Home Affairs Committee
Executive Summary
(i) Introduction
1. This response has been prepared by TRP Solicitors Ltd, a private law practice in Birmingham, UK, working almost exclusively in the areas of immigration and asylum law.
2. This response represents both our professional experience of the Home Office asylum decision making process, and a critical survey of a representative sample of specific cases dealt with by TRP Solicitors. Initials and country of origins have been changed to protect anonymity.
3. We have not had the resources to respond in detail to each element of the terms of reference of the inquiry. However, we have sought to address the inquiry questions which we feel require urgent attention and also point to wider issues in the asylum system in the UK.
(ii) The effectiveness of the 5 year review system introduced in 2005
4. Our experience of the 5 year review system for those granted refugee status is that the system serves no meaningful purpose and is a waste of taxpayers money. Our experience is also that those who are required to undergo the system find obtaining advice difficult.
5. Home Office policy is to consider only a tiny fraction of the applications made by refugees at the end of their five year leave to remain. The largest trigger for such a review is criminal convictions. However, this does not substantially increase the suite of measures available to the Home Office to address the immigration status of refugees who subsequently commit criminal offences.
6. Furthermore, because the great majority of applications for ILR fall out of the scope of criminal offending, the negative impacts on integration and welfare of being required to apply in this way (as identified in detail in Section 2.2 of our full submission) considerably outweigh the putative benefits.
7. We also argue that the effective advice desert of Legal Aid advice to refugees to obtain advice on their applications is presently grossly unfair to those required to apply. We highlight in our full submissions in Section 2.3 where information provided to applicants by the Home Office is confusing, misleading, incorrect and/or absent.
(iii) The assessment of the credibility of women, the mentally ill, victims of torture and specific nationalities within the decision-making process and whether this is reflected in appeal outcomes
8. As practitioners we are constantly aware of a ‘culture of disbelief’ in the asylum decision making process. It is our experience that in the vast majority of cases, the Home Office’s initial position is always one of doubting the credibility of an asylum applicant, and of seeking to find the gaps in an applicant’s knowledge or recollection rather than finding the truth of past events.
9. The range of cases that the Home Affairs Select Committee has requested responses on is too large for us to be able to comment on each area in detail. However, we have identified two specific areas of concern to us regarding the Home Office’s assessment of credibility, namely;
(a) the assessment of the credibility of male asylum applicants against whom male rape has been used as a method of torture, and;
(b) the assessment of the credibility of female asylum applicants who have been sexually assaulted.
10. We identify a series of trends in Section 3.1.2 in relation to the assessment of the credibility of male asylum applicants against whom male rape has been used as a method of torture.
11. In some cases, the Home Office deny the link between male rape in detention and torture. The Home Office policy on credibility appears to be to assume that late disclosure of such sensitive information is evidence of fabrication. Also, credibility is equated by the Home Office with consistency of recall and no more, even in cases of trauma victims and where PTSD is formally diagnosed.
12. All of these trends run directly counter to the established academic and medical literature on the subject.
13. Finally, Home Office decision making in cases involving medical evidence show a worrying lack of knowledge of the Istanbul Protocol—the gold standard for the assessment of torture injuries—and other relevant medical practice.
14. Within the category of ‘women’ we have particular concerns regarding the assessment of credibility of female asylum applicants who have been sexually assaulted. Our concerns arise from negative credibility findings made against a number of our clients in relation to their claim to have been sexually assaulted in their country of origin, or where their claims to have been sexually assaulted are not addressed at all. These are discussed in detail in Section 3.2.1 of our full submissions.
15. In preparing our submissions, we approached a sample of cases in which we have represented women who have been sexually assaulted. We were particularly surprised and concerned that the Home Office, in refusing the asylum claims of these women, simply ignored the allegations made by them of sexual assault. Time and again, we saw refusals which recorded only the bare fact of an allegation of rape or sexual assault. Other factors or elements to the asylum claim were then used to reject as incredible the whole asylum claim without any further consideration of the rape or sexual assault; even where it was one of the a central acts of persecution carried out.
16. Section 3.2.2 of our full submissions also address what we have termed ‘legal credibility’, by which we mean that the claims of domestic violence or sexual abuse victims are not automatically considered by the Home Office as falling under the Refugee Convention definition of what constitutes a refugee.
17. We argue strongly that the category of ‘women’ as a particular social group should be accepted by the Home Office as a matter of policy. We argue that by accepting that ‘women’ constitute a particular social group, the Home Office would not lessen the evidential burden on individual applicants to make out their claim to asylum, but would ensure that the question of ‘legal credibility’ is resolved in their favour and ensure consistent treatment between individual asylum applicants.
(iv) Summary of Recommendations
18. We make a series of recommendations based upon our
19. We strongly recommend that those who are granted refugee status are granted Indefinite Leave to Remain in the first instance. Should the present practice of granting five years leave to remain continue we recommend the following;
(a) That means-tested Legal Aid be available to every refugee required to apply for ILR and that the Legal Aid contracting of new matter starts be reviewed to be demand led
(b) That the Home Office publish clear immigration rules and accompanying policy on the way such applications will be determined
(c) That any application for ILR made on an incorrect form will not be rejected, that any fee payment made in association with that incorrect form will be refunded promptly, and that the applicant will be contacted for any information that the Home Office cannot obtain from the incorrect form with no consequence for their “3(c) leave” (leave to remain whilst an in-time application for further or indefinite leave is considered.
20. We make the following recommendations in relation to the way the Home Office assesses the credibility of asylum applicants;
(a) That the Home Office assess credibility on the totality of the evidence presented
(b) That little (if any) weight should be given by Home Office decision makers to late reporting of male rape, other traumatic incidents, or stigmatised social status where the academic literature suggests that late disclosure is a common factor in such cases
(c) That late reporting of male rape, other traumatic incidents, or stigmatised social status should never be taken as the starting point to an assessment of credibility by the Home Office
(d) That the Home Office assessment of credibility should not rely solely on an equation of credibility and consistency of memory recall
(e) That Home Office decision makers should be trained in the application of the Istanbul Protocol in medico-legal reports and to approach such reports in light of medical reality
(f) That Home Office decision makers be required to remain up-to-date with the caselaw of domestic courts which have direct relevance to their decision making functions
(g) That where a asylum applicant discloses a past sexual assault as part of her asylum application, she is referred by the Home Office to an independent rape and sexual violence counselling service and to a competent, Legal Aid funded legal representative (where not already represented)
(h) That the Legal Aid Graduated Fees Scheme of fixed total payment to legal representatives are scrapped, and that Legal Aid payments are made for actual work done in order to incentivise full and proper legal representation for asylum applicants
(i) That Home Office assessment of the credibility of the asylum claims of those who have been sexually assaulted, always includes consideration of a report by an independent rape and sexual violence counselling service
(j) That asylum claims, whether in the first instance or further submissions, based upon allegations of sexual abuse within the family should never be certified as clearly unfounded by the Home Office
(k) That in the assessment of credibility, less weight is placed by the Home Office on the credibility of the actions of third parties
(l) That women be treated as a particular social group for the purposes of 1A of the Refugee Convention as a matter of policy
1. Introduction
1. This response has been prepared by TRP Solicitors Ltd, a private law practice in Birmingham, UK, working almost exclusively in the areas of immigration and asylum law.
2. TRP Solicitors was established in 2003 serving clients throughout the UK and at all levels of the legal process. It has been recognised as a leading firm from the start. Chambers and Partners says of us in its 2013 Directory:
“TRP Solicitors is a national leader on human rights and issues of national security as they intersect with immigration law. The firm regularly works with pre-eminent counsel on complicated appeals, and is frequently successful in the higher courts.”
3. Both TRP Directors, Margaret Finch and Sean Mcloughlin, are recognised as leaders in their field. In a rapidly changing area of law and practice, we pride ourselves on our cutting-edge work, the quality of our service, and the expertise of our staff. All our solicitors and advisors undertaking legal aid work are accredited at Level 2 (Senior Caseworker) of the Solicitors Regulation Authority immigration and asylum accreditation scheme.
4. We have not had the resources to respond in detail to each element of the terms of reference of the inquiry. However, we respond in detail to the following questions;
(a) The effectiveness of the 5 year review system introduced in 2005.
(b) The assessment of the credibility of women, the mentally ill, victims of torture and specific nationalities within the decision-making process and whether this is reflected in appeal outcomes, specifically as this relates to;
(i) the assessment of the credibility of male asylum applicants against whom male rape has been used as a method of torture, and;
(ii) the assessment of the credibility of female asylum applicants who have been sexually assaulted.
5. This response represents both our professional experience of the Home Office asylum decision making process, and a critical survey of a representative sample of specific cases dealt with by TRP Solicitors. The latter are presented as anonymised case studies.
6. We end each section of this response with a series of considered recommendations which we commend to you in conducting your own inquiry.
2. The effectiveness of the 5 year review system introduced in 2005
7. Our experience of the 5 year review system for those granted refugee status is that the system serves no meaningful purpose. Our experience is also that those who are required to undergo the system find obtaining advice difficult.
2.1 Case Studies
8. We refer to four anonymised case studies:
9. AL
A Rwandan national with two dependent children. The family were granted refugee status and five years leave to remain in October 2007. They applied for indefinite leave to remain in October 2012. The dependent children were over 18 years old but included on the application. AL and one of the children both had committed traffic offences (speeding, driving without insurance and non-payment of road tax). They were all granted Indefinite Leave to Remain as a result of the application.
10. BA
A national of Syria granted refugee status and five years leave to remain in November 2007. BA had a partner and two dependent children, one born in Syria and one in the UK. They were all granted Indefinite Leave to Remain as a result of the application.
11. CC
A Zambian national granted refugee status and five years leave to remain in March 2008. CC had no dependents. His application is still outstanding.
12. VT
A Yemeni national granted refugee status and indefinite leave to remain in 2002 whilst a minor. VT was convicted of a criminal offence and sentenced to 2 ½ years imprisonment, which VT is serving in a Young Offenders Institute.
2.2 Effectiveness
13. In each case of AL, BA and CC, minimal of representations were made by this firm as part of their application for indefinite leave to remain. No detailed representations were made regarding the applicant’s continued fear on return to their country of origin, other to say that they remained, despite changes in country situation in the five years since they were initially granted leave to remain.
14. AL and BA both had their applications accepted with no difficulty. CC’s application is still outstanding.
15. Whilst we mean in no way suggest that these, or any other applicants, should not have been granted indefinite leave to remain, a number of factors suggests that the process is not an efficient use of tax-payers money.
16. Firstly, as no representations were made by us on the subject, it is unlikely that individual cases have been scrutinised in detail regarding an individual’s continuing fear on return. In fact, we believe that Home Office policy is to not substantially consider the vast majority of applications for ILR under the five year review scheme (see ILPA (9 August 2010): http://www.ilpa.org.uk/data/resources/4708/10.08.1166.pdf)
17. Secondly, over the course of five years most individuals will develop a substantial private and/or family life in the UK which will create a compelling case under Article 8 ECHR to prevent removal in most cases.
18. Thirdly, the grant of ILR after five years rather than immediately does not substantially delay the grant of British Citizenship to a refugee. Where someone is granted ILR after their asylum application then they are entitled to apply for British Citizenship after five years lawful residence. Under the five year review system a refugee would be entitled to British Citizenship under long residence criteria, six years after their grant of refugee status (five years limited leave plus one year indefinite leave).
19. Fourthly, the uncertainty of future leave to remain can act as a barrier to a refugee’s integration into UK society and particularly because those with limited leave to remain are less attractive prospects for employers and because limited leave disincentives self-employment.
20. Fifth, the uncertainty of future leave to remain can act as a barrier to successful rehabilitation from mental ill-health, including PTSD, which was sustained as a result of torture or other mistreatment.
21. Sixth, a grant of ILR does not prevent a person from voluntarily returning to their country of origin.
22. Seventh, although an application for ILR before the expiry of limited leave (an in-time application) is deemed to automatically extend the leave to remain whilst the application is considered (3(c) leave), it can be very difficult for someone to prove this to the satisfaction of employers. The Home Office ‘Employer Checking Service’ is in our experience ineffective and in at least one case (not included in the case studies above) had to begin Judicial Review procedures where the information given by that service has been incorrect. The negative consequences for integration and financial and emotional wellbeing of individuals are clear. In addition, if a Refugee is dismissed by their employer whilst they have valid 3(c) leave, they would be entitled to claim public funds in the form of unemployment benefits which is a further waste of tax payers money in the circumstances.
23. Finally, the suite of measures available to the Secretary of State to remove foreign nationals with refugee status in the UK who commit serious criminal offences is not enhanced by the present system. We refer above to the case of VT who was granted indefinite leave to remain as a refugee in 2002 before the five year review was introduced. He had not made an application for British Citizenship before his criminal conviction, despite having potentially been able to register as such whilst a minor.
24. In this situation, the Secretary of State has the power to withdraw refugee status from VT by virtue of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention and s72 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. VT is thus in no better or worse position than a refugee granted their status post-2005 and who committed an identical offence and is subject to consideration of their refugee status after five years leave to remain.
25. As the above case of AL shows, some criminal offending is not a barrier to ILR under the current five year review procedures.
2.3 Availability of Advice
26. Legal Aid is available to practitioners to advise and assist refugees who needed to apply for ILR through the five year review procedures. However, under Legal Aid contracting, only a limited number of ‘matter starts’ (ie new cases) could be begun by any one firm in a year. This lead to firms like ours to impose rationing on what kind of cases that we would usually conduct under legal aid.
27. Although the Legal Services Commission (now the Legal Aid Agency), when pushed, admitted that legal aid would be available to all SET (Protection) applications, the internal rationing that we were forced to do meant that these types of applications tended to miss out against asylum applications at first instance, asylum appeals and fights against deportation.
28. Since the changes to Legal Aid contracting on 1 April 2013, the matter starts available to us has dropped by four fifths. At the same time, some legal aid providers have left the market voluntarily or through bankruptcy, and our local Law Centres are teetering on the brink.
29. This has made the necessity to internally ration provision even more acute and our signposting options more limited. An anonymous ring round to a sample of other Birmingham asylum Legal Aid providers uncovered only one firm who would consider taking on such work under Legal Aid. The rest would not offer Legal Aid for this type of work. Because the Legal Aid contracting on 1 April 2013 offered only 106 new matter starts to each provider in the region, that one firm offering Legal Aid for SET (Protection) applications could not possibly fulfil all the need in our region.
30. That the recent Legal Aid contracting round has led to an effective advice desert potentially puts the UK in breach of its international legal obligations.
31. Aside from the financial difficulties faced by the charitable advice sector, because immigration and asylum advice is regulated by the OISC and by primary legislation, the number of charitable advisory services which are able to assist refugees on legal matters is both small and declining.
32. Furthermore, because a potential employee with limited leave to remain is less attractive than one with indefinite leave to remain, refugees frequently earn substantially lower than the national average. They are thus less likely to be able to afford our professional fees.
33. However, it continues to be our experience that refugees nearing the end of their five year limited leave to remain require advice and assistance associated with the five year review.
34. Even identifying and accessing the correct form on the UK Border Agency website can be difficult.
35. For example, the UK Border Agency website provides information on the five year review process under ‘settlement’ rather than under ‘asylum’. Although information in the ‘settlement’ section eventually links through from ‘asylum’, this is found two links away from the page which explains ‘active review’ (a sub-set of the five year review procedure and which could be easily confused for it, but which requires a separate form).
36. An applicant thus needs to be able to successfully differentiate an active review and ILR application, needs to be computer literate and needs to be sufficiently competent in the English language. These are major barriers to many of our clients, who include the elderly and those with limited formal education.
37. It is also incredibly unhelpful that in some cases the UK Border Agency website points refugees seeking to apply to ILR to the wrong form:
Settlement
ww.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/visas-immigration/settlement/
>> Find the Right Form
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/visas-immigration/settlement/findtherightform/
Options of Family, Work, Study or Other (“For migrants who are currently in the UK for another reason.”)
>> Other
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/visas-immigration/settlement/findtherightform/other
Options of:
- — as a former member of HM Forces
- — as a retired person of independent means
- — because I have been given exceptional leave to enter or remain
- — because I have been given discretionary leave to remain
- — because I have been given humanitarian protection
- — because I have been legally resident in the UK for a continuous period of more than 10 years
- — in another immigration category
>> In another immigration category
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/view/questionnaireSubmit.form
“You told us that you are a migrant in another immigration category. You should use form SET(O).”
38. Thus the UK Border Agency website itself gives incorrect instructions to a refugee applying for ILR as the correct form is a SET(Protection Route).
39. Where someone makes an application under SET(O) instead of SET(Protection Route) in error, their application may be returned after the date of the expiry of their leave. A late application may cause additional difficulties to the applicant in relation to their immediate application (with associated costs to the taxpayer through the costs of Home Office caseworking) and to later applications (eg for naturalisation).
40. Furthermore, the Home Office provides no readily available information regarding the factors or information considered important to them in determining these applications.
41. There is no such information on the UKBA website pages on SET(Protection Route): http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/visas-immigration/settlement/applicationtypes/completing_set_protection_route/
On the SET(Protection Route) application form:
Or in the information leaflet provided:
42. There is also no information on this subject in the Immigration Instructions on settlement: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/IDIs/idichapter6a/
Or asylum:
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/IDIs/idischapter11/
Nor the asylum policy instructions:
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicyinstructions/
Nor the asylum process guidance:
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/asylumprocess/
43. Applicants are thus left completely in the dark as to what is appropriate for inclusion in their application, how their application will be considered and what factors will weigh in favour or against their application. This failure to inform individuals as to how their cases will be judged is a breach of legal certainty; one of the principles of the rule of law that requires that laws must be definite and clear.
2.4 Recommendations
44. We believe that the five year review of the grant of refugee status is wasteful of public funds, provides an unnecessary barrier to integration and that the information provided by the Home Office to those who are required to apply for ILR is mismanaged and misleading.
45. We strongly recommend that those who are granted refugee status are granted Indefinite Leave to Remain in the first instance.
46. Should the present system continue we recommend the following;
(a) That means-tested Legal Aid be available to every refugee required to apply for ILR, and that the Legal Aid contracting of new matter starts be reviewed to be demand led
(b) That the Home Office publish clear immigration rules and accompanying policy on the way such applications will be determined
(c) That any application for ILR made on an incorrect form will not be rejected, that any fee payment made in association with that incorrect form will be refunded promptly, and that the applicant will be contacted for any information that the Home Office cannot obtain from the incorrect form with no consequence for their “3(c) leave” (leave to remain whilst an in-time application for further or indefinite leave is considered.
3. The assessment of the credibility of women, the mentally ill, victims of torture and specific nationalities within the decision-making process and whether this is reflected in appeal outcomes
47. As practitioners we are constantly aware of a ‘culture of disbelief’ in the asylum decision making process. It is our experience that in the vast majority of cases, the Home Office’s initial position is always one of doubting the credibility of an asylum applicant, and of seeking to find the gaps in an applicant’s knowledge or recollection rather than finding the truth of past events.
48. This is evident from the records of asylum screening interviews—usually the first recorded conversation between an asylum applicant and the UK authorities—at which the interviewing officer frequently takes an adversarial approach. It is also evident from Home Office refusal letters and the approach of Home Office Presenting Officers at asylum appeals.
49. The range of cases that the Home Affairs Select Committee has requested responses on is too large for us to be able to comment on each area in detail. However, we have identified two specific areas of concern to us regarding the Home Office’s assessment of credibility, namely;
(c) the assessment of the credibility of male asylum applicants against whom male rape has been used as a method of torture, and;
(d) the assessment of the credibility of female asylum applicants who have been sexually assaulted.
We address each in turn below.
3.1 The assessment of the credibility of male asylum applicants against whom male rape has been used as a method of torture
50. We include publicly available academic literature in the bibliography. We also refer to two anonymised case studies:
51. PW
(a) PW is a Eritrean national who was granted refugee status in 2010 after a successful asylum appeal. His initial asylum application was rejected in 2003 but in late 2003 he was able to disclose the fact that he was raped whilst held in detention in Eritrea (amongst other methods of torture inflicted upon him).
(b) Medical and other evidence was presented to the Home Office which substantiated that he was tortured as claimed, including incidents of anal rape in 2006. Further evidence was submitted in 2007 and yet further evidence was submitted in 2009. This evidence was dismissed by the Home Office, who stated the following in their refusal letter;
(c) “Your claim that you were that whilst you [sic] were detained by Eritrean authorities…you were beaten on numerous occasions and anally raped by two soldiers has been given careful and compassionate scrutiny. It is accepted that this event may have occurred…in this individual instance the benefit of the doubt has been given to you with regards to the late disclosure and submitting of details pertaining to your rape…However, it was also considered that whilst these actions are condemned in the strongest form and warrant criminal punishment is placed in doubt whether the rapes were carried out as part of a concerted and systematic campaign of persecution against you as an individual and not random criminal acts perpetrated by individual[s]…”
(d) PW’s account of torture and rape was also dismissed in its entirety because, “…whilst it is accepted that you have suffered extreme trauma your account is inconsistent.”
(e) At PW’s appeal hearing, the Home Office Presenting Officer made submissions that, as the Immigration Judge recorded; “The rape could have been because of abuse of position by officials.”
(f) The Immigration Judge found that PW was a refugee for the reasons that he had claimed in 2003.
52. FP
(a) FP is a Ugandan national. He claimed asylum in the UK in 2003 and his claim was rejected. It was not until 2010 that he was able to disclose to his legal representatives that he had been anally raped in Ugandan detention, although he had previously described a number of other methods of physical torture.
(b) In 2012 the Home Office made a decision to refuse to revoke a deportation order of 2010, a decision prompted by the submission of medical evidence in 2011. The Home Office refusal letter summarised the medical report (which contained physical evidence of anal rape) but gave no weight to the report. The decision stated that;
(c) “It is noted that Dr MT although [sic] some of the scars are non specific, many support the given history. She finds that the location and distribution of his scars are highly suggestive of physical abuse and have no obvious alternative causes. She states that some of the scars and injuries are highly consistent with his account of torture.
(d) However, it is noted from Dr MT’s methodology in her report that she describes Highly consistent as, “the injury could have been cause [sic] by the trauma described, and there are few other possible causes.” Furthermore, it is noted that it was found at your client’s appeal that he was not a credible witness. The Immigration Judge also found his claim to be a fabrication. It is noted that Dr P has prepared the report on the evidence given by your client which was found to be fabricated [by an Immigration Judge]. Although it is accepted that your client has numerous injuries and scars, it is not accepted that you [sic] client has sustained these injuries in the manner he has claimed.”
(e) At an appeal hearing in 2013 FP’s case was remitted to the Home Office to be reconsidered, in part for the medical evidence to be considered again.
3.1.1 Academic Literature
53. Accurate data on the prevalence of male rape as a method of torture is impossible to collate and existing statistics do not often distinguish between anal rape and other forms of sexual abuse of detainees. Therefore there is a divergence in the reported prevalence of male rape, not just between country to country but between different reports. For example, some quoted statistics include:
(a) 80% of male concentration camp inmates in Sarajevo reported that they had been raped in detention (Stemple (2008): p614)
(b) 76% of male political prisoners in El Salvador in the 1980s reported at least one instance of sexual torture (Stemple (2008): p613)
(c) 23% of Iranian males detained after the 2009 elections reported that they had been raped in detention (Freedom From Torture (2013): p8)
(d) 21% of Sri Lankan Tamils males reported sexual abuse whilst in detention (Stemple (2008): p613)
(e) 5.3% is given as a global average for the incidents of male rape as a method of torture with regional/country variation between 0%-20% prevalence (Peel (2004): p63).
54. However, although accurate statistics are not available, the literature clearly reveals a significant incidence of male rape being used as a method of torture. As such, incidents should not be treated by the Home Office as rare or as incidents isolated from other forms of physical abuse or torture.
55. The academic literature points towards several trends in the conceptualisation of rape as a form of torture;
(a) The fact that rape is used as a form of torture is widely recognised (Blatt (1991)).
(b) That the rape of men by men as a form of torture is less widely recognised as a phenomena by governments and practitioners, but is widespread (Stemple (2008))
(c) That there is a prevalence of ‘rape myths’ surrounding the subject of male rape (Doherty & Anderson (2004))
56. The academic literature agrees that there are a series of issues that arise out of incidents of male rape with direct relevance to those seeking sanctuary and Home Office decision making in such cases;
(a) Men find it very difficult to disclose rape and will avoid talking about it if they can (Peel (2004): p65)
(b) Men tend to greatly underreport experiences of sexual violence (Burnett & Peel (2001))
(c) Anal penetration by a penis rarely leaves any identifiable physical signs after only a few days (Peel (2004): p66 & Burnett & Peel (2001))
(d) PTSD in men who have been raped has been observed to in 70% of cases (in contrast to 30% amongst those tortured but not sexually assaulted, and 55% in those who were sexually assaulted but not raped) (Peel (2004): p67)
(e) That PTSD has particular, negative effects on memory and recall (Cohen (2001): p9 of online version)
3.1.2 Home Office assessment of credibility
57. Having identified the above issues, widely agreed by the academic literature, the two case studies above illustrate concerns that we have regarding the Home Office’s approach to credibility we have encountered in almost all cases involving male rape.
58. In PW the Home Office, in their refusal letter and submissions to the Tribunal, denied that incidents of male rape in detention were part of the wider torture inflicted upon PW but rather “individual criminal acts” or an “abuse of position”. This was despite the presence of evidence of other forms of physical torture and the fact that the rape was conducted by state agents whilst PW was in state detention. The wider implication of the Home Office’s position is that, contrary to substantial evidence, male rape is not used as a form of torture but should be considered as an isolated criminal act with no implications for an asylum applicant’s claim to have been mistreated in their country of origin.
59. Again in PW, the Home Office made a concession that;
“…in this individual instance the benefit of the doubt has been given to you with regards to the late disclosure and submitting of details pertaining to your rape…”
60. The academic literature on a number of subjects—including torture, male and female rape, homosexuality and domestic violence—all indicate that late disclosure of relevant facts by asylum applicants is closely linked to the trauma of events and/or feelings of shame (Burnett & Peel (2001)). Whilst late reporting of events of this kind can be because of fabrication, late reporting is also widely recognised to be a result of the negative impact of the past events on the individual and on their current and future relationships with interpreters and clinicians (Peel (2004): p65) and also legal representatives and authority figures (including immigration officials).
61. We believe that the Home Office approach to credibility of men who have been raped, evidenced in the passage above, is to assume that late reporting is evidence of fabrication until proven otherwise through other means, such as physical evidence. We submit that such an attitude towards credibility in most circumstances is unwarranted, but is of particularly concern where the academic literature is clear that late reporting is a common feature in genuine claims and where medical evidence of injury may not be available to substantiate claims, even a short period after the rape event. Credibility should be considered on the totality of the evidence presented to the Home Office and little (if any) weight should be given to late reporting of male rape. Late reporting should never be taken as the starting point to an assessment of credibility, as it was in the case of PW.
62. PW illustrates a common barrier placed before asylum applicants seeking to establish their claim to refugee status. PW was refused partly on the ground that;
“…whilst it is accepted that you have suffered extreme trauma your account is inconsistent.”
63. In PW, there was a formal diagnosis of PTSD. However, it is in our experience common for those who have been diagnosed with PTSD or who have undergone traumatic events to be required to maintain an unreasonably high level of consistency regarding the details of their description of traumatic and other events.
64. This approach to credibility, where credibility is equated with consistency of recall and no more, has been highlighted as problematic in all asylum claims (Herlihy (2002)), highly problematic in relation to those who have experienced trauma (Herlihy (2002)), and inappropriate where the applicant has PTSD (Cohen (2001)). Our experience is that the Home Office’s approach to the credibility of all asylum applicants, and specifically of men who have been raped, does not take into account this body of academic literature, and in fact runs counter to their findings.
65. Finally, we are concerned that the cases of men who have been raped are made subject to a Home Office approach to the credibility of medical reports which is deeply flawed. In FP the Home Office refusal was in part based upon;
“…that Dr MT has prepared the report on the evidence given by your client which was found to be fabricated [by an Immigration Judge]…”
66. This decision was written in late 2012. However, in early 2012, the case of AM, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 521 was promulgated. In it, the High Court dismissed this line of reasoning used by the Home Office in FP when it was used in similar circumstances in AM. LJ Rix at paragraph 17 of his judgment stated that;
“However, I would not agree that Ms Kralj [who had conducted a medical report on AM] was merely taking everything AM said “at face value”. She was reporting as an experienced assessor in such matters, and she was conducting a “health assessment”. Her biography was included with her reports… Her report set out her detailed findings of AM. It is of course true that her assessment was conducted without the benefit of knowledge of AM’s litigation history. But then that litigation was conducted without the benefit of Ms Kralj’s reports.”
67. We find it deeply concerning that decisions in cases of such sensitivity as FP’s are being decided by the Home Office either in ignorance of, or deliberately excluding, the most recent caselaw on credibility assessment.
68. We are also aware of the recent caselaw JL (medical reports-credibility) China [2013] UKUT 145 (IAC) regarding good practice in the use of medical reports but it does not detract in any way from the point made by LJ Rix in AM.
69. Furthermore, the Home Office refusal in FP states that;
“She states that some of the scars and injuries are highly consistent with his account of torture.
However, it is noted from Dr MT’s methodology in her report that she describes Highly consistent as, “the injury could have been cause [sic] by the trauma described, and there are few other possible causes.””
70. This decision on the credibility of the applicant is clearly made by the Home Office in ignorance of the Istanbul Protocol; the gold standard for the assessment of torture injuries which was quoted in full in Dr MT’s report on FP.
71. The Istanbul Protocol (the Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 9 August 1999), paras 186/7 of Chapter Five, under the heading “D. Examination and Evaluation following specific forms of Torture”, states:
“For each lesion and for the overall pattern of lesions, the physician should indicate the degree of consistency between it and the attribution:
(a) Not consistent: the lesion could not have been caused by the trauma described;
(b) Consistent with: the lesion could have been caused by the trauma described, but it is non-specific and there are many other possible causes;
(c) Highly consistent: the lesion could have been caused by the trauma described, and there are few other possible causes;
(d) Typical of: this is an appearance that is usually found with this type of trauma, but there are other possible causes;
(e) Diagnostic of: this appearance could not have been caused in anyway other than that described.
Ultimately, it is the overall evaluation of all lesions and not the consistency of each lesion with a particular form of torture that is important in assessing the torture story…”
72. As the above description of the methodology of the Istanbul Protocol makes clear, ‘Highly Consistent’ describes specific injuries with few other possible causes other than the ones attributed to it by an asylum applicant. Many factors can lead to injuries or scars becoming less susceptible to being found ‘typical’ or ‘diagnostic’, such as the passage of time on visible scar tissue or that the methods of torture used (eg the application of blunt force) does not offer precise physical clues as to the intent behind their cause. Where the Home Office reject the credibility of expert reports of this kind on the simple grounds that they do not offer absolute proof, they impose a threshold to the assessment of credibility which is too high; in both practice and in established law. In doing so, the Home Office demonstrate a lack of understanding of the nature of such reports, medical practice and the experiences of victims of torture.
73. FP, in common with many of our clients, has had his case refused by the Home Office’s approach to the assessment of credibility of medical reports which leaves one wondering what, if any, evidence would be considered sufficient.
3.1.3 Recommendations
74. We make the following recommendations from the issues identified above;
(a) That the Home Office assess credibility on the totality of the evidence presented
(b) That little (if any) weight should be given by Home Office decision makers to late reporting of male rape, other traumatic incidents, or stigmatised social status where the academic literature suggests that late disclosure is a common factor in such cases
(c) That late reporting of male rape, other traumatic incidents, or stigmatised social status should never be taken as the starting point to an assessment of credibility by the Home Office
(d) That the Home Office assessment of credibility should not rely solely on an equation of credibility and consistency of memory recall
(e) That Home Office decision makers should be trained in the application of the Istanbul Protocol in medico-legal reports and to approach such reports in light of medical reality
(f) That Home Office decision makers be required to remain up-to-date with the caselaw of domestic courts which have direct relevance to their decision making functions
3.2 The assessment of the credibility of female asylum applicants who have been sexually assaulted
75. In the category of cases identified by the Home Affairs Select Committee to seek responses on is the broad category of ‘women’. It is beyond our ability to significantly comment on whether the Home Office’s assessment of the credibility of female asylum applicants differs from the assessment made of the credibility of male asylum applicants.
76. However, within the category of ‘women’ we have particular concerns regarding the assessment of credibility of female asylum applicants who have been sexually assaulted. Our concerns arise from negative credibility findings made against a number of our clients in relation to their claim to have been sexually assaulted in their country of origin, or where their claims to have been sexually assaulted are not addressed at all.
77. We again refer to a number of case studies;
78. HT
(a) HT is a Cambodian national who claimed asylum in the UK in 2002.
(b) She initially claimed that her husband had been an activist of an opposition political party and as a result they were both targeted for attack. In the course of an attack by police, HT was raped.
(c) The Home Office refusal letter makes no direct findings of credibility as to whether the claimed rape occurred but dismissed the credibility of HT on other grounds.
(d) At appeal, the Immigration Judge found that; “I do not accept that the act of rape can amount to persecution in this case…It appears that in this case it was a one off act of criminality that was used to punish the appellant for perceived wrongs…”
(e) After the appeal hearing, HT disclosed to the Home Office that her first claim was deployed by her as a story in order to secure her safety and that her real reason for leaving Cambodia was that she had been the victim of sexual abuse from her father (including becoming pregnant by him) since the age of 9 years old, and that the Cambodian authorities could not and/or would not protect her from further abuse. This claim was certified as clearly unfounded by the Home Office (ie would not be considered by the Home Office in detail) on the grounds that such information should have been disclosed previously.
(f) The Home Office Presenting Officer, at the first asylum appeal to consider this new information, submitted that; a) HT’s credibility was damaged because her second claim was totally different to her first and so should not be believed at all, and b) someone at risk of the kind of sexual abuse described by HT was not a member of a ‘particular social group’ (as required by the Refugee Convention) as she did not have an immutable characteristic. This was accepted by the Immigration Judge.
(g) Reconsideration of this decision was required by the Court of Appeal and the case came again before an Immigration Judge in 2008. The Home Office Presenting Officer again submitted that HT was not a member of a ‘particular social group’.
(h) The Immigration Judge acknowledged that HT had previously put forward a false story but said that;
“It ought to be obvious to anyone with a grain of humanity that a person who has experienced, perhaps particularly at a young age, the degradation and abuse that this appellant claims to have suffered, would be reluctant to tell that story even if her life depended on it.”
(i) The Immigration Judge also found that HT was at risk as a member of a ‘particular social group’ (in this case ‘Cambodian women’) and found that HT was in fact a refugee.
79. IC
(a) IC is an Ivorian national who claimed asylum in the UK in 2003. She was abducted by a militia and taken to a remote farm with the intent to sexually assault her. She was tied to a tree, but when the would-be rapists discovered that she was pregnant, they left her.
(b) The Home Office refusal letter states that were IC a genuine opposition supporter she would have come to more harm, including “torture, rape and killings”. The refusal letter also stated that;
“Furthermore, it is known that acts of torture have been carried out on pregnant women, causing them to miscarry, as reported in country information. It is not accepted that, had their intention been to cause harm to you, they would have stopped on finding out you were pregnant.”
(c) IC was eventually granted indefinite leave to remain through the ‘legacy’.
80. JM
(a) JM is a Zimbabwean national who also claimed asylum in the UK in 2003. She was arrested by Zimbabwean police and raped in detention.
(b) The Home Office refusal letter did not address the circumstances of the rape or made credibility findings based upon her description of those events. However, the Home Office found JM to be not credible in part because;
“…it is not accepted that, had the guards in prison mistreated you as you have claimed, they would subsequently take you to hospital for you to be treated for the injuries sustained by them [sic] in prison.”
(c) JM was also granted indefinite leave to remain through the ‘legacy’.
81. KA
(a) KA is a national of Sudan and claimed asylum in the UK in 2007. She was detained in prison and raped.
(b) The Home Office refusal letter rejected her claim but made no reference to her detention or rape, other than to record that she had mentioned these incidents in her asylum interview.
(c) KA was granted discretionary leave to remain after an appeal to the Tribunal.
82. LS
(a) LS is a Ethiopian national who claimed asylum in 2008. She was an opposition supporter who was abducted by members of the Ethiopian security forces and taken to a farm where she was sexually assaulted and beaten.
(b) Other than to record that LS claimed that she had been sexually assaulted, the Home Office refusal letter makes no further reference to the attack.
(c) LS was found to be a refugee by the Tribunal.
83. UF
(a) UF is an Iranian national who claimed asylum in the UK in 2012. She had been detained by Iranian security forces whilst attending demonstrations in 2009. Whilst in detention, UF was raped twice. It is reported that 60% of women detained after the 2009 demonstrations were raped in detention (Freedom from Torture (2013): p8).
(b) UF’s release from detention was secured by her family through the unofficial help of a member of the Iranian security forces. This man kept some identity documents belonging to UF which he had requested from her family in order to help secure her release. When UF eventually requested the documents from him in person, he refused, but propositioned her and tried to coerce her into a sexual relationship.
(c) UF left Iran when she was summoned by the Iranian authorities in connection to her activities in 2009.
(d) Apart from recording the claim to have been raped in detention, the Home Office refusal makes no reference to the sexual assaults against UF.
(e) The Home Office refusal letter found UF’s claims that the security officer had tried to coerce a sexual relationship to be incredible because; a) his ‘infatuation’ did not emerge until some time after UF was released; b) the security officer had been unsuccessful in his advances up to the point when UF left Iran, and; c) the security officer did not try to use force to effect a sexual assault on UF. This was used to discount UF’s credibility in relation to the entirety of her experiences.
(f) The Home Office refusal was withdrawn at around 5pm on the day before the Tribunal was due to hear UF’s appeal. The Home Office subsequently granted UF refugee status of its own volition.
3.2.1 Factual Credibility
84. The case studies described above highlight three themes common to many Home Office decisions, taken in relation to assessing the credibility of women who have been sexually assaulted;
(a) That allegations of sexual assault are routinely ignored by the Home Office
(b) That the personal and individual nature of sexual assaults is not taken into account by the Home Office
We address both in turn below.
3.2.1.1 That allegations of sexual assault are routinely ignored by the Home Office
85. In five of the six case studies, claims by female asylum applicants to have been sexually abused were ignored entirely by the Home Office when addressing the credibility of the factual matrix presented by them.
86. In each case involving rape or sexual assault in state detention, the circumstances of coming in to and out of detention were considered in detail by the Home Office in relation to credibility. However, the acts of persecution and mistreatment within detention were not considered at all.
87. This is in contrast to the way that the credibility of an asylum applicant’s account of mistreatment outside of detention is often discussed at length by the Home Office.
88. It is also all the more surprising as a credible account of detention, conditions and mistreatment should be considered more persuasive by the Home Office than accounts of escape or release which, in our experience, occur in often bizarre and unlikely circumstances. True stories, such as POW escapes from Colditz, are compelling in the public imagination for the very reason that they are unlikely; yet the veracity of these events is not disputed.
89. Subject to the issues raised above in relation to victims of trauma, consideration should be given by the Home Office to allegations of sexual assault in considering the overall credibility of an asylum applicant.
90. At present, the failure in these cases by the Home Office to address the accusations of sexual assault leaves the Home Office open to the perception that it does not take sexual assault seriously in the context of asylum applications.
3.2.1.2 That the personal and individual nature of sexual assaults is not taken into account by the Home Office
91. By their very nature, sexual assaults are personal and individual; both with regard victim and perpetrator.
92. In IC, the existence of some country information to suggest that some pregnant women had been physically assaulted was used by the Home Office to cast doubt on the credibility of events as they were related by IC; an incident of country of origin information being used poorly by the Home Office. That each attack on each individual will have different characteristics, or that sexual assaults are not readily susceptible to generalisation, is ignored.
93. In JM and UF, the Home Office decision maker made assumptions about the behaviour of perpetrators of sexual abuse and assumed that all perpetrators of sexual violence will behave in the worse way, all of the time. Ironically, this wholly negative view of male perpetrators—which denied the possibility of guilt, remorse, restraint, compassion for strangers or attacks of conscience—substantially disadvantaged the female asylum applicants.
94. Another common thread in all these cases is that assessments of credibility are made by the Home Office with reference to the actions or motives of third party actors. An asylum applicant is only able to state what they have personally seen or heard. As a result, only part of a narrative of events is ever told.
95. An asylum applicant cannot, and cannot be expected to, read the minds of her attackers. She is not privy to conversations held behind closed doors. Acts by others which seem inexplicable, may be motivated by rational concerns that she cannot foresee or be aware of. Some acts are conducted or motivated irrationally, especially during periods of stress, high violence, under ‘mob-mentality’ or whilst ‘high on power’.
96. Where an asylum applicant does attempt to apply reasoning to explain the actions of others, her explanation is inevitably not an objective one. Other plausible motives or reasoning could be ascribed to the actions of a third person but in assessing credibility the Home Office will consider only the one presented to them without looking at the events as a whole and exploring other possibilities.
97. That state apparatus may act irrationally has long been recognised by the Tribunal. In Suleyman (16242; 11 February 1998) the Tribunal said that;
“It is clear to us that a repressive regime…may well act in ways which defy logical analysis. A person who is genuinely a victim of such a regime may well find that the partial account he is able to give of its activities as they have affected him is not something which will stand up to a strictly logical analysis. The regime may seem to govern by confusion; it may engage in other activities, of which the Appellant knows nothing; it may simply behave in a way which a person sitting in safety in the United Kingdom might regard as almost beyond belief.”
98. In our experience, the above passage us a useful guide to assessing the credibility of the actions of individuals; regardless of whether they act on behalf of the state, non-state actors, or act as a private person.
3.2.2 ‘Legal Credibility’
99. In HT, the only case study above related to domestic violence/sexual abuse within a domestic setting, part of the legal argument at appeal was whether she could rightly come under the protection of the Refugee Convention. Was HT part of a ‘particular social group’?
100. We here refer to this question as one of ‘legal credibility’, as one whose asylum claim is rejected for technical, legal reasons is still stigmatised as a ‘failed asylum-seeker’.
101. Whether, and how, victims of sexual assaults within the family can be part of a particular social group is subject of much discussion in the academic arena, especially in the US. In UK caselaw, “women in Pakistan” have been found to constitute a particular social group (Islam v SSHD [1999] 2 AC 629). In HT, “Cambodian women” were found to be a particular social group.
102. However, whether someone who has been sexually assaulted within the family is part of a particular social group, and how that should be framed, is an argument faced afresh by almost every asylum applicant. It is clearly an unsatisfactory state of affairs where such assessments are being made and remade constantly in terms of both court time (and associated costs). It is also unsatisfactory that two identical asylum applicants may have the question answered differently because they were heard by two different Immigration Judges or because one was represented and the other not.
103. We submit that the question of the ‘legal credibility’ of women who have been sexually assaulted within the family must be resolved as a matter of law. We submit two basic arguments that ‘women’ should be acknowledged as a particular social group.
104. Firstly, the personal is political. That domestic violence is a form of political violence is elucidated by the 1996 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women;
“At its most complex, domestic violence exists as a powerful tool of oppression. Violence against women in general, and domestic violence in particular serve as essential components of societies which oppress women, since violence against women not only derives but also sustains the dominant gender stereotypes and is used to control women in the one space traditionally dominated by women, the home…[Domestic violence is] violence which is intended to impact, directly and negatively, on women within the domestic sphere. Such violence may be carried out by both private and public actors or agents.” (Quoted in Davar (1996): p253)
105. Secondly, ‘women’ are self evidently a particular social group. The particular social group of ‘women’ is also not being defined with reference to the persecution of that group as not all women are persecuted. This is recognised in Australian caselaw. In Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Khawar [2002] 210 CLR 1, Chief Justice Gleeson concluded that;
“Women in any society are a distinct and recognisable group; and their distinctive attributes and characteristics exist independently of the manner in which they are treated, either by males or by governments…Neither the conduct of those who perpetrate domestic violence, or those who withhold the protection of the law from victims of domestic violence, identifies women as a group.”
106. We do not find convincing some of the counter arguments levelled against the view that ‘women’ should be considered to be a particular social group.
107. It is self-evident that not all women in all countries at all times are persecuted. However, that every member of the particular social group must be a victim of persecution has never been a requirement in law for finding the existence of that social group. Even when accepted categories of particular social group are drawn (“women in Pakistan” or “Cameroonian women”, for example) there will always be some individuals who do not, for whatever reason, face the persecution imposed on others of that group.
108. A comparison on this point can be drawn with the accepted particular social group of ‘practicing homosexuals’. In HJ (Iran) [2010] UKSC 31, the Home Office submissions were that;
“The Secretary of State accepted that practising homosexuals are a particular social group for the purposes of article 1A of the Convention. The issue was how those who had a well-founded fear of persecution could be identified.”
109. However, it does not follow from HJ (Iran) that the Home Office or Tribunal must grant the claims of practicing homosexuals from any country in the world under any circumstances. The burden of proof is still on the asylum applicant to show that s/he is at risk of harm sufficient to engage the Refugee Convention, that there is no state protection or internal flight option, etc.
110. By accepting that ‘women’ constitute a particular social group, the Home Office would not lessen the evidential burden on individual applicants to make out their claim, but they would ensure that the question of ‘legal credibility’ is resolved in their favour and ensure consistent treatment between individual asylum applicants.
111. Finally, we share Lieberman’s objections to a floodgates argument against accepting women as a ‘particular social group’;
“Opponents of gender-based asylum argue that opening up the doors for women to seek asylum on account of their gender would overwhelm our immigration system…Ironically, this position underscores the prevalence of gender based persecution.” (Lieberman (2002): p9)
3.2.3 Recommendations
112. We make the following recommendations based upon our experience and on the issues highlighted above;
(a) That where a asylum applicant discloses a past sexual assault as part of her asylum application, she is referred by the Home Office to an independent rape and sexual violence counselling service and to a competent, Legal Aid funded legal representative (where not already represented)
(b) That the Legal Aid Graduated Fees Scheme of fixed total payment to legal representatives are scrapped, and that Legal Aid payments are made for actual work done in order to incentivise full and proper legal representation for asylum applicants
(c) That Home Office assessment of the credibility of the asylum claims of those who have been sexually assaulted, always includes consideration of a report by an independent rape and sexual violence counselling service
(d) That asylum claims, whether in the first instance or further submissions, based upon allegations of sexual abuse within the family should never be certified as clearly unfounded by the Home Office
(e) That in the assessment of credibility, less weight is placed by the Home Office on the credibility of the actions of third parties
(f) That women be treated as a particular social group for the purposes of 1A of the Refugee Convention as a matter of policy
4. Selected Bibliography
Blatt; Recognizing Rape as a Method of Torture (1991) NYU Rev. L. & Soc. Change 821 (http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv3/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__review_of_law_and_social_change/documents/documents/ecm_pro_066527.pdf Accessed 9.4.13)
Burnett & Peel, The health of survivors of torture and organised violence (2001) British Medical Journal 606 (/Accessed 9.4.13)
Cohen; Errors of Recall and Credibility: Can Omissions and Discrepancies in Successive Statements Reasonably be Said to Undermine Credibility of Testimony? (2001) Medico- Legal Journal 25 (http://www.freedomfromtorture.org/sites/default/files/documents/JulietCohenRecallandCredibility.pdf Accessed 9.4.13)
Davar; Rethinking Gender-Related Persecution, Sexual Violence, and Women’s Rights: A New Conceptual Framework for Political Asylum and International Human Rights Law (1996) Texas Journal of Women and the Law 241 (http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/Diana/fulltext/dava.pdf Accessed 10.4.13)
Doherty & Anderson; Making sense of male rape: Constructions of gender, sexuality and experience of rape victims (2004) Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 85 (http://roar.uel.ac.uk/1046/1/Anderson,%20I%20(2004)%20JCASP%2014%20(2)%2085.pdf Accessed 9.4.13)
Freedom From Torture; Torture in Iran since the 2009 elections (2013) (http://www.freedomfromtorture.org/sites/default/files/documents/iran%20report_A5%20-%20FINAL%20-%20web.pdf Accessed 9.4.13)
Herlihy et al; Discrepancies in autobiographical memories— implications for the assessment of asylum seekers: repeated interviews study (2002) British Medical Journal 324 (/Accessed 9.4.13)
Lieberman; Women and Girls Facing Gender-Based Violence, and Asylum Jurisprudence (2002) Human Rights 9 (Not free-to-view online)
Marouf; The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a Particular Social Group and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender (2008) Yale Law & Policy Review 47 (http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1428&context=facpub Accessed 9.4.13)
Peel; Rape as a Method of Torture (2004) Freedom From Torture (http://www.freedomfromtorture.org/sites/default/files/documents/rape_singles2.pdf Accessed 9.4.13)
Stemple; Male Rape and Human Rights (2008) Hastings Law Journal 605 (http://scienceblogs.de/geograffitico/wp-content/blogs.dir/70/files/2012/07/i-e76e350f9e3d50b6ce07403e0a3d35fe-Stemple_60-HLJ-605.pdf Accessed 9.4.13
TRP Solicitors Ltd
Birmingham, UK
April 2013