Conclusions and recommendations
1. We
welcome Mr Sedwill's commitment to his role as Permanent Secretary
and hope that his appointment will mark the beginning of a much-needed
period of stability in the senior leadership of the Home Office,
and in particular the membership of the Executive Management Board.
We also welcome the open and transparent way that Mr Sedwill has
dealt with the Committee and the occasions that he has intervened
to facilitate the Committee's work. This is a refreshing approach
from such a senior civil servant and a model for other departments.
(Paragraph 2)
2. The
Home Office's poor results in the 2012 Civil Service People Survey
show that engagement and confidence in the civil service leadership
of the Home Office are at crisis levels and need to be addressed
as a matter of urgency. It is vital that when significant changes,
such as the abolition of the UKBA, are instituted, the staff are
engaged. It is notable that scores were particularly low in the
former UK Border Agency and in Border Force, two areas which have
experienced particular operational and performance problems in
recent years. We recommend that the Permanent Secretary start
an immediate investigation into the reasons for low morale in
the Department, which should include meetings with groups of staff
at all levels in the operational areas giving most cause for concern.
From the results of this investigation, a strategy of staff engagement
should be published which can be benchmarked against the survey
going forward. We will return to this subject when the results
of the 2013 survey are available later this year. (Paragraph 5)
3. We
recognise the spending pressures placed on the Home Office mean
that some difficult decisions will need to be taken in order to
hit these targets. However, it is crucial that the cuts must not
be at detriment to the work performed by the Home Office and its
functions. We recommend that if savings need to be made they should
be, as much as possible, found in efficiencies in IT, procurement
and back office functions. (Paragraph 7)
4. The
Permanent Secretary was right to commission a robust audit of
G4S and Serco's contracts with the Home Office in the light of
the tagging scandal and we are pleased that, so far, no anomalies
have been revealed. It is unacceptable that the Home Office is
still over-reliant on a very small number of large providers to
deliver its major projects, many of whom appear to have a track-record
of underperformance, from the lamentable saga of e-Borders, through
the absent Olympic security staff, to the placement of asylum-seekers
in sub-standard housing under the COMPASS contracts. We believe
that the Home Office's procurement arrangements could be made
more efficient if more thought were given to how contracts could
be made more accessible to smaller businesses, in order to increase
the range of providers who are able to bid for them. Breaking
down great, monolithic contracts, which can only be tackled by
large providers, into smaller components would increase the complexity
of the contract management process, but it would increase competition
for contracts, breaking what is perilously close to an oligopoly
in the provision of contracted-out Government services, some of
which, such as G4S's contract to deliver security for the 2012
Olympics, have in the past gone badly wrong. We recommend that
the Home Office conduct a review into all of its contracts with
a view of selecting those with the potential to be split into
smaller deals. Those which can be remodelled immediately with
no financial penalty should be put out for retender without delay,
and all others retendered at the first opportunity. (Paragraph
11)
5. The
Government has rejected our recommendation for a register of high-risk
providers. However, we remain convinced that greater openness
and transparency about providers' failure to deliver on Government
contracts would improve the quality of procurement on major projects.
In light of an increase in the evidence of poor performance from
these type of companies we recommend the Government reconsider
its response to the high-risk register recommendation and adopt
it immediately. (Paragraph 12)
6. The
current picture of police procurement is dismal: forces are making
next to no use of the central procurement hub, and they continue
to operate a wide variety of procurement arrangements, making
it difficult to realise the potential savings that would flow
from a more co-ordinated approach. On top of this, the Home Office's
understanding of police procurement is sketchy, at best. The Permanent
Secretary clearly recognises the scale of the problem, and we
are pleased that he has a clear target to improve the quality
of the Department's information about police procurement by the
end of the Parliament. We will review progress in January 2015
against (a) the Home Office's information about police procurement,
(b) the number of forces which are making active use of the central
procurement hub and (c) the proportion of transactions which go
through the hub. (Paragraph 16)
7. One
of the obstacles to adopting a more consistent approach to procurement
has been the tension between the Department's strategy to increase
procurement at a national level, and its reforms to increase local
accountability. In order to resolve this tension, the Department
should enlist the support of police and crime commissioners in
improving their forces' compliance with national procurement procedures.
We recommend that, before the end of the current financial year,
the Home Office issue detailed guidance to PCCs and chief constables
about good procurement practice, and encourage them to work together
to develop a procurement improvement strategy. (Paragraph 17)
8. We
are appalled at the handling of this matter post-termination of
the contract; and that 3½ years later it still is not resolved.
Neither the company nor the Government are in a position to explain
more. The confidentiality means we do not known what went wrong
and are losing the opportunity to ensure this does not happen
again. To avoid conspiracy theories there has to be full transparency
and lessons need to be learnt. (Paragraph 19)
9. We
are pleased to see that, more than ten years after the e-Borders
business case was first prepared, some of the projected benefits
are finally beginning to be realised. However, many of the key
benefits, including the ability to count all foreign national
passengers into and out of the UK, are still a long way off. It
is farcical that, given that passenger information is already
collected on departure, exit checks cannot be implemented to a
shorter timetable and we recommend that the Home Office produce
a plan for doing so. (Paragraph 21)
10. We
have noted the fact that Mr Sedwill will not take a bonus and
recognise that this shows leadership. However, with the current
financial pressures on the Home Office and the increased public
scrutiny of bonuses it is irresponsible of the Home Office to
continue to pay out very significant sums in staff bonuses despite
poor performance in many areas. We recommend that no further bonuses
should be paid until a thorough review of performance against
the whole range of Home Office activity has been undertaken. (Paragraph
27)
11. We
have noted the fact that Mr Sedwill will not take a bonus and
recognise that this shows leadership. However, with the current
financial pressures on the Home Office and the increased public
scrutiny of bonuses it is irresponsible of the Home Office to
continue to pay out very significant sums in staff bonuses despite
poor performance in many areas. We recommend that no further bonuses
should be paid until a thorough review of performance against
the whole range of Home Office activity has been undertaken. (Paragraph
27)
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