4 Procurement Capability
50. There are clear shortcomings in the ability
of the Civil Service to run effective and efficient procurement.[80]
Tim Heywood, expressed a view common to many witnesses:
[...] the Civil Service is having to adapt, and this
has been true over a number of years, to a role that is more focused
on commissioning and procuring the delivery of services, goods
and such like, as opposed to being a delivery organisation itself.
I think the skill sets have not kept pace. If there was one thing
I would change, to try to bring about that cultural and other
structural change, I would make commercial skills, commercial
awareness and procurement skills one of the core skills for being
employed in the Civil Service.[81]
Francis Maude acknowledged this view; he told us
that there were "too few" civil servants with the right
knowledge and skills, stating that that was "a serious deficiency
which has been long recognised".[82]
51. Sir Peter Gershon's 1999 review of civil
procurement indicated the need for more "strategic procurement
skills" in government, for example, to run private finance
initiatives, outsourcing and the management of very large complex
projects.[83] Witnesses
told us that the Civil Service has become more commercially skilled
since then, although felt that there was still some way to go.[84]
Tim Heywood noted that:
[...] there are lots of centres of excellence. There
are lots of civil servants who are very, very good in terms of
commercial nous, procurement skills and so on, but there are not
nearly enough of them for the scale of procurement being undertaken.[85]
52. One key deficiency which witnesses highlighted
was civil servants' lack of understanding of commercial risk.
Discussing procurements by the Ministry of Defence, Professor
Bovis of Hull University suggested that "the inability to
understand risk" was a systemic problem and that a more nuanced
understanding of risks in each contract was needed. Robin Southwell,
Chief Executive, European Aeronautic Defence and Space UK, and
president of the defence industry trade organisation, Aerospace
Defence Security, reinforced this view noting that "the effort
to take no risk means you end up taking huge risks".[86]
The Chief Operating Officer for Government recognised this problem
and accepted that when contracting, civil servants should be more
aware of the genuine limits on transferring risk from the public
to the private sector: "The reality is we [the public sector]
carry the risk [...] the elimination of any naivety in that is
fundamental to us making wise decisions".[87]
The Competition for a Carbon Capture and Storage Demonstration Project
In November 2007, the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) launched a competition for industry to run a project to design, construct and operate the UK's first commercial-scale carbon capture and storage demonstration project at a coal-fired power station, by 2014, with Government funding.
Four years later, in October 2011, the Department of Energy and Climate Change, which was by then the department with responsibility for this project, withdrew from negotiations with the last remaining bidder in the competition as the Department considered it could not agree a deal that would represent value for money.
A National Audit Office report considering the lessons to be learned from this ultimately unsuccessful procurement exercise noted that: "the Department and its predecessor did not engage sufficiently early with the commercial risks involved and their consequences on cost". [88] It proposed that in future competitions: "the Department needs to understand fully its commercial proposition to industry [
] To do this, the Department will need appropriate commercial skills in place from the outset of its new programme". [89]
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53. Another deficiency highlighted was civil
servants' unwillingness to exercise judgement. So, while commercial
ability exists within the Civil Service, it is constrained by
a culture of adhering to processes. With regard to defence procurement,
Dr Moore of Cranfield University noted that:
[...] the system is such that you have to follow
the processes. An individual cannot be wrong if they follow the
processes. If they use their judgment to say, 'This is a better
value-for-money item', however you define that, the system may
well show them that they cannot do that, and they therefore follow
the system.[90]
54. Francis Maude similarly said that existing
commercial nous had been suppressed by the process-oriented culture
of the Civil Service:
I have seen some, who have been lifer, mainstream
civil servants, exposed to the commercial world and interacting
with suppliers and potential suppliers, and they absolutely light
up and discover a commercial part of their DNA that they did not
know existed. [...] I have on too many occasions heard, or heard
reports of procurement people in Government saying, 'Well, of
course we are not allowed to make a judgment about choosing a
supplier. It is all reduced to some sort of mechanistic process.'
You would never do that in a commercial setting. You would be
making a commercial judgment about what is the best overall value.[91]
55. Another key area for improvement is the Government's
engagement with business and the way it identifies and specifies
what it wanted to procure and how.[92]
The International Association for Contract and Commercial Management
commented that: "The world of procurement has changed dramatically
in recent years" but noted that:
[...] most [government] Procurement professionals
appear to have been trained to deal with commodity purchases and
have little appreciation of the methods or techniques that are
needed to effectively gather requirements, evaluate supplier capabilities,
develop relationships and oversee contract outputs or outcomes.
This is a serious deficiency in a world that has moved increasingly
to services and solutions, where outcomes matter far more than
inputs.[93]
56. Sally Collier, the Deputy Chief Procurement
Officer, said that efforts to improve the level of pre-procurement
engagement with suppliers were starting to pay off. "We have
still got a long way to go [...] but I think we have got some
evidence that suppliers out there do think it is changing".[94]
Nonetheless, businesses in some sectors told us of recent failures
by the Government to consult properly with potential suppliers.
The Institute of Practitioners in Advertising wrote with regard
to a recent procurement exercise run by the GPS that:
there was no consultation with the industry on the
relevance to advertising of the questions asked [in the Invitation
to Tender]nor their intelligibilityprior to publication,
while the resource available to explain and answer queries was
limited and lacking in detailed knowledge of the industry.[95]
57. Suppliers to Government emphasised that government
bodies needed to become more flexible. Instead of narrowly specifying
the outputs they want they should specify outcomes, so that businesses
can help to identify and provide the most effective solution.[96]
Kevin Craven, Chief Executive of Balfour Beatty Services and Chairman
of the procurement sub-committee of the CBI, told us that the
Government has tended to find it difficult to reach an agreed
position on what it wanted to procure. By specifying outcomes
rather outputs, they could make the whole procurement process
more efficient, passing the challenge of finding an effective
solution to a particular problem to the bidder. He noted that:
"it is easier to describe what you want to achieve rather
than the methods by which you want to achieve it".[97]
58. Nonetheless the CBI, among others representing
suppliers to Government, argued that Government should go further
and give greater consideration to procurement issues as part of
policy making.[98] Andrew
Coulcher, Director of Business Solutions at the Chartered Institute
of Purchasing and Supply, told us that: "There is an opportunity
to have a much earlier and closer involvement of procurement and
commercial teams in the policy-setting process, but I also think
that the policy professionals need a better commercial understanding
of the implications of those policies and knowing when to get
the professionals engaged at the right time".[99]
59. Peter Smith argued that part of the problem
is the lack of senior leaders within the Civil Service with experience
of procurement:
[...] there is no Permanent Secretary that I am aware
of who has come through the procurement route, in any sense. There
might be the odd one who has done a bit of programme management,
but we do not have anyone who has come all the way through procurement.[100]
60. The Civil Service shows a persistent
lack of understanding about how to gather requirements, evaluate
supplier capabilities, develop relationships or specify outcomes.
The effort to reduce risk tends to increase risk in the form of
delay and increased costs. Policy making remains divorced from
the practicalities of procurement, while few policy makers or
senior leaders in the Civil Service have relevant procurement
experience or training. The Cabinet Office has responsibility
for leading procurement training across Government. It should
publish a procurement training plan demonstrating how it will
increase the understanding of procurement issues among civil servants
engaged in policy development.
Improving Commercial Capability
61. The Cabinet Office has already launched a
number of initiatives to improve civil servants' commercial skills,
not least in relation to the management of major projectsmany
of which involve a significant procurement. In 2012, the Cabinet
Office announced plans to develop and run the Major Projects Leadership
Academy in partnership with the Sad Oxford Business School and
Deloitte, to train 150 Project Leaders over four years from October
2012. In January 2013, the Government also announced the creation
of a virtual Commissioning Academy: an online development programme
for senior commissioners from all parts of the public sector to
improve skills in commissioning others to deliver services.
62. The Chief Procurement Officer, Bill Crothers,
argued that existing training and development initiatives, such
as the Commissioning Academy and Major Projects Leadership Academy,
have "made a big difference" but said that more needed
to be done, in particular to improve commercial and contract management
skills.[101] The Cabinet
Office has stated that "further work to strengthen commercial
capability within the Civil Service remains an important priority"
going on to remark that "the Civil Service Reform Plan [...]
committed to the development of a five year plan on how the Civil
Service as a whole would develop the necessary capabilities in
this (and other priority areas)".[102]
We understand this is still being developed.
63. As part of its Civil Service reform capabilities
plan, the Cabinet Office has committed to a number of further
actions by summer 2013, which should help to develop commercial
and procurement capability. These include the creation of a new
unit within the Cabinet Office of commercial specialists to assist
departments in buying and managing the commercial delivery of
complex ICT services, and mechanisms to allow greater interchange
of personnel between the Civil Service and private sector organisations.[103]
64. Alongside the Chief Operating Officer, Stephen
Kelly, and the Chief Procurement Officer who have considerable
private sector expertise between them, the Cabinet Office also
named five other senior civil servants "with a broad range
of commercial experience" recently recruited to drive the
efficiency and reform agenda. It also pointed out that it has
now recruited "a number of highly experienced commercial
negotiators from the private sector". They are the Crown
Representatives" who "lead the strategic relationship
with a number of suppliers to secure better value for taxpayers
and improve the way services are delivered".[104]
65. Tim Cummins, Chief Executive of the International
Association for Contract and Commercial Management, sounded a
note of caution and suggested that a more fundamental reform of
Civil Service culture would be needed:
There is a real risk that skills development can
be, in a sense, a sticking plaster as opposed to a real remedy
or cure [...] It may be creating a group of people who will, in
a sense, be frustrated by their inability to shift the organisation.[105]
66. A range of valuable initiatives
to improve capability and skills have already been launched, such
as the Major Projects Leadership Academy, which should improve
the commercial and procurement skills within the Civil Service.
The Civil Service Reform Capabilities Plan has also proposed a
number of further initiatives to build commercial and procurement
skills and the Cabinet Office has successfully recruited a small
number of experienced procurement and commercial personnel to
senior roles. We commend the Cabinet Office for its efforts to
develop commercial skills. We are concerned however that a more
fundamental culture shift is required within the Civil Service
if those with commercial skills are to be allowed to operate effectively
to feel appreciated and rewarded accordingly by the Civil Service,
so they wish to remain.
67. The Government has only limited information
on the state of skills and capability within the Civil Service.
The International Association for Contract and Commercial Management
noted that: "there seems to be an innate resistance to skills
analysis and benchmarking, so while work to identify required
skills has been undertaken, it is not evident how gaps will be
addressed".[106]
Francis Maude acknowledged that "we do not absolutely know
how many procurement professionals there are across Government".[107]
In response to our request, the Cabinet Office has collected information
from sources in the public domain and by individual "follow
up" on the number, skills and experience of Senior Civil
Servants in procurement leadership roles within central government.
The Cabinet Office provided us with the table below.
Table 2: Commercial expertise of senior civil
servants within departmental procurement teams.
Number of SCS | Sector Experience
| Nature of experience/ typical commercial roles
| Typical length of private sector experience
|
32 have private sector experience | Banking Services
Utilities
Consultancy
Retail
Manufacturing
Insurance Services
Telecomms/ICT
| Senior Purchasing Manager
Senior Logistics Director
European/ Global Supply Chain Director
Company Director
Operational Manager
Senior consultant
| 49% >10 years
45% > 5-10 years
6% < 5 years
|
12 have public sector experience only | -
| - | -
|
17 not known | -
| - | -
|
Source: Cabinet Office[108]
68. Even though there are only
61 senior civil servants in procurement leadership roles within
central government, there is little known about them, their skills
and experience, or lack of them, across Whitehall. There is no
departmental breakdown and the fact that the Cabinet Office does
not know the experience of 17 of the 61 senior procurement cadre
indicates a serious lack of coordination of this vital resource.
These officials will be thrown into the public spotlight, now
that the Government is to make Senior Responsible Owners of major
projects directly accountable to select committees.
69. In its Capabilities Plan for the Civil Service,
published in April 2013, the Cabinet Office has committed to establishing
"a central database of commercial specialists, starting with
procurement professionals by summer 2013, recording each person's
experience and skills".[109]
It notes further that "Departments will need to populate
this database and ensure that records are kept up to date".[110]
70. We welcome the Government's
proposals to establish a central database of commercial specialists,
starting with procurement professionals by summer 2013 as a first
step, but not much has been achieved. The Cabinet Office database
should include all key procurement positions and functions in
the Civil Service. The database should be updated each quarter
so that progress in improving commercial capability can be monitored
effectively. Departments should be required to provide this information.
This information should also be provided as part of the response
to this recommendation. This should include a list of Senior Responsible
Owners of procurement projects, who the Government now propose
should be accountable to select committees of Parliament.
71. Consideration should be
given to regenerating the professional Civil Service, so that
highly qualified professionalsscientists, engineers, manufacturers,
retailerscan be deployed to deal with purchasing, and with
projects, managed by the Permanent Secretary, but with a symbiotic
relationship to the head of those professions, of which procurement
should be one.
Accessing private sector expertise
72. The Chief Operating Officer told us that:
If we look at most of the Senior Civil Service today,
it is probably dominated by policy people. Some of the skills
[...] can be done through training, but also you can need a lot
of 'university of life' experience, having dealt on one side of
the table managing large, complicated commercial constructs.[111]
73. A number of witnesses pointed out the difficulty
of recruiting and retaining staff with the necessary skills and
the importance of the public sector offering salaries which can
compete with the private sector.[112]
For example, Tim Cummins said that:
The challenges, probably around procurement, are
in part to do with relative status. They are partly to do with
confidence over career path and career potential. Of course, they
are somewhat related to perceptions around salary, particularly
the correlation between salary and contribution. There is often
a feeling by more talented people that they will just operate
within an environment where their particular contribution is not
necessarily acknowledged or rewarded.[113]
74. As an alternative to direct recruitment or
employing consultants on an ad-hoc basis, the Government has considered
whether it can outsource procurement and commercial functions
to the private sector.
75. We highlighted the risks of outsourcing in
IT in our report Government and IT a recipe for rip-offs:
time for a new approach. We found in particular that the outsourcing
of the government's IT service means that many Civil Service staff,
along with their knowledge, skills, networks and infrastructure
had been transferred to suppliers.[114]
Witnesses confirmed our findings in that report that for outsourcing
to be effective, the Government still must have its own commercial
and contract management skills to manage the relationship with
the chosen provider. Jon Hughes, a procurement consultant, commented:
[...] if [outsourcing] then loses transparency, scrutiny
and proper examinations of all the financials and service outcomes,
I am sorry but the public sector is going to get ripped off. So
you have to have internal capability of a very high quality to
manage those outsourcing deals.[115]
76. A number of witnesses discussed the risks
of the Ministry of Defence proposals to contract out their management
of procurement, through a "Government Owned Contractor Operated"
(GOCO) model.[116]
This was first proposed in a review by Bernard Gray published
in 2009, before his appointment as Chief of Defence Materiel,
as a solution to improving defence procurement.[117]
In this model, a private company would be contracted to act as
a parent body for the section within the Ministry of Defence responsible
for procurement and logistics (Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S)),
while the Government retained overall ownership. Lord Levene told
us that the intention behind the GOCO model was:
[...] to give that [procurement] process to a commercial
company which will not be constrained by Civil Service limits
on pay and conditions which can then recruit the best possible
people and pay them well, on the basis that they will produce
a better result.[118]
77. This was recently confirmed by Bernard Gray
in an interview with Civil Service World: "If industry wants
to go out and hire the best lawyers, the best programme managers,
they can; and all the choices they make create costs that we bear.
So we're paying them to upgrade their side of the equation, but
we don't pay to have those skills available to our own side".[119]
With regard to the GOCO, Francis Maude told us that: "it
is definitely easier in that kind of arrangement to hire people
at competitive private market rates; that is undoubtedly the case.
It is certainly not impossible, but it is more difficult, to do
it within Civil Service constraints".[120]
78. Lord Levene warned however that outsourcing
defence procurement "could well result in the GOCO employing
the same civilian and service individuals, but paying them considerably
more, which with a further mark-up would then be added to the
bill that MOD would have to pay".[121]
He added that he had some fairly fundamental concerns about the
whole concept:
even if it is true that a small number of people
need to be brought in on a higher rate, [...] it seems to me to
be an extraordinary price to pay necessitating the change of the
whole system of Government procurement, by transferring it to
a private company, in a move which has not been carried out in
any other country in the world, simply in order to be able to
pay a handful of people more money. The figures that I have seen
showing how much can be saved by handing over to a commercial
company are, I believe, fanciful, particularly when set against
the real cost of introducing a GOCO.[122]
79. Sir Jeremy Blackham, former Deputy Chief
of the Defence Staff at the Ministry of Defence, told us that
he was not convinced the GOCO model for DE&S was "a good
thing", but said that it was necessary to await the final
details of the proposals before reaching a judgement.[123]
Nonetheless he echoed Lord Levene's comments stating that the
GOCO operating model:
appears to be trying to repair deficiencies that
could be repaired by other means, notably the balance and level
of skills [...] There is a feeling that a commercial operator
can buy them and reward them more appropriately, and attract the
right people. It would be possible to do this in another way,
I would have thought.[124]
80. A decision on whether the GOCO model will
be adopted was initially expected at the end of 2012. However
in April 2013, the Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, the Secretary of
State for Defence, announced the start of a 12 month assessment
phase. During this phase, the Ministry of Defence proposed to
work with HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office "to explore
the extent of change that could be delivered whilst keeping the
organisation fully within the boundaries of the public sector".[125]
Mr Hammond also announced that in parallel "a commercial
competition will be launched that will enable us to determine
with potential private partners how a GOCO would work in practice,
and what the costs and benefits would be".[126]
By the end of the assessment phase in 2014, Mr Hammond expects
to have a comprehensive set of qualitative and quantitative data
with which to evaluate the options and make a final decision about
the future of DE&S.[127]
81. Civil Service reform should
aim to deliver an organisation that can recruit, train and retain
people with the necessary procurement and commercial skills. Reforms
such as the Ministry of Defence's "GOCO", designed to
get around outdated restrictions on Civil Service salaries and
conditions in order to improve Government access to commercial
and procurement capability should not be necessary. A decision
has yet to be taken on whether to contract out the management
of the Ministry of Defence's procurement and logistics arm to
a GOCO. There are risks with this model, not least the complexity
of another relationship which the Ministry of Defence will have
to be able to control. We are not convinced that this concept
is sound or that cost-benefit analysis will prove its viability.
82. The very fact the Ministry
of Defence is seeking to contract out the procurement function,
which is a fundamental reason for the Ministry of Defence's existence,
underlines how counterproductive it is to maintain the existing
restrictions on salaries and conditions for leading professionals
in a modern Civil Service. No other Civil Service in a comparable
country operates on the basis that the Prime Minister's salary
should be a maximum. Such a myopic policy makes the UK Civil Service
internationally uncompetitive. In the meantime, Government
should make an assessment of what salaries must be offered to
recruit and retain the senior and experienced procurement professionals
it needs.
80 Q 278, Ev w17, Ev w20,
Ev w87 Back
81
Q 324 Back
82
Q 585 Back
83
Sir Peter Gershon, Review of Civil Procurement in Central Government,
April 1999 Back
84
Q 278-9 Back
85
Q 278 Back
86
Q 168 Back
87
Q 510 Back
88
National Audit Office, Carbon capture and storage: lessons
from the competition for the first UK demonstration, HC 1829
Session 2010-2012, 16 March 2012, p 8 Back
89
National Audit Office, Carbon capture and storage: lessons
from the competition for the first UK demonstration, HC 1829
Session 2010-2012, 16 March 2012, p 11 Back
90
Q 186 Back
91
Q 592, Q 585 Back
92
Q 52 Back
93
Ev w17 Back
94
Q 510 Back
95
Ev w4 Back
96
Ev w32, Ev w36 Back
97
Q 54 Back
98
Ev w11, Q 79 Back
99
Q 359 Back
100
Q 365 Back
101
Q 493 Back
102
Ev w75 Back
103
Cabinet Office, Meeting the Challenge of Change A capabilities
plan for the Civil Service, April 2013 Back
104
Ev w102 Back
105
Q 324 Back
106
Ev w17 Back
107
Q 585 Back
108
Ev w102 Back
109
Cabinet Office, Meeting the Challenge of Change A capabilities
plan for the Civil Service, April 2013 Back
110
Cabinet Office, Meeting the Challenge of Change A capabilities
plan for the Civil Service, April 2013 Back
111
Q 494 Back
112
Ev 35 (PMI), Q 190 (Mr Southwell), Q 313 (Mr Cummins) Back
113
Q 313 Back
114
Public Administration Select Committee, Twelfth Report of Session
2010-12, Government and IT-'A Recipe for Rip-Offs': Time for
a New Approach:, HC 1724 Back
115
Q 46 Back
116
Qq 221-227 Back
117
Ministry of Defence, Review of Acquisition for the Secretary
of State for Defence: An independent report by Bernard Gray,
October 2009, Back
118
Ev w120 Back
119
Civil Service World, 'Interview: Bernard Gray', Matt Ross 2 July
2013 Back
120
Q 608 Back
121
Ev w120 Back
122
Ev w120 Back
123
Q 224 Back
124
Q 224 Back
125
Written Ministerial Statement, HC Deb 25 April 2013, Col 61-62ws Back
126
Written Ministerial Statement, HC Deb 25 April 2013, Col 61-62ws Back
127
Written Ministerial Statement, HC Deb 25 April 2013, Col 61-62ws Back
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