Counter-terrorism - Home Affairs Committee Contents

5  The UK's response to the terrorist threat

88. Terrorist plots and acts of terrorism are investigated by the police and the security and intelligence agencies. Government funding for counter-terrorism policing was £573 million in 2012-13. The security and intelligence agencies receive a budget of £2.1 billion. In 2011-12 MI5 allocated 72% of its resources to international counter-terrorism whereas MI6 and GCHQ allocated roughly a third each of their budgets to international counter-terrorism.[81]

89. The current UK threat level is substantial, having been downgraded from severe in July 2011. That means that an attack is a strong possibility. Since its inception in 2006, the threat level was either severe or critical up until July 2009 when it was listed as substantial. It was upgraded to severe in January 2010 before the July 2011 downgrade.[82] This latter period has coincided with a liberalisation in terrorism laws following a review of Counter-Terrorism legislation carried out by the coalition Government. David Anderson QC welcomed the changes since 2010 in his written evidence to this inquiry.

    Over the past few years, the anti-terrorism laws and their operation have been cautiously liberalised in areas ranging from stop and search and retention of biometric data to detention periods and control orders. In successive reports I have found the liberalisation-but also the caution-to be justified. I have pointed to gaps in protection, though it is often difficult to do so publicly. I have also made recommendations for further change. A few such recommendations (for example the possibility of bail for those arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000) have been rejected, at least for now. Others have been partially adopted or are currently in train: in particular, the review and amendment of Schedule 7 port powers and the revocation of outdated and potentially unlawful proscription orders.[83]

90. Acts of terrorism are not generally charged under terrorist legislation-the perpetrators of the attack of Fusilier Lee Rigby and the man responsible for the death of Mohammed Saleem were both charged with (and convicted of) murder rather than a terrorist offence although both cases were investigated as terrorism. Instead terrorism legislation is intended to prevent both radicalisation (which can lead to acts of terrorism) and acts of terrorism themselves. The purpose of terrorism legislation is to

·  Ensure that what are known as 'prior acts' (such as preparation, training, dissemination, possession for terrorist purposes and even encouragement) are criminalised, and

·  To criminalise individuals who may have known about the intentions of terrorists (non-disclosure to the police or being present during training).[84]

There is also a degree of associated legislation which can be used to disrupt terrorist action. In this inquiry we have mainly focused on the effectiveness of the UK counter-terrorism policy and legislation which can be used to disrupt the activities of foreign fighters. In this chapter we also discuss the possible transfer of counter-terrorism policing from the Metropolitan Police to the National Crime Agency.

Countering terrorist activity

Schedule 7

91. Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 empowers police, immigration officers and designated customs officers to stop and question travellers at ports, airports, or hover ports in order to ascertain whether they are a terrorist, which for this purpose means "a person who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism".[85] There is no requirement that the officer have reasonable grounds for suspicion that the person is involved in terrorism before the powers can be exercised. The person being questioned can be

·  detained for questioning for up to 6 hours;

·  required to answer questions and provide information and documents on pain of criminal penalty; and,

·  searched, as can any property they have on them (including personal electronic devices such as laptop computers, tablets and mobile phones). That property can be seized and retained for examination.

Failure to comply with any duties or requests is a criminal offence, punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 months. The powers are used on a considerable scale (approximately 60,000 stops a year[86]) and, according to the EHRC, the ethnic breakdown of those subjected to the power suggests a statistical disproportionality in terms of race.[87]

92. There has been further controversy following the use of schedule 7 to detain David Miranda at Heathrow Airport in August 2013. Mr Miranda is the partner of Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald (the author of the Guardian newspaper stories based on classified intelligence material leaked by Edward Snowden). He was in transit at Heathrow airport on his way from Berlin to Rio de Janeiro when he was detained and questioned for 9 hours. His electronic devices were seized and detained by the police as the devices were understood to contain material provided by Mr Snowden to the Guardian, including some 58,000 classified UK intelligence documents.[88] Following his detention, Mr Miranda brought a judicial review of the decision to detain him under schedule 7 which was dismissed in February 2014 (although he has publicly stated his intention to appeal against the decision.).[89] The Miranda judicial review is one of a number of legal challenges to Schedule 7 which have been brought and a number of changes to the process have been incorporated in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The amendments include a statutory review of the detention at regular intervals, the introduction of a code of practice and safeguards on the retention of electronic data.

93. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (who reports annually on the use of schedule 7) had previously been intending to report on the use of schedule 7 to detain David Miranda at Heathrow Airport in August 2013. Following the outcome of legal proceedings brought by Mr Miranda against the decision to detain him under schedule 7 and the Royal Assent of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act in March 2014, Mr Anderson has decided to not to issue such a report. Instead he will include any recommendations in his annual report which will likely be published in July 2014.[90] Mr Anderson raised a number of issues in evidence to us which were not dealt with in the Act, specifically:

·  An introduction of a test of grounds of suspicion when ancillary powers are used (such as detention or making copies of material found on the person);

·  The use of answers given under compulsion in a criminal court; and

·  The treatment of legally privileged material, excluded material and special procedure material.[91]

We believe that all of these issues should be subject to further review and we await Mr Anderson's report.


94. In April 2013, the Home Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement to the House which announced a change in the rules allowing the Home Secretary to prove that it was 'undesirable' for such a person to have a British passport as opposed to 'demonstrably undesirable'. The statement contained the commitment to use the power 'sparingly'.[92] It also included the following reference to its purposes for countering terrorism.

    For example, passport facilities may be refused to or withdrawn from British nationals who may seek to harm the UK or its allies by travelling on a British passport to, for example, engage in terrorism-related activity or other serious or organised criminal activity. This may include individuals who seek to engage in fighting, extremist activity or terrorist training outside the United Kingdom, for example, and then return to the UK with enhanced capabilities that they then use to conduct an attack on UK soil. The need to disrupt people who travel for these purposes has become increasingly apparent with developments in various parts of the world.[93]

95. In the past the use of the power has been thought to have been rare. It was reported to have been used only 16 times between 1947 and 1976. It was also reported to have been used in 2005 following the return from Guantanamo Bay of Martin Mubanga, Feroz Abbasi, Richard Belmar and Moazzam Begg,[94] However, because it is a royal prerogative there is no requirement for the Home Office to report its use to Parliament. When he gave evidence to us on the 18 March 2014, the Immigration and Security Minister informed the Committee that the Royal Prerogative had been used 14 times since April 2013. He told us that none of those who have had their passport removed have challenged the decision by way of judicial review.[95] He also repeated the commitment to the Royal Prerogative being used proportionately, in the public interest and sparingly.[96]

96. The withdrawal of passports is a vital tool in preventing UK citizens from travelling to foreign conflicts. We understand the need to use the prerogative power to withdraw or withhold a citizen's passport. Given that the estimates of foreign fighters are in the low hundreds, we are surprised that it has only been used 14 times since April 2013 and recommend that, in all appropriate circumstances where there is evidence, the power is utilised as an exceptional preventative and temporary measure. However, we note that its use is not subject to any scrutiny external to the executive. We recommend that the Home Secretary report quarterly on its use to the House as is currently done with TPIMs and allow the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to review the exercise of the Royal Prerogative as part of his annual review.


97. Another method to address the issue of British citizens (with dual citizenship) fighting in Syria is removing their British citizenship. Using powers in the British Nationality Act, the Home Secretary can terminate the British citizenship of dual-nationality individuals if she believes their presence in the UK is 'not conducive to the public good', or if they have obtained their citizenship through fraud. Deprivation of citizenship orders can be made with no judicial approval in advance, and take immediate effect-the only route for people to argue their case is through legal appeals. When we took evidence from the Immigration and Security Minister he informed us that deprivation of citizenship orders had been made in 41 cases since 2010-24 on non-conducive grounds and 17 on fraud grounds. He refused to specify how many cases were linked to Syria.[97]

98. At present, only dual nationals can have their British citizenship withdrawn. However, there is currently legislation being debated which would allow a naturalised mono-British national to have their citizenship removed (which would make them stateless) if it

    is conducive to the public good because the person, while having that citizenship status, has conducted him or herself in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom, any of the Islands, or any British overseas territory.[98]

In such cases, the Government maintains, the individual can attempt to (re)acquire an alternative nationality.

99. In a Westminster Hall debate on the subject, the Immigration and Security Minister noted that the power would be used 'sparingly' but emphasised that deprivation of citizenship would be imposed even if the individual could not obtain alternative nationality. If the individual were in the UK and unable to obtain alternative nationality, they could apply to remain in the UK as a stateless person. He noted that

    The UK would continue to comply with the provisions of the 1961 UN convention on the reduction of statelessness, regarding the rights of stateless persons. Where appropriate, we could regularise a person's position in the UK by granting limited leave—possibly with conditions relating to access to public funds and their right to work and study.[99]

We were surprised when the Minister informed us that the policy approach had been based on a single case (the Al-Jedda case) and that the focus had been on individuals who would be able to apply for alternative nationality. Mr Al-Jedda is not currently in the UK, hence the Minister's apparent lack of concern, but the legislation would seem to have no discernible outcome were it used against someone whilst they were in the UK.

100. On Monday 7 April the House of Lords voted to amend the Immigration Bill to further investigate the efficacy of the policy. The House voted to replace the clause with the following text.

    (1) A committee of members of both Houses of Parliament shall be established to consider and report on whether section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 (deprivation of citizenship) should be amended to enable the Secretary of State to deprive a person of their citizenship status if—

    (a) the citizenship status results from the person's naturalisation, and

    (b) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the deprivation is conducive to the public good because the person, while having that citizenship status, has conducted him or herself in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom, any of the Islands, or any British overseas territory,

    even if to do so would have the effect of making a person stateless.

    (2) The committee shall consist of six members of the House of Lords nominated by the Chairman of Committees, and six members of the House of Commons nominated by the Speaker of the House of Commons, to be appointed on the passing of this Act to serve for the duration of the present Parliament.

    (3) Any casual vacancy occurring by reason of the death, resignation or incapacity of a member of the committee shall be filled by the nomination of a member by the Chairman of Committees or the Speaker of the House of Commons, as the case may be.

    (4) The quorum of the committee shall be two members of each House and the committee shall be entitled to sit and to transact business whether Parliament be sitting or not, and notwithstanding a vacancy in the membership of the committee.

    (5) Subject to the above provisions, the committee may regulate its own procedure.[100]

We welcome the decision to constitute a joint committee to look at the proposal to strip the citizenship of naturalised citizenship. We hope that one of the issues will examine is the impact making a person stateless whilst they are in the United Kingdom.

101. We have grave concerns about how effective the deprivation of mono-citizenship powers will be. Drafting legislation on the basis of an individual case lessens the impact of the legislation because the exact circumstances are unlikely to repeat themselves. We support the Minister's commitment to the power being used sparingly. We recommend that the Government endeavour to use the power only when the person subject to the decision is outside the UK.


102. Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) were introduced in January 2012 as the successor to control orders.[101] TPIMs are used by the Government to monitor and restrict the actions of those who are suspected of terrorist-related activity but who cannot be prosecuted or deported. The Home Secretary is responsible for the decision to make an individual subject to a TPIM order, but subject to the prior approval of the court, except in urgent cases, where the court must consider the TPIM notice within seven days of it being issued. The subject is not permitted to participate in these hearings directly, but his or her interests are represented by a special advocate appointed (in England and Wales) by the Attorney General. The special advocate is not responsible to the person whose interests he or she is appointed to represent.

103. A TPIM notice may be made by the Secretary of State only if the following five conditions are satisfied:

·  The Secretary of State must reasonably believe that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity, as very broadly defined ("Condition A");

·  Some or all of that activity must be "new" ("Condition B"), though in the case of a first TPIM to be imposed on a given subject, this condition is always met since activity occurring at any time is deemed to be "new".

·  The Secretary of State must reasonably consider that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public (whether in the UK or overseas) from a risk of terrorism, for TPIMs to be imposed on the individual ("Condition C");

·  The Secretary of State must reasonably consider that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual's involvement in terrorism-related activity, for the specified TPIMs to be imposed on the individual ("Condition D");

·  The High Court must give prior permission for the TPIM notice to be imposed, such permission to be withheld when the decisions of the Secretary of State on Conditions A-D are "obviously flawed", save in urgent cases where permission may be obtained retrospectively ("Condition E").[102]

104. Given that two of those subject to TPIMs have absconded (Ibrahim Magag absconded on 26 December 2012 and Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed on 1 November 2013), one has been revoked whilst the subject is in prison and that the remaining TPIMs expired by 10 February 2014[103], we feel that it is a subject worth examining in more detail. There are currently no active TPIMs. TPIM subjects in 2013 were subject to restrictions which included overnight residence at a specified address, GPS tagging, reporting requirements, and restrictions on travel, movement, association, communication, finances, work and study.[104]

105. TPIM notices expire after a year, and may be renewed for a maximum of one further year. The TPIMs imposed at the start of 2012 expired, after the single permitted extension, in early 2014. This means that people who have been judged by the Home Secretary and by the courts to be potentially dangerous are now, unless they are prosecuted or new evidence of terrorism-related activity is found, free from restrictions.

The difference between control orders and TPIMs

106. In his 2012 report on TPIMs, David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation included a table which set out the difference between control orders and TPIMs.
Control orders TPIMs
Legal Test Legal test for imposition of control order: reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism-related activity; order must be necessary to protect the public. Legal test for imposition of TPIM notice: reasonable belief of involvement in terrorism-related activity; measures must be necessary to protect the public.
Duration Order lasted maximum of 12 months. Renewable if necessary to protect the public; no maximum number of renewals where necessity test satisfied. Orders in place in a small number of cases for over 4 years. Order lasts maximum of 12 months extendable once, giving maximum time limit of 2 years. Evidence of further engagement in terrorism-related activity required to justify a further notice beyond 2 years.


Any obligation to protect the public could be imposed where judged necessary and proportionate to disrupt terrorism-related activity. (The obligations were not set out in detail on the face of the legislation.) A narrower range of measures-described in detail on the face of the Act-can be imposed where judged necessary and proportionate to disrupt terrorism-related activity
Curfew / Overnight residence requirement / Residence requirement Maximum curfews of up to 16 hours for non-derogating control orders with electronic tagging available to monitor compliance. A requirement to reside overnight at a specified residence (most TPIM notice specify 10 hours)-with limited stays at other locations possible. Electronic tagging available to monitor compliance.
Relocation Option to relocate individuals to Home Office provided accommodation-potentially several hours travel away from current residence. No power to relocate away from local area without agreement. A power to provide alternative accommodation within the locality of the home address.
Communication Option to have complete prohibition of access to mobile phones, computers and the internet (and associated technology/equipment). All individuals have a right to use one mobile phone without internet access and one landline telephone. All individuals will be able to have access to the internet through one home computer. Use of equipment will be subject to necessary controls e.g. regular inspection and notification of passwords.
Association Option to prohibit association with any named individuals where necessary. And option to prohibit association without permission with anyone other than named individuals and specified descriptions of persons. Option to prohibit association with named individuals retained. Association with any other person requires notification. (Policy intention is that notification will be required on the first occasion (and will be unrestricted on subsequent occasions)).
Work/studyOption to require notification and/or approval of work and study. Option retained.
BoundaryOption to impose a very restrictive geographical boundary-limiting the individual to a relatively narrow area and excluding him from areas of significant concern. Option to impose a limit on entry to one of more mosques. No geographical boundaries. Power to exclude from particular places-streets or specified areas or towns-or descriptions of places (e.g. airports, specified mosques).
Travel abroad Option to prohibit travel abroad. Option to prohibit travel abroad without permission of Secretary of State.
Police reporting Option to require daily reporting to the police. Option retained
FinancialOption to place restrictions on use of financial services and transfers of property and requirements to disclose details of property. Option retained.
RenewalAnnual renewal of Act Renewal of Act every five years
DerogationDerogating control orders possible-if Government was to derogate from Article 5 (right to liberty) of the European Convention on Human Rights-imposing 24 hour curfew (house arrest). No power orders.
Prospects of prosecution Police must keep prospects of prosecution under review, consulting CPS as necessary Police must keep prospects of prosecution under review, consulting CPS as necessary. Police under statutory duty to inform Home Office of outcome.

Source: TPIMs report 2012, Pg. 102

107. The Quilliam Foundation noted that

    The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 is a welcome amendment that repeals and replaces the Control Orders in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. It thereby ensures greater compatibility with the ECHR and less intrusion on the human rights of the individuals subject to them than the previous control orders, particularly in reference to the potential forced relocation and indefinite length of the control orders that have now both been written out of the revised TPIM legislation. However there remain several significant problems with TPIMs that mean they are inconsistent with a clear human rights-based counter-extremism strategy.[105]

Cerie Bullivant, who was subject to a control order between 2006 and 2008, told us that he saw very little difference between the two. Although he welcomed the abolition of the power to relocate subjects and the two-year limit on the duration of a TPIM, he told us that life under each order would be exactly the same.[106] The Quilliam Foundation suggested that one way of improving TPIMs would be to have an additional element that comprises de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration.[107] An exit strategy developed by specialised probation officers with approved mentors from external organisations was the recommendation made by David Anderson QC.[108] We return to this subject below.

TPIM breaches

Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed

108. On 1 November 2013, Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed absconded from his TPIM by entering a mosque, removing his electronic tag and leaving dressed in a burkha. In the statutory review of his TPIM in 2012, the High Court found that Mr Mohamed was closely linked to a UK-based terrorist network with links to Al Qaida and Al-Shabaab. He had travelled to Somalia where he received training in 2008 from experienced Al-Shabaab operatives, after which he went on to fight for them on the front line in Somalia. He helped others to travel from the UK to Somalia for similar purposes and he facilitated the support of the UK-based network for terrorism-related activity in Somalia. The network, which included Ibrahim Magag and Jama Hersi, had access to money (which Mr Mohamed was involved in procuring), false passports and documentation, as well as equipment, and was involved in procuring funds for terrorism-related activity. Between 2008 and 2010, Mr Mohamed was involved in procuring weapons and planning attacks in Somalia and elsewhere, including a planned attack on the Juba Hotel in Mogadishu in August 2010. Other attacks were planned against western interests in Somaliland.[109] The Home Office have provided us with a chronology of their involvement with Mr Mohamed (see Annex A).

109. The Metropolitan Police told us that they were satisfied with their response to the absconsion and did not feel that it could have been improved upon.[110] However David Anderson QC has recommended that some form of locational restraints to be introduced in to TPIMs in order to lessen the ability of subjects to abscond.[111] It is deeply worrying that anyone who is subject to a TPIM, or those who were subjects of control orders, can abscond with relative ease. We recommend that a review of the types of measures placed upon subjects needs to be conducted to ensure that enough is being done to prevent absconsion.

110. During our evidence session it emerged that Mr Mohammed had been arrested on three occasions, for a total of 21 suspected breaches of the terms of his Control Order (March 2011 to February 2012) or TPIM (since February 2012) . He was remanded in custody after each of these arrests, but the Court subsequently ruled in each case that he should be released on bail. The prosecution in relation to the third arrest (on suspicion of a 'tag tamper' on 16 May) was discontinued, but Mr Mohamed was still on bail when he absconded. He is due to stand trial for these alleged breaches (which do not include the absconsion) in the week beginning 28 April 2014. If he is not present, it is likely that the trial will be postponed. Mr Mohammed has also brought an appeal against the original decision of the High Court to uphold his TPIM and a separate civil claim against the Government. These cases are currently active before the courts and we make no comment on them, though the next steps are uncertain in Mr Mohammed's continued absence.

Prosecution of TPIM breaches

111. The Home Office have provided details of other cases where a TPIM has been breached following their introduction in 2012.

·  One person pleaded guilty to three counts of breaching: broadcasting without permission, attending a meeting or gathering without permission and entering an internet cafe without permission. He was sentenced to nine months imprisonment on 21 June 2013. Charges in relation to a further three counts were allowed to lie on file following his guilty plea.

·  One person was charged with five counts of entering an excluded area without permission. The CPS discontinued the prosecution because, in their view, there was no realistic prospect of a conviction.

·  In three cases (of which Mr Mohamed was one) charges relating to tampering with the electronic monitoring tag were discontinued after the CPS concluded that challenges to the reliability of the forensic evidence meant that, in their view, there was no realistic prospect of a conviction.

·  One person was found not guilty in relation to two counts of breaching—failure to report to the police station and failure to report to the monitoring company as required.

·  One person is currently remanded in custody awaiting trial, having been charged with one count of breaching—having an unauthorised meeting.

112. David Anderson QC suggested that one of the difficulties with prosecuting breaches of TPIMs was that juries often considered the breach to be a 'trivial' matter and were therefore reluctant to convict. In his report on TPIMs, he gave this example:

    Another subject (CF) was charged in June 2012 with entering the Olympic Park, an excluded area, without permission. The CPS decided not to pursue the prosecution in September 2012.


    The alleged breach consisted of CF sitting on an over-ground train as it crossed the Olympic Park, on his way to visit his solicitor in Stratford. After receipt of evidence to the effect that the subject had been advised to take that route by a junior employee of the solicitor's firm, charges were dropped-presumably on the basis that if the case had been left to them, the jury would inevitably have found there to be a reasonable excuse.[112]

The Government's position on decisions to prosecute for breach of TPIMs is that

    The police investigate all potential breaches and consult with the CPS regarding the viability of prosecution in each case. Where there is sufficient admissible evidence and it is deemed to be in the public interest, a prosecution for breach of the measures in a TPIM notice will usually be taken forward.[113]

However, information provided by the Home Office shows that at the time of writing there have been three trials for breach of a TPIM, one guilty plea and two forthcoming trials (one of which is that of Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed). Not one of the three trials for a breach of a TPIM has been won by the CPS. In two trials the defendants have been found not guilty and in the third, the CPS discontinued the prosecution due to a lack of realistic prospect of conviction. So far there have been no jury convictions of breaches of TPIMs or Control Orders and the CPS needs to bear this in mind when bringing prosecutions. We recommend that the Government and Crown Prosecution Service produce specific guidance on investigating and prosecuting breaches. The continued failure to secure a conviction undermines the system of TPIMs.

The prosecution of 'tag tampering'

113. In regards to the 'tag tamper' case, Mr Mohamed's solicitors—who represent two-thirds of those subject to TPIMs—have written to us to highlight the deficiencies which they believe to exist with the tags. They note that all of their TPIMs clients have been accused of tampering with their tags and that this is an accusation which "all have strenuously denied from the outset in police interviews and in subsequent correspondence from their lawyers to the CPS."[114] They further note that another TPIM subject who was represented by a different firm of solicitors had been subject to the same allegation of tampering with their tag resulting in a tag-tamper alert for which the CPS maintains that there is "no innocent explanation". In evidence to us, G4S told us that

    In terms of tamper detection systems and capabilities, this uses proven technology which we have had in place in our equipment for many years now and which has proved to be extremely reliable and robust.[115]

114. Mr Mohamed's solicitors have consulted experts who believe that the tamper alerts are a result of the attachment of the larger GPS tag which are more likely to be "snagged, twisted or rotated away from the leg", using the same strap as used on the smaller, more widely used tags. It has been noted that the tags have not been subjected to tests to establish the effect of praying five times a day (which can involve repeated flexion and rotation of the ankle) can have on the tag and strap, and that, due to the size of the tag, it can be subject to greater wear and tear. Mr Mohamed's solicitors note that "more than one wearer of the new tag has reported tripping/falling down stairs, and knocking, for instance on a bicycle." Ross Anderson, Professor of Security Engineering at the University of Cambridge, was consulted on tampering prosecutions and concluded that

    The quality of evidence is poor, and in at least five cases now, when defence experts have asked to examine the tags a defendant was supposed to have tampered with, or the systems, or even samples of straps and clips, the prosecution has been withdrawn or collapsed.[116]

115. Many breaches of a TPIM order are minor infringements which might plausibly have happened inadvertently. It is therefore right that the CPS does not prosecute every single breach, considering the cost to the public purse and the difficulty of convincing a jury of the materiality of the alleged breach without being able to explain the basis on which the relevant restriction was included in the order. It is worth noting that no prosecution has been successful following a not-guilty plea and in only one case has the accused pleaded guilty. In the case of the tag tampering trial, it is of serious concern that the prosecution was discontinued. Deliberately tampering with a tag must be viewed as an attempt to abscond and we recommend that the Home Office request independent testing of the tags provided by G4S to definitively prove, as they claim, a tag-tamper alert can only be caused through deliberate actions. This will enable the Home Office to present reliable evidence to the court that such an alert cannot be caused inadvertently. Given that five prosecutions for tag tampering have been withdrawn or collapsed it is vital that both the public and TPIM subjects understand the extent to which it might or might not be possible for a tag-tamper alert to be innocently caused.

De-radicalisation of those subject to TPIMs

116. In his report examining the operation of TPIMs in 2012, the Independent Reviewer emphasised that the imminent two-year limit would "focus energies on finding an exit strategy", but suggested that more needed to be done in this area. He recommended that exit strategies should in future include the integration of any related Prevent activity into the management of the TPIM,[117] as well as giving consideration to some form of dialogue with subjects similar to that employed in criminal cases, where the probation service proposes how an individual might best be rehabilitated.[118] In his 2013 report on TPIMs, David Anderson noted that his central recommendation—that a power to require attendance at meetings with specified persons for the purposes of de-radicalisation and re-integration—was not accepted by the Government despite the fact that it was supported by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the police, the security service and the National Probation Service.[119]

117. When he appeared before us, Mr Anderson again highlighted the importance of an exit strategy. He allowed that it would not de-radicalise all of those subject to TPIMs, but argued that it might have an impact on some.[120] Assistant Commissioner Cressida Dick also highlighted the need for a processes for managing the risk associated with the lifting of TPIM restrictions:

    We will need to manage any lingering risk that there may be around [former TPIM subjects] and also in this phase work as well as we can with them to try to ensure that they don't pose any further risk.[121]

We examined de-radicalisation during our inquiry into The Roots of Violent Radicalisation in 2012, where we noted the importance of family and community support in the counter-radicalisation process.[122] The anonymity order which is traditionally granted to those on TPIMs makes this difficult. However the Home Secretary has told us that Prevent interventions play a part in operational planning to manage the risk from TPIM subjects after the expiry of TPIM measures. In his 2013 report, David Anderson QC also emphasised the importance of devising a TPIMs exit strategy as soon as the TPIM is imposed in order to allow time for trust to be built between the TPIM subject and the probation officer.[123]

118. In evidence, Cerie Bullivant told us that no attempt had been made to de-radicalise him either when his control order was in force or after it had been quashed, despite the Home Office continuing to assert that he was dangerous.[124] We note that in their recent Post Legislative Scrutiny report which examined TPIMs legislation, the Joint Committee on Human Rights also questioned the Government's de-radicalisation work with those subject to TPIMs. The report highlighted that

    We sought to find out more about the work being done with the individuals concerned, such as how it relates to the Government's wider-de-radicalisation work; what sorts of agencies or other organisations the Government has sought to involve in this work; whether any work has been done with the families of TPIMs subjects, given the significant impact of TPIMs on them and the risk of creating a new generation subject to the influence of extremist narratives; and whether any TPIMs subjects are being actively helped into work or study to assist with their reintegration when their TPIM expires. On all of these questions, we found the Government to be unforthcoming.[125]

119. The Home Secretary told us that TPIMs is one of the tools the Home Office uses for monitoring the activities of foreign fighters on their return from places like Somalia and Syria[126] although no TPIMs have yet been imposed on those who taken part in the Syrian conflict. Shiraz Maher, Senior Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation noted that there had been variable success with de-radicalisation strategies within the UK but warned that any strategy to de-radicalise those who had fought in the Syrian conflict would need to deal with the intra-Muslim conflict rather than the traditional 'West versus Islam' narrative on which the PREVENT strategy currently focuses.

120. It is essential that the Government engages with those placed on a TPIM whilst they are subject to the control and not only afterwards. It is a missed opportunity not to implement a de-radicalisation programme until the subjects are free of the measures. We recommend that all TPIM subjects are placed on a graduated scheme, which commences concurrently with the measures, with the sole purpose of engagement and de-radicalisation. We accept that the anonymity order may cause difficulties in terms of liaising with the local community when seeking support for that process. However, we believe that the Government should engage with community leaders who are working with prisoners and ex-prisoners who have been radicalised in order to design a programme which would be suitable for TPIM subjects. Such a programme should take account of the different narratives of radicalisation. Due to the constraints placed on a subject it is unlikely that they will be eager to engage with the state or official parts of society. It is disastrous, therefore, for a subject to left without a constructive path towards reintegration following the end of the measures. The Government must ensure that an exit strategy is started as soon as the TPIM is imposed upon a subject. We recommend a continuation of the de-radicalisation engagement programme which they would have started under the TPIM which evolves into a more practical scheme enabling the former subject to reconnect with society through work or education.

Countering extremist narratives

121. In our previous report on counter-terrorism, we noted that the internet could play a role in the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals.[127] The inducement to travel to Syria to fight in the civil war seems to have taken place largely over social media.[128] Dr Hegghammer told us

    Syria is the most socially mediated conflict in history and there is an enormous amount of audio-visual documentation produced by rebels themselves, documenting the things they do … social media affects recruitment simply by linking people up—Facebook, for example. When someone travels to Syria and posts pictures from there and his friends see those pictures, those friends are more likely to be inspired to go. That is not really propaganda; that is just regular information conveyed through online social media that then facilitates recruitment.[129]

122. Countering the extremist narrative is something that must be supported both within the community and by public authorities. The Metropolitan Police highlighted the importance of parents and mosque leaders as well as visits to schools by police officers.[130] The role of Governments in countering extremist narratives is thought to be most effective when they act as a facilitator for other groups rather than delivering their own alternative narrative. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue suggest that

    One of the most important roles for government is in building capacity among those best suited to act as counter-narrative messengers and campaigners, who often lack the basic skills and competencies to do this work effectively and at scale. This would focus on technical, communications and strategic knowhow to ensure they understand how to construct their messages, can develop the kinds of products and vehicles that will be well received by an increasingly digitally-savvy generation used to high production values, apply smart marketing strategies and have the right networks to generate communication economies of scale.[131]

The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator supported this view noting that Governments themselves are seen as biased making the priority creating an environment which is conducive to counter-narrative.[132] Both the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator and Richard Barrett suggested using the experiences of those who had returned from Syria as a method of counter-narrative.[133]

123. There are a number of civil society groups which work to produce a counter-narrative. There are also examples of private sector involvement in assisting the development of counter-narrative. The Against Violent Extremism network which is made up of a number of former extremists and survivors of terrorism who engage with individuals and organisations that are developing counter-extremist messages. The AVE network receives funding from private sector—the Gen Next Foundations and Google Ideas.[134]

124. Google also facilitates the development of counter-narratives through a project run by YouTube, which we visited during our inquiry. YouTube run workshops through which it provides a variety of free, in-kind support and services to civil society organisations. This includes offering advice from creators with high audience numbers, support through training on and access to production equipment including time in certain YouTube studios. This project was highlighted by the Immigration and Security Minister as the sort of initiative that the Government was keen to encourage.[135]

125. One example of the projects which has been assisted by private sector funding is that of Abdullah-X, a short animated mini counter-narrative graphic novel which describes a fictional character's journey and adventures based on countering extremism and hate. This has involved advice on the design of the content and in-kind support to tailor the cartoon's delivery.[136] Abdullah-X was created by a former extremist and the most recent Abdullah-X video discusses the desire to travel to fight in Syria and alternative methods of helping the Syrian people. Such work is an excellent example of work by those within the Muslim community to counter the extremist narrative.

126. We welcome the progress made by internet companies such as Google (who own YouTube) in the work they are doing to promote counter narratives. We commend the work by the creators of Abdullah-X and note the importance of peer-led education. Given the role that social media is playing in the dissemination of extremist messages we hope that other large multi-national social media companies will follow suit. We note the significance of the independence of funding for these types of project but recognise the desperate need for more resources to be made available. We, therefore, recommend that the Government asks the European Union and other independent funders to prioritise resources for community projects such as Abdullah-X.

Countering terrorist financing

127. There has been an increase in activity to counter the financing of terrorist activity since the events of 9/11. Despite a host of regulations having been introduced, identifying terrorist financing is still an area of limited success. Written evidence submitted to us suggested that this was the fault of government departments who were drawing up requirements without issuing guidance on they ought to be implemented, stating

    banks and other financial service providers are effectively expected to play a counter-terrorist role with almost no meaningful assistance from the authorities.[137]

This is further compounded by the fact that in the UK, the responsibility for countering terrorism finance is spread across a number of departmental departments and agencies with no department in charge of overseeing the policy.

128. David Anderson's report on terrorist asset freezing in 2013 found that only one person (a Syrian national) had been designated in the period up to September 2013. He noted that designation was not being considered in all the cases in which it could be of value and that none of the 24 terrorists who had been convicted in early 2013 have been designated. He suggests that

    The fact that asset-freezing is administered by a different department from other counter-terrorism powers means however that extra effort may be required if asset-freezing is always to be considered as an alternative to or in conjunction with other possible disposals for those believed to be engaged in terrorism.[138]

The EU's Counter-Terrorism coordinator told us that no bank accounts had been frozen in relation to EU nationals travelling to fight in the Syria conflict.[139] We have also heard suggestions that the financial information of individuals could be used to identify foreign fighters, either on a standalone basis or in conjunction with data from social media.[140]

129. We recommend that the responsibility for countering terrorist financing be given to the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism where it will be considered a higher priority. Although it is not an area where success comes easily, cutting off the flow of money to terrorist organisations and the identification of foreign fighters are vital to the UK's response to the terrorist threat.


130. There are over 350,000 charities in England and Wales of which over 163,000 are registered with the Charities Commission. Although the total annual income of the 163,000 registered charities is £60 billion, just under half will have an annual income which has less than £10,000. The Charity Commission told us that the vast majority of charities are not at risk of terrorist abuse but that a small minority might be at risk from their funding being diverted for terrorist purposes or for charity personnel using the charity as a cover for travelling overseas or raising funds.[141]

131. Following the death of the first British suicide bomber in Syria, concerns were raised on the basis that he had joined a humanitarian convoy organised by a charity in order to travel out to Syria. On 24 February 2014 the Charities Commission launched a regulatory alert for charities sending humanitarian convoys to Syria, warning them that Foreign Fighters may well be joining convoys in order to travel to Syria to fight the Assad regime.[142] In a press interview, the Charity Commission's head of investigations and enforcement said more than a fifth of its 48 current terror investigations now relate to Syria.[143] However, in the Commission's written evidence, it is highlighted that

    The Commission is not a prosecuting authority and does not conduct criminal investigations. Where there are concerns about suspected terrorist abuse connected to a charity, the Commission will always liaise with and work closely with the police and the Security Service as terrorist activity is a criminal offence.[144]

132. The Henry Jackson Society criticised the Charity Commission for its lack of effectiveness in countering terrorist abuse of charities.

    The Charity Commission has demonstrated limited abilities to tackle fundraising by U.K.-based charities for terrorist purposes, and, more broadly, to vet or disqualify unsuitable charitable trustees by virtue of their association with terrorism.[145]

The Society suggested that lack of resources was a significant issue for the commission. Professor Clive Walker suggested that the system could be improved by instituting a financial investigation approach which

    should primarily be conducted by a formal police body. The roles left for the Charity Commission would be as standard-setter, as standard-monitor (with early alerts back to the police financial investigators), and as standard-applier (with police advice).[146]

Professor Walker suggests that had such an investigatory system existed in the past then it could have improved provision of information about terrorist networks and reduced the facilitation of militancy without diverting money from worthy causes. We note that our sister committee, the Public Accounts Committee made a recommendation earlier this year needed to respond more quickly in relations to concerns around individual charities.[147] In its formal response the Charity Commission emphasised that it needed both more resources and stronger legal powers in order to prevent and tackle abuse and mismanagement.[148]

133. There have also been concerns raised around the impact that regulations aimed at countering terrorist financing have on charities trying to move funds in to areas of conflict. The Charity Finance Group told us that a number of international charities are finding it increasingly challenging as banks become overly risk-averse. The examples given were the withdrawal of banking facilities from money service businesses in Somalia and the inability to transfer funds in to Syria. It emphasised the role that charities play in countering terrorism.

    Many international charities have operations that provide humanitarian assistance, healthcare, outreach and infrastructure building-all of these activities support and the stabilising and development of regions, which in turn contributes to restricting the growth of terrorist activity abroad. Civil society plays a key-albeit secondary - role in supporting counter-terrorism efforts and this consideration should be the starting point when developing policy to prevent the abuse of charities by terrorist organisations.[149]

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has announced that he is intending to examine this subject over the next year following UN recommendation that more work needed to be done to reconcile counter-terrorism measures and humanitarian effort.[150]

134. We are deeply concerned with the potential for 'bogus' charities to dupe members of the public into raising funds which are eventually used to support terrorist activity. We recommend that the Charity Commission be granted extra resources and stronger legal powers to counter the abuse of charities by terrorists. We also recommend that the Charity Commission be able to undertake unannounced inspections in order to audit their accounts.

135. We welcome the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation's inquiry in to the impact of counter-terrorism legislation on charities and recommend that it be expanded to look at the scale of abuse of charitable status to support terrorist actions. We recommend that he assess the response to such abuse and suggest changes which will improve the ability of the authorities to tackle terrorist financing whilst ensuring that law-abiding charities can continue their vital work.

The proposal to move counter terrorism to the National Crime Agency

136. The national Police CT Network comprises of

·  the Counter-Terrorism Command (SO15) within the Metropolitan Police;

·  four Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs) in the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester and Thames Valley; and

·  Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) in the East Midlands, South West and Eastern regions, and Wales and Scotland.

137. The Metropolitan Police's SO15 Counter Terrorism Command was created in 2006, taking over the roles and responsibilities of the Anti-Terrorist Branch and Special Branch. It is designated to protect London and the UK from the threat of terrorism. Counter Terrorism Command is responsible for:

·  bringing to justice those engaged in terrorist, domestic extremist and related offences;

·  providing a proactive and reactive response to terrorist, domestic extremist and related offences, including the prevention and disruption of terrorist activity;

·  supporting the National Co-ordinator of Terrorist Investigations outside London;

·  gathering and exploiting intelligence on terrorism and extremism in London;

·  assessing, analysing and developing intelligence to drive operational activity;

·  engage in partnerships with London's communities in order to understand their concerns and to provide reassurance and support where needed;

·  providing an explosive ordnance disposal and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capability in London

·  assist the British Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service in fulfilling their statutory roles;

·  to be the police single point of contact for international partners in counter-terrorism matters;

·  assisting in the protection of British interests overseas and the investigation of attacks against those interests.[151]

The regional Counter-Terrorism Units have been set up in the past few years and are resourced by 'lead' police forces. Their role includes the gathering of intelligence and evidence to help prevent, disrupt and prosecute terrorist activities.[152]

138. Following the proposed creation of the National Crime Agency, there were suggestions that the counter-terrorism policing could move from the Metropolitan Police in to the NCA. On 8 June 2011, the Government published The National Crime Agency: A plan for the creation of a national crime-fighting capability, which expanded on the information about the National Crime Agency included in Policing in the 21st Century. The plan stated that there would be four distinct commands within the National Crime Agency:

·  Organised Crime

·  Border Policing

·  Economic Crime

·  Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre.

The plan did not rule out the possibility that counter-terrorism could be one of the National Crime Agency's responsibilities at some point in the future:

    Counter-terrorism policing already has effective national structures. The Government is considering how to ensure these strengths are maintained and enhanced alongside the rest of its new approach to fighting crime. However, no wholesale review of the current counter-terrorism policing structures will be undertaken until after the 2012 London Olympic and Paralympic Games and the establishment of the NCA.[153]

In their written evidence to this inquiry, the Home Office did not elaborate further upon their intentions.

    The NCA will lead work on serious, organised and complex crime, including cyber crime and border security. Once the agency is up and running the Government will consider what - if any - role, it should play in respect of CT. Until then, the NCA will work with the Police CT Network on issues of common interest.

139. We note that the Metropolitan Police believe that in order to maintain the link between neighbourhood policing and counter-terrorism policing, the police counter-terrorism network should not be moved to the NCA. Their written evidence to this inquiry emphasised the prevention and detection work carried out by front line policing where the neighbourhood officer's role is the ability to build relationships, confidence and trust. It is hoped that such a relationship will encourage greater public vigilance, responsiveness and passing of intelligence. It is also noted that front line policing that will be the first to respond to a terrorist attack where they will act to preserve life, safety and evidence. It is that response which sets the tone for the investigation and wider community confidence.[154] In this opinion, they are supported by David Anderson QC who told the Committee that

    We have a system that, although not ideal, does at least work pretty well and it has one priceless benefit that one does not see to the same extent in a lot of other countries, which is a pretty good operational relationship between police and intelligence. At the other end you have another benefit. You saw, for example, the investigation of the murder of Mohammed Saleem in Birmingham earlier this year. That was a terrorism investigation but what you saw there was specialist terrorist police working very well with local police. By the end it was a question of knocking on doors and say, "Have you seen this man?" Again, the fact that the unit was embedded in the local community and was part of a local force, I think, had some usefulness.[155]

140. Both Charles Farr[156] and Professor Sir David Omand highlighted the effectiveness of the relationship between the police, the security and intelligence agencies and the Crown Prosecution Service. However Professor Sir David Omand also noted that

    the present arrangements involving the Security Service and the Met and the other police services in England and Wales and Scotland are not the only possible ones, nor necessarily the most economical. But they have evolved under fire and I would be very cautious about seeking to replace them with a theoretical structure that might look tidier on paper, such as giving the lead to the NCA, until we have seen both a significant diminution in the threat and an NCA that has established itself firmly as being on the top of its game in relation to serious organised criminality.[157]

141. The National Crime Agency was established as a national mechanism as part of the changing landscape of policing. Like all new organisations, it is still seeking to establish a strong identity and its own remit. For instance, we remain concerned that the NCA does not have full operational capacity in Northern Ireland. The Metropolitan Police have a wide remit which has many complexities and the current difficulties faced by the organisation lead us to believe that the responsibility for counter-terrorism ought to be moved to the NCA in order to allow the Met to focus on the basics of policing London. The work to transfer the command ought to begin immediately with a view to a full transfer of responsibility for counter-terrorism operations taking place, for example within five years after the NCA became operational, in 2018. When this takes place, it should finally complete the jigsaw of the new landscape of policing.

Partnership in the fight against terrorism

142. Although the counter-terrorism command and the security service are pivotal in the fight against terrorism, others also play a role. In 2012, a traffic police officer impounded a car which didn't have insurance which led to a discovery of weapons. The weapons (and a homemade bomb) were to have been used against supporters of the EDL at a rally in Dewsbury. In 2007, a plot to blow up the Tiger Tiger nightclub in London was discovered when Ambulance staff reported a suspicious vehicle to Police. The vehicle was discovered to contain a bomb which was defused.

143. During the visit to Kenya undertaken as part of this inquiry, we visited the site of the Westgate shopping centre where terrorists killed scores of people. The devastation caused by the acts of terrorism that day highlight the need for vigilance on the part of the public and private enterprise. Terrorists can strike anywhere and previous terrorist plots in the UK have focused on shopping centres (including planned attacks on Bluewater and the Trafford Centre). The National Counter Terrorism Security Office has produced Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Shopping Centres.[158] However, as the British Council of Shopping Centres notes

    Security of shopping centres is not just about conducting risk assessments and installing the latest equipment. The way in which operators are trained, their use of equipment and the general environment in which this equipment is used, will all have a significant impact on the overall performance of the security system.[159]

Following the Westgate attack, the British Council of Shopping Centres issued up to date guidance on firearms attacks in shopping centres, noting the importance of developing and testing a Response Plan.[160]

144. Both members of the public and those in private enterprises have to ensure that vigilance is constant, this is especially important in areas where crowds of people congregate. Those in charge of areas visited by high numbers of people (such as shopping centres) must ensure that they have adequate security, surveillance and response plans. Ensuring public safety cannot be the sole purview of the counter-terrorism command and the security service, it is a responsibility in which all UK citizens and companies take a share. We note that the British Council of Shopping Centres have updated their guidance following the Westgate attack. We recommend that all police forces ensure that local shopping centres have received this guidance and put in place and test a Response Plan.

81   Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, The Terrorism Acts in 2012, July 2013, p46 Back

82   Ibid., p34 Back

83   CTE0017 Back

84   Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, The Terrorism Acts in 2012, July 2013, p121 Back

85 Back

86   Q112 Back

87 Back

88  Back

89  Back

90  Back

91   Q122; CTE0018 Back

92   HC Deb, 25 Apr 2013: Col 68WS Back

93   HC Deb, 25 Apr 2013: Col 68WS Back

94  Back

95   Q854-5 Back

96   Q867 Back

97   Q870-1 Back

98   HC Deb, 30 Jan 2014: Col 1026  Back

99   HC Deb, 11 Feb 2014: Col 257WH Back

100   HL Deb, 7 Apr 2014: Col 1167 Back

101   The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, which repealed in its entirety the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 Back

102   Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2012, First Report of The Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the Terrorism Prevention And Investigation Measures Act 2011 (March 2013) (hereafter, "TPIMs report 2012"), p 19 Back

103   Ibid., p2 Back

104   Ibid., p19-20 Back

105   CTE0027 Back

106   Q423 Back

107   CTE0027 Back

108   TPIMs report 2012, p53 Back

109  Back

110   Q356 Back

111   TPIMs Report 2012, p4 Back

112   TPIMs report 2012, p83 Back

113  Back

114   CTE0018 Back

115   Q53 Back

116   CTE0018 Back

117   Prevent is one of the four elements of CONTEST, the government's counter-terrorism strategy. It aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. See Nineteenth Report from the Home Affairs Committee of Session 2010-12, Roots of violent radicalisation (HC 1446) Back

118   TPIMs report 2012, p95 Back

119   TPIMs report 2012, p53-54 Back

120   Q109 Back

121   Q357 Back

122   Home Affairs Committee, Session 2010-12, Roots of violent radicalisation (HC 1446), para 64 Back

123   TPIMs report 2012, p54 Back

124   Q432 Back

125   Joint Committee on Human Rights, Tenth Report of Session 2013-14, Post-Legislative Scrutiny: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, HC 1014, para 78 Back

126   Home Affairs Committee, The work of the Home Secretary, HSE0002 Back

127   Home Affairs Committee, Session 2010-12, Roots of violent radicalisation, HC 1446, para 33 Back

128   Q487; 517 Back

129   Q576-5 Back

130   Q368-9 Back

131   Institute of Strategic Dialogue, Review of programs to counter narratives of violent extremism, 2013, p26 Back

132   Q517 Back

133   Q518; 692 Back

134   Institute of Strategic Dialogue, Review of programs to counter narratives of violent extremism, 2013, p20 Back

135   Q890 Back

136   Institute of Strategic Dialogue, Review of programs to counter narratives of violent extremism, 2013, p20 Back

137   CTE0014 Back

138  Back

139   CTE0034 Back

140   CTE0040 Back

141   CTE0022 Back

142  Back

143  Back

144   CTE0022 Back

145   CTE0015 Back

146   INQ0011 Back

147   Public Accounts Committee, Forty-second Report of Session 2013-14, The Charity Commission, HC 792, p5 Back

148  Back

149   CTE0019 Back

150   Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010, Independent Reviewer's Annual Report, December 2013, p25 Back

151 Back

152  Back

153   Ibid. Back

154   INQ0003 Back

155   Q124 Back

156   Q232 Back

157   INQ0012 Back

158  Back

159  Back

160  Back

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Prepared 9 May 2014