1 Programme management
1. On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller
and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for
Transport (the Department) and Network Rail on the progress in
delivering the Thameslink programme and the risks to delivery
that remain.[1]
2. The Department became sponsor of the programme
in July 2005. The programme involves:
· Infrastructure
work to improve tracks and stations including extending platforms,
reconstructing Blackfriars, Farringdon and London Bridge stations
and introducing new signalling technology. This work is expected
to cost £3.55 billion (at 2006 prices) and is being done
by Network Rail, funded by the Department.
· Buying a fleet
of new trains and two new maintenance depots, with an estimated
capital cost of £1.6 billion, which the Department is financing
through a Private Finance Initiative.
· New franchise
arrangements for running the passenger service on the Thameslink
route.[2]
3. Since the Department became sponsor of the
programme it has made most progress in implementing the infrastructure
project, with the first phase delivered under budget and on time
in December 2011. The Department has, however, deferred its planned
completion date, from 2015 to 2018. The procurement of new trains
has taken over three years longer than expected and the Department
has also revised its timetable and approach for letting the new
franchise.[3]
4. The first proposals to modernise the Thameslink
route and increase capacity were made in 1989, and were then developed
by a succession of rail industry sponsors in the 1990s and early
2000s. The Department told us that the early stages of the programme
were dogged with protracted planning issues and a period of unstable
funding from 1990-2000. Once all planning issues were resolved
in 2006, the Department and Network Rail moved quickly to start
main construction work in 2009.[4]
However, it will still be some 30 years since the need to upgrade
Thameslink was first recognised before passengers see the benefits.
The Department told us that it had learnt lessons from Thameslink
and that if projects like this are to move quickly in the future
they require clear objectives, political consensus and a stable,
predictable funding base as well as very strong project planning.[5]
5. The Department's Thameslink team is under-resourced
for a programme of this profile, size and complexity. The Department
told us that the senior responsible owner (SRO) has a core team
of just five people, down from eight prior to the Spending Review
in 2010.[6] The C&AG's
report shows that the team is small compared with teams in other
Department's such as the Department of Energy and Climate Change
for its smart meter and carbon capture and storage programmes.
There have also been a number of other external assurance reviews
which indicated that the core team is tight for resource.[7]
The Department told us that it has many other people across the
Department and the industry supporting the delivery of Thameslink
and has spent £28 million on consultants since the start
of the programme.[8] However,
the Department accepted that the small core team raised a 'resilience
issue' for the programme and we remain sceptical about whether
the Department has the capacity to deliver the remainder of the
programme by 2018.[9]
6. The continuity of the SRO has been important
to the success of the programme so far but the Department now
plans to move the SRO from the Thameslink programme on to High
Speed 2. The current post holder has been involved in the programme
since 2005 and has been the SRO for the last five years, providing
valuable continuity of leadership and much needed programme management
skills and experience.[10]
The Department sought to assure us that the management of the
succession planning has been carefully thought through. The Department
believes that the award of the train contract provides a sensible
break point at which to change the SRO.[11]
The Department told us that the next 'key inflection point' would
be 2018 which, recognising the personal dimension to the decision,
the Department believes would be a long time to ask an individual
to work on the same project.[12]
7. Given the amount that remains to be done to
deliver the programme by 2018 we remain concerned about the impact
on the Thameslink programme of the Department's decision to move
the current SRO. We are worried that the development of individual
skills has taken priority over making sure that projects get delivered
on time with good value for money. We are also concerned that
the current, highly experienced SRO's move to High Speed 2 highlights
the shortage of project management skills in the Department to
deliver its wider portfolio of projects. [13]
1 C&AG's Report, Progress in the Thameslink
programme, Session 2013-14, HC 227, 5 June 2013 Back
2
C&AG's Report, paras 2-3 Back
3
C&AG's Report, Progress in the Thameslink programme,
Session 2013-14, HC 227, 5 June 2013, para 3 Back
4
Q2 Back
5
Qq 1-2 Back
6
Qq 30-33 Back
7
Q 17; C&AG's Report, para 1.20 Back
8
Q34; Ev 21 Back
9
Q 109 Back
10
Qq 23-27 Back
11
Q 24, 27 Back
12
Q 27 Back
13
Qq 25, 27 Back
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