The impact
of Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 on Government
Background to the inquiry
1. In 2010, the Government pledged to
establish fixed five-year Parliamentary terms, as part of its
commitment to political reform in The Coalition: Our
Programme for Government. We reported on the constitutional
implications of this move in our 2010 Report, Fixed-term Parliaments
Bill.[1] Professor
Robert Hazell, of University College London, described the Fixed-term
Parliaments Act 2011 as "a very significant surrender of
prime ministerial power."[2]
2. As part of our inquiry into The
role and powers of the Prime Minister, we have been exploring
the impact of the 2011 Act. We are particularly interested in
the practical implications of the shift to fixed terms on Departmental
planning. This report represents our findings to date. We will
continue to explore prerogative powers as part of our wider inquiry.
3. We decided to hold a one-off evidence
session on this issue as we think that half-way through the first
fixed term provides a good opportunity to reflect on the impact
of the 2011 Act, and, moreover, to ensure that Departments make
the most of the potential planning benefits fixed terms bring.
We have focused only on the impact on Government in this Report,
and have not considered the impact of fixed terms on Parliament
itself.
4. On 18 December 2012, we wrote to
the Permanent Secretaries of central Government Departments to
request written evidence on the impact of the 2011 Act. A copy
of our letter, along with the 17 replies from Permanent Secretaries,
can be found on our website. The National Audit Office assisted
us in analysing the responses we received. The Chair has also
held meetings with Permanent Secretaries of central Government
Departments, to assist us with our inquiry. We also took oral
evidence from the Rt Hon Peter Riddell, Director of the Institute
for Government and Ms Chloe Smith MP, Minister for Political and
Constitutional Reform, Cabinet Office. We are grateful to all
those who contributed to this part of our inquiry.
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act
2011
5. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act came
into force in September 2011 and provides for the next general
election to take place on 7 May 2015 and thereafter for general
elections to be held every five years on the first Thursday in
May.
6. The Act provides for two cases in
which an election would be triggered, other than at five-year
intervals:
- either, a motion of no confidence
in the Government is passed, by a simple majority and 14 days
elapses without the House passing a confidence motion in any new
Government formed;
- or a motion for a general election
is agreed by two thirds of the total number of Members in the
House of Commons (currently 434 out of 650) including vacant seats.
7. Section 7 of the 2011 Act provides
for the Act to be revisited in 2020: it requires the Prime Minister
to establish a committee, to carry out a review of the operation
of the Act and make any recommendations for repeal or amendment
as required.
Emerging Benefits
8. Overwhelmingly, the written evidence
we received from Departments welcomed the move to fixed terms:
many responses cited the fact that a fixed term provided a platform
of greater certainty for legislative, strategic and financial
planning. The most commonly cited advantages of fixed terms were:
- the potential to reduce uncertainty
and instability;
- a clear timetable for the next general
election;
- more effective forecasting;
- ability to prioritise more effectively;
- ability to allocate key staff in
accordance with the policy priorities;
- a sense of direction from the outset;
- greater consistency and clarity
of strategy.
LEGISLATIVE PLANNING
9. According to the evidence we received,
the main benefit of the 2011 Act for Departments is the greater
certainty it brings to the legislative process: primary legislation
can be planned more efficiently because the time available for
the passage of bills is more predictable. In particular, there
is greater certainty that the fourth and fifth sessions of a Parliament
will run their full-length, and less risk of bills being lost
in the process known as the "wash-up", which is the
period between the announcement of a general election and the
dissolution of Parliament, when all the unfinished business must
be dealt with very quickly, and bills are often shortened or lost
altogether.
10. The Department for Transport explained
the impact of fixed-terms with reference to a historical example:
A Road Safety Bill was introduced
into the Commons in November 2004, before moving to the Lords
in March 2005. The consequence of the dissolution of Parliament
ahead of the June 2005 election was that the Bill was lost in
its entirety. It was reintroduced after the election but at the
time of dissolution there was no certainty that this would happen…and
of, course, the implementation of the Bill was delayed. Additionally,
having to take the Bill forward twice was not an efficient use
of Departmental resources. If the [Fixed-term Parliaments] Act
had been in force at the time, it would have been more likely
that there would have been sufficient time for the Road Safety
Bill to have become law first time around.[3]
The ability to plan into a fourth and
fifth parliamentary session with "neutrality" was a
point echoed by the Department for Education[4],
the Home Office[5] and
the Cabinet Office.[6]
STRATEGIC PLANNING
11. Many Departments cited the potential
for greater consistency and clarity of strategy as a positive
effect of the 2011 Act. The ability to plan priorities in the
context of a fixed five-year term enables Departments not only
to set a sense of direction from the outset, but to be reasonably
confident that they will have time to follow their strategy through.
12. The Minister for Political and Constitutional
Reform explained that fixed terms enabled the rollout of certain
strategic initiatives within the Cabinet Office itself:
Something I am taking forwards is
the use of management information across Government. Francis Maude
and I have taken the view that we have five years in which to
get this piece of work bedded in. It is my view that it is this
kind of work that ought never to be reversed. There is no good
reason for not having good management information…across
Government….but we know very clearly that we have an initial
period …in which to get a good system bedded in.[7]
13. Six Departments referred to departmental
business plans in their written evidence as a useful planning
exercise, enabling policy priorities and structural reform to
take account of the fixed Parliamentary term. In particular, the
Ministry of Justice stated that the introduction of the 2011-15
business plans had supported its strategic vision, which in turn
had assisted forward looking delivery plans.[8]
14. The Department of Health emphasised
that the timetable provided by the 2011 Act would "allow
for more effective planning and deployment of resources, especially
to support the election process,"[9]
both before and after a general election. This would enable the
Department "to plan the establishment of a team to coordinate
election briefing within a more specific timeframe."[10]
The ability to look ahead and staff accordingly was stated as
being particularly important to Departments with as wide-ranging
and complex a remit as Health.[11]
FINANCIAL PLANNING
15. Departments also referred to the
changes in their financial planning brought about by fixed terms.
The Treasury explained that the annual Finance Bill and Supplementary
Estimate process "have been altered to take account of the
move to fixed-term Parliaments, giving the Department further
certainty around the Budget and spending rounds."[12]
16. Whilst the general view of many
Departments was that the October 2010 Spending Review, which covered
the period up until 2014-15, had increased clarity and allowed
more effective planning, the Department for Education suggested
that Spending Reviews should be more closely aligned with fixed-term
Parliaments so as to provide even greater certainty:
Financial planning plays a central
role in departmental planning, and our current sense is that the
fixed term has been helpful in decisions about committing money
and entering into contracts, for example. For the planning benefits
of a fixed term to be realised more fully, however, the spending
cycle might need to be aligned to a similar timetable. With the
current Spending Review plans ending in 2014-15 this has necessitated
a one-year "mini" spending review to agree budgets for
the financial year beginning just before the end of this current
term.[13]
17. Peter Riddell was sceptical about
the possibility of aligning the Spending Review more closely with
the fixed term at a time when there was a Coalition Government:
I think it is the existence of the
Coalition that has made the spending issues more difficult, not
the fixed-term Parliament as such. If we had had a majority Government,
we would have had a full-scale spending review this year, stretching
ahead to the first two to three years of the next Parliament rather
than a one-year one. It is perfectly and absolutely understandable
why it is only one year because of the politics of it.[14]
18. Financial planning is the bedrock
of long-term Departmental planning; without a clear indication
of spending plans, short-termism in delivery and policy formulation
is bound to prevail. We call on the Government to produce
a rolling five-year Spending Review, which is aligned more tightly
to the fixed term, so that Departments can plan as effectively
as possible.
19. When he gave evidence to us on 24
January 2012, in connection with another inquiry, the Cabinet
Secretary, Sir Jeremy Heywood, told us that he would put on the
agenda for discussion at one of the weekly meetings of Permanent
Secretaries the issue of the impact of the 2011 Act on departmental
planning and stability, stating that it "would be a good
subject to discuss, to get different Departments' perspectives
on it."[15] We
wrote to Sir Jeremy on 22 May to inquire about the results of
this discussion and have not yet received a reply.
20. It is too early to provide a
comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the Fixed-term Parliaments
Act 2011, as several Departments and the Minister for Political
and Constitutional Reform emphasised in their evidence to us.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the greater certainty about the
date of the next general election that the Act provides facilitates
better strategic, financial and, above all, legislative planning
by Departments. It is early days, but we are keen that Departments
maximise these benefits and share best practice with one another.
21. We recommend that, at six
monthly intervals, the impact of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act
2011 on Departmental planning be added as an agenda item for discussion
at the meetings of Permanent Secretaries, in order to provide
an opportunity to share best practice. We ask the Cabinet Secretary
to keep us informed of the date of his next meeting with the Permanent
Secretaries and look forward to hearing the outcomes of that discussion.
POLITICAL PLANNING
22. Departments were, on the whole,
consistent in their analysis of fixed terms: the Act has enabled
them to formulate their legislative, strategic and financial plans
with a greater degree of certainty. The clearer timetable for
the next general election also has benefits for the Government
itself in terms of political planning.
23. Peter Riddell said that the move
to fixed terms had removed a layer of speculation and political
pressure, as the political parties, the general public and the
media now have greater certainty about the timetable for the next
general election as provided for in the 2011 Act.[16]
However, Peter Riddell was also clear that fixed terms alone could
not eliminate all uncertainty, and that "speculation over
leadership changes, speculation over reshuffles...[remain] the
same as ever."[17]
24. The Department for Education also
singled out ministerial reshuffles as a key element of administrative
uncertainty.[18] The
Permanent Secretary for the Department for Education, in particular,
stated a preference for a single reshuffle:
I would suggest that having a single
Ministerial reshuffle at the mid-term point of the parliament
also seems to have brought some benefits from the perspective
of departmental planning.[19]
25. This was echoed by the Department
of Health:
In some cases a reshuffle may have
more of an effect on a department than an election. The provisions
of the Act do not make arrangements for changes to this internal
reorganising (such as fixed-term contracts for ministers) and
so reshuffles will continue to have the potential for impact on
business within the cycle. [20]
Those conclusions align with our own
analysis of ministerial reshuffles, in our previous Report, The
impact and effectiveness of ministerial reshuffles.[21]
26. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act
2011 has provided Departments with a clearer electoral timetable,
which in turn facilitates greater certainty when it comes to planning.
It has also removed some political speculation, allowing Ministers
and officials to focus on delivery of policy rather than short-term
survival. This will also allow the Prime Minister to plan with
more certainty and this should have beneficial consequences in
reducing disruptive reshuffles.
27. We restate the conclusions
and recommendations made in our previous Report, "The impact
and effectiveness of ministerial reshuffles", and encourage
the Prime Minister and his successors to improve the planning
of Ministerial terms.
Beyond Government
28. Peter Riddell commented that too
much of the debate on fixed terms had centred on Government and
Parliament, and that "one of the key questions...is what
is the impact [of the Act] on...constituents, both individually
and business, unions, councils."[22]
The Minister also emphasised the broader reach of the 2011 Act,
by highlighting the benefits of fixed terms for electoral administration.
She said that electoral registration, timetabling for postal and
overseas votes and oversight of elections all benefitted from
being brought into a fixed cycle.[23]
We are pleased to note that the 2011 Act has made planning
easier not only for Government and Parliament, but for those whose
work is to a greater or lesser extent determined by these institutions,
such as electoral administrators.
Other factors
LONG-TERM POLICY AREAS
29. Some evidence we received stated
that it is not always possible, or desirable, to tie the work
of Departments too closely with a fixed term. The Ministry of
Defence stressed that some of its work, particularly on the National
Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR), cannot always be tied to the lifetime of a Parliament:
We may need to guard against frequent
NSS and SDSRs being tied too closely to the electoral cycle, which
could result in a rushed process. In addition, the important interactions
and dependences between the NSS, SDSR and Comprehensive Spending
Review are acknowledged, but the choreography required to align
the overall strategy and resource needs may not always be straightforward.[24]
The Minister and Peter Riddell commented
that this also applied to other Departments with longer-term policy
horizons, particularly on issues relating to defence procurement,[25]
infrastructure projects,[26]
foreign policy,[27] energy
policy[28] and climate
change.[29]
30. We note the evidence we have
received which suggests that there are some aspects of Departments'
work that should not be aligned too closely to the electoral cycle.
Policy areas such as defence, foreign affairs and energy have
a much longer-term planning horizon. Alignment should not be an
end itself; it should be attempted only if there are clear benefits.
31. At their regular meetings,
the Permanent Secretaries should identify areas of policy or planning
where greater alignment with the fixed parliamentary term would
be beneficial.
FIXED TERMS AND THE COALITION
32. We received some evidence to suggest
that the impact of the 2011 Act could not be separated from the
political reality of the Coalition Government. Peter Riddell
stated:
You cannot separate the Coalition
from the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act. Political scientists would
love to have to have two experiments: one with a single party
Government and one with a coalition. I think some phenomena we
are seeing now are to do with the Coalition. It might be very
different in a majority Parliament.[30]
33. Peter Riddell further argued that
the fact there was a Coalition had diminished the potential impact
of fixed terms, because questions of planning and priorities would
be subject to negotiation and partnership:
I think the only benefit of the
existence of the five-year Parliament is that it provides a clearer
framework in which you can operate. You know when you are going
to face the voters, both individually and collectively, so that
enables your own planning to be a bit easier. As I say, there
are countervailing factors that complicate it. It is a wonderful
thing other things being equal, but they are not. We operate with
a Coalition and that fundamentally alters a lot of the equation.
On the whole, I think it is a plus but I don't think one should
exaggerate the plus.[31]
His view is that a single-party Government
with a majority would be much better placed to take advantage
of the fixed term, particularly in respect of planning a full
fifth legislative session in Parliament.[32]
34. We appreciate that the impact
of fixed terms is currently difficult to separate from the impact
of Coalition Government. There may be further benefits to fixed
terms under a single-party Government. However, we do think there
is still scope to monitor, evaluate and embed best practice into
the Departmental planning processes.
Next steps
35. There is clearly potential for
Departments to share knowledge and explore the opportunities available
for longer-term planning. Given that we are just over half-way
through the first fixed term, we think it would be timely to hold
a seminar, to explore those opportunities. We are grateful to
Peter Riddell for expressing an interest in assisting us in this
respect, and look forward to working with the Institute for Government
on this issue.
1 HC 436 Back
2
Q 82 Back
3
Ev w1 Back
4
Ev w6 Back
5
Ev w5 Back
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Ev w4 Back
7
Q 244 Back
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Ev w2 Back
11
Ev w2 Back
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Ev w3 Back
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Ev w6 Back
14
Q 219 Back
15
HC 707-v, Q 312 Back
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Q 236 Back
17
Q 235 Back
18
Ev w2 Back
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Ev w2 Back
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Ev w2 Back
21
HC 255 Back
22
Q 209 Back
23
Q 289 Back
24
Ev w1 Back
25
Q 227 Back
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Q 265 Back
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Q 213 Back
28
Q 265 Back
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Q 213 Back
30
Q 209 Back
31
Q 226 Back
32
Q 229 Back
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