most notorious Islamists, such as the former leader of the LIFG, Abdel Hakim Belhaj, have given up their military struggle and formed political parties instead, thus accepting for now the rules of the democracy. Belhaj spent time in the notorious Abu Selim Prison, before being freed in 2010 under a ‘de-radicalisation’ drive promoted by Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, the son of the former Libyan dictator, who is now under arrest awaiting trial.

26. Together with an inner-circle of former LIFG fighters, Belhaj has established control over a number of military entities. In December, 2011, it was being alleged that that Belhaj, Abdel-Mehdi al-Harati, was leading a detachment of Libyan fighters supporting Syrian rebels along the border with Turkey. [24]

27. Many more Islamists joined a separate group, the Umma al-Wasat, led by Sami al-Saadi, the LIFG’s key ideologue who had once authored an influential anti-democratic treatise. Al-Saadi was joined by another dominant figure in the LIFG, Abd al-Wahhab al-Ghayid, the brother of the late al-Qa’ida deputy Abu Yahya al-Libi, who ran successfully as a candidate in the 2012 elections in southern city of Murzuq. [25]

28. Another key figure is Abd al-Hakim al-Hasadi, who formed the Dernah Brigade in the early stages of the revolution, which was later renamed the Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade. Al-Hasadi was directing unsanctioned security arrangements in Derna, which was home to several dozen Libyan recruits who travelled to Iraq to fight coalition forces. [26]

29. Al-Hasadi was joined by Sufyan bin Qumu, a veteran of the LIFG, who was linked up with Osama bin Laden in Sudan and fought alongside Taliban. [27] Qumu had a falling out with the group, ostensibly because of his overt ties to al-Qa’ida. Another, individual associated with this faction is Abd al-Basit Azuz, a former mujahedeen of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, who fled Libya for Syria in the 1990s, then lived for a period in the United Kingdom before moving to Pakistan in 2009. There is a belief in some quarters that Azuz was personally dispatched by al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to Libya in the wake of the 2011 revolts to establish an al-Qa’ida foothold in Dernah. [28]

30. As of mid-2012, the Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade had become a force unto itself in Dernah. It began closing down beauty parlours and enforcing strict social behaviours in the city. [29] In Dernah’s central court, it hung up a banner proclaiming Shariah law. Outside the city, the group has also been accused of running a training camp for volunteers to fight in Syria against the Assad regime. [30] There are also indications that it is establishing itself through criminal activities such as drug smuggling and illicit weapons trafficking. [31]

Al- Qa’ida In The Islamic Maghreb

31. On 11th September 2006, the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, al-Qa’ida Central issued a video statement by its then deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri that the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat had joined forces with al-Qa’ida. Al-Zawahiri announced a ‘blessed union’ between the groups. [32] In January 2007, the group announced that it had changed its name to al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to reflect its alliance with the al-Qa’ida franchise. [33]

32. At first glance, AQIM remains principally Algerian based on its leadership. In others ways however, it has evolved into a regional insurgency successfully integrating local communities and drug traffickers. The new name not only underlined its submission to the hierarchy and ideological platform laid down by al-Qa’ida, but also served notice of the regional aspirations of what was until then essentially an Algerian group in terms of its makeup, objectives and scope.

33. The name change and the content of communiques released appeared to signal a change in direction in the agenda and modus operandi of the Algerian terrorist group. Al-Qa’ida had added to its ranks a powerful, resilient, organization that would eventually prioritize attacks on western targets within and beyond North Africa. This prediction seems to now be confirmed by a series of attacks undertaken by the group against western interests and nationals throughout North Africa and The Sahel.

34. On November 3, 2007, a new video from al-Qa’ida media production house as-Sahab was circulated on jihadi forums. Entitled ‘Unity of the Ranks,’ the video featured senior al-Qa’ida leaders Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Laith al-Libi. [34] This video marked the announcement of the long anticipated merger between al-Qa’ida and the LIFG. The LIFG has been in existence since the mid-1990s and has long been loosely affiliated with al-Qa’ida through various collaborations.

35. In addition to Abu Layth al-Libi and Abu Yahya al-Libi who both played a prominent role within al-Qa’ida, documents captured by US forces in Iraq in 2007, known as the Sinjar Records, that were recovered in 2007, showed that the most violent acts in Iraq were carried out by foreign fighters, and Libyans comprised the second-to-highest number of foreign fighters to enter Iraq to fight coalition forces. [35]

36. The Algerian, Malian, and Chadian governments continue to express concern about the potential for instability in Libya to weaken security along Libya’s long borders, which could allow AQIM operatives and criminal networks that provide support to AQIM to move more freely.

37. There is a belief that AQIM fighters have obtained weaponry from plundered Libyan military stockpiles, including surface-to-air missiles. On 16th April, 2012, London-based pan-Arab newspaper al-Hayat published an email interview with an AQIM member, Salah Abu Muhammad, who stated that AQIM cooperated with al-Hasadi and so-called ‘emirates’ in several Cyrenaican cities. A 17th March, 2012, statement attributed to AQIM leader Abdelmalik Droukdel addressed Libyan rebels and sought to associate the Libyan uprising with al-Qa’ida campaign against Arab and Western governments. [36]

38. Despite making its southern border a ‘restricted military area’ in December 2012, Libya was nonetheless host to the AQIM faction that was responsible for the In Aménas hostage crisis of January 2013 in Algeria where close to 800 people were taken hostage including 107 foreigners. [37] The In Aménas Gas complex is close to the Libyan border.

The 2012 Elections

39. Despite a significant rise in the number of Islamists across the nation, and particularly in Cyrenaica, religious militancy does not seem to reflect the Libyan people's wider religious or political objectives. In the July 2012 landmark parliamentary elections, Libyans went to the polls to elect a 200-member General National Congress which will form an interim government, oversee the writing of a constitution, and supervise polls for an elected government based on the new constitution. The elections were the first to involve political parties since 1952 and were widely hailed as an extraordinary achievement.

40. In generally free and fair elections, the voter turnout of around 1.8 million Libyans or 65% of registered voters produced the landslide victory of the National Forces Alliance (NFA) which is a coalition of around 60 political parties, some with a very small membership, and around 200 civil society groups. [38] Indeed, the election results were a surprise to many observers as Libyan voters largely supported moderate parties and candidates, reversing a regional trend in support of Islamists who fared quite poorly. Abdel Hakim Belhaj's al-Watan party didn’t win any seats in the General National Congress (GNC) despite its leader's strong reputation as a resistance fighter against the Qaddafi regime.

41. The NFA presented itself as a moderate Islamic movement that recognised a limited role for Islam in political life. It was a strong supporter of decentralisation, supporting local council control of areas like education, healthcare and transport, however, it steered away from support for federalism. The NFA, took 39 of the 80 seats available to political parties, more than twice as many as the 17 seats won by its nearest rival. [39]

42. The Justice and Construction Party (JCP), led by Mohammed Sawan, a former political prisoner under Qaddafi, is the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was the largest and best organised of the political parties. Presenting itself as a moderate, progressive religious party, it argued a parliamentary system was best suited to Libya, supported decentralisation, but like the NFA opposed federalism. [40] While it may have expected to receive a boost in the polls following regional trends in which Islamist parties took power in both Egypt and Tunisia, the JCP emphasized its independence from Muslim Brotherhood groups elsewhere in the region.

43. Several factors can explain why the JCP and other Islamist parties failed to do better in the elections. Unlike in other North African countries, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood had reached a political accommodation with the Qaddafi regime which was criticised by many Libyans. Related to this point, there was concern among many Libyans that Islamic parties like the JCP and the Nation Party were under the influence of some Gulf Emirates. Based on these issues, women voters, in particular, strongly supported the NFA. [41]

Conclusion

44. Libya's modern history has been influenced by the continuous undercurrents of ideology, religion, tribalism and oil. After 42 years in power Qaddafi was killed at the hands of revolutionaries and the final chapter of his dictatorial reign was concluded. With direct and decisive support from NATO countries like the United Kingdom, and some Arab governments, the revolution was successfully led by the National Transitional Council and militias in many Libyan cities. However, there needs to be a sustained focus by the west on developments inside Libya and not just when there is an attack against western interests inside the country.

45. Libya is facing a challenging point in its history and is currently standing at the crossroads. In addition, the North African sub-continent is also confronted with significant security challenges that could have severe ramifications across several countries and regions with potential blowback into western Europe and especially into the United Kingdom. Attacks against western interests in Libya point to a trajectory that could spread beyond the confines of North Africa. This cannot be ignored.

46. Libya is a potential economic and political giant of North Africa, so a weakened and fragmenting nation is the last thing that this region needs nor the international community, as it would almost certainly upset the positive trends that have emerged from this part of Africa over the last few years. Libya could become the hegemon in Africa, but only if it can solve its domestic political problems.

47. Regional clashes over identity, power, and resources continue unabated in Libya, straining the capacity of the weak government, deterring foreign investment, diluting the emergence of strong democratic institutions. The most pressing of these problems is in Libya’s eastern region of Cyrenaica, where Benghazi is located is fuelled by longstanding neglect and religious militancy. The tribes have proven to be the strongest counterbalance to the militias in the east encouraging them into local councils and incorporate their brigades into the national governmental bodies. And their voices carry influence. They don’t need western encouragement or support which could actually be counter-productive.

48. Undoubtedly, religion has remained a central component of the cultural composition and the definition of Libyan identity. Despite the attempt of Qaddafi's suppression of Islamic orientations not sanctioned by him and to substitute them with the ideology of the Green Book in its place, Islam remained basic and essential to the value structure of Libyan society and the primary formative element of the social system itself.

49. The Libyan people have never shown any real attraction to the more extreme, radical religious strains. Moreover, the general public over the two years has shown little interest in an Islamist alternative to the non-ideological revolution against Qaddafi. Most Libyans expect and want Islam to play a role in political life, but opinions vary widely as to exactly what this means. Most Libyans agree that the new constitution should draw on Shariah law, but there is no consensus as to whether the constitution should be based solely on Shariah law or whether it should only be an important reference among others.

50. Qaddafi destroyed the concept of state and institutions and made war on society and its political and civil organizations and upsetting the components of its political culture. Therefore, establishing an effective constitution and formalizing the security sector are the best ways to address the sources of Cyrenaican instability in the short-term. The constitution must carefully strike a balance between the central government and local administration. To help supress violence and restore Cyrenaican confidence in the state, the government must discharge and disarm the country’s numerous revolutionary and Islamist militias and strengthen the national army and police.

51. Not all Libyans who went to Iraq or those who eventually returned, were indoctrinated by al-Qa’ida’s ideology. However, many will have attained military skills that could be used against their home government as well as linking up with groups that pursue a more trans-national agenda.

52. For the time being, it appears that AQIM has chosen to benefit from the Libyan unrest by seizing weapons, including thousands of small arms and man-portable anti-aircraft missiles that were believed to have been looted from military armouries during the revolution. [42] However, AQIM have remained ensconced in safe havens in northern Mali and Algeria. The In Aménas hostage crisis, which was near the Libyan border, illustrates the group still has the infrastructure and resources to plan large operations. This does not appear to have diminished even though several of its leaders have been killed.

53. The British diplomat, Ian Martin, who is the head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), has advocated a strategy to help enhance and strengthen Libya’s fragile political institutions and rule of law. It is a noteworthy goal and with merit but it is critical that the lead actors in delivering them are the Libyan people themselves. Libya’s future has to be directed with Libyan characteristics and not with outside influence and that will be the only ways that the extremists will be unable to develop their own infrastructure inside the country and use it as a launch pad to plot and plan operations beyond the borders of Libya thus averting the potential blowback to the United Kingdom.

30 April, 2013