Home Affairs Committee
Executive Summary
Asylum seeker destitution is often intermittent and cyclical in its effects on individuals, but is prolonged and, at any given time, unacceptably prevalent. This situation is the result of irrational policies producing inordinate and unnecessary delay in settling and closing old files. In our view a few key reforms could cut destitution and, at the same time, slash the support budget with its current exorbitant cost to the tax-payer. The government is under the mistaken impression that psychological tactics allied to criminalisation will induce asylum seekers to leave the country voluntarily. This is reflected in Section 35 of the 2004 Treatment of Claimants Act and the 2007 UK Borders Act, inter alia. The effect of such measures is to induce fear and mental stress without leading to any increase in voluntary departure. We believe that our eight recommendations (paragraph 15 of the text), if carried out, will greatly reduce the problem of destitution, without necessarily increasing the pull effect into the UK. The other major EU countries all have properly-managed regularisation programmes. Why should not Britain do the same?
Full Text of Submission
1. My name is David Forbes. Together with my wife, Barbara, I have been closely associated with Quaker social action for many years, both at the Quaker Council for European Affairs (Brussels) and in the Central England Area of the Society of Friends. In addition I have been professionally active in refugee work since 1999. Since 2006 my wife and I have been involved in running a small not-for-profit company, “Lifeline Options”, having been awarded asylum client files after the liquidation of the Midlands Refugee Council, where I worked until September 2005. The inherited client files involved immigration advice, welfare intervention, employability and business advice and a range of special education projects for asylum seekers, refugees and failed asylum seekers. However, progressively restrictive measures on access to ESOL and other key transitional education courses, combined with major funding cuts after 2008 in all social fields, have led to an increased concentration on the immigration and welfare advice and delivery issues over the last five years at the expense of educational and developmental activities. The focus on education has switched during this time to our management of the encounter between social work and human rights students from local and continental universities and our asylum seeker clientele. We operate under a fee exemption from the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner (OISC) and are registered at Companies House as a Community Interest Company. We are also registered with the Charities Aid Foundation.
2. As well as reporting regularly to our donors and supporters and to the Community Interest Company regulator at Companies House, Lifeline Options is active in the Central England Area Quaker Asylum Group and also participates in the national Quaker Asylum and Refugee Network (QARN).
3. Over the past seven years over 2,000 new service users (closer to 3,000 if dependents are included) have received varying levels of assistance from us, to which can be added several hundred more whom we inherited from the Midlands Refugee Council. The major portion of these users has consisted of refused asylum seekers at the time when they first made contact. About one third of this number gained Indefinite Leave to Remain Outside the Rules (ILOTR) in 2009, 2010 and the beginning of 2011 under the “LEGACY” programme for asylum cases re-dating March 2007. Several hundred have bafflingly been left out of this regularisation process, having had their further submissions refused or being merely caught up in a renewed backlog under the Case Assurance and Audit Unit. Significantly, grants of permission to work as a result of over 12 months delay in making a substantive decision have started to escalate in the past few months and the CAAU has passed these cases over to their colleagues at Liverpool, CEBU, as part of the latter’s role in producing appropriate Asylum Registration Cards (the “ARC cards” have to be amended from “Work Prohibited” to “Work Permitted” within the SOL restrictions).
4. I have so far observed no sign that the CAAU (recently re-named OLCU, “Older Live Cases Unit”) is winding down its work, despite a deadline of March 2013 having been given out last year. Similarly, there is no sign of any initiative to resolve a very large number of other old cases (about half of our own case load) which are now four, five or six years old and classed as “New Asylum Model” (NAM), despite the fact that when the back-log clearing system, “LEGACY”, came on stream in 2008 it included cases under two years old. There is also no move to lower the barrier to acceptance of asylum seekers who are known to have overstayed, or indeed have had previous legal stay, several years before they made an asylum claim. We have observed that an ever-increasing number of such cases are contacting us, especially individuals or families from Commonwealth countries on which no entry clearance requirement was imposed in the early 2000s. In such cases, it is never the total duration of their stay in this country which is counted, but only the duration of stay since their asylum claim.
5. All these factors, we find, are contributing to an entrenchment of long-term destitution. This is not to say that all those who can be characterised as long-term destitute are destitute all the time. In our experience individuals enjoy sporadic family or community support, but this regularly breaks down. We can often succeed in gaining Section 4 support for them for a time as a result of further asylum submissions, but this is removed as soon as a negative decision is made on the submissions, whether this occurs after days, weeks or months (see also paragraph 14 below). The individuals concerned are then thrown back onto their communities as destitute people requiring informal support. Destitution has thus become, for many, a long and cyclical process.
6. In terms of the mental health of those concerned, this cyclical destitution is bad enough, but the situation is hugely aggravated by a policy of what might be termed “planned benign neglect” interspersed with the threat or actuality of attempts to remove the sufferers. This planned benign neglect, and these sporadic attempts to remove or threaten removal arise from the core policy of the Home Office as defined ever since the 1971 Immigration Act. The position is that once the claim of the asylum seeker has been fully refused, inclusive of prescribed appeals, the asylum seeker is effectively ordered to leave voluntarily or else face forced removal at some unspecified time. The information given to him or her that they are liable to be detained at any time is designed as an incentive for them to leave before the “Sword of Damocles” falls. But this policy flies in the face of our experience on the ground of asylum seekers’ actual motivation. The vast majority of those we encounter see themselves as clinging firmly to a one-way ticket to a safe future. Only after they have gained protection definitively will they contemplate voluntary return (as British citizens or permanent residents) to their country—and even then the return is rarely permanent or uninterrupted.
7. As a result, the failed asylum seekers (as they are termed) often see no other option but to “choose” destitution, when asked to choose between that and voluntary or enforced return. As a further result, there is a strong incentive for those who feel most under threat to disappear off the Home Office’s radar rather than face the threat of removal. This incentive, however, competes with an equal and opposite one, which is to take the risk of removal in order to achieve the goal of settlement. The clients of Lifeline Options are, by definition following the latter course of action. Oddly, some might say perversely, Home Office policy does little, aside from the prospect of Section 4 support, to make this course of action attractive. Rather it is the counter-incentives which stand out, as we now describe.
8. In order to make renewed asylum submissions, the asylum seeker must first demonstrate that he or she is reporting to their regional immigration office or a sub-contracted police station at regular intervals. Indeed, it is their legal obligation to do so and, under Section 35 of the 2004 Treatment of Claimants Act, they can theoretically be fined or imprisoned for up to 6 months if they do not comply (we have never heard of this actually being enforced). However, this reporting activity offers no tangible benefits in and of itself. The asylum seeker must get to and from the reporting centre at their own cost and , what is more, do so in the full knowledge that it may be their turn to be “detained off reporting” and transferred to a Detention Centre for removal. This happens only to a very small percentage of those reporting, but it is devastating in its effect and the looming fear that “it could be you” overshadows each visit to the reporting centre.
9. It is true that those acknowledged to be from certain countries, such as Iran or Somalia or Eritrea or the Palestinian face a very small likelihood of detention, mainly because the Home Office knows that there is no chance, or a minimal chance, of co-operation from authorities in those countries, and in the case of Somalia and Palestine there is no sufficiently empowered authority to offer useful co-operation in the safe removal of their fellow nationals. But, where this is the case it is equally true that the UK government is currently unprepared to give even temporary status to those who cannot be removed solely on the basis of the impracticality of their removal. The onus remains on the failed asylum seekers of those countries to remove themselves voluntarily, irrespective of the numerous issues which deter them from doing so, such as general oppression, civil war and (in the case of Palestine) the virtual impossibility of return because Palestine is able to control its border only under the supervision of Israel. When we tell them that they are under an obligation to report, asylum seekers in these positions often retort that they can see no point in doing so, unless it is in order to make new submissions (with a prospect of temporary Section 4 support following from these submissions). Consequently, the facts on the ground reflect atmosphere of stalemate surrounding the current policy.
10. This unproductive stalemate, as has been indicated above, is a source of high anxiety for those who know there is a real chance of removal as a result of reporting. The anxiety is heightened further by periodic summonses to “re-documentation” sessions. The latter, like the obligation to report are the outworking of the Treatment of Claimants Act 2004, in this case its Section 35, which makes it an offence punishable by up to 12 months imprisonment to frustrate an immigration officer in his attempt to produce a travel document for the asylum seeker’s departure. In other words, “voluntary departure” has effectively become compulsory. The fact that it is not in the asylum seeker’s perceived interest to comply is treated as irrelevant. Here is another psychological dilemma which is tending to lead some (possibly many) asylum seekers to “choose” destitution as a lesser evil.
11. In theory, the remedy is meant to be “assisted voluntary return”, at least to those countries where voluntary return is possible. This involves an incentive in the form of £1500 to be delivered following return and other assistance to re-integrate. Of course £1500 may well represent several years’ average income in the poorest countries, but barely a month in other countries such as Iran or Libya. But AVR, currently administered by the charity, Refugee Action, attracts only a small percentage of asylum seekers. Although there is a paucity of reliable figures, it would appear that only a tiny percentage of asylum seekers actually proceed with the programme and the outcomes are far from clear from the available literature. AVR is also open to the objection that it is only “voluntary” within a narrow compass of the definition of that word, as it actually appears to the prospective user as a form of damage limitation rather than a genuinely preferred option. And yet it is treated, of course, by the government as a potentially expensive benefit which needs to be strictly controlled and rationed. The feedback we have from refugee communities is that the £1500 is seldom paid out in full (if at all), as it proves to be conditional on a submerged re-integration contract linked to performance targets which are extremely difficult to attain. In addition, as already described in para11 above, voluntary return is not possible to several key refugee-producing countries. The relative dysfunctionality of the Assisted Voluntary Return system is, therefore, yet another factor which leads refused asylum seekers to remain in intermittent destitution.
12. The final factor we wish to flag up is the counter-productive way in which the Home Office has responded to the development of an underground labour market among people who would otherwise be destitute. Over the last 3–4 years we have had an increasing number of cases of individual asylum seekers who have fallen into the regime of “automatic deportation” introduced by the 2007 UK Borders Act. As we understand it, a typical way for the underground labour market to operate is for a loan system of passports to be set up by ad hoc entrepreneurs. Work-ineligible individuals are invited by work-eligible individuals (usually at a cost—possibly deductions from resulting wages) to “borrow” their passport and impersonate them or, indeed to use the valid passports of third parties. Sometimes the document used is itself forged. Under the 2007 Act and the associated immigration rules, tariffs have been set for judges to fit in with the Act , which stipulates that a sentence of 12 months or more will attract automatic deportation. There is a strong incentive for judges to hand down a sentence of 12 months or more whenever a prosecution is brought against a participant in a fraudulent “scheme” such as outlined above. Some judges recommend deportation at even lower sentences. The rationale of this is that the offending asylum seekers (and other immigrants) constitute a danger to society as they have committed the serious offence of identity theft and have participated in illegal working. The fact of having worked long hours in, say, the care sector, and having delivered much-valued services, is seldom seen as a sufficient mitigation. Meanwhile, there is no sign that, in the present social and economic climate, the bar on asylum seekers working will be lifted, except where they have awaited a substantive decision for more than 12 months.
13. However, all deportations carry a right of appeal, whereas the usual administrative removals, mistakenly described as “deportation” by most people, can be challenged only by Judicial Review. The Criminal Case Work Directorate has to carry out quite a cumbersome set of procedures, which often seem to occupy them for many months if not years, in order first to issue a valid deportation order with rights of appeal and then, after this has been done, to prepare a comprehensive respondent’s bundle for the appeal. It may well be that, despite the deportation order and the usual victory of the Home Office at the appeal, the individual in question is from a country to which it is impossible to deport or remove people. It may also be that they have developed family life with permanent residents or British citizens and, despite a judge finding that they are a “danger to British society” and that it is not disproportionate for their British families to follow them and relocate themselves in the foreign country of origin, it is actually impossible to make the arrangements for this without infringing the rights of the British citizens or residents involved. Because the British components of the family are often economically marginalised, the potential deportee is often destitute and may well end up in Section 4 support for long periods of time.
14. In conclusion, as alluded to in paragraph 5 above, it is worth noting that Section 4 (1999 Asylum and Immigration Act) support to failed asylum seekers who are awaiting a decision on their future operates in an anomalous way, which, in our experience, tends to promote destitution. At the same time it appears to be one of the biggest cost centres in the Border Agency (or asylum department) budget. Apparently, the cost of Section 4 alone is £35–40 million per annum. Unlike, Section 95 support to asylum seekers with cases bearing full appeal rights, Section 4 is a single, indivisible package and can be granted only on the basis of compulsory housing along with an azure shopping card worth £35 a week. Yet, anyone who, like us, actually has occasion to visit the shared houses provided, will find that there are usually numerous apparent vacancies. On further enquiry, we find that many destitute people can continue to be partially hosted by a circle of friends in rotation if they have a degree of financial independence. It is the element of financial independence which is most sought after, and numerous Section 4 users make only partial, or sometimes no, use of the accommodation provided at such great expense through the expensive contract with G4S and other multinational provider companies. The significant change to their lives made by Section 4 is the contribution (albeit restricted) to greater independence afforded by the Azure card. Given the frequency with which Section 4 is discontinued and later resumed as new submissions are made (see para 5 above), this form of limited and restricted support seems to be as much a contributor to destitution as an alleviator of it. Ironically, this support of destitution is at the taxpayer’s expense.
15. EIGHT RECOMMENDATIONS
Destitution can be significantly reduced by:
(a) Disposing of the remaining “LEGACY” (pre March 2007) cases in a manner which reflects realistically the barriers to removal of the candidates. This might result in settlement or partial settlement for over 90% of the remaining backlog
(b) Treating the age of the file as dating form the time when the first immigration application was made if this predates the asylum application per se
(c) Disposing of all other applications dating from more than three years ago in a similar manner to the LEGACY cases
(d) Repealing Section 35 of the 2004 Treatment of Claimants Act. No prosecutions have been successfully brought against asylum seekers exclusively under this section, as far as we know. It simply adds to individual anguish and mental distress.
(e) Repealing or significantly amending the 2007 UK Borders Act to eliminate the largely meaningless concept of “automatic deportation”. This would remove the long delays involved in the attempt to carry out this largely meaningless procedure ad will reduce the pressure on judges to artificially bolster sentences in order to meet their externally imposed tariff-related performance targets
(f) Incentivizing mandatory reporting by measures “a”–”d” above and by offering reimbursement of travel cost to all who report (not just those who are on Section 4 support, as at present)
(g) Offering Limited Leave to Remain of a specified duration to all asylum seekers from countries where there are insurmountable barriers to enforced return. Any possible voluntary return will then be truly “voluntary” and the Section 4 budget will be significantly reduced, while the prevalence of destitution drops
(h) Sundering the monetary benefit component of Section 4 support from the accommodation component in a similar way to that applying to Section 95 support arrangements. This could further slash the expensive Section 4 budget, as many asylum seekers can nominate hosts if they have the means to contribute to their upkeep and thus avoid destitution.
Central England Area Quaker Asylum Group
April 2013