Session 2013-14
Extremism and political instability in North and West Africa
Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Introduction
1. North and West Africa is a region which offers opportunities, not least for trade and investment, but is also of increasing concern. Instability, terrorism, and organised crime create threats to western and UK interests, and if left unchecked, potentially to Europe and the UK. Tackling this will require major regional and international investment across the political, security and development spheres, in support of continuing engagement by the countries of the region. The FCO is coordinating a new strategic approach across Government to address the threats to and from the region.
2. This evidence has been coordinated by the FCO Sahel Task Force which works closely with the Department for International Development (DFID), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Home Office, and the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for the Sahel, the Rt. Hon. Stephen O’Brien MP.
Background: North and West Africa
3. Recent trends and events have demonstrated the profound links between North Africa and West Africa. These ancient tribal, cultural, and trading links have until recently been largely ignored or forgotten by the outside world, but political instability, natural disasters and crime and terrorism at the heart of the region have focussed international attention. Simultaneously, radical political change in North Africa and political and security challenges in West Africa have demonstrated that regional threats and challenges are linked across often ill-defined borders, requiring a coordinated response.
4. The current crisis derives from events in the Sahel as well as tensions in the North and South, particularly Libya and Nigeria. The international community has mainly concentrated on the terrorist threat. Although this is moveable, we can identify three current areas of activity: Mali, Libya, and Nigeria. In Mali, the 2012 coup d’état enabled a terrorist advance which was later stopped and dispersed by the French-led military intervention in 2013. Part of the terrorist activity was apparently facilitated by returning Tuareg mercenaries from Libya, while the French intervention is likely to have driven at least some of them back into eastern Libya. Nigerian extremist groups have proven links with Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQ-M) and other Mali-based terrorists, and we must be concerned about the potential for more regional cooperation. These groups threaten the wider region and our interests.
5. The embedding of terrorist and criminal threats derives from multiple factors, all of which need addressing by the region and the international community. Though these apply variously to sub-regions (for example, the North is considerably wealthier) they are all elements which drive instability, exacerbate humanitarian and human rights problems and entrench poverty. Briefly, they are:
· Poverty and lack of economic and human development
· Poor governance or failing states
· Corruption and criminal activity, including by ruling elites.
6. These conditions favour the arrival and embedding of extremist and criminal groups. Our policies are designed to increase the effort against them.
UK interests in North and West Africa
7. Historically, UK interests in North and West Africa have been concentrated in coastal West Africa, accompanied by good relations with Francophone North Africa. After WWII (which brought military engagement in North Africa and the involvement of West African troops) and the subsequent, sometimes violent, decolonisation of the region, our relations settled to a steady building of trade and political relationships with the new governments. Other than the difficult relationship with Libya, most were largely positive. Our relations with former colonies were especially warm and deepened by diaspora links.
8. In the last years of the twentieth century our relations with North Africa developed, though at an uneven pace, driven by local conditions (most dramatically the conflict in Algeria) and the opening up of others (e.g. Morocco). Trade has gradually increased in North Africa and has grown more swiftly in West Africa. The events and trends which are shaping our new thinking have been:
· The Arab Spring;
· The emergence of terrorist threats from Mali, Nigeria, and Libya; and,
· Growing economic opportunity in sub-Saharan Africa.
9. This is leading to a new approach, currently under discussion, the headlines of which we will share with the Committee. Its security focus means it does not cover all UK interests, but directly addresses the issues covered by the Committee’s inquiry.
10. Our current interests in the North and West Africa region are broadly:
· Investments, primarily in the extractive industries;
· Trade with developing markets, some growing more strongly than others;
· British nationals (particularly working for UK and international operations on and offshore);
· British tourists across the region;
· Development (Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia) and humanitarian (mainly the Sahel) contributions; and,
· Our political influence-building through diplomacy, the Arab Partnership Fund in North Africa and capacity-building programmes in both North and West Africa.
HMG Resources in North and West Africa
11. The UK currently has Embassies/High Commissions in the following countries in North and West Africa:
|
· Algeria · Gambia · Ghana · Guinea · Côte d’Ivoire · Liberia · Libya |
· Mali · Morocco · Nigeria · Senegal · Sierra Leone · Tunisia |
12. We re-opened our Embassy in Mali in 2010, and have recently re-opened UK Embassies in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire as part of our wider network shift. We also employ a UK-based Political Officer in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and locally-engaged member of staff in Niamey, Niger.
13. The FCO engages bilaterally and regionally through our network of posts, and through regional conflict and counter-terrorism advisers. Other Government Departments are also engaged:
· The Home Office, with SOCA, the Metropolitan Police Service, HMRC, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Department for Transport, focus on organised crime, terrorism, migration, aviation security and narcotics;
· The MoD pursues defence engagement and provides military training;
· DFID has major bilateral programmes in Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone, and has made a substantial humanitarian contribution to the Sahel (£30million in 2013). It has a smaller presence in North Africa supporting political and economic reform through the Arab Partnership;
· UKTI is represented in Nigeria, Ghana and across the Maghreb;
· The Prime Minister has appointed the Rt. Hon. Stephen O’Brien MP as his Special Envoy for the Sahel.
14. In addition to the direct costs of supporting our Embassies, several funds support our work in the region. These are principally:
· The Conflict Pool (in 2012/13 £8.5m in North Africa and £7.68m for West Africa);
· Arab Partnership (in 2012-13 approximately £6.6m in North Africa);
· Bilateral Programme Budgets, run by each post (e.g. £80,000 for Nigeria in 2012-13 and £35,000 for Morocco).
15. The map at Annex B demonstrates the UK’s coverage in the region, and our aid commitment.
Threats
16. We are increasingly concerned by the threats posed to the UK and our interests in the region, following the 2011 Arab Spring and evidence of an increasing threat from terrorism. Our main concerns, grouped under the subjects of concern to the Committee, are as follows:
Extremism
17. We do not believe that any terrorist group in the region is currently capable of attacking the UK mainland, but these groups do pose a threat to Western interests in the region and to regional stability. Northern Mali-based groups such as AQ-M, the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Masked Battalion, which recently conducted the In Amenas attacks in Algeria, are likely to have been degraded by French military action. But the threat has not been eradicated entirely, and has probably been displaced around the region. Boko Haram and Ansaru continue to threaten the stability of northern Nigeria, carrying out attacks on state institutions and local populations, and have recently kidnapped Westerners. Other terrorist groups in Tunisia and Libya pose a local threat, and we believe there has been interaction between Islamist movements around the region.
18. We are currently building our analysis of the roots and drivers of terrorism. It is true that key groups have become radicalised and that subgroups and individuals can also self-radicalise (as in the 2011 Casablanca bombing). There is abundant evidence of the jihadist narrative identifying local, regional and international grievances. But it also appears that some recruits are motivated by financial gain: a monthly salary of $400 for a young unemployed Malian is a real incentive. And there is a complex link between criminality and terrorism. A direct link between the regional drugs trade and terrorism is not easily proven, but the presence and opportunity of widespread criminality is. Groups such as MUJWA appear to combine extremist and criminal elements.
19. The development of extremist views in northern Mali posed a risk that the area would provide a base from which terrorist groups could expand. In the past 30 years an Islamic revival in northern Nigeria has been accompanied by the emergence of several extremist movements. Extreme interpretations of Islam are fairly alien and unwelcome concepts in West Africa, but extremist groups across the region have sometimes won supporters by offering services which the state has failed to provide.
Political instability
20. The Arab Spring has been succeeded by post-revolutionary fragility as political powers test their influence. The young and radically-minded see socio-economic challenges and the debate about the relationship between Islam and the state as particular priorities. Initially, most sections of society had high hopes for democratic politics as the forum through which to articulate their frustration. If this fails to deliver change swiftly enough, there remains a danger – particularly in Libya – that armed groups and vigilantes will try to assert control. To the south, instability is more extreme. Many countries have had multiple coups d’état and suffer from corrupt elites with no popular legitimacy. The challenge of building good governance and popular legitimacy is critical. Without this, there is a vacuum that terrorists can exploit. This is to an extent what has happened in Mali.
21. There is also a risk of instability spreading from Mali, particularly if displaced terrorist groups are able to gain footholds. Fragile neighbours such as Niger and Mauritania are especially vulnerable. To the south the gravest threat would be the undermining of Nigeria and their containment of Boko Haram and Ansaru. State failure anywhere in the region would incapacitate our democracy and governance objectives and severely damage our economic interests.
Gangsterism and Organised Crime
22. Crime is both a driver for the region’s problems and a result of lack of governance. Even without its links to terrorism, illicit trafficking is a major threat to the stability of regional governments. Conversely, weak states such as Guinea-Bissau create an environment where all criminality, including terrorism, can flourish.
23. Endemic corruption and weak law enforcement make West Africa a significant transit region for Latin American cocaine destined for the UK. The UNODC estimates that 18-30 tonnes are trafficked through Guinea-Bissau alone each year - roughly equivalent to the estimated size of the annual UK market (25-30 tonnes). Cannabis resin and tobacco are also trafficked through the Sahel in large quantities. Nigeria offers a base for organised crime including fraud (mass-marketing fraud is assessed as costing the UK £340m in 2012), cyber-crime and money-laundering. Beyond the direct impact on the UK homeland, crime in West Africa affects our wider interests, undermining democracy, governance and the rule of law and generating wider instability. This is complicated by weak regional willingness and capacity to address the issues, and by a lack of information, particularly on the routes and connections used by criminals.
Piracy
24. Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea threatens our economic interests, UK nationals, international freedom of trade and the security of regional energy supplies, as well as facilitating the smuggling of drugs, weapons and people. Attacks in the Gulf of Guinea are now more violent than those seen in the Indian Ocean and increasing in frequency.
Weapons Proliferation
25. State fragility has caused weapons proliferation across the region for some time. In particular, the security vacuum during and after the 2011 Libyan revolution released a flow of armed, trained soldiers into the region. Corruption is also a problem, with weapons sold to terrorists in northern Mali by corrupt individuals in the Malian Armed Forces. This contributes to regional instability, and undermines global initiatives like the Arms Trade Treaty.
Threats to the people of the region
26. We have an obligation as a leading donor. There is a significant humanitarian need across the Sahel. In particular, there is a pressing need to build resilience against natural disaster so that future food crises can be averted, and to address issues of post-conflict instability. DFID takes a leading role in both areas.
Human rights
27. Our human rights concerns vary across the region, though we are especially concerned about freedom of speech, women’s rights, LGBT rights and the death penalty, and country-specific challenges such as post-conflict stabilisation in Libya and reconciliation in Mali.
Our Approach to North and West Africa
28. On 22 January 2013, the National Security Council tasked the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to lead a new, cross-Government approach to North and West Africa with the following objective:
"To achieve a safer, more stable and more prosperous North and West Africa that does not provide a base for serious threats to UK interests by disrupting, degrading and isolating terrorist networks and addressing the drivers of instability."
29. The approach we are discussing will be based around three pillars – security, developmental, and political – and will aim to:
· shape international thinking on an integrated and coordinated security and development approach to the region, mindful of their diverse needs;
· encourage a new way of thinking about North and West Africa within the UK Government that adds to and transcends the standard bilateral approach;
· Demonstrate clear examples of bilateral and regional impact achieved by UK activity including, in time, examples of greater regional cooperation;
· Increase awareness of cross-border threats, both internationally and regionally, bringing greater regional coherence to international engagement.
Security
30. On counter-terrorism, we will continue to build bilateral partnerships in the region and work with international partners and organisations, for example on improving aviation security; conducting and sharing assessments with close allies to allow us to coordinate counter-terrorism activity; focusing at Lough Erne on the G8’s ability to analyse and tackle the drivers of instability in North and West Africa; and pressing for international consensus on not paying ransoms to terrorists.
31. On religious extremism, we support in northern Nigeria a DFID programme which aims to address the socio-economic drivers of radicalisation in six key states. In Mali we are pressing for action by the National Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation, who aim to overcome religious and ethnic divides. And regionally, we are planning work to understand attitudes towards extremism across North and West Africa and identify vulnerable and priority communities.
32. On organised crime, the FCO offers a platform for UK government partners in their deployments to the region. A SOCA Regional Manager based in Accra acts as EU Regional Coordinator for the 30+ EU liaison offices in the region. We are supporting G8 action and in June and November this year the Home Office will be hosting two G8 expert meetings on organised crime in West Africa.
33. On maritime security, we offer a platform for SOCA’s work with other EU member states in operating the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre in Lisbon, and contribute to the EU-funded Seaport Cooperation Programme. We are also supporting G8 action and hosted a G8+ experts meeting on the Gulf of Guinea on 30 April, with a follow-up meeting in November 2013.
34. On proliferation, we are assisting the Libyan authorities in securing borders and recovering weapons, and stepping up our work with regional partners to reduce the risk of a successful MANPADS attack.
35. Regional connections are key. We will work with regional and international allies, bilateral and multilateral, focusing on information-sharing and using our influence in organisations such as the EU and UN to shape international approaches. We will also encourage improvements in regional countries’ traditionally weak coordination of security activities, particularly on organised crime. For example, we will continue to support US attempts to encourage more joint working among Sahelian governments, including through its "Flintlock" exercise, which brings together the Mali, Niger and Mauritania militaries for extensive training.
Development
36. Development does not fall directly within the scope of this inquiry, but is at the heart of the Government’s approach to dealing with the drivers of instability. 60% of the countries in the region are classified as fragile or conflict-affected, and the Sahel is the world’s poorest region. The immediate humanitarian challenge is to address short-term and emergency needs in the Sahel. Longer-term, challenges range from developing stable and integrated economies to improving governance, security and accountability. The UK has already made major financial contributions to the Sahel region (approximately £600 million in FY 2012/13) and will remain a strong partner.
Political
37. Political and diplomatic engagement is central to the UK’s work to build a more functional and secure region. Political fragility has long characterised West Africa, and needs sustained engagement. Although recent trends towards political stability and economic growth are positive, coups d’état and stalled elections remain a concern. In North Africa, the Arab Spring has prompted unprecedented political change, opening up new opportunities (and challenges) for the UK. We will:
· Promote good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights, working through our network of posts, by direct contact between governments, and through major multilateral institutions. Our activities range from support for civil society organisations through the FCO-DFID Arab Partnership Fund, to Crown Prosecution Service projects designed to improve rule of law, and promoting dialogue and reconciliation in conflict-affected states such as Mali.
· Promote regional cooperation and leadership within organisations such as the AU, ECOWAS and the Arab-Maghreb Union. We already engage with some – for example through a British Military Liaison Officer to ECOWAS – but we intend to look at deepening the UK’s engagement with others. We will also encourage international financial institutions to take a more coherent approach to the region and take a more systematic approach to seconding experts to help build capacity.
· Take an international leadership role in conflict and security issues, using our position as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, our membership of the European Union and our governorship of International Financial Institutions and other international bodies proactively to promote conflict prevention and regional cooperation. We are taking an active role on Mali and promoting progress through contacts and participation with our allies and regional partners.
Prosperity
38. While our new approach is security and stability-led, we are also active on trade and investment, recognising that economic opportunity will be the long-term driver of growth, stability and development. North and West Africa contains two of the fastest growing economies (Ghana and Nigeria) and Africa’s wealthiest sub-region (North Africa). We retain a focus on UK commercial opportunities across the region – for example, agreeing a communiqué with Nigeria aiming to double bilateral trade to £8 billion by 2014. We have also established a West Africa Regional Prosperity Network which, working with the UKTI office in Ghana, harnesses the efforts of FCO prosperity officers in six West African posts.
39. This is a short selection of lessons and risks prompted by the Committee’s terms of reference. We will brief in more depth as required.
Mali
40. It is still early to draw conclusions from the Mali crisis. Nevertheless the international community misjudged the nature of the Government of Amadou Toumani Touré in Mali, which until early 2012 was held up as an example of stability. That Government had in fact been permitting the establishment of terrorists and had wasted aid money.
41. It was evident that without the terrorists’ advance there would have been a long and risky process of getting African troops onto the ground. There was willing regional support but a lack of capacity, and international contributions would probably have been slow to materialise. The French intervention was necessary and we were right to offer immediate support and to concentrate on logistical assistance. Cooperation was highly effective. Our contribution was valued and in proportion to both our interest in the challenge and our level of expertise in the region.
42. Our activity on Mali and the need for an international approach to the Sahel appears to be welcome both in the region and among partners. It is clear that in order to have impact the UK will need to continue to work through multilateral institutions (particularly the EU and UN), with our strategic partners (particularly the US and France), and with countries in the region to exploit our own particular areas of expertise. The process of dialogue, reconciliation and long-term stabilisation and development has just begun and presents a range of challenges.
Risks to the stability of the region
43. These are substantial. A number of countries across the region were fragile before recent events in Mali. Further conflict in the Sahel risks prompting major flows of refugees and illegal migrants, and could create permissive environments for terrorists and organised criminals. There is a risk of asymmetrical terrorist attack across the region, including to our interests and our citizens.
Risk of "blowback"
44. Increased UK involvement in the region brings an inevitable risk that the UK and our interests will increasingly become a target of those that oppose Western policy. As our involvement increases, our risk of exposure to terrorist acts also increases. Nevertheless we judge that this is outweighed by the importance of tackling the growing threat to Europe and the UK of terrorist groups being allowed to establish footholds from which to train, recruit and mount attacks. The UK would in any case have been high on the list of AQ-M targets, regardless of our involvement in Mali.
45. We have yet to see any significant "blowback" as a result of UK involvement in the French intervention in Mali. This is partly due to our limited footprint in the Sahel region and partly to the fact that our involvement in the intervention occurred as part of a coordinated international effort.
46. Some commentators have linked recent events such as the attacks on the In Amenas gas facility in eastern Algeria and the French Embassy in Tripoli to the French intervention in Mali. The complexity of the In Amenas attack would have required planning to have begun well before the French intervention in Mali, although it remains possible that a link will be established with the attack in Tripoli.
47. There is no doubt, however, that North and West Africa, particularly the Sahel region, is undergoing a period of flux and instability. Porous borders, conflict and fragile states mean that the movement of people, weapons and ideologies will flourish. Our understanding of the regional dynamics is evolving in parallel. We will continue to share our understanding of this emerging picture with the Committee.
10 May 2013