Committee of Selection and membership of general committees

Committee of Selection and Membership of General Committees (P19)

Dr Louise Thompson, University of Hull

My submission focuses on the lack of transparency in the appointments process and the relationship between the membership of general committees and legislative scrutiny. It is based on research undertaken into the work and process of House of Commons bill committees across the 2000-2010 sessions [1] .

AN OPAQUE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS

There is little doubt that the selection and appointments process for general committees would benefit from reform. The current process is opaque and often a source of uncertainty to backbench and frontbench Members. Whilst it is clear to all that the Committee of Selection formally nominates the membership of general committees, there is much speculation (both inside and outside of the House) as to how this process actually takes place.

Indeed, my own interviews with a small sample of MPs revealed great confusion as to the method of appointment and why some Members were found to be more suitable to scrutinise legislation than others. In particular, although the Standing Orders state that the Committee of Selection is to take the ‘qualification’ of Members into account, it is not clear if such considerations are actually made in practice. A study by R L Borthwick in the 1960s reported the Chairman of the Committee of Selection stating that Members’ outside activities or employment were not taken into account when making appointments [2] . Still today the general impression is that loyalty to the party is valued more highly than knowledge, experience or qualifications when it comes to committee appointments. There is also confusion over the value of contributions at second reading. Some MPs feel that making a contribution at second reading will increase the likelihood of their nomination to the bill committee, whilst others believe that such a contribution is in fact the best means of avoiding nomination. The Committee of Selection as presently constituted is thus inclined to work in a manner which is too secretive and its composition implies that it is there to act as a vehicle to ensure committee discipline rather than effective scrutiny. A more transparent and visibly democratic Committee of Selection would be a welcome development.

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP AND THE QUALITY OF LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY

The longstanding perception of legislative committees is one filled with loyal backbench MPs who will not stray from the party line. Committee members are said to be further discouraged from playing an active role by the party whips also serving on these committees [3] . MPs are regularly reported to be writing their Christmas cards [4] , reading newspapers [5] and even playing Sudoku [6] . This supine and disinterested membership is generally regarded as the primary explanation for the poor scrutiny undertaken in general committees and the very low number of formal amendments made to legislation at committee stage. Yet evidence to suggest that this is directly related to the role of the Committee of Selection in appointing members is not clear cut.

Firstly, the membership of general committees is more conducive to good scrutiny than is often thought. The Committee of Selection can – and very often does – appoint Members with considerable knowledge and experience of the issues contained within bills. High levels of specialisation can be observed in the backbenchers nominated to general committees. The number of Members appointed to bill committees who had a specialisation in the policy area being considered averaged 63 per cent across the 2000-2010 sessions. Interestingly, this figure is higher than that reported under the old ‘nucleus system’ of appointments. [7] I refer here to specialisation of members rather than to expertise; the expectation that MPs appointed to a bill committee will have an understanding of the bill by virtue of their previous employment, positions held within the House or through their own personal interests or circumstances. Specialisation in some committees (such as the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill Committee in the 2006-07 session) has been very high. In this case it reached 95 per cent, with all but one member having experience of local government. Although it lacks transparency, the Committee of Selection appears to be nominating knowledgeable Members to general committees and a greater proportion of specialised Members than under the previous system of appointments.

These specialised backbenchers are more effective scrutinisers of legislation; they are twice as likely to table amendments in committee than unspecialised appointees [8] and the overwhelming majority (87 per cent) of non-government amendments accepted in committee are moved by specialised committee members. Such committees often develop the ‘corporate ethos’ usually said to be nonexistent [9] . It would be assumed then, that an appointments process which took personal requests and the qualifications, background and experience of MPs into account more thoroughly and openly would increase the quality of committee scrutiny. Those appointed would not only have more of an interest in the bill itself, but they would be better qualified to draft, move and speak to sophisticated amendments in committee. Allowing the House to vote on the membership of general committees (or electing members of the Committee of Selection) would therefore not necessarily produce a greater proportion of Members considered to have the experience needed to adequately scrutinise legislation.

Secondly, it is unclear whether the Committee of Selection is the predominant factor in occasions where bills have been poorly scrutinised. Other issues may be more to blame. These include: the crowded parliamentary timetable which results in Members serving on more than one committee at the same time [10] , the lack of training and resources available to backbench MPs who wish to make contributions in committee and the use of programme motions which often leave large sections of bills unscrutinised. [11] There is little incentive for Members to take committee scrutiny seriously if they are constrained by time and poor resources. Thus, reforming the appointments process, although valuable, would not necessarily improve the outputs of the scrutiny process.

CONCLUSION

Reforms to increase the transparency of the Committee of Selection are long overdue. A more transparent process that is less dominated by the party whips would increase Members’ faith in the system and has the potential to bring great improvements to the general culture of bill committee work. However, the effect of the current system on legislative scrutiny should not be exaggerated. As such I would argue that reform of the Committee of Selection as presently constituted would be more effective than abolishing it. This reform should include a more varied membership, less dominated by party whips. Most importantly, formal procedures should be put in place to ensure that the background, experience and interests of MPs are taken into account when appointing members of general committees. Such reforms would enable the Committee of Selection to build on the good practice that can already be found in some general committees. Finally, whilst reform of the appointments process is worthwhile, rectifying the problem of poor scrutiny in committee requires other more wide ranging changes to committee procedure, training and resources.

July 2013