2 The transition from Trusts to Community
Rehabilitation Companies and the National Probation Service
The target operating model
36. The reorganisation of probation services to facilitate
the reforms will see the 35 Probation Trusts dissolved in April
2014 and replaced with a National Probation Service (NPS) and
21 Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs). The Government has
published a target operating model which explains how the system
would work in practice once the reforms are fully implemented.[77]
The CRCs, owned and run by those organisations that are successful
in bidding to deliver services in a designated area under contract
to NOMS, will manage the majority of offenders in the community-those
sentenced to community orders or suspended sentence orders, and
those subject to post-custody licence conditions or supervision
requirements. Each CRC will be designated a small number of resettlement
prisons which will release the vast majority of offenders to that
area,and in those prisons theCRCs will be expected to deliver
a pre-release resettlement service. The National Probation Service
(NPS) will be a delivery arm of NOMS comprised of local delivery
units which will directly manage offenders who pose a high risk
of serious harm to the public—including those whose risk
has escalated to that level during the course of their sentence—and
those released from custody who have committed serious offences.
They will also play a role in the management of all offenders,
including conducting risk assessments, advising the courts on
sentencing, responding to escalations in risk, and taking enforcement
action. It is envisaged that the NPS will deliver some specialist
interventions for the offenders it manages, but in general it
will purchase interventions from CRCs.
37. The Ministry has planned for a staged transition
process. Although the Government's plans will constitute a radical
change in the probation system, Mr Wright reiterated to us that
this was not a "big bang" approach, which he accepted
would be "inherently risky". He explained that there
would be a period of time to enable the transfer of the case load
and to make sure that the system is working as intended whilst
both halves were still in public ownership.[78]
We set out the Government's timetable for the phases of reform
in Appendix 1.
38. Initial speculation was that there would be a
30:70 split in resource allocation between the new services, with
the lion's share going to new providers, reflecting the fact that
the highest risk offenders constitute only 30% of the existing
probation caseload. However, whilst the Ministry estimates that
the split in caseloads is likely to be in roughly this ratio,
they were unable to detail exactly how the funding would be split,
although they indicated that it was likely to be somewherebetween
30:70 and 50:50, as the cost of supervising high risk offenders
is greater than for those who are low risk.[79]The
precise split in resource will not be clear until the competition
process is completed.
39. As we noted in the previous chapter, the proposed
delivery structure represents a significant departure from the
existing system for operation of probation services. Our witnesses
have highlighted three key design problems with the model related
to: the risks of separating aspects of offender management; the
potential impact on relationships between probation services and
their local partners; and limitations in opportunities for staff
development. We also consider in this chaptersome practical considerations
related to the process of apportioning the staff who are responsible
for managing offenders to the two separate entities, and the capacity
of trusts to maintain business as usual through the transition
process.
Public safety
40. Many of our witnesses had particularly serious
misgivings about how one of the fundamental elements of the model—the
division of the management of probation cases between those offenders
deemed to represent the highest risk of harm and less dangerous
offenders—will work without jeopardising public protection.[80]
The target operating model proposes that if the risk assessment
of an offender changes from low or medium to high, the public
sector National Probation Service will assess the case and consider
whether the management of the case should transfer from the CRC
to the NPS.
41. Witnesses saw an apparent contradiction between
the new model and what is known about the importance of the relationship
between the offender and the supervising officer in desistance
from offending. The assumed wisdom in probation practice is that
there should be a single "offender manager" for an offender
throughout the life of the order or licence.[81]Christine
Lawrie, a former Chief Probation Officer and former Chief Executive
of the Probation Association said:
The most effective risk assessment is an unbroken
process involving periodic "actuarial" and continuous
"clinical" monitoring, review and action by a single
responsible person.The new arrangements make it impossible for
this to happen in the contracted services.[82]
Sue Hall, Chair of the Probation Chiefs Association,
explained the implications of this:
Where currently we have one simple model of an
offender manager managing the offender's entire journey through
their order or licence, we now potentially have a bureaucratic
system to put in place that ensures that information moves between
two sets of organisations. We all know that points of data and
information transfer are potential points of risk.[83]
42. NAPO, the PCA and the PA all say they are gravely
concerned about the implications of this split for safeguarding
public safety.[84]The
public sector will retain responsibility for public protection,
but the day to day management of risk is likely to reside with
the provider which will need to take decisions about when, for
example, a change in behaviour or non-attendance requires an issue
to be escalated to the national service. While it is not yet clear
precisely where the split in caseloads will lie, it is likely
that CRCs will be "managing a whole raft of offenders who
are at risk of committing harm" including "domestic
violence cases, complex mental health cases and child safeguarding
cases".[85]This,
and the necessary escalation process to enable new providers to
identify and notify the probation service if they believe the
risk posed by an individual may have changed, will be determined
during the next phase of implementation.[86]
Probation stakeholders anticipated difficulties in creating a
new interface between the contracted and the public sector as
they estimate that 20% to 25%of the caseload will move across
the sectors, in other words from low or medium to high risk and
vice versa..[87]
43. The Probation Chiefs Association thought that
the complexity of information exchange to keep track of changes
in individual cases was likely to result in greater bureaucracy
and to more public protection failures than under the current
system.[88]Napo considered
that risk changes needed to be acted on immediately in order to
protect the public.[89]The
potential complications that might stem from these observations
were illustrated by the reported breakdown in the timely sharing
of comprehensive information by the contractor which prevented
probation staff from taking breach action in the community payback
scheme in London mentioned in the previous chapter.[90]Our
witnesses also anticipated difficulties with particular elements
of probation work which will be retained by NPS, including that
of victim liaison officersand advice to the parole board.[91]When
the Chairman and Chief Executive of the Parole Board appeared
before us on 17 December to give evidence on their work in general,
we asked about the implications of the Transforming Rehabilitation
reforms for the Board. They welcomed the greater focus on serious
offenders by the NPS, and were confident in the advice they would
receive from them, but were concerned about the likelihood of
higher levels of recall on their caseloads.[92]
DUAL OVERSIGHT IN EXISTING AND FUTURE
PRACTICE
44. A key question which the Government must address
is how these inherent difficulties can be minimised satisfactorily
under the programme. When asked to explain how this dual oversight
would work, the Justice Secretary said he envisaged it being "a
simple process". He told the House:
The national probation service team will be responsible
for risk assessment. They will have a duty to carry out a new
assessment when a person's circumstances change, and it will be
the duty of the provider to notify the team of any material change
of circumstances. They will be co-located, and when an offender
becomes a high-risk offender, they will be taken back under the
supervision of the national probation service. This is about people
sitting in the same office and working together, just as people
work together in any office environment.[93]
When asked about this, Sue Hall replied:
Is there any model that mirrors what the target
operating model will be? No, there is not. Will people be sitting
in the same offices? Yes, they will, for about two years, but
the process will allow prime providers to move out of MOJ offices
in due course. On day one, we will all be in the same office,
although we may have moved our chairs around a bit, but the fact
is that you will have one national structure managing half, or
40%, of the staff and one local structure managing the other 60%
of the staff. Those management structures are not aligned in a
way that will make the development of local processes easy.[94]
45. Jeremy Wright MP, the Parliamentary Under Secretary
of State for Justice with direct responsibility for the reforms,
did not see what was proposed as a significant departure from
existing practice:
"It is not the case now that necessarily
the same individual deals with an offender when they are medium
risk and high risk, and that the offender manager is the same
individual and the person who determines breach.There are already
interactions between individuals, and it is important that they
continue."[95]
Whilst Mr Wright acknowledged that the relationship
between CRCs and NPS would be "crucial", he was confident
that risks would be minimised effectively for two reasons: first,
there would be an expectation that there will be good communication
between them as it will be mutually beneficial and, secondly,
there would be contractual obligations on behalf of the CRCs to
engage with the NPS.[96]
The Secretary of State recognised that there was potential for
a detrimental impact on public protection during the process of
allocating cases between staff once they are repositioned into
the two new entities, but felt that phasing the migration of some
cases would manage this risk: "We can make modifications
in the plans for an extended period [of transition] for those
individual cases where there is a public safety issue. We are
not going to compromise public safety."[97]
46. Research
and professional experience suggest that those being supervised
by probation benefit from having a single case manager. The changing
dynamics of risk of harm in individual cases also require continuous
case management to enable professional and objective assessment
to be made, based on a direct relationship with an offender.Whilst
under the present system offenders sometimes move between supervising
officers much of the evidence we received pointed to there being
additional risks over and above the current situation which will
be challenging to remedy through contractual specifications. It
is essential that arrangements are put in place to ensure very
good lines of communication and cooperation between Community
Rehabilitation Companies and the National Probation Service. Co-location
will certainly help in the short term, but unless that is required
through contractual terms there is no guarantee that it will happen
in practice over the medium to long term, as the quest for efficiencies
leads to the evolution of delivery models and reconfiguration
of the probation service estate.It will be important for the Ministry
to monitor this aspect of the new operational arrangements particularly
carefully.
LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS
47. The other aspect of probation stakeholders' apprehensions
about the new model is its potential to damage Probation Trusts'
existing work with local partner agencies which they see as crucial
to reducing re-offending.[98]
Police and Crime Commissioners, local authorities, and other criminal
justice stakeholders shared these reservations.[99]
As noted in our report on the role of probation, a key characteristic
of rehabilitation is the wide range of local delivery partners
involved.[100] These
partnerships might not be an unqualified success but many, such
as integrated offender management schemes, are demonstrating effectiveness.[101]
48. Our witnesses identified a number of unintended
consequences of the reforms which might erode the close working
links between local partners and frustrate efforts for them to
work even more closely together.[102]
In particular, they questioned whether the introduction of national
commissioning against the trend of other Departments' programmes,
changes to existing area boundaries for the delivery of probation
services, and the introduction of new providers paid for by results
might militate against proactive engagement, co-commissioning
and the pooling of resources to develop more efficient and comprehensive
services at local level.[103]
The role of local authorities and police and crime commissioners
as local commissioners also appeared to some of our witnesses
to have been undervalued.[104]Richard
Monkhouse of the Magistrates' Association feared that the new
commissioning arrangements would undermine the contribution of
local voluntary sector organisations that provide a net of non-statutory
assistance to those whose offending does not (yet) warrant a community
order signposted to them by the courts.[105]
49. Mr Grayling characterised this aspect of probation
work as "simply organising resources that are already there
locally from other public bodies."[106]
Nevertheless, the Ministry appears to have been conscious of the
need for new providers to integrate into and make best use of
existing local structures from the outset, and has given particular
attention to seeking to ensure that Multi-agency public protection
arrangements (MAPPA) and Integrated Offender Management (IOM)
schemes are preserved.[107]
Participation in some statutory partnerships will be contractual,
but for others prospective providers will be required to evidence
how they will engage and this will be monitored.[108]For
the majority of statutory partnerships the Ministry proposes that
both new entities will need to be involved, suggesting that there
is likely to be some duplication of resource and the need for
clear delineation of each entity's responsibilities.
50. Probation
is the lead agency in a range of local partnerships. In future
there will be two probation services (the new National Probation
Service and the contracted provider) in every locality delivering
similar services side by side and sometimes via one another. Each
will have to form working relationships with other local organisations,
bodies and services for the delivery of the joint or complementary
services which characterise effective local work with offenders.
Ministers should recognise that there is a potential risk that
this will lead to inefficient use of resources, and confuse accountability
at local level.The Government proposes to give new providers accountability
for reducing offending within community safety partnerships by
mandating this in contracts and asking prospective providers for
clarification of how they will preserve and develop existing partnerships:
that is to be welcomed. It is important that Ministers put in
place appropriate safeguards to ensure that new providers in the
private sector appreciate the importance of working with existing
local partnerships to reduce reoffending. We will consider the
future prospects for local partnerships further in our final report
in this inquiry.
Practicalities related to splitting
the service
51. The first phase of the transition to the new
model is the creation of the Community Rehabilitation Companies
(CRCs) and the National Probation Service (NPS) which will replace
the 35 existing Probation Trusts in April 2014[109].
The plans for creating the new structures are well underway, with
the Ministry aiming for the transition of staff to Community Rehabilitation
Companies and the National Probation Service to be completed by
the end of January 2014. We understand that the intention is then
to shadow run CRCs in the public sector until about November 2014,
using the same buildings and IT equipment, whilst making refinements
to the operating model, when they would be handed over to the
new providers.
TRANSITION TO THE NEW MODEL
52. Probation stakeholders impressed on us the magnitude
of change that they felt Trusts were being expected to manage
in order to reorganise the service within very tight timescales.
They are moving to a new state, involving Trust mergers and future
changes to conditions of service, and being expected to wind down
by April 2014—faster than initially anticipated. As well
as these complex and demanding tasks, they must maintain "business
as usual" and avoid standards of public protection slipping.[110]
Sue Hall anticipated that there would be "quite a lot of
upheaval" to ensure that staff end up in the right place,
at the right time and, more critically, that offenders also know
who their supervising officers are to be.[111]Both
she and Sebert Cox, Chairs of the Probation Chiefs Association
and Probation Association respectively, felt that the pace at
which they were being expected to make the transition was challenging
and risky.[112]
53. The Ministry has put in place a number of measures
in an effort to involve existing probation stakeholders in the
transition process and to implement the reforms at a manageable
pace. These include establishing a Ministerial Sounding Board
to "hear directly from Trust leadership" and seeking
input into defining the criteria that will be used to test readiness
at each stage of transition.[113]The
Ministry has developed a "Business and System Readiness"
assurance process designed to:
[...] ensure that every aspect of the new service
and the system reform being developed are thoroughly validated
prior to proceeding with implementation; provide the programme
and the business with the assurance that the system performs as
expected in an environment that mimics implementation as closely
as possible; support the "business as usual" function
to ensure that structures and resources are in place to respond
to the reforms as required.[114]
54. Despite these measures the pace of change appears
to be making it difficult for civil servants to provide timely
information to probation trusts to enable a difficult transition
to go as smoothly as possible and to carry staff with them. Sebert
Cox explained how it felt from his perspective as a Trust Chair:
[...] we are getting a lot of information—coming
almost on a daily basis now—on the way it sees the programme
operating [...] We also have a process of information flowing
around but not in sufficient detail that allows us to be making
the necessary changes to build the new structure".[115]
Sue Hall's view as a Trust Chief Executive was that:
There are issues in terms of capacity from the
centre and about managing the staff transfer safely and well and
in a way that does not demoralise and demotivate staff, so that
performance does not deteriorate and so on. We have been very
clear about the risks that the programme is currently running.
We have been very plain in our discussions with the Ministry of
Justice and have written to the Secretary of State outlining our
concerns very directly. […] It is reasonable to say that
there is a big gulf between the way the programme is being experienced
by trusts and the way I think it is being described at the centre.
From a trust point of view, it feels unco-ordinated and as if
it is not keeping to the time scales that we will need if we are
going to do our bits of the business.[116]
Neither Mr Cox nor Ms Hall felt that the concerns
of Chairs and Chief Executives were being given sufficient weight
by the Ministry of Justice and they felt many questions remained
unanswered, despite their having written to officials on 10 October
and the Secretary of State on 8 November, drawing his attention
to their joint risk register (which had led them to conclude that
the "risk of unsafe and unsatisfactory implementation is
very high").[117]
This does not accord with the reassurances theSecretary of State
gave us of the Ministry's commitmentto "giving Trusts all
the information, resources, and support they need to successfully
transition to the new system"[118]
55. The Probation Chiefs Association also warned
of risks that "the existing professionalism, skills and public
service motivation will be lost through the transition".[119]There
is some evidence to suggest that the programme is beginning to
impact on Trusts' performance in reducing reoffending, which fell
for the last quarter.Sue Hall attributed this to: staff lacking
certainty about their future; capacity in the system to manage
the change; and staff leaving.[120]
Several other witnesses noted the likelihood of a loss of expertise,
including from Trusts Boards, senior management, and frontline
staff.[121]The fact
that a quarter of posts for the leadership of CRCs are unfilled
is perhaps testament to the depth of feeling amongst the probation
sector about these reforms, given that there are currently 35
Trust Chiefs.
56. We put to the Secretary of Statethe views of
probation professionals responsible for managing the splitting
of the service about the risks attached to the pace of transition.
He said:
I do not think that is right. Every time you
put a group of people through change it causes challenge and uncertainty,
and that is unavoidable. We are doing our best to make sure that
we take the process through as smoothly as possible. We have had
some constraints on our ability to communicate plans in detail
because of the negotiations that took place with the unions […]
One or two people in the probation service have said to you it
is quite rushed. People in senior positions in the probation service
have said to me they just want to get on with it from the point
of view of staff; they want to know where they stand and end the
uncertainty.[122]
57. He also explained that once the initial reallocation
of staff had taken place by April 2014 there would be a"very
long period of bedding down and transition" during which
time the caseloads would be migrated and the systems—includingthe
process of interaction between the two teams, for example on risk
management—will be dry run, tested and modified to ensure
they are "fit for purpose" before the new providers
take ownership.[123]
58. In our 2013 report on ALS and the interpreting
and translation contract we concluded that the Ministry did not
give sufficient weight to the concerns raised by professional
stakeholders, and argued that had it done so, many of the operational
problems experienced during the project's implementation could
have been anticipated and avoided. It would be extremely unfortunate
if the Ministry's desire to see this new tranche of complicated
reforms designed and implemented quickly led to a similar situation
developing. We have heard compelling evidence that neither Chief
Executives nor Trust Boards feel confident that they are ready
for the first stage of transition or that their concerns are being
listened to.
AGREEMENT WITH THE UNIONS
59. The Ministry wishes existing staff to be allocated
to CRCs or the NPS by the end of January 2014. On 20th November
2013, the Unions, Probation Association (acting for Trusts) and
the MoJ were unable to settle a National Agreement on Staff Transfer.
There are differing interpretations of what transpired during
the final negotiation meeting that resulted in the breakdown of
talks. The Secretary of State told us that the Ministry:
[…] went as far as we felt we could in trying
to take the unions with us. We worked very hard over an extended
period to try to reach agreement with them on transitional arrangements.
In the end, they decided they could not reach agreement with us,
which is a shame because things like the quite generous voluntary
redundancy package we were going to offer to back-office staff,
who will lose their roles in the new set-up, will now not be available
because we cannot do it without union agreement. It is a bizarre
situation where the unions are blocking a quite generous redundancy
package for their own members.[124]
60. The unions have publicly given a very different
version of events. Napo's blog states that talks failed because:
"On the last available day for negotiations, new information
was presented by a senior MoJ Official which would have caused
significant detriment to members. This prevented the NNC [National
Negotiating Committee] from actually debating the substantive
Framework Agreement which was on the table."[125]Napo
also issued a statement that it would be seeking the intervention
of ACAS.[126] During
the Commons Bill Committee deliberations it was clear that the
main concerns of staff relate in particular to the continuity
of employment and pension provisions.[127]
We asked the Ministers whether they would pause the process of
staff transition but they stated that it was important to proceed
to give staff certainty about their future positions.
61. The explanations of the unions and the Ministry
about why they were unable to come to an agreement about terms
and conditions for staff under the new modeldiffer. Regardless
of what actually occurred, it is important that both sides resolve
this difference of opinion through negotiation. It is highly unfortunate
that agreement was not reached before NOMS commenced the splitting
of staff, but we understand that negotiations on terms and conditions
have resumed and we hope that outstanding issues can be resolved
swiftly and satisfactorily.
Retention of skills and development
of staff
62. A further concern relates to staff qualifications
in the new probation landscape, in particular, in relation to
the qualifications that will be required of staff employed by
the new providers, and the implications of splitting the system
for ongoing staff development.In our probation report we examined
new arrangements that had recently been introduced for training
probation staff—known as the probation qualifying framework—and
concluded:
The success of any new commissioning model in
protecting the public will be predicated on the existence of strong
safeguards to monitor standards of professional expertise. Staff
undertaking offender management work on behalf of other sectors
will require the same high-quality qualifying training as probation
professionals working for trusts in order to foster some consistency
in the specialist skills required.[128]
63. With respect to these matters, the target operating
model states:
"The new system will ensure that professional
standards continue to be maintained, with probation professionals
working in both the NPS and CRCs, and opportunities for placements
and interchange between them. The NPS and CRCs will both be required
to have suitably qualified and competent staff. The NPS will continue
to use the Probation Qualification Framework (PQF) and CRCs will
also be free to use the PQF should they choose to do so. It is
envisaged that a new Institute of Probation will promote professionalism
and provide a forum for sharing best practice across the probation
profession in the public and market sectors".[129]
The Secretary of State wanted to retain the skills
of probation practitioners but also to bring in additional mentoring
and support skills, in particular from the voluntary sector.[130]
He told us that he did not wish to have proscriptive qualification
requirements that would prevent "old lags" from being
able to mentor offenders.[131]
64. The Ministry has agreed to provide some initial
financial support to the Probation Institute—a joint initiative
of the Probation Association, Probation Chiefs Association, Napo
and UNISON which will be established in March 2014 to "safeguard
professional standards and act as a centre of excellence".
However, despite its creation, Sue Hall observed:"[t]he only
thing [new providers] will be required to do is to explain how
levels of training and qualification are appropriate to the job
they need to do." She argued that giving new providers a
choice in whether they have qualified probation officers was "a
mistake" and called for a unified framework of qualified
staff across both the CRCs and the NPS."[132]
65. Community Rehabilitation Companies will be
managing considerable risk on a day to day basis, yet will not
be required to have professionally qualified staff. This is a
matter of considerable concern to us. We welcome the creation
of a centre of excellence for probation, and we would hope that
new providers will support their staff to gain suitable accreditation
and qualifications through thisProbation Institute. We nevertheless
believe that they should be bound by a contractual requirement
to have a minimum proportion of qualified probation staff related
to the volume and risk levels of offenders supervised and to provide
continuous training. This should not inhibit the Secretary of
State's desire to enable more ex-offenders to become involved
inmentoring offenders currently under supervision, which we support.
77 Ministry of Justice, Target Operating Model:
Rehabilitation Programme,
September 2013 Back
78
Q240 Back
79
TheNational Probation Service's assessments will determine whether
someone is a high, medium or low-risk offender, so the exact proportions
cannot be determined. Qq191-193 Back
80
See for example Q5 [Mr Hadjipavlou]; Q25 [Mr Lawrence]; Prison
Reform Trust (PPC 13). See also A4E (PPC 03); Christine Lawrie
(PPC 28); Napo (PPC 31); Martyn Underhill (PPC 23); Gillian Riley
(PPC 25) Back
81
Napo (PPC 31) Back
82
Christine Lawrie (PPC 28) Back
83
Q156 [Ms Hall] Back
84
Q156 [Ms Hall], Napo (PPC 31). See also Probation Chiefs Association
and Probation Association risk register. Back
85
The public sector probation service is retaining only offenders
who are a high risk of serious harm. Back
86
Q156 [Ms Hall] Back
87
Q24 [Mr Hadjipavlou]; Napo (PPC 31) Back
88
Probation Chiefs Association (PPC 07). See also Q55. Back
89
Napo (PPC 31) Back
90
See PPC 31. Napo members have complained about offender projects
being closed without warning, of a lack of robust evidence when
cases come to court for enforcement action, a lack of proper health
and safety, lack of safeguarding procedures for those aged under
18 and a lack of proper record keeping. Back
91
See Ms Riley (PPC 25); Napo (PPC 31) Victim liaison officers provide
assurance to victims about aspects of the case management of offenders,
and the Parole Board relies on evidence about risk management
from probation practitioners who know the offender. Back
92
Oral evidence taken on 17 December 2013, HC 917, Qq16-17 Back
93
HC Deb, 30 October 2013, col 1001 Back
94
Q163 [Ms Hall]. See also Q55 [Mr Johnson] Back
95
Q182 Back
96 Ibid. Back
97
Q195 Back
98
Q5 [Mr Hadjipavlou]; Q23 [Mr Lawrence]; Probation Chiefs Association(PPC 07) Back
99
London Councils (PPC 05) Back
100 Commissioning
activity to reduce crime and re-offending is embedded in the work
of a range of local partnerships (and their component agencies)
including: community safety partnerships (CSPs) in England and
Wales, multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA), Child
Safeguarding Boards and local criminal justice boards (LCJBs).
LCJBs were abolished by the government in April 2011 and funding
ceased but they continue to exist in many areas. Probation's role
in community safety partnerships was cemented by the Policing
and Crime Act 2009 which made the trusts a 'responsible authority'
sharing responsibility with other agencies for local targets to
cut offending. According to the Probation Chiefs Association,
other partnerships in which Probation Trusts are a lead agency
include: Integrated Offender Management schemes featuring co-delivery
of services with the police; Community Budget pilots and 'Total
Place' initiatives with Troubled Families; Women Offender Community
Schemes; Strategic engagement with Health and Well Being Boards;
Resettlement, social housing and back to work projects; Victim
Support and Restorative Justice; service user mentoring schemes;
and youth offending teams. Probation Chiefs Association (PPC 07) Back
101
Q34 [Mr Johnson]; Probation Chiefs Association (PPC 07); National
Policing Lead for Integrated Offender Management (PPC 08); Ms
Mountstevens (PPC 19); Mr Underhill (PPC 23); Napo (PPC 31) Back
102
See for example, A4E (PPC 03); Criminal Justice Alliance (PPC 06);
Prison Reform Trust(PPC 13); Mr Allen (PPC 20) Back
103
Local Government Association (PPC 11); London Councils (PPC 21)
Back
104
See for example, Centre for Justice Innovation (PPC 10); DrugScope
(PPC 12); Prison Reform Trust (PPC 13); Howard League for Penal
Reform (PPC 16); London Councils (PPC 21); Ms Lawrie (PPC 28) Back
105
Q7 Back
106
Q15 Back
107
Ministry of Justice, Transforming Rehabilitation: a strategy
for reform, Cm 8619, May 2013, p 29 Back
108
Ministry of Justice, Target Operating Model: Rehabilitation Programme,
September 2013 Back
109
This was originally anticipated to be occurring in October 2014. Back
110
It was initially proposed that shadow arrangements would be operating
from April 2014. Q154 [Ms Hall]. See also Q173 [Mr Cox] Back
111
Q153 Back
112
Q153 [Mr Cox; Ms Hall]; Qq172-175 [Ms Hall]. Letter from Probation
Chiefs Association and Probation Association to Rt Hon Chris Grayling
MP, 8 November 2013 Back
113
Ministry of Justice (PPC 32) Back
114 Ibid. Back
115
Q152 Back
116
Q172 Back
117
Letter from Probation Chiefs Association and Probation Association
to Rt Hon Chris Grayling MP, 8 November 2013 Back
118 Ibid. Back
119
Probation Chiefs Association (PPC 07); see also Prison Reform
Trust (PPC 13) Back
120
Qq154, 157 Back
121 Q155
[Mr Cox]; Magistrates' Association (PPC17); Ms Lawrie (PPC 28)
Back
122
Q195 Back
123
Q195; Q184 Back
124
Q195 Back
125 NNC talks breakdown due to MoJ interference,
Napo News, 21 November 2013 Back
126 Transforming Rehabilitation - NNC talks break down after chaotic MoJ intervention,
Napo News, 21 November 2013 Back
127
Offender Rehabilitation Bill Committee: 4th sitting: House of Commons, 28 November 2013 Back
128 Justice
Committee, The role of the Probation Service, Eighth Report of
Session 2010-2012, HC519-I, para 258 Back
129
Ministry of Justice, Target operating model: Rehabilitation Programme,
September 2013, p 7 Back
130
Q180 Back
131
Oral evidence taken on 27 February 2013, HC (2012-13) 964, Q48 Back
132
Q156 Back
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