Home Affairs Committee
Executive Summary
This submission is based on the long and detailed experience of the Southampton and Winchester Visitors Group (SWVG) in working with asylum seekers and makes a number of recommendations about improving government policy and practice in relation to the asylum system.
Part 1 addresses the effectiveness of the UKBA screening process. It recommends that proper legal representation is made available to asylum seekers when they first encounter the Home Office; that the costs to taxpayers through the failure to provide proper legal representation are made public; and that the consequent savings are reinvested in improving the asylum system.
In Part 2 the question of whether the system of support to asylum seekers is sufficient and effective and possible improvements are considered. In general the accommodation provided for asylum seekers is basic but adequate. It is recommended that, as far as possible, that asylum seekers do not have to move to another city to receive support; that the contracts of accommodation providers include a requirement to respond to problems with accommodation within 24 hours; that locks should be provided on all residents’ doors; and that Section 4 support is provided in cash, not vouchers.
Part 3 deals with the extent of destitution amongst asylum applicants and refused asylum seekers. Over the past 18 months, over half of the asylum seekers befriended by SWVG were destitute. It recommends that the government acknowledges publicly that the creation of destitution is inhumane and unjust. It also recommends that in any changes to the system of support, the government should ensure that any further destitution is not created.
Part 4 uses a detailed case study to explore the issues about refused asylum seekers who are tortured upon their return to their country of origin. It recommends that full and up to date information about conditions, especially dangers, in the country to which individuals are returned are fully taken into account by UKBA and the courts. It also recommends that neither the names nor the status of returned asylum seekers are disclosed to the authorities in the country to which they are being returned; and that protection by means of mandatory return, is made easily available when removals from the UK are misjudged.
In framing our conclusions, SWVG fully acknowledges the complex practical, legal, ethical and financial considerations involved—indeed we face them in our everyday work with asylum seekers. However, SWVG is confident that the community as a whole, not just asylum seekers, would gain considerably if our recommendations were implemented.
SWVG Evidence Part 1
The effectiveness of the UK Border Agency screening process.
1. SWVG’s Recommendations:
1.1 That proper legal representation is made available to all asylum seekers at the first encounter between the Home Office and the asylum seekers.
1.2 That the costs to taxpayers through the failure to have proper legal representation available are made public.
1.3 That the savings thus made are re-invested in improvements to the asylum system.
2. The below case study outlining the experiences of just one of SWVG’s client’s experiences demonstrates the gross inefficiency and unnecessary costliness of the current UKBA screening processes and is a strong recommendation for change.
2.1 I am an established visitor with SWVG and this submission outlines a case study of an asylum seeker (“David”) with whom I have been closely involved for three years. I believe his experience encapsulates some of the current failures of the system.
2.2 When he first approached SWVG he was advised by his solicitor to go immediately to Lunar House to register a claim. I consulted the opening hours and before dawn we set out for Croydon, only to find on arrival that applications had ended at 11.30am. We returned the next day and he was fast-tracked, despite the fact that his interviewer was repeatedly asked to read an email from David’s solicitor stating that he had been referred for an examination into his claim that he had been tortured, a claim which was subsequently validated by an expert. I was not allowed to attend this interview, otherwise I would have insisted on the email being read.
2.3 He was sent to a detention centre and then, overnight, having had no opportunity to sleep, he was moved to another centre, which we estimate was more than one hundred miles way. When he arrived, there was no means of charging his mobile phone, and he felt isolated and fearful. Thanks to rapid work by SWVG and David’s solicitor, he was released. I believe he was automatically detained because he came from a country officially considered safe, despite a recent Amnesty International report on his country of origin containing a highly damaging account of its human rights abuses. Clearly, the interviewer and other relevant UKBA staff had not taken the trouble to obtain up-to-date country-of-origin information.
2.4 Subsequently, on three occasions David received the letters inviting him to his first interview after the date that the actual interview was supposed to have taken place. On each occasion, it took frantic, extremely lengthy calls by SWVG to exonerate him from the charge that he had knowingly failed to appear. When he did finally attend, the case worker didn’t appear and the appointment had to be re-arranged; and at the re-arranged meeting, the case worker, having photocopied his Asylum Registration Card, failed to return it. It took three months to obtain a replacement. The relationship with the case worker remained unsatisfactory; frequently David was unable to get a reply to his phone calls, even on very urgent matters. Subsequently, David was given no contact details for a second and third replacement caseworker, and when he phoned his fourth to introduce himself, she put down the phone without replying.
2.5 Having been sent to the North under Section 4, hundreds of miles away both from our support and, more importantly, his trusted solicitor, on several occasions he was denied his weekly income, having to rely on emergency funds sent by myself on behalf of SWVG; on two of these occasions he was unable to claim back payment.
2.6 After waiting for over a year for a decision, David’s solicitor applied for the right to work, but a month later this was refused, with no reason given. For this to be legally challenged David needed to return to Southampton to see his solicitor, with SWVG paying travel expenses.
2.7 At this point the UKBA refused his application, providing a lengthy justification. However, when I carefully dissected the refusal document I realised that it was extremely partial, for example, it referred to a report by Human Rights Watch on his country of origin which mentioned the publication by Amnesty International mentioned above. Therefore, the writer of the refusal document knew of the existence of this publication but chose to ignore it. Had I not had both the motivation and experience to dissect this document, that would have been the end of the asylum process and he might have joined the shadow world of failed asylum seekers too fearful to return home.
2.8 Instead, David’s appeal at a tribunal was successful and he was granted the usual five year refugee status. In looking back at David’s time as an asylum seeker, it is clear how regularly the system, until the final tribunal, was stacked against him and how, without the support of SWVG, an injustice would have been done. In the process, it cost SWVG about £1000 in total to support his search for asylum. More importantly, it cost UK taxpayers several thousand pounds, including a year’s accommodation and financial support, along with the costs to the legal system. It is a case which forcefully supports the need for proper legal representation at the very first encounter between the Home Office and the asylum seeker.
SWVG Evidence Part 2
Whether the system of support to asylum applicants (including Section 4 support) is sufficient and effective and possible improvements.
1. SWVG’s Recommendations
1.1 Ensure as far as possible that asylum seekers do not have to move to another city to receive Section 95 or Section 4 support.
1.2 Include in accommodation providers contracts responsibility to respond to problems with accommodation within 24 hours.
1.3 The provision of locks on all residents’ doors.
1.4 Give everyone on Section 4 cash, not vouchers.
2. Almost all our clients have been at some time in receipt of either Section 95 or Section 4 NASS support. The accommodation is basic but generally adequate. We do however feel a number of aspects of the system could be improved:
2.1 Only if there is no other accommodation available where they live should asylum seekers who receive Section 95 or Section 4 support be required to move to another city. Much avoidable distress is currently caused when asylum seekers are moved so far from their solicitors, current medical advisors and support networks on which they rely.
Proposed improvement: Ensure as far as possible that asylum seekers do not have to move to another city to receive Section 95 or Section 4 support.
2.2 Poor contact with accommodation providers has made the resolution of problems (for example, regarding water supply, toilets, electricity supply, cooking arrangements, relationships with other occupants of the house), extremely slow and difficult for a number of our clients. Numerous phone calls requesting help have received no response.
Proposed improvement: Include in accommodation providers contracts responsibility to respond to problems with client’s accommodation within 24 hours.
2.3 Accommodation providers have frequently failed to give the support necessary to help clients seek medical advice from GPs.
2.4 The policy of not providing locks on all room doors leaves asylum seekers vulnerable both to personal attacks and to theft. Many of our clients have had personal possessions, including vital papers, stolen. Since no control can be exercised over who comes into the houses at any time of the day or night, only a lock can provide the necessary security and privacy.
Proposed improvement: The provision of locks on all residents’ doors.
2.5 Azure cards are a most unsatisfactory and demeaning method of payment for basic necessities. They are not accepted in the many shops which sell the kind of ethnic food our clients prefer. They cannot be used to pay for bus fares, a particular disadvantage for the disabled or pregnant women and for those who have to travel a considerable distance to sign on at a police station.
Proposed improvement: Give everyone on Section 4 cash, not vouchers.
SWVG Evidence Part 3
The prevalence of destitution amongst asylum applicants and refused asylum seekers.
1. SWVG’s Recommendations:
1.1 That the government publicly acknowledges that the creation of destitution is inhumane and unjust.
1.2 That in planning any changes to the system of support to asylum applicants and refused asylum seekers the government ensures that the revised system does not creates destitution
3. Introduction:
The financial support SWVG gives to people who are destitute through our ASSIST scheme is a basic room at the lowest weekly rent that landlords in Southampton will accept (£75), and £25 a week in cash for food and basic needs. During the past 18 months SWVG has befriended 56 asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers. Twenty-eight of these people were destitute or about to become destitute ie with no place to sleep and no money for food. Many were spending nights in the park, in church doorways or the street, not actually daring to sleep for fear of attack. Some had slept on a floor or sofa, moving from person to person, sometimes finding no shelter at all. Most of these men and women were not eating regularly; some got soup or snacks from churches, some had begged for throw-out food from restaurant kitchens, others got occasional meals from friends.
4. The most serious consequences of destitution for our clients:
4.1 Exploitation and prostitution: Several young women, desperate for food and shelter, have turned to prostitution or have been abused and exploited by men who said they would “help”. During the past year this has resulted in two unwanted pregnancies.
4.2 Mental health deterioration: Destitution has caused or exacerbated mental health problems. Many of our clients are on medication (particularly anti-depressants) and several have required regular treatment from College Keep Community Mental Health or have been taken into hospital.
4.3 Theft and loss of possessions: The possessions of many destitute clients have been stolen, damaged or lost. This includes crucial legal papers, medical details, warm clothes and sleeping bags. With no secure indoor base, there is nowhere safe to keep their belongings.
4.4 Asylum claims cannot proceed: Destitution means that asylum claims cannot be properly processed. With no address, asylum seekers are unable to secure a solicitor or be in communication with UKBA. Because these men and women are often suffering from cold, hunger and lack of sleep, they are unable to concentrate on their cases or piece together the necessary evidence. When they are referred to us, many of our clients have been in limbo for months, the progress of their cases severely impeded by being destitute.
5. The effects of removing clients from destitution:
5.1 During the past 18 months SWVG has financially supported all 28 of our clients who would have otherwise been completely destitute, together with a further 16 who were living in great hardship. As well as providing very basic accommodation and/or subsistence, trained volunteers have helped these clients to access medical care and reliable legal advice.
5.2 The result has been a marked improvement in their health and welfare. Getting good legal advice has enabled their cases to progress: during the period seven clients have been granted Leave to Remain in the UK, 21 were able to submit claims (fresh or initial) for asylum and move onto State NASS support; five decided to apply for Assisted Voluntary Return.
6. Conclusion
6.1 We are convinced that enforced destitution, denying basic needs, is both inhumane and unjust.
6.2 Moreover, the consequences can, in the long term, be costly to the taxpayer (as shown above).
6.3 The alienation and hardship resulting from destitution is a serious impediment to future integration into British society.
SWVG Evidence Part 4
The prevalence of refused asylum seekers who are tortured upon return to their country of origin and how the UK Government can monitor this.
1. SWVG’s Recommendations:
1.1 That the government ensures that full and up-to-date information about conditions, especially dangers, in the country to which individuals are returned are carefully taken into account by UKBA and the courts when returns are authorised.
1.2 That the names of returned asylum seekers are not given to the authorities of their country to which they are being returned.
1.3 That the asylum status of returned individuals is not divulged to authorities in the country to which they are returned.
1.4 That protection, by making mandatory return, is made easily available when removals from the UK are misjudged.
2. Introduction
This evidence is submitted by Professor John Mellor concerning the removal of asylum seekers from the UK and specifically the removal of a Sri Lankan “A” in June 2011. I was the Visitor of A and met with him regularly over several years before he was removed to the Haslar Detention Centre and then the Gatwick Detention Centre. I visited him in both centres and have maintained a phone and e-mail contact with him since his removal to Sri Lanka on 16 June 2011. There are four related matters I wish to describe:
2.1 A’s manner of removal to a situation of great danger in Sri Lanka.
2.2 The complicity of the UK authorities in permitting the Sri Lankan authorities to establish that A was an asylum seeker being returned to Sri Lanka.
2.3 The evidence of the dangerous conditions to which A was returned.
2.4 The ineffective monitoring of A’s safety once he was returned to Sri Lanka.
3. Summary of the case of A, a Sri Lankan Tamil Muslim, returned on 16 June 2011
3.1 A was refused Leave to Remain and on June 16th an injunction to stop his removal was not upheld. Along with many other refused Sri Lankan Tamil asylum seekers, A was removed on 16 June, exposed on 17 June by the media in Colombo, interviewed, released and forced into hiding. Many of those returning asylum seekers were tortured. A was not tortured but feared torture and capture by those looking for him in white vans.
3.2 Prior to departure from Gatwick, A was interviewed at the Sri Lankan Commission and questioned about his asylum status and his reasons for leaving Sri Lanka. A UK Minister stated that there had been no leaking of names to the Sri Lankan authorities. It was recognised by a Harrow solicitor at the time that leaking of names would likely constitute reasons for a mandatory removal to the UK.
3.3 The case of A highlights a failure on 16 June to appreciate the dangers Tamils would face upon being returned to Sri Lanka. It also shows the need to better protect returned asylum seekers by not allowing their asylum status to be known on return and by exercising a continuing responsibility of protection. In the absence of credible protection, A and others should not have been returned.
3.4 The case of A illustrates the importance of mandatory return, when removals from the UK are misjudged.
4. The Removal of A to Sri Lanka:
4.1 A was taken from his residence early in the morning and moved from Southampton on 1 June 2011, first to Colnbrook and then transferred to Haslar. His circumstances were known to his Legal Adviser, Mrs Lee of Gillman, Smith and Lee of Twickenham (Phone 02087440909).
4.2 From Haslar, A was briefly returned to Colnbrook, then back to Haslar and finally later moved to Gatwick. It became known that the flight, PVT030, to take removed asylum seekers to Sri Lanka was to leave at 5pm on 16 June.
5. The concern about the situation in Sri Lanka was illustrated by:
5.1 Early day motion 1882: Investigation into Alleged War Crimes in Sri Lanka That this House notes Channel 4’s documentary, Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields, broadcast on 14th June 2011, which features devastating new video evidence of war crimes during Sri Lanka’s civil war; further notes that certain footage has been authenticated by the UN and has been declared as evidence of definitive war crimes by the UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial killings; condemns strongly the Sri Lankan government for dismissing outright the analysis of the UN Special Rapporteur and its unwillingness to engage in a proper accountability process; urges all hon. Members to view the Channel 4 documentary; supports the Government’s policy of an independent investigation into these allegations; and calls on the UN to establish an independent, international mechanism to ensure truth, accountability and justice in Sri Lanka. Primary sponsor: Lee Scott, Date tabled: 08–06–2011
5.2 As a result of the publicity associated with the Channel documentary, the dangers of returning asylum seekers to Sri Lanka were well recognised and expressed by many, for example, Yolanda Foster, Researcher for Sri Lanka, Amnesty International:
Nobody should be deported from the UK if they are at risk of torture. The end of the armed conflict in Sri Lanka in May 2009 has not diminished the risks faced by failed Sri Lankan asylum seekers, who continue to be subjected to arrest and detention upon their arrival in Sri Lanka. We are aware of cases of returned asylum seekers being tortured.
6. The Complicity of the UK Authorities:
6.1 I understand that A was returned to Colnbrook to permit his having an interview with the Sri Lankan High Commission. At this interview he was asked his status and the reason why he had left Sri Lanka to obtain asylum in the UK. Hence, from the description given to me by A when I visited him again at Haslar, he was delivered into an interview with the Sri Lankan authorities permitting them to learn that he was an asylum seeker before he was returned to Sri Lanka.
6.2 On 13 June I received an e-mail from a Solicitor stating, “Today on the Refugee Legal Group “blog” there is some to-ing and fro-ing about this Charter Flight. Apparently Home Office have accidentally leaked confidential information about some of the returnees. I think the Anti-Deportation Coalition are trying to get some kind of urgent motion tabled—especially as there is going to be that horrific programme about Sri Lanka shown on Channel 4 tomorrow. I am not sure whether anything will come of it all but will keep you posted.”
6.3 On 15 June one Sri Lankan asylum seeker attempted to commit suicide at the Gatwick Detention Centre.
6.4 On 16 June the flight took place. Also on this day there was the possibility of a debate in the House of Commons concerning the return of asylum seekers to Sri Lanka, but this was refused: Parliament debate on Sri Lankan expulsions banned, Yesterday, Siobhain McDonagh MP tabled an emergency debate on the expulsion of UK Sri Lankan’s by charter flight. The Deputy Speaker of the Commons without giving reasons ruled the debate out of order
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110616/debtext/110616-0002.htm#11061639000005> House of Commons/16 Jun 2011: Column 977
6.5 Around this time, the legal process was finalised and an injunction to prevent the deportation of A and others, was refused. I had contacted John Denham MP, in whose constituency A lived, to ask that he might oppose the removal of these asylum seekers. I received the reply from his Secretary, “A letter from John has just been emailed to the Secretary of State asking that she carefully consider the request made by Amnesty that no one is returned”.
6.6 In my communication with John Denham MP I had expressed my concern that as a result of his interview with the Sri Lankan authorities, A might be placed at risk.
6.7 On June 17th I received the following from the Secretary of John Denham, “I have a message from the Minister’s office left for me last night. She advised that the injunction had failed and A had been put on the flight. She said that there was no record that the names had been leaked.” On 20 June I received from the Secretary of John Denham an addition, “John has just come back to me. He is going to write to the Minister again. John does not have a problem with you releasing the reply we received. However, the office did not speak directly with the minister so if you do can you say that John received a call from the Minister’s office and he was advised by them etc.”
6.8 On June 18th I wrote to John Denham expressing the opinion of Karim Assaad of Harrow Solicitors, Ravi, who supported the asylum seekers in the injunction case. On the phone Assaad suggested “proof of inappropriate questioning by the Sri Lankan authorities in Colnbrook and in Sri Lanka would likely constitute reasons for a mandatory removal of all 42 asylum seekers to the UK”. As I have had a better contact with A I have provided the best evidence that there is a strong case according to Karim Assaad.
7. The Dangerous Conditions to which A was exposed in Sri Lanka:
7.1 In my e-mail of 18 June as a result of speaking with A on the phone I was able to write to John Denham, “A was aggressively interviewed in Colombo and required to give the addresses and names of his wider family. He was also required to give his e-mail address.”
7.2 As a result of establishing an e-mail link I was able to learn much concerning the conditions encountered by A on his return at the airport. The following was written to Members of the Southampton and Winchester Visitors Group, the organisation through which I was a regular Visitor of A on 19 June: “The main concern at this moment is that his photo is across the media in Sri Lanka. It was taken as he left the airport. The photo of his father is there as well. They are staying low in the Colombo area. I spoke with both and they are clearly very frightened, both of the mob and the authorities.” And “In Colombo, A was interviewed for 3.5 hours, by Immigration, Police and anti-terrorist bods. There was a British Embassy person occasionally at the door. They knew that A was an asylum seeker and A believes they knew everything discussed at Colnbrook. This included reasons for leaving Sri Lanka and date of asylum claim in the UK etc. In Colombo they also took all addresses of the family of A including phone numbers and e-mail addresses”.
7.3 On 25 June I wrote to the teachers of A at a Southampton College with information obtained by e-mail from A: “I have spoken with A or exchanged e-mails every day since he arrived. This has required a switch of e-mail addresses and a change of his phone. All the advice I receive indicates that the security have phones tapped and hence all communication has a risk. Therefore I believe we should be sparing in communicating by e-mail to him on any address and you should avoid using his new address. I suspect that if he has replied to any of your e-mails he will have done so on his old address. In writing we should avoid saying anything which is likely to inflame the security people. The advice has been given by Amnesty, who have been excellent, and UK and Sri Lankan legal people. I have also been in touch with a Human Rights Group in Sri Lanka.” And “A is in hiding in the Colombo area. Sadly he was photographed on leaving the airport and the media interest means that his face can be recognised. He is mainly going out at night. I do not know how long this avoidance of contact can be maintained. A is frightened and it has been very difficult to face the lack of options.”
8. On 5 July I wrote a further e-mail to John Denham as I learnt that he was hoping to speak to Damian Green M.P. and wished to inform him of the plight of A.
I wrote, “I am pleased you have asked to speak with Damian Green. I am adding nothing new below but thought that I would summarise the points I would be making if I were to speak with Mr Green.”
8.1 There is much evidence that two years after the end of a dreadful civil war in Sri Lanka tensions remain very high, abductions continue and there continue to be accusations of torture and unlawful Government behaviour.
8.2 Amnesty has made it clear that forced returns of rejected asylum seekers to the present scene in Sri Lanka should not take place.
8.3 The Channel 4 documentary has fanned the tensions in Sri Lanka and has surely indicated to the British public that such a level of atrocities only two years ago does not provide a safe environment for the return of refused asylum seekers.
8.4 The question of releasing names of asylum seekers to the Sri Lankan authorities was raised in the application for an emergency debate.
8.5 16 Jun 2011: Column 975 Tamils (Deportation), Application for emergency debate (Standing Order No. 24), Siobhain McDonagh (Mitcham and Morden) Lab
I understand that the application was refused and the Home Office has indicated that names of asylum seekers were not released to the Sri Lankan authorities. I would ask for an explanation as to why A was interviewed in Colnbrook Detention Centre by the Sri Lankan High Commission. He was asked why he had left Sri Lanka, when he had asked for asylum in the UK and on what grounds he had asked for asylum.
Given the above I would suggest that forced removals to Sri Lanka at this time are wrong.
8.6 Should the Government continue with removals not only to Sri Lanka but also to other countries where a returnee is likely to be seriously threatened there is a responsibility on our Government to ensure the safety of the returnee. I do not accept that it is presently safe in Sri Lanka. The following illustrates the level of danger in Sri Lanka.
8.7 A was interviewed at Colombo Airport for 3.5 hours on his return. He said that there was a presence at the door of a person from the British Embassy. When this person was about he felt that the questioning was gentler. On other occasions when the person was not at the door the questioning was less gentle. It was obvious that the Sri Lankan authorities knew that A was a returned asylum seeker. When he was released he left the Airport and his photo was taken and he and others were displayed in the media as returned asylum seekers. Consequently he was terrified and has remained largely hidden since then. I am told by the solicitor Karim Assaad of Ravi’s that two people on the flight have been abducted. A has been told that in his native area people in vans have been asking about him on several occasions. He dare not return to his home region and he remains hidden. His family are now looking to move to Saudi Arabia as life in Sri Lanka promises to be intolerable. I have spoken many times with Tim Molyneux of Amnesty 02074135500 tim.molyneux@amnesty.org and once with Paul Dillane 02070331575, again of Amnesty. None of the above surprises them.
9. Given the above I would ask for three things:
9.1 A mandatory right of return to the UK I understand is a possibility. Given the clear danger presented to A and others who were returned recently to Sri Lanka, I would ask that such returns should be viewed sympathetically.
9.2 Given the present dangers there should be no forced returns to Sri Lanka in the immediate future. There should be a review of the responsibilities of our Government to those who are returned by force to their countries of origin.
9.3 Identifying returnees as asylum seekers, whether by permitting interviews in detention centres or by release of names is wrong. I had asked the Red Cross to provide a presence at the Airport in Colombo but they refused. The identifying of refused asylum seekers by the media is regrettable and a part of the responsibility rests with our Government. When it is chosen to make returns by charter flight such returns should be made with discretion and adequate protection should be afforded on return.
10. Following A’s Return to Sri Lanka
Following A’s return I had an exchange of e-mails and occasional phone calls with him over an extended period. A remained in hiding in Colombo and his situation is best summarised by this extract of an e-mail dated 26 August in which A writes of his experiences in the two months since his return. This extract is part of the case he submitted to the Swiss Embassy in which he asked for asylum in Switzerland. He was subsequently interviewed by the Embassy, on 4 October, and I believe he has never received a decision concerning his request.
10.1 I arrived in Sri Lanka on 17 June 2011 at Katunayaka airport. When I got into the airport some Sri Lankan authorities were waiting to receive us and I saw them holding our entire name list. UK immigration should not have passed information about returnees who came from the UK identifying us as asylum seekers, but it seems such information was leaked.
10.2 After they received us they put us all in a room and then we were divided with five people in one group and we were moved into another small room where they started to question us. When the interview took place, I was questioned for three and half hours by the Sri Lanka immigration, CID and NIA (National information bureau). Also there was a person from the British Embassy who came to monitor the work of the Sri Lankan authorities who asked me questions as if I was a suspect of LTTE and failed asylum seeker. Two or three times that British Embassy person come to check the situation of my questioning progress. The Sri Lankan authorities behaved well when that person was by the interview room, but once he left the door those Authority people asked me questions in bad manner as they very eager to know about my asylum claim details.
10.3 All I told to them is I went to UK as a visitor on a six month visa, and I overstayed for another three and a half years, but the police arrested me in an enforcement visit so that I was removed from the UK. However, they did not seem to be convinced by what I said they took my photograph as I was holding a board which was written in Sinhala. Then they took my other information such as my home address and other details about my parents and also some of my relations addresses. So I gave those details and they let me come out from the airport. I believe the only reason they let me come out from the airport without holding me for more days was because on that day this matter was monitored by the international society.
10.4 When I came out from the airport I have seen lots of media people waiting outside and I have been photographed by them. Although I tried to hide my face they kept following me and they took photos and video. However, my father and his friend were waiting for me out side at the airport as I already informed them on day before of my departure. Then, we went to my father’s friend’s home in Colombo. I was so scared that the media people might expose my face in the media and it might reach to members of the Karuna Group, because I am quite sure that once I got into their hands they would kill me because I escaped from them. In fact it is very easy for them to find me because today Karuna has more power than before as he is a minister now.
10.5 However, my family and I stayed a day in my father’s friend’s home. On that day all of Sri Lankan news headlines are about us who return from the UK. My fear was genuine and my face exposed by the media. Major Sri Lankan newspaper and TV news have revealed most of those returnees’ faces and it permitted lots of people to identify me. When I came out next day morning many people identified me because of the ITN news as a Tamil failed asylum returnee who returns from the UK. Not only my face but those of most of the returnees were revealed by the Sri Lankan media. Since then I am scared to go to my home town near the place where I was abducted as Karuna and his group still exist there. So, my father’s friend arranged a house which belongs to one of his friends who is living abroad. I am living there hidden and I do not often come out.
10.6 On 19 June we heard from people that some people in a van were asking for me in my home town. Also in my town G.N (Grama Niladari) who is the Government servant responsible for my area, contacted my father and told him it is not safe for me to come to my home town at this situation as the van people are looking for me. Also he said those van people have been asking for me in my home town and also to my neighbours. My home neighbours knew that my parents went to Colombo to receive me in 16 June. So they told to those van people that we were in Colombo. However I am not sure who really looking for me in that van. But as far as the home town people are concerned those van people seemed to have unfamiliar faces as they do not seem to live in my area but they were speaking in both Tamil and Sinhala languages. Also they do not seem to have any official positions. Their questions were all about me and where I am now and they confirmed that I am not in my home town but I am in Colombo.
10.7 At this moment I really cannot trust anyone because I do not know who is working for whom. Since am I back to Sri Lanka I am living hidden and I am not going out anywhere. I cannot really build a life in Sri Lanka when unknowns appear to be desperate to find me. I need a safe place to live freely and develop a normal life.
10.8 A’s problems cascaded to his family, “In-terms of my family that my father has received a unexpected job transfer to another corner of Sri Lanka which is very unpleasant to my family , my father said its result of the personal political reasons.” I received this news on 12 December concerning the father of A, a teacher.
11. The Responsibility of the UK authorities for the Safety of A
The notes I made during a meeting at the Home Office on 13 October 2011, in the presence of Emma Churchill and other Home Office Staff, Steve Brine MP and John Mellor raised thee issues:
11.1 The use of charter flights to return deportees. Emma Churchill outlined how most removals were by regular flights, and charter flights will continue to be used occasionally, as now.
11.2 The “leaking” of the identity of asylum seekers names to the country to which they are returned. Emma Churchill explained that it is common practice for the High Commission of the country to which a person is being returned, to interview that person before removal. Most of those interviewed in this way are students, etc. There should be nothing on anyone”s papers to identify them as a failed asylum seeker. John indicated the unsatisfactory situation of an interview in which the asylum status of A was confirmed. Worse he was asked why he had chosen to leave Sri Lanka. From his interview at the Airport in Colombo he found that all his replies had been passed on to those interviewing him in Colombo. The media were at the airport in order to take photos etc. of returning asylum seekers, who were then reported to be asylum seekers by the media.
11.3 Guidance re level of safety in countries to which individuals are being returned. Emma Churchill outlined the process whereby this guidance is produced, including testing by the courts before it is made official. She accepted that a British official had been present at the interviews at the airport in Colombo in order to see “fair play”. I suggested this showed an acceptance of responsibility by the UK to those returned. She agreed. I then asked what steps could be taken to ensure their subsequent safety. She considered that this was unnecessary because the courts had deemed that it was safe to return people to Sri Lanka. I then asked about the situation of Eritrea. Earlier the country guidance had stressed the undesirability of returns to Eritrea. The most recent country guidance from UNHCR has removed the sentences indicating that forced returns to Eritrea are undesirable. Emma Churchill did not give me a clear answer and we ran out of time.
12. Personal comments from John Mellor
The evidence above is largely drawn from my personal e-mails. Copies of all these e-mails can be made available. I note just one uncertainty. I was given the impression that A was interviewed at Colnbrook. I now know the interview took place in Central London at the Sri Lankan High Commission. From the case of A I draw the following conclusions:
12.1 At the time of the removal of A on 16 June there was ample evidence of the danger of returning asylum seekers to Sri Lanka. The decision concerning the injunction, the refusal to permit full debate in the House of Commons and the refusal of Ministers to intervene contrasts sharply with later decisions to stop returns to Sri Lanka because the situation was too dangerous. The reality was that on June 16th the situation was very dangerous but either not recognised or ignored by our authorities. I conclude that under the present conditions refused asylum seekers should not be returned to Sri Lanka.
12.2 The manner of returning asylum seekers requires review. To Sri Lanka the possibilities are by regular scheduled flights or by special charter flights. The case of A exposes the consequence of returning asylum seekers via a special charter flight. He was identified as a returning asylum seeker, was exposed on TV and in the print media and remained in hiding in Colombo because of his legitimate fears. His exposure as an asylum seeker directly followed from his interview with Sri Lankan officials in London orchestrated by UK authorities. There may be practical reasons for revealing some information to the Sri Lankan authorities before returns take place, but organising interviews where inevitably the status of individuals is revealed is wrong. The denials of the leaking of information could be technically correct. However the masking of the truth does no credit to the politicians involved.
12.3 Following the return of A to Colombo he was very scared and remained in hiding. I conclude that his caution was justified by the reports of “white vans” searching for him in his native area. Evidence of others, eg Karim Assaad of the Solicitors Ravi of Harrow, has indicated that abductions of returned asylum seekers were taking place. The more recent news concerning asylum seekers now back in the UK indicates that the fear of torture of A should he fall into the wrong hands, was justified. I conclude that the conditions in Sri Lanka indicated wrong decision making on 16 June. A should never have been returned. The wider conclusion is that the warnings of international organisations such as Amnesty International who monitor the situation effectively should be noted.
12.4 I was pleased that at the Home Office on 13 October 2011, Emma Churchill acknowledged a responsibility of the UK Government for the safety of returned asylum seekers. The presence of a UK official at the interviews of A at Colombo Airport was recognition that this responsibility was being observed. However that responsibility was reduced nearly to nil as A left the Airport. It is clear that it is impractical to accept significant responsibility once returning asylum seekers enter their country. I conclude that the difficulty in exercising responsibility implies that the decisions to return asylum seekers to countries must be taken with greater than the present level of caution.
12.5 Over recent weeks both the media and politicians have questioned aspects of the present level of protection of human rights. I am encouraged that decisions taken through the legal system concerning sanctuary and human rights are based on a deep seated view of the value of a dignified human life. I conclude that since his return A has been denied a dignified life. The responsibility rested on bad decisions made on 16 June 2011. I ask that the Select Committee should enhance rather than diminish the opportunities for another person in the future to have a more dignified life than A.
12.6 The Harrow Solicitor predicted in June 2011 that A and others might have a right to mandatory return to the UK. Given his treatment and subsequent difficulties I believe A and others should be given this opportunity.
Southampton and Winchester Visitors Group
April 2013