Conclusions and recommendations
Foreign fighters
1. The number of UK
citizens and Westerners travelling to fight in foreign conflicts
has reached alarming levels unlike anything seen in recent years.
We require an immediate response targeted at dissuading and preventing
those who wish to go to fight from going; helping countries who
are key to intercepting those who are entering Syria, and ensuring
those who return do not present a danger to the UK. (Paragraph
58)
2. We are alarmed
by the relative ease by which foreign fighters appear to be able
to cross the border into Syria. It is the responsibility of the
international community to assist transit countries, and the UK
must offer practical support to those countries in securing their
borders. We have been impressed by the efforts made to prevent
football hooliganism in foreign countries by sending "spotters"
to help pick out those at risk of committing criminal acts and
believe similar practical help would be beneficial in the fight
against terrorism. We recommend that the Government maintain representation
from the UK Counter Terrorism command to help the Turkish authorities
identify those who are at risk of crossing the border into Syria
intending to fight and make available any relevant intelligence
to the Turkish authorities that may be beneficial. The Government
should also work with transit countries such as Turkey, Lebanon
and Jordan to better establish who is likely to be travelling
for genuine humanitarian reasons. (Paragraph 59)
3. The Government
needs a clear strategy for dealing with foreign fighters on their
return, which may include help to come to terms with the violence
they have witnessed and participated in, as well as counter-radicalisation
interventions. We are concerned that their experiences may well
make them vulnerable to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder thereby
increasing their vulnerability to radicalisation. We recommend
that the Government implement a programme, similar to Channel,
for everyone returning to Britain where there is evidence that
they have fought in Syria. The engagement in this strategy should
be linked to any legal penalties imposed on their return. In developing
the strategy the Government must work with mental health practitioners
and academia to ensure that the programme best integrates those
returning from conflict zones such as Syria. (Paragraph 60)
Capacity building
4. The increasingly
diverse and dispersed nature of the threat makes capacity building
a front-line defence against a changing threat landscape. We note
that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's budget is limited by
available resources but given the importance of capacity building
to the Government's counter-terrorism efforts we look to the OSCT
and the FCO to reassure us that the Counter-Terrorism Fund will
be maintained at current levels in this and the next financial
year. In the light of the announcement that the Prime Minister
is considering using some of the UK's aid budget on peace keeping
and other defence-related projects, we recommend that within the
definitions of Overseas Development Aid, money could be used to
increase resource for capacity building abroad. (Paragraph 75)
5. We accept that
some of the UK's capacity building programmes are sensitive but
we believe that greater transparency about how much the Government
spends on capacity building overseas and who funds these programmes
(i.e. fully by UK Government or jointly between UK and EU) is
crucial for accountability. (Paragraph 78)
6. We recommend that
the Government raise the issue of Interpol databases as part of
discussions around counter-terrorism at the next EU Justice and
Home Affairs Council and encourage others to utilise the tools
at their disposal. (Paragraph 85)
7. Interpol is an
international policing organisation with a proven record of success
and should be widely supported. We recommend that the Government
take the lead in working with Interpol and the UK's international
partners to create an international operational platform supporting
terrorist investigations. The UK should use its pivotal position
in the G7 to ensure that this change is achieved. Whilst UK policing
may lack sufficient resources to supply a significant number of
staff to such a platform, we also recommend the Government consider
offering to host the permanent base of the platform. (Paragraph
87)
The UK's response to the terrorist threat
8. The withdrawal
of passports is a vital tool in preventing UK citizens from travelling
to foreign conflicts. We understand the need to use the prerogative
power to withdraw or withhold a citizen's passport. Given that
the estimates of foreign fighters are in the low hundreds, we
are surprised that it has only been used 14 times since April
2013 and recommend that, in all appropriate circumstances where
there is evidence, the power is utilised as an exceptional preventative
and temporary measure. However, we note that its use is not subject
to any scrutiny external to the executive. We recommend that the
Home Secretary report quarterly on its use to the House as is
currently done with TPIMs and allow the Independent Reviewer of
Terrorism Legislation to review the exercise of the Royal Prerogative
as part of his annual review. (Paragraph 96)
9. We have grave concerns
about how effective the deprivation of mono-citizenship powers
will be. Drafting legislation on the basis of an individual case
lessens the impact of the legislation because the exact circumstances
are unlikely to repeat themselves. We support the Minister's commitment
to the power being used sparingly. We recommend that the Government
endeavour to use the power only when the person subject to the
decision is outside the UK. (Paragraph 101)
10. It is deeply
worrying that anyone who is subject to a TPIM, or those who were
subjects of control orders, can abscond with relative ease. We
recommend that a review of the types of measures placed upon subjects
needs to be conducted to ensure that enough is being done to prevent
absconsion. (Paragraph 109)
11. So far there have
been no jury convictions of breaches of TPIMs or Control Orders
and the CPS needs to bear this in mind when bringing prosecutions.
We recommend that the Government and Crown Prosecution Service
produce specific guidance on investigating and prosecuting breaches.
The continued failure to secure a conviction undermines the system
of TPIMs. (Paragraph 112)
12. Many breaches
of a TPIM order are minor infringements which might plausibly
have happened inadvertently. It is therefore right that the CPS
does not prosecute every single breach, considering the cost to
the public purse and the difficulty of convincing a jury of the
materiality of the alleged breach without being able to explain
the basis on which the relevant restriction was included in the
order. It is worth noting that no prosecution has been successful
following a not-guilty plea and in only one case has the accused
pleaded guilty. In the case of the tag tampering trial, it is
of serious concern that the prosecution was discontinued. Deliberately
tampering with a tag must be viewed as an attempt to abscond and
we recommend that the Home Office request independent testing
of the tags provided by G4S to definitively prove, as they claim,
a tag-tamper alert can only be caused through deliberate actions.
This will enable the Home Office to present reliable evidence
to the court that such an alert cannot be caused inadvertently.
Given that five prosecutions for tag tampering have been withdrawn
or collapsed it is vital that both the public and TPIM subjects
understand the extent to which it might or might not be possible
for a tag-tamper alert to be innocently caused. (Paragraph 115)
13. It is essential
that the Government engages with those placed on a TPIM whilst
they are subject to the control and not only afterwards. It is
a missed opportunity not to implement a de-radicalisation programme
until the subjects are free of the measures. We recommend that
all TPIM subjects are placed on a graduated scheme, which commences
concurrently with the measures, with the sole purpose of engagement
and de-radicalisation. We accept that the anonymity order may
cause difficulties in terms of liaising with the local community
when seeking support for that process. However, we believe that
the Government should engage with community leaders who are working
with prisoners and ex-prisoners who have been radicalised in order
to design a programme which would be suitable for TPIM subjects.
Such a programme should take account of the different narratives
of radicalisation. Due to the constraints placed on a subject
it is unlikely that they will be eager to engage with the state
or official parts of society. It is disastrous, therefore, for
a subject to left without a constructive path towards reintegration
following the end of the measures. The Government must ensure
that an exit strategy is started as soon as the TPIM is imposed
upon a subject. We recommend a continuation of the de-radicalisation
engagement programme which they would have started under the TPIM
which evolves into a more practical scheme enabling the former
subject to reconnect with society through work or education.(Paragraph
120)
14. We welcome the
progress made by internet companies such as Google (who own YouTube)
in the work they are doing to promote counter narratives. We commend
the work by the creators of Abdullah-X and note the importance
of peer-led education. Given the role that social media is playing
in the dissemination of extremist messages we hope that other
large multi-national social media companies will follow suit.
We note the significance of the independence of funding for these
types of project but recognise the desperate need for more resources
to be made available. We, therefore, recommend that the Government
asks the European Union and other independent funders to prioritise
resources for community projects such as Abdullah-X.(Paragraph
126)
15. We recommend that
the responsibility for countering terrorist financing be given
to the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism where it will
be considered a higher priority. Although it is not an area where
success comes easily, cutting off the flow of money to terrorist
organisations and the identification of foreign fighters are vital
to the UK's response to the terrorist threat. (Paragraph 129)
16. We are deeply
concerned with the potential for 'bogus' charities to dupe members
of the public into raising funds which are eventually used to
support terrorist activity. We recommend that the Charity Commission
be granted extra resources and stronger legal powers to counter
the abuse of charities by terrorists. We also recommend that the
Charity Commission be able to undertake unannounced inspections
in order to audit their accounts. (Paragraph 134)
17. We welcome the
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation's inquiry in to
the impact of counter-terrorism legislation on charities and recommend
that it be expanded to look at the scale of abuse of charitable
status to support terrorist actions. We recommend that he assess
the response to such abuse and suggest changes which will improve
the ability of the authorities to tackle terrorist financing whilst
ensuring that law-abiding charities can continue their vital work.
(Paragraph 135)
18. The National Crime
Agency was established as a national mechanism as part of the
changing landscape of policing. Like all new organisations, it
is still seeking to establish a strong identity and its own remit.
For instance, we remain concerned that the NCA does not have full
operational capacity in Northern Ireland. The Metropolitan Police
have a wide remit which has many complexities and the current
difficulties faced by the organisation lead us to believe that
the responsibility for counter-terrorism ought to be moved to
the NCA in order to allow the Met to focus on the basics of policing
London. The work to transfer the command ought to begin immediately
with a view to a full transfer of responsibility for counter-terrorism
operations taking place, for example within five years after the
NCA became operational, in 2018. When this takes place, it should
finally complete the jigsaw of the new landscape of policing.(Paragraph
141)
19. Both members of
the public and those in private enterprises have to ensure that
vigilance is constant, this is especially important in areas where
crowds of people congregate. Those in charge of areas visited
by high numbers of people (such as shopping centres) must ensure
that they have adequate security, surveillance and response plans.
Ensuring public safety cannot be the sole purview of the counter-terrorism
command and the security service, it is a responsibility in which
all UK citizens and companies take a share. We note that the British
Council of Shopping Centres have updated their guidance following
the Westgate attack. We recommend that all police forces ensure
that local shopping centres have received this guidance and put
in place and test a Response Plan.(Paragraph 144)
Oversight of the security and intelligence agencies
20. We do not believe
the current system of oversight is effective and we have concerns
that the weak nature of that system has an impact upon the credibility
of the agencies accountability, and to the credibility of Parliament
itself. The scrutiny of the work of the security and intelligence
agencies should be not the exclusive preserve of the Intelligence
and Security Committee. Whilst we recognise the importance of
limiting the access to documents of a confidential nature, we
believe that as the relevant departmental select committee, we
ought to be able to take oral evidence from the head of the security
service. Engagement with elected representatives is not, in itself,
a danger to national security and to continue to insist so is
hyperbole. There are questions about the accuracy of information
provided to the House by the security and intelligence agencies
in the past, particularly in 2003. As future decisions on warfare
look likely to be determined by votes of the members of the House
of Commons, there is heightened importance in ensuring that the
House is accurately informed in future. (Paragraph 157)
21. Furthermore we
recommend that the Commons membership of the Intelligence and
Security Committee should be elected like other select committees
and that the Chair, who should always be a member of the Commons,
ought to be subject to election of the whole House, as is the
case for Select Committees. We further recommend that the Chair
should always be a member of the largest opposition party.(Paragraph
158)
22. The Investigatory
Powers Tribunal is the only body which can investigate individual
complaints against the security and intelligence agencies and
actions taken under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act.
It ought to command public confidence in its actions. For there
to be public confidence there must first be public understanding
of the work of the Tribunal. We recommend that the if the Investigatory
Powers Tribunal are unwilling to voluntarily produce a detailed
annual report on their work, that legislation be amended so that
they are required to do so. Such an annual report should, at the
very least contain the number of cases it has received and the
outcome of cases determined in that year with comparable data
for the previous four years. We also recommend that the data be
broken down to show which agency the complaint was against. (Paragraph
162)
23. It is unacceptable
that there is so much confusion around the work of the Intelligence
Services Commissioner and the Interception of Communications Commissioner.
We recommend that as a matter of urgency data is collected on
how many applications there were under the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act and how many people were subsequently subject to an
application. Furthermore, the fact that the Intelligence Services
Commissioner cannot tell us what percentage of consolidated guidance
cases or disciplinary proceedings he has examined is concerning.
(Paragraph 166)
24. We have serious
doubts that either the Interception of Communications Commissioner
role or the Intelligence Services Commissioner role should be
part-time. We are also concerned that the extent of the Intelligence
Services Commissioner's staff is one personal assistant. The fact
that less than 10% of warrants which allow intrusion in to the
private lives of individuals are examined is concerning—we
believe this figure ought to be at least 50%, if not higher. We
recommend that the Commissioners are made full-time positions
and that their resources are increased to allow them to examine
half of the requests for information. (Paragraph 167)
25. All parts of the
oversight system need to do more to improve public confidence
in their work. We recommend that each of the Commissioners and
the Investigatory Powers Tribunal develop an outreach strategy
which ought to be published as part of their annual reports along
with details of how they have tried to fulfil the objective of
improving knowledge of their work. (Paragraph 168)
26. The security and
intelligence agencies are staffed by brave men and women who in
many cases risk their lives to protect this country. They deserve
our gratitude and they deserve to be honoured for their work.
The best way to honour them is by ensuring that there are no questions
about their integrity and, in order to prove this, there must
be adequate scrutiny of their actions. The current system of oversight
belongs to a pre-internet age, a time when a person's word was
accepted without question. What is needed is a scrutiny system
for the 21st century, to ensure that sophisticated security and
intelligence agencies can get on with the job with the full confidence
of the public.(Paragraph 170)
27. It is essential
that the legal position be resolved clearly and promptly. It is
currently unclear whether CSPs are obliged to store communications
data as they were previously, or indeed if they are allowed to,
because of the Data Protection Act. It is also unclear if the
Home Office will continue to pay CSPs for their work on communications
data.(Paragraph 174)
28. Given the criticism
which the Regulation of the Investigatory Powers Act is subject
to, we believe that the legislation is in need of review. We recommend
that a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament should be
appointed in order to hold an inquiry with the ability to take
evidence on the Act with a view to updating it. This inquiry would
aim to bring the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act up to
date with modern technology, reduce the complexity (and associated
difficulty in the use of) the legislation, strengthen the statistical
and transparency requirements and improve the oversight functions
as are set out in the current Act. We recommend that the inquiry
address the areas of concern raised with us concerning communications
data and the oversight of Section 94 of the Telecommunications
Act 1984. (Paragraph 177)
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