Extremism and political instability in North and West Africa

Written evidence from Guy Lankester, Director, From Here 2 Timbuktu Ltd

1) Summary

a) I will argue that:

- The UK’s foreign policy in the region of North and West Africa over the past decade has helped create the "extremism and political instability" which has led to France’s intervention in Mali.

- The UK’s growing strategic and natural resource interests in the region have gone in parallel with the growth of extremism and political instability. The "interests" on the one hand and the "extremism" and political instability on the other are inseperable and mutually dependant.

b) If this inquiry is about whether the UK’s foreign policy best serves the British self-interest in the region, there is little for me to add or detract: the policy has served its purpose as the UK’s presence militarily in Mali and the virtual Afghanistanisation of the country can only help its longer term influence and interests.

c) However, if this inquiry and British foreign policy has a moral dimension or is looking forwards for real lessons on ways to avoid allowing Al Qaeda type "extremism" to take root, grow and produce the political instability that has rocked a nation, created 100,000’s of refugees, created regional instability, destroyed a hitherto reasonably stable democracy, induced racial and ethnic tensions, conflict and murder, then there is much to learn.

2) Introduction

a) I am the sole director of From Here 2 Timbuktu Ltd, a travel company specialising in the Sahara and West Africa. Since 2004 I have been travelling and running tours in the region in question. Mali has been my main destination and I have spent part of every year since 2006 in the country. I have a close relationship with Tuareg communities in the north of the country.

b) My relationship with the north of Mali has coincided with the growth of a so-called Al Qaeda presence in the region. I have watched from very close by as a threat that at first only seemed to exist in the offices of western government foreign departments began to establish itself, become active and slowly grow to the point of being capable of taking over half a country. All under the watchful gaze of US and French troops based in the region.

c) In December 2009 I narrowly escaped being kidnapped, along with my 2 clients, by Al Qaeda In The Islamic Magreb (AQMI). Despite the fact that we were reported as missing to and by British and German intelligence services before we were actually taken (and so were alerted to our danger), nobody has ever contacted me about this incident to find out what happened.

d)Following this incident, and because of the nature of my business, I have taken a close interest in the security situation in the north of Mali and in the wider region.

I have no relationship or affiliation with any political or military group either in the UK or abroad.

3) Responses to the committee’s themes

1. The effectiveness of UK co-operation with France and other Western allies to secure UK interests in the region, and lessons to be learned from the French-led intervention in Mali;

a) There is a suggestion here that UK co-operation with the French led intervention was always about " securing interests" of the UK and no suggestion that the interests of Mali or of simply destroying the Al Qaeda afilliated groups that have created the political instability were factors that came into the calculation.

b) What was the effect of the much acclaimed French intervention?

With the so called ‘islamist" forces tempted out of the main towns of Timbuktu and Gao, and in the open around the small town of Konna, and with French planes dominating the air unchallenged (as the much talked of anti-aircraft artillery that the Islamists were supposed to posess failing to materialise), a turkey shoot and a swift conclusion to the campaign was on the cards at the outset of the intervention.

c) However the most wanted man, Iyad Ag Ghali, was able to retreat back to his fiefdom of Kidal with a convoy of his best troops unchallenged, a journey of well over 1000kms. This journey includes the crossing of the river Niger at some point on one of only 2 bridges and 2 extremely slow car farries on its entire Malian stretch. If these crossing points had been put out of action, the fight against Al Qaeda in Mali would have been over in days. But somehow Iyad Ag Ghali was able get from Konna, cross the river Niger and then travel through flat and open desert back to Kidal.

d) Since the French intervention and "liberation" of the north of Mali, refugees have been pouring into the refugee camps in Burkina Faso and Mauritania for one main reason: the Malian military have been left behind the French advance to manage the "liberation" in the regions of Timbuktu and Gao.

e) This is the same military that that the MNLA rebelled against at the beginning of January 2012, the same military who abandoned Timbuktu and Gao after their own coup d’etat in Bamako in March 2012, leaving the northern population to the mercy of first the MNLA rebels and then the Islamists terrorist groups.

f) This is the military that have historically always performed exactions against the northern population after and during any rebellion. This is the military that fought amongst itself in Bamako, beat up the interim president, forced the resignation of the interim prime minister as he was trying to find a negotiated solution in the lead up to the French intervention.

g) This is the military who have been responsible, since retaking the regions of Timbuktu and Gao and the Gourma, for murder, kidnap, hostage taking and ransom demands against the light skinned population (Tamashek and Arab). I know all of this because I have been witnessing firsthand accounts of these exactions from the Burkina Faso refugee camps.

h) It is the inexplicable policy of leaving the Malian military in control of the northern regions that the French have liberated that has led to the greatest political and ethnic instability since the commencement of the crisis in January 2012. A common refrain in the refugee camps is that the Islamists imposed their sharia law on the population but the military have been killing them. The French intervention has caused far more refugees than even the Islamist occupation. What sort of liberation is this?

i) Like the rest of Mali, the northern population welcomed the French intervention with desperate and open arms. They now see the French intervention as the most disasterous event in the many traumatic events of 2012-13.

2. The factors contributing to the power of religious extremists in the region, how they can most realistically be dealt with, and whether they amount to a significant threat to UK interests or are primarily a regional concern;

a) - The main factor contributing to the "power of religious extremists" has been their support from the Algerian and Malian states. Without this, they could not have existed. Their existence in the Tuareg desert helped both governments manage their Tuareg issues, and allowed them to paint the Tuareg as islamist sympathisers.

- This can only be dealt with on an inter-governmental level, but the UK government have shown no interest in pressurizing its Algerian ally.

- In terms of "religious extremism" there has been very little anti-western rhetoric, kidnappings have been about money rather than promoting ideology so the threat to UK interests at home is negligible and is much more of a regional concern.

b) In the north of Mali, the Tamsheq (Tuareg) community practise a very tolerant Islam that is diametrically opposed to the ideology of Al Qaeda. Their women go open faced, their music is very important to them and women have their own form of music in "Tinde", they believe strongly in gri gri (the power and wearing of good luck charms), and pretty much everyone, including women, chews tobaco. There is little within the Tuareg society for extreme Islam to key into. Those that are involved are more likely to be seduced by money than ideology.

c) Over the past 9 years I have travelled extensively across north and West Africa. I have never heard an extremist viewpoint. I have come within a hair breadth of being kidnapped by these "extremists". I was saved by Tuareg friends who could have earned more money than they will ever see in their lives by selling me on.

d) From 2007-2010 I was travelling extensively in the Kidal region of Mali. Again here, amongst the Tuareg, I never heard an extremist viewpoint - indeed people, including rebel fighters, went out of their way to ensure me of my safety amongst them and talking of the how alien islamic extremist ideology was to them.

e) In West Africa and Mali in particlular, if there is extremist ideology it is very hidden away and is not something that sits comfortably with the tolerant Islam that the region has always displayed. I have never felt that extremism would take off in West Africa as it has nothing in the society to key into. If anything one sees more signs of fundamentalist Islam in Bamako than in the north, but again this is religious and not ideological. AQMI have been attempting to sensitise the local population of the north towards its ideology for years but have had very little success.

f) The plain truth is that Al Qaeda type extremism was introduced to the region from outside, and even up to today , most of the die hard ideologues- and there aren’t many among the ranks of drug dealers, cigarette smugglers and kinappers of hostages for ransom - are foreigners to Mali.

g) AQMI ranks have grown since AQMI was first allowed (by the Malian president Amadou Toumani Traore) to camp up in the Tigharragh mountains under the watchful eye of US and French militaries, on the ground in Mali. These troops were supposedly in the region to help train the Malian military in counter terrorism. The growth of AQMI and the events of 2012 suggest this observation and training was either a catastrophic failure or a great success, depending on what these "interests" that we are talking about are.

h) Factors contributing to religious extremism:

As is well known, AQMI’s local raison d’etre and its source of finance is drugs running, cigarettes smuggling and, more recently, hostage taking for ransom. All of these things are obviously haram in Islam. It’s rank and file are much more likely to have been recruited for work in the smuggling than for reasons of ideology. Western focus on the religious extremism rather than the criminality can only increase the appeal of these groups to vulnerable and unemployed youth.

Comments on UK policy:

i) Possibly the main factor was the destruction of the tourist industry. The main factor contributing to this was western government travel warnings that have written off the northern half of the country for 4-5 years.

ii) I have been arguing with the UK FCO for years that their policy of blanket and generalised warnings about "terrorism" in the north of Mali did more to contribute to the ranks of AQMI than anything else. If you are a young man seeking to provide for your family and your work as a guide or a driver in the tourism industry, which was the main source of outside income for the region, is taken away, what are you to do when AQMI turn up and offer you €300 a month to drive for them?

iii) The FCO argue that their policy is focussed solely upon protecting British citizens travelling in the region. As a British citizen travelling in the region over the past 10 years I can say that this policy has greatly increased the danger for all travellers, as cutting off the tourism industry is the best way of filling the ranks of extremist groups.

iv) Over use of the term "islamist" is another contributing factor as it alienates people. For example, today, as these groups are being broken up by the French campaign and as their rank and file are deserting in droves, we are now told that "islamist terrorists" are filtering back into the community ready to attack from within. This is just not true. I have met these people. They are ordinary people caught up and press ganged into joining one militia or another. Many are now refugees. And it is statements like this that have given the Malian military its excuse to enter into these communities on the pretext of looking for these"islamsists", whom they identify solely by the colour of their skin. These "terrorists" then just disappear, or turn up in shallow graves or are even ransomed back into the community. If you are described as an islamist, attacked as an islamist, you might as well move over to islamist ranks for protection.

v) The UK policy that has most protected me has been the policy not to pay ransoms to hostage takers. I wholeheartedly agree with this, and it could well be argued that British citizens travelling in Mali have over the past 4 years been more secure than their European counterparts because of this policy. Since Edwin Dyer who was in one of the first groups kinapped and was the only hostage to have been executed by AQMI, no British citizen has been taken hostage.

3. The extent to which gangsterism and crime contribute to regional instability and how this is best tackled;

Gangsterism and crime are inseperable from the extremism talked about earlier. As is well known in the region and within intelligence circles, AQMI’s main source of income came from drugs and cigarettes smuggling and from the ransom money from hostage taking.

It is impossible to effectively tackle gangsterism and crime in the region without looking at regional government and military complicity.

If we take the drugs routes alone. It is well known that the cocaine comes over in planes and boats from South America, is then transported right across West Africa and the Sahara before finding its way into Europe, a journey that may includes crossing between three and seven borders. There is no way this merchandise could travel across all these states and borders without authorities being involved. Until western governments face this reality head on there seems no point in even attempting to combat this trade.

4. The UK’s support for regional co-operation by ECOWAS and others;

ECOWAS offered no effective support for the people of Mali throughout the 2012 -13 crisis and came up with no workable solution to the problems. All ECOWAS states have the same underlying issues, principally majority ethnicities dominating minorities, and so their interests are alligned. What west Africa and the rest of the continent is desperately in need of is a body that represents the interests of the people, and especially minority ethnicities, and not just the interests of the states.

5. The extent to which the UK Government’s long-term policy aims of building inclusive democracies, strengthening the rule of law, and tackling extremism in the region are realistic and achievable.

a) The current situation in Mali gives the UK government its best chance to make this policy of building inclusive democracies "realistic and achievable". But sadly we seem intent on throwing this opportunity away by our support for the US position of pushing for genaral elections in Mali in July before the country is at peace and before it has had a chance to reflect on a new constitution.

b) The fundamental and underlying problem in Mali’s hitherto peaceful and successful democracy was its lack of inclusivity. The northern population has always felt dis-enfranchised and ‘colonized" by the Bamabara dominated south. This has been the cause of all the rebellions since independence.

c) The fact that there is not even a tarmac road to Timbuktu, Mali’s primary tourist attraction and a town that is better known internationally than the country itself is indication of how "inclusivity" has never been part of the Mali government’s policy towards the north. We could talk also about the lack of schools, and hospitals in the north of the country, not to mention a university even in the city that produced the world’s first ever university - Timbuktu.

d) Now is the moment for the international community to give Mali the opportunity to rebuild its democracy, its constitution and its civil society so that the aims of "strengthening the rule of law and tackling extremism in the region" can be fulfilled. Unless the relationship between the north and the south is given constitutional support, the rebellions of the past and the events of 2012 are sure to return.

e) But the headlong rush to push Mali towards elections in July whilst the country is still effectively at war and the northern population are exiled outside the country will mean this opportunity is lost. The elections are being pursued not for Mali’s domestic interests, but for the interests of the US and the EU, so that they can re-establish their aid links with the country and thus begin to reassert their control.

f) If the UK government is serious about this question of "re-building inclusive democracies" it should oppose the imposition of early elections. Furthermore it should work towards providing Mali with a Truth and reconcilliation" forum and an internationally hosted round table talks with all ethnicities represented to discuss a new constitution.

g) Mali’s unity, in my opinion, would best be solidified for long term propsperity and peace with a federal system of government, giving the north and the south, which are very distinct entities, powers to run their own affairs and receive their own development resources.

30 April 2013