Conclusions and recommendations
1. We recommend
that DFID Burma's budget be increased from £60 million to
£100 million. If the reform process stalls, the budget can
always be reduced. (Paragraph 16)
2. We support DFID's
current wary stance on budget and sector support to the Burmese
Government. However it is important that parallel systems of delivering
basic services are not created and that Government capacity is
enhanced. We are pleased that DFID's partners are working alongside
ministries at the local level to prevent this from happening.
(Paragraph 20)
3. The UK, working
with multilaterals which it can influence, in particular the World
Bank, should seek to prevent a proliferation of donors who do
not intend to spend significant sums of money taking up Burmese
Ministers' time. DFID should encourage smaller development agencies
to contribute through multi-donor funds and encourage these funds
and the Burmese Government only to engage with donors if they
contribute a minimum amount. (Paragraph
24)
4. DFID should
continue to seek to encourage official development agencies such
as Japan's and India's as well as NGO and private donors to coordinate
with each other and the multilateral organisations to prevent
duplication. (Paragraph 25)
5. We welcome the
close cooperation between DFID and the Foreign Office. We recommend
that the Foreign Office and DFID be able to access Conflict Pool
funds for their conflict related programmes in Burma.
(Paragraph 27)
6. We recommend
that DFID consider having a simple table on each country programme
page on its website to present the basic country projects' data
such as duration, allocation of funds, funding channels such as
the non-government organisation or multilateral it is going through
and a short summary of its intended outcomes. In addition it would
be useful if the projects linked with the operational plan expected
results for the country. (Paragraph 29)
7. DFID, MoD and
FCO should work closely together to put pressure on the Burmese
Government for an effective outcome to the peace process. This
should include pressure to push forward negotiations for a political
settlement while continuing to seek and maintain a nationwide
ceasefire. The UK should be prepared to increase its spending
to support on the peace process. (Paragraph
38)
8. DFID should
continue to engage with the armed ethnic groups converting them
to civilian administrations that can help build up health and
education in the ethnic regions and ensure service delivery during
the peace process period. (Paragraph 42)
9. Rape has been
widespread in Burma as part of the conflict. UN resolution 1325
stresses the need for women's equal participation and full involvement
in peace and security efforts. We call on the Government of Burma
to develop a national action plan on 1325 to ensure that women
are involved in the peace process. We also call on the Government
of Burma to support the participation of women in reform, including
increased representation in Parliament and in developing provincial
and local government. (Paragraph 47)
10. We support the
training given by the UK Armed Forces to the Tatmadaw to encourage
a better understanding of human rights and better working with
civilians. The MoD should work further on military to military
advice about governance reform and democracy building as soldiers
listen best to other soldiers. (Paragraph 50)
11. The violence
in Rakhine, in particular the plight of the Muslims there, and
the extension of violence to the rest of Burma is very worrying
and could cause the reform movement to unravel. The UK Government
must acknowledge the concerns of the majority of the population
with a large Muslim country to its west and the world-wide threat
posed by jihadists. However, while we acknowledge that the situation
is highly charged, delicate and complicated, we urge the UK Government
to maintain its pressure on the Burmese Government to improve
the situation of the Rohingya and allow humanitarian access to
the internally displaced people camps.
(Paragraph 62)
12. It is worrying
that violence has spread beyond Rakhine state, but from our visit
it seemed that resolution of the conflict may be easier in central
Burma. There may not be ready solutions to end the violence both
in Rakhine and the rest of Burma, but DFID can help facilitate
dialogue between the different faith groups, with the use of experts
to help meditate and bring communities together—to encourage
interfaith understanding and to help build cohesive and peaceful
communities. The UK Government can also advise on integration
for example in supporting Muslims to become members of the police
force. (Paragraph 63)
13. Without progress
in dealing with the inter-communal violence, we have concerns
that it could spread further. There is potential for the violence
against Muslims in Burma to radicalise Muslims there, who have
traditionally been moderate, and attract Islamic extremists to
the country. Historical accounts reveal that Muslim communities
have lived in the country for centuries.
(Paragraph 64)
14. We support
DFID's commitment to the nationwide population census as it is
needed for future planning in Burma. It is important to get an
accurate measure of the ethnic and religious diversity of the
country but DFID, with the Government of Burma, should consider
how ethnic and religious classification contribute to future planning
without inflaming tensions or whether simpler data on just sex
and age would be sufficient. (Paragraph
68)
15. We urge the
UK Government to support reforms to the constitution that ensure
ethnic groups are treated fairly and equally. It should also press
for a reduction and eventual elimination of the role of the military
in Parliament and Government. (Paragraph
79)
16. We support
the UK Government's view that the presidential eligibility clause
59f should be removed not just because of Aung San Sui Kyi but
because there should not be a qualification targeted at one individual
or group. (Paragraph 80)
17. Most leading politicians,
including Aung San Suu Kyi, are associated with the Burman Buddhist
majority. It is essential to build a state that gives equal rights
to all citizens and ensure that ethnic minorities have a say in
federal and especially provincial government. (Paragraph 81)
18. The UK should
put more pressure on the Burmese Government to divert spending
away from the military to the provision of basic services such
as health and education for its population.
(Paragraph 84)
19. DFID should
continue its support for civil society in Burma, but it needs
to ensure that small, local organisations, based outside Rangoon
also have access to funds. (Paragraph
88)
20. DFID should
consider supporting Aung San Sui Kyi's rule of law centres only
following a full assessment of the pilot projects and alternative
options. (Paragraph 92)
21. We welcome
the current projects which the UK Parliament and UK Government
are undertaking to support the Parliament of Burma, but we believe
that a more sustained programme is required over a long period,
especially as the Burmese Parliament is likely to lose many of
the newly trained MPs in the elections in 2015. We urge DFID and
other donors to continue to encourage the Burmese Parliament to
establish a strategic reform plan to coordinate the work of donors.
We also recommend support to existing women MPs as well as encouraging
more women to become involved in politics and at all levels of
Government. (Paragraph 98)
22. We recommend
that DFID and the Foreign Office give more emphasis to, and provide
more funding for parliamentary strengthening. We further recommend
that as part of sector programmes, for example in health and education,
DFID country teams routinely fund work to improve the effectiveness
of the relevant parliamentary committees.
(Paragraph 112)
23. Unfortunately,
too often parliamentary strengthening work has not been well done.
We are pleased that DFID recognises this and has published a draft
'How to Note', which points to the need to understand political
sensitivities, the motivation of politicians, to establish regular
contact with parliaments over several years and to respond flexibly
to a changing environment. (Paragraph
113)
24. The 'Westminster
brand' is strong and there is considerable demand for Westminster
expertise. However, DFID commonly uses non-UK bodies. We recommend
that DFID make more use of Westminster-based organisations. We
recommend that the UK Government establish an organisation with
the attributes listed below. It could be a reformed Westminster
Foundation for Democracy and could expand its work if it proved
to be effective: (Paragraph 114)
· a permanent staff, including a significant
number of people with extensive parliamentary expertise, for example
who have worked, or served in, Parliament and have experience
of politics; the organisation should consider seeking to secure
secondments from the House of Commons, the Foreign Office and
DFID; and
· the establishment of a larger group
of people with a knowledge of Parliament to draw on to work overseas;
this might include people who have experience of parliaments outside
Westminster.
25. If this organisation
is to be a reformed Westminster Foundation for Democracy, there
will need to be improved governance arrangements in relation to
political party and parliamentary strengthening work. (Paragraph
114)
26. The organisation
described above, whether or not a reformed Westminster Foundation
for Democracy, will need time to settle in. Moreover, it does
not make sense to create a monopoly supplier. We recommend that
DFID facilitate greater use of smaller organisations, which should
be able to bid directly for parliamentary strengthening contracts
from DFID. We further recommend that DFID establish a small central
fund to support travel and accommodation costs where its country
offices believe there is a need for a speedy intervention.
(Paragraph 115)
27. Finally, we
recommend that DFID improve its capacity in its UK offices; it
should: (Paragraph 116)
· Increase from one to two the number
of governance advisers working on parliamentary strengthening
and ensure that these advisers remain in post for longer periods;
· Ensure that governance advisers make
parliamentary strengthening a focus of their annual meeting in
the near future work; and
· Establish a parliamentary advisory
panel in DFID, which should include serving and former MPs and
parliamentary officials.
28. Effective work
on governance depends on understanding political context and making
contacts. We recommend that DFID stress the importance of its
staff engaging in the politics of Burma and continue to work closely
with the UK Embassy staff. (Paragraph
120)
29. In view of
the importance of the next few years to Burma's future, we recommend
that DFID staff, particularly in important sectors such as health,
remain in post for longer than they might in other offices.
(Paragraph 124)
30. We are impressed
by, and strongly support, the Three Millennium Development Goal
Fund (3MDG Fund). We welcome its focus on building capacity both
in Government-controlled areas and in ethnic areas. We are, however,
disappointed by the EU which is refusing to provide funding beyond
2016 and hence threatening the future of the 3MDG Fund. We urge
the EU to continue to fund the 3MDG Fund after 2016; if it is
unwilling to so, the least it can do is find a donor to replace
its contribution. (Paragraph 129)
31. We have been impressed
by the careful focusing of the 3MDG Fund's maternal and child
healthcare programme in the Irrawaddy delta determining what works
and what does not and how a small investment can make a big difference.
We are pleased that it is being rolled out elsewhere in Burma
so that women and children in conflict and ceasefire regions who
are desperately in need of care will soon also be receiving it.
(Paragraph 133)
32. The evidence
the Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) provided indicates how
much needs to be done in the health sector in these areas. We
are pleased that the 3MDG Fund seeks to address this but urge
DFID to carefully consider its criteria for funding organisations
such as SWAN so that they too can receive DFID support.
(Paragraph 134)
33. DFID should
develop a more focused policy on drugs especially the provision
of anti-retroviral for HIV. They should be administered to patients
as early as possible to give the best chance of survival.
(Paragraph 137)
34. Drug resistant
malaria in Burma is of international importance. If it is not
tackled it would have a devastating impact on the ability to treat
malaria elsewhere, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Addressing
this issue in Burma should be a high priority. We recommend that
surveillance be stepped up in Burma, in particular in the border
areas and amongst the migrant population.
(Paragraph 142)
35. Better medical
education would bring many benefits and Burmese medics are keen
to form a partnership with the UK. Such partnerships will be an
increasingly important feature of development in future. We recommend
that DFID carefully examine the proposals for University College
London, Royal College of Physicians' and others to improve medical
education with a view to providing the relatively small amount
of funding they require, either from DFID Burma funds or central
funds. We appreciate that DFID does not have the funds to rebuild
Rangoon hospital, concentrating rightly on building community
health services, but it should consider how it can facilitate
the process. (Paragraph 148)
36. Burma has a
unique problem in that the younger generation is less well educated
than their parents. There is an urgent need for education not
only for children but also adult education and training if the
need for teachers, health workers, administrators and private
livelihoods is to be met. We recommend that DFID significantly
increase spending on education provided DFID receives an overall
increase in its total budget and its number of staff in Burma.
We further recommend that teacher training be a priority.
(Paragraph 153)
37. We support
DFID's work with monastic schools in raising the quality of education.
(Paragraph 156)
38. Burma's extractive
industries should benefit the people of Burma and make a major
contribution to taxation. We welcome DFID's encouragement and
support for Burma to join the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative. We hope it signs in the near future. We support DFID's
responsible business initiatives helping to set standards for
Burma's economic development. (Paragraph
167)
39. While there
have been concerns that funding is no longer necessary for the
camps on the Thai border, we do not believe that people should
be pushed out of the refugee camps; they should leave voluntarily.
However the situation requires monitoring as DFID currently spends
over £20 million which could be spent on improving conditions
inside Burma. If there is a successful peace process and a stable
economy emerges the camps should be closed. The return of the
refugees should be carefully handled ensuring that where they
are returning to is safe and viable to live in. The Burmese along
with aid agencies should be considering and planning for this
now. (Paragraph 174)
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