2 Threat Assessment
4. The threat from terrorism to the UK and its interests
overseas is more diverse and geographically dispersed than it
was a decade ago. In a speech to the Royal United Services Institute
(RUSI) in February 2013, the Foreign Secretary said that the greatest
terrorist threat to the UK remained Al Qa'ida and its ideology,
and suggested that the nature of the threat had changed in three
principal ways:
First, it is geographically more diverse. We
face a determined 'Al Qaeda core' in Pakistan and Afghanistan's
border region, and multiple groups inspired by Al Qaeda in the
world's most fragile regions. Second, the threat is more fragmented.
Al Qaeda does not control a franchise of groups all operating
to the same agenda, however much they would like us to think this.
Third, terrorism today is based even more closely on the exploitation
of local and regional issues. Terrorists are constantly searching
out new areas where they have the greatest freedom to plan external
attacks.[2]
5. We heard evidence that the threat is not only
diversifying in terms of geography—with Syria becoming the
latest battleground for terrorist groups—but in methodology,
as terrorists collaborate and coordinate their actions, both online
and offline, sharing information, skills and expertise. The evolution
of the terrorist threat in Syria and the increasing reality of
foreign fighters travelling back to the UK from Syria in order
to carry out an attack on the British mainland is the latest,
troubling development.[3]
6. While Syria is a priority concern for the Government,
the UK still faces a significant threat from Al Qa'ida (AQ) based
along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, groups such
as Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen and Al Qa'ida
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQM) in West Africa.
7. In recent times there have been reminders of the
global nature of the terrorist threat and its ability to impact
upon UK interests. The attack on In Amenas, in Algeria, included
six British citizens amongst the 40 dead. Following the attack
on the Westgate shopping Mall in Nairobi (in which six British
citizens also died), Al Shabaab, a terrorist group based in Somalia,
remains capable of mounting attacks throughout Kenya and against
targets in the Horn of Africa. The bomb blast in Addis Ababa which
killed two people in late 2013 could be a sign Al Shabaab are
beginning to target Ethiopia.
8. Kidnapping for ransom has become an increasingly
common terrorist tactic. Over 150 foreign nationals have been
kidnapped by Islamist terrorist groups since 2008 (at least 13
of whom were British nationals). Numbers kidnapped in 2012 (almost
50) were more than double those in 2010. In many cases ransoms
have been paid, and the British Government conservatively estimates
that AQ affiliates and other extremist groups have collected at
least $60 million in foreign national ransom payments since 2008.
9. The Government's CONTEST strategy identifies Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Nigeria as priority countries for
the UK's counter-terrorism work overseas. The United States Government's
National Counterterrorism Centre estimates that the number of
terrorist attacks around the world has levelled off following
a rapid increase between 2003 and 2008, but the global threat
from terrorism remains high.[4]
According to the CONTEST Annual Report published in 2014 there
were there were nearly 8,500 terrorist attacks in 85 countries,
causing nearly 15,500 fatalities.[5]
The United Kingdom
10. According to Home Office figures, between April
2010 and March 2013, 580 individuals were arrested in Great Britain
for terrorism-related offences.[6]
The breakdown of arrests, along with figures for the past year
can be found in the table below.
| Domestic terrorism
| Northern Irish terrorism
| International terrorism
| Not Classified
| Total |
| 2012-2013 | 33
| 4 | 182
| 30 | 249
|
| 2010-2013 | 80
| 9 | 446
| 45 | 580
|
From https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-2012-to-2013/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stop-and-searches-great-britain-2012-to-20
The outcomes of those arrests can be found in the
table below.
| Charged
| Released
| Alternative action taken
| Total |
| Under Terrorism Act 2000
| Under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000
| With terrorism offences under other legislation
| With non-terrorism related offences
| | | |
| 2012-2013 | 31
| 4 | 2
| 68 | 105
| 39 | 249
|
| 2010-2013 | 78
| 8 | 12
| 143 | 285
| 54 | 580
|
From https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-2012-to-2013/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stop-and-searches-great-britain-2012-to-20
11. David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of
Terrorism Legislation, suggested to us that Jonathan Evans, then
Director General of MI5, was not exaggerating when he said in
2012 that "Britain has experienced a credible terrorist attack
about once a year since 9/11."[7]
Mr Anderson went on to say:
The will and capacity to commit 7/7 style atrocities
in the United Kingdom may well still exist, as demonstrated by
the Birmingham rucksack bomb plot of 2011. Significant numbers
of British citizens have lost their lives abroad this year to
terrorism, notably in the Algerian gas plant and Nairobi shopping
mall attacks. In Great Britain, 43 persons were charged with terrorism-related
offences during 2012-a figure precisely in line with the average
since 2001.[8]
12. We understand that, in the past few years, the
police, security and intelligence agencies have seen a trend towards
'low signature' terrorism by small, self-directed groups and lone
actors. These individuals or groups develop the intent and capability
to conduct attacks without support or direction from AQ or AQ
affiliates.[9]
13. We also heard that the police were concerned
with so-called 'self-starters': individuals who radicalise themselves
(often over the internet) and plan attacks independently. Their
attack methods tend to be simple, requiring little money or technical
ability, and detecting and disrupting such threats is therefore
a significant challenge.[10]
An example of such an attack occurred last year when Pavlo Lapshyn,
a Ukrainian student, was convicted of murdering an 82-year-old
man and planning to cause explosions near mosques in racist attacks.[11]
14. Many of the trends outlined above have been identified
by Government. The CONTEST strategy included the following series
of planning assumptions:
· The death of Osama bin Laden will further
damage the operational capability of Al Qa'ida in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Continued international pressure will make it harder
for the Al Qa'ida senior leadership to plan and conduct terrorist
attacks. Al Qa'ida will try to exploit the withdrawal of western
forces from Afghanistan.
· Al Qa'ida affiliates may continue to grow,
taking advantage of state fragility and failure. They will all
aspire to attack western targets. The Al Qa'ida senior leadership
will try to guide and direct its affiliates but will not exert
close control: Al Qa'ida will continue to become less of an organisation
and more of a movement.
· A wider range of Al Qa'ida inspired terrorist
networks, groups and unaffiliated individuals will collaborate
to launch attacks against the West, sharing resources and capabilities.
· Current political and social change in
the Middle East and North Africa has undermined the credibility
of Al Qa'ida and like-minded terrorist groups and may continue
to do so; but terrorist groups will try to adapt their propaganda
and will exploit uncertainty and instability in the region.
· The process of radicalisation will continue:
the ideology which has come to be associated with Al Qa'ida will
be more resilient than Al Qa'ida itself. Extremist material on
the internet will continue to motivate some people to engage in
terrorism but will rarely be a substitute for the social process
of radicalisation.
· Terrorist groups will use a range of attack
techniques, both established and new. There will be more cyber
terrorism. Groups will continue to benefit from off-the-shelf
technology in planning and conducting attacks, making operations
more secure and potentially more lethal. The internet and virtual
space will be strategically vital.
· Organisations will seek to conduct attacks
which cause mass casualties or otherwise have visible mass disruptive
impact. Al Qa'ida and other groups will maintain their long-term
interest in using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
materials.
· Geographically, vital countries for our
counter-terrorism work will continue to be Afghanistan and Pakistan,
Yemen, Somalia and Nigeria.
· Some states will continue to support terrorist
groups to try to protect their own strategic interests.
· Terrorists in Northern Ireland will continue
to conduct attacks in an attempt to reverse the peace process.
Some groups will aspire to conduct attacks inside Great Britain.
· There will continue to be isolated individuals
who engage in terrorist activity in the name of extreme right
or left-wing views or other ideologies. They will not pose as
high a risk to our national security as terrorism associated with
Al Qa'ida.[12]
15. We asked Charles Farr, the Director General of
the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism whether he was satisfied
with the planning assumptions two years on. He replied:
I am satisfied that our planning assumptions
in 2011 continue to be relevant. They do not mention Syria specifically
though they do refer to the likely increase in activity by Al
Qa'ida affiliates and their exploitation of instability in the
Middle East. Syria of course reflects these broad trends.[13]
Global
Syria
16. Syria is the current theatre of choice for foreign
fighters, something which should be of great concern for EU Member
States, given the country's proximity to Europe, and ease of travel
to its main cities. Dr Thomas Hegghammer, Director of Terrorism
Research at The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, suggested
that while there are not strong signals of a concerted effort
by terrorist groups on the ground in Syria to target the West:
There have been some indications in the past
six months that such a change might happen...Those indications
include statements and threats by foreign fighters in Syria—including
British ones—and reports conveyed by intelligence officials,
like James Clapper in the US, that dominant groups in Syria have
now established training camps dedicated to the grooming of operatives
in the west.[14]
Dr Hegghammer went on to say that foreign fighters
in Syria were present in unprecedented numbers:
No other conflict in the Muslim world in recent
history has attracted the same number that we are now seeing in
Syria. The best estimates we have speak of 2,000 Europeans in
Syria, which I believe is more than the total number of European
foreign fighters in all previous conflict zones combined.[15]
17. The potential threat was confirmed by Mr Farr,
when he suggested the UK faces the threat of a terrorist attack
from Syria-based groups which may make use of foreign fighters
(including British citizens).[16]
Further on in this report, we discuss the position over UK citizens
travelling to Syria to assist in the fighting.
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
18. While Syria is the focus of much attention, there
remains a significant terrorism threat emanating from the border
between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Government recognises
the threat from terrorist groups operating in the tribal areas
along the Afghan border. This has long been a priority for our
national security.
19. Although Al Qa'ida is much reduced in number,
it continues to operate from this region and still has the capability
to conduct terrorist attacks in the UK and other countries. The
leadership of Al Qa'ida (based in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas of Pakistan) has been severely weakened by operations conducted
by the Pakistan Government. However British citizens still travel
to the region and return to the UK to conduct attacks. We cannot
afford to allow the considerable coverage of the Syrian conflict
to distract us from the threat posed by extremists within this
region. As the Government notes:
Operational capability of Al Qa'ida's leadership
is now less than at any time since 11 September 2001. Many have
been killed, captured, or dispersed. Communications, training
and planning have been significantly disrupted. Al Qa'ida's senior
leadership has been forced to rely more on other terrorist groups
for operational support and has increasingly called for extremists
to conduct independent attacks without further guidance or instruction.[17]
HORN OF AFRICA
20. The appalling September 2013 attack on the Westgate
Mall in Nairobi, Kenya demonstrated the intent and capability
of Al Shabaab, the Somali terrorist group. The attack in Nairobi
is the most serious act of terrorism in Kenya since Islamist extremists
attacked the US Embassy in 1998, but it is by no means an isolated
event in the region. We visited the Westgate Mall during, accompanied
by a British police officer based in Nairobi, and were horrified
at the devastation which had been wrought by a very small group
of people, using simple, inexpensive technology.
21. The recent shooting of Sheikh Abubakar Shariff
is likely to undermine community relations in some areas of Kenya.
His death follows similar shootings in Mombasa and the storming
of Musa Mosque in the city, during which at least eight people
were killed (including a policeman) and Kenyan Police arrested
129 people, including children. Many of the suspects have been
released following public condemnation.
22. In Somalia, some progress has been made by the
Somali Government in containing the threat posed by Al Shabaab
however these are fragile gains. Al Shabaab remains capable of
mounting attacks throughout the country, collaborating with other
terrorist organisations (such as AQAP in Yemen) and aspires to
attack targets in the region, including UK interests. Al-Shabaab
conducted over 30 attacks-including 10 suicide bombings-in 2010
alone.[18]
23. In 2012 the terrorist group launched fewer attacks
but remained in control of a substantial area of South Central
Somalia. However, 2013 saw an increase in the number of attacks
and in April, approximately thirty people were killed when Al-Shabaab
stormed Mogadishu's main court complex, while in early September
explosions at 'The Village', a restaurant near the Parliament
building in Mogadishu, killed fifteen people. We understand that
while the African Union-led military offensive in Somalia has
been successful in targeting Al-Shabaab, the terrorist group continues
to try and establish networks outside the country-both in Kenya
and Tanzania.
24. Al-Shabaab uses a combination of conventional
and asymmetric tactics-these include 'religious police' who employ
violent punishments, the use of automatic weapons, suicide bombers
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The group employs radio
and online communication to publicise its message and further
funding and recruitment drives. In addition to recruitment of
foreign-born suicide bombers, there has also been growth of home-grown
religious extremists through local recruitment and radicalisation
efforts. Terrorism and violent extremism in the region is growing
increasingly complex. Reports of a steady stream of recruits travelling
to Somalia from Western Kenya and Tanzania are concerning.
25. There are also concerns regarding the travel
of British extremists to the region attempting to link up with
Al Shabaab or other, related, extremist groups. The May 2013 murder
of Fusilier Lee Rigby was carried out by an individual who had
travelled to the region several times and was suspected of trying
to join Al Shabaab. We visited Kenya as part of this inquiry to
examine the links between the UK and Kenyan counter-terrorism
personnel and to examine the capacity building work which was
being carried out there.
YEMEN
26. Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)'s main
area of activity is within Yemen where it continues with a campaign
of attacks against the Yemeni Government and supportive countries.
It also continues to conduct operations against both internal
and western diplomatic targets in Yemen. Kidnappings for ransom
are commonplace, and tribal groups may attempt to sell hostages
to AQAP.
27. In the past few years, AQAP are estimated to
have made $15-20 million through kidnap and ransom. A number of
UK diplomats have been attacked. Despite a partially successful
counter-terrorism campaign by the Government, AQAP continues to
pose a significant threat both to the UK and to UK interests in
the region.
28. AQAP propaganda, in the shape of Inspire-an online
magazine - has continued to encourage acts of lone terrorism against
the West. In April 2012, AQAP attempted a third attack on a civilian
aircraft. AQAP are not coordinated by the AQ leadership and are
seen by analysts as more technically astute than other AQ affiliated
groups. They remain a key concern for UK national security.
29. At the start of the Arab Spring, AQAP improved
infrastructure in some areas by connecting towns to electricity
grid, putting teachers in school and playing a governmental role.
However, their popularity waned following a level of brutality
imposed their leaders. Despite this, intercepted communications
between AQAP and AQM in Mali during the incursion there emphasised
the importance of winning the hearts and mind of the people and
gave advice to AQM leaders on organising rubbish collections and
ensuring access to electricity.[19]
30. AQAP is responsible for the production of Inspire,
the English language magazine which is frequently found in the
possession of self-organised groups planning attacks in the UK.
Its key messages include an emphasis on promoting attacks in the
West, specifically lone actor style attacks. One of the alleged
Boston bombers, Dzhokar Tsarnaev, stated that he and his brother
Tamerlan had access to a copy of Inspire.
31. AQAP also has a track record of attempting to
carry out sophisticated terrorist attacks in the West. AQAP has
demonstrated the capability to produce IEDs aimed at defeating
aviation security, and there is a continuing risk that a successful
attack against an aeroplane could happen with little or no warning.
These include the 'underpants bomber' and the 'printer cartridge
plot'.
NORTH AFRICA
32. There has been a sharp increase in terrorist
activity in the region conducted by Al Qa'ida in the Maghreb (AQM).
AQM has its origins in Algeria, where the majority of its attacks
to date have been directed. However, following the Arab Spring,
AQM benefited from the deterioration in the security situation
in the area-particularly in Libya - to increase its geographical
reach, add to its arsenal of weapons and attract recruits to its
cause. We remain very concerned that some analysts have described
Libya as a large warehouse full of weapons with the doors wide
open.
33. Smaller, affiliated organisations are also active.
AQ-related groups are now stronger in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia
than ever before and have greater freedom of movement. The attack
on the gas installation at In Amenas in Algeria in January 2013
demonstrates the current capability and intent of terrorist groups
in the region.
34. AQM has kidnapped and ransomed western hostages,
securing significant funds for further operational activity; AQM
has moved south into Mali and provides practical support to the
Nigerian militant Islamist group-Boko Haram. The group has constantly
exploited the freedom of movement afforded to it in the largely
unpoliced desert areas of the Sahel.
35. The French-led intervention in Mali has removed
this control and pushed AQM into more remote areas. The threat
of attacks from AQM elements is however likely to endure in the
region for the foreseeable future.
NIGERIA
36. In Nigeria the Islamist extremist group Boko
Haram has carried out a violent campaign, largely in the north
of the country, often aimed at Christian communities and places
of worship, as well as against Nigerian governmental and official
targets. A second Nigerian jihadist organisation, Ansaru, is an
offshoot of this group although it is worth noting the groups
have separate ethnic identities-Boko Haram is mainly Kanuri whereas
Ansaru is Hausa.
37. Boko Haram is conducting a large scale insurgency
in Nigeria. There are almost daily attacks in Nigeria, causing
large numbers of fatalities. Its splinter group. Ansaru, has a
more international agenda and has kidnapped and murdered western
(including British) hostages. Boko Haram and extended its reach
into the volatile region of northern Nigeria.
38. Ansaru is widely associated with carrying out
kidnap for ransom. There are many links between terrorist groups
and drug trafficking in North-West Africa. In many cases, drugs
will arrive on the West Coast and will be transported northwards
by terrorist groups who take advantage of the porous borders in
the region. There are also reports that smugglers have been adopting
a religious or jihadist rhetoric in order to justify their fight
against the security services. A number of criminal organisations
in Mali have adopted a separatist stance to 'legitimise' themselves.
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/countering-terrorism-overseas
Back
3
Ruth Sherlock, Gaziantep, and Tom Whitehead, Al-Qaeda training
British and European 'jihadists' in Syria to set up terror cells
at home, Daily Telegraph, 19 Jan 2014 Back
4
CONTEST Annual Report, Home Office, March 2013, Cm 8583 Back
5
CONTEST Annual Report, Home Office, April 2014, Cm 8848 Back
6
INQ0007 Back
7
CTE0017 Back
8
CTE0017 Back
9
CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism,
July 2011, Cm 8123 Back
10
INQ0007 Back
11
Mosque bomber Pavlo Lapshyn given life for murder, 25 October
2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-24675040 Back
12
CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism,
July 2011, Cm 8123 Back
13
INQ0010 Back
14
Q566 Back
15
Q554 Back
16
Q187 Back
17
CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism,
July 2011, Cm 8123 Back
18
CONTEST Annual Report, March 2013, HM Government, Cm 8583 Back
19
CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism,
July 2011, Cm 8123 Back
| 
