Conclusions and recommendations
Police Recorded Crime (PRC)
1. Our inquiry covered
crime statistics in England and Wales. However, it would be surprising
if similar issues to do with the quality of the statistics did
not exist in Northern Ireland and Scotland. HM Inspectorate of
Constabulary for Scotland's recent review into compliance of police
recording with the expected standards gives cause for concern-the
recording of some crime types falls well below the expected standard.
(Paragraph 7)
2. We recommend that
UKSA urgently investigate the quality of crime statistics in Scotland
and Northern Ireland and their compliance with the Code of Practice,
in the light of the findings of this inquiry, and UKSA's decision
to remove the 'National Statistics' kitemark from crime statistics
in England and Wales. (Paragraph 8)
3. Accurate Police
Recorded Crime data is essential if Police and Crime Commissioners
and Chief Constables are to know what crimes are being committed
in their area and therefore how to respond. (Paragraph 13)
4. It is not credible
to suggest that sensible resolution of the tensions between a
rigid compliance with the recording rules and a common-sense approach
can explain the exaggerated decline of Police Recorded Crime.
Our witnesses provided a wealth of insight into the various ways
in which crime data accuracy and integrity can be and have been
compromised. However, the lack of regular and rigorous audit of
crime recording practices in recent years makes it impossible
to assess the extent of any compromise and the relative importance
of these factors. The re-establishment of regular annual external
audit of forces from this year onwards, which we discuss later
in this Report, provides a vital opportunity to fill this gap
in the understanding of the problem and to contribute towards
a durable solution. (Paragraph 29)
5. It is vital that
the Government ensures the accuracy and reliability of Police
Recorded Crime. Police Recorded Crime provides a crucial intelligence
resource for the police and informs the operational deployment
of police resources. Lax supervision of recorded crime data risks
reducing the police's effectiveness in their core role of protecting
the public and preventing crime because they cannot deploy resource
effectively if they are not aware of the true level and nature
of crime. (Paragraph 30)
6. Under-recording
or miscategorising crime erodes public trust in the police and
undermines the trust and confidence of frontline police officers
in police leadership: it creates doubt that the public will be
taken seriously when they report a crime. (Paragraph 31)
7. Any instance of
deliberate misrecording of sexual offences is deplorable, but
especially so if this has been brought about by means of improperly
persuading or pressurising victims into withdrawing or downgrading
their report. (Paragraph 39)
8. The disparities
between different police forces in the 'no-crime rates' for rapes
and sexual offences are sufficient in our view to raise serious
concerns about the varying approaches taken by police forces to
recording and investigating these horrendous crimes. We look forward
to the outcome of the research commissioned by the Metropolitan
Police examining the force's 'no crime' decisions in respect of
sexual offences. (Paragraph 40)
9. The fact that this
research is necessary, following the 2008 Independent Police Complaints
Commission report into the Sapphire Unit is a damning indictment
of police complacency, inertia and lack of leadership. However,
the data indicates that the Metropolitan Police Service is unlikely
to be the only force of concern. (Paragraph 41)
10. The Home Office
must undertake a comprehensive analysis in order to explain the
extraordinary disparities in no-crime rates for sexual offences
across all police forces. We expect this to be completed within
two months and included with the response to this Report. We also
recommend that the devolved administrations undertake analogous
work. This should lead to work to improve the accuracy transparency
and reliability of police recorded sexual offences so that a table
of no crime rates does not suggest systemic inconsistency in recording
practices. (Paragraph 42)
11. We note the reduction
in the sample size of the Crime Survey for England and Wales.
Police Recorded Crime is the only detailed indicator of crime
trends at local level, enabling police forces, Police and Crime
Commissioners, local authorities, the public and the Home Office
to keep track of crime in different force area. The Crime Survey
for England and Wales is no substitute for Police Recorded Crime
in respect of monitoring crime trends in local areas. (Paragraph
45)
12. We recommend that
the ONS review and then publish, alongside the Crime Survey for
England and Wales, information about the nature of the sample,
including the impact of the reduction in sample size on the reliability
of the statistics, its cost over time, and an explanation of what
statistics might be published at a sub-national level, for example
for the larger police forces. (Paragraph 46)
Removal of National Statistics status
13. We commend UKSA
for acting in response to the evidence exposed by PASC's inquiry,
to strip Police Recorded Crime statistics of the quality designation
'National Statistics'. However, the fact that it took our inquiry,
and a whistleblower from the Metropolitan Police Service, to expose
sufficient evidence suggests serious shortcomings in UKSA's ability
and capacity in their assessment function. We acknowledge their
recent decision to remove the designation 'National Statistics',
but this cannot mitigate what amounts to a long-standing failure
of a number of bodies to address the thoroughness of the assessment
of Police Recorded Crime, despite a series of previous reviews
which identified shortcomings. (Paragraph 54)
14. This raises serious
concerns around the decision to designate Police Recorded Crime
as National Statistics in 2011. It has been quoted by ministers
that the ONS described the system for recording crime in England
and Wales as "one of the best in the world" in 2012.
This was after the cessation of regular external audit of force
crime recording in 2007. All can see now that this reflected a
lamentable complacency. The then National Statistician took no
action at that time. This was wrong-the then National Statistician,
or UKSA, once established, should have pressed for other process
to be put in place to ensure the integrity of crime data. (Paragraph
55)
15. The reviews of
crime statistics by UKSA and the ONS in 2011 failed to expose
the unreliability of recording practices within police forces
themselves. An opportunity was therefore missed to gather evidence
and identify issues which could have called into question the
designation of Police Recorded Crime as 'National Statistics'
at a much earlier stage. (Paragraph 56)
16. It is deplorable
that ONS can have overseen the production of crime statistics,
which were a set of National Statistics, with what appears to
have been very limited knowledge of the 'quality assurance' steps
that the data went through before being sent to the ONS. The ONS
has been too reliant on too little information about the audits
performed within police forces or by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary.
Overall, the ONS has been too passive in carrying out their duties
in relation to crime statistics. This cannot continue. (Paragraph
57)
17. The fragmentation
of responsibility between individual forces, Home Office and the
ONS was not satisfactory and contributed to the failure of the
Police Recorded Crime series to meet the standards of the Code
of Practice with which official statistics must comply. No single
organisation has taken overall responsibility or accountability
for ensuring an acceptable quality of crime statistics, which
has led to their inadequate quality. (Paragraph 58)
18. We endorse
UKSA's recommendation that the ONS should publish a clear statement
of the respective roles and responsibilities of the Home Office
and the ONS in the production of Police Recorded Crime statistics.
(Paragraph 59)
19. We recommend
UKSA works closely with the Home Office in its role as the first
recipient of raw data from forces, and ensures the Home Office
takes active primary operational responsibility and accepts accountability
for ensuring the integrity of the data which it collates, validates
and submits to the ONS for publication. UKSA should hold the Home
Office directly accountable for its role in the recorded crime
statistics process, including its validation and quality assurance
processes as well as its policy guidance to forces and Police
and Crime Commissioners, and should in future examine the Home
Office's processes and procedures directly rather than at one
remove. (Paragraph 60)
20. The Crime Statistics
Advisory Committee (CSAC), which contains representation of all
of the main stakeholders in the crime statistics production process
as well as the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, has failed. It
has not demonstrated sufficient independence and objectivity in
carrying out its role to ensure recorded crime statistics are
"accurate, clearly presented, comprehensive, transparent
and trustworthy" as set out in its terms of reference. CSAC
has a vital role in leading the efforts to provide that the system
guarantees the reliability and integrity of all crime statistics
emerge strengthened from this episode. (Paragraph 61)
21. We recommend
that UKSA should review the role and composition of CSAC and the
structures supporting the production of crime statistics, just
as it has recently with a similar committee advising on inflation
figures, to ensure that CSAC is independent and rigorous and that
these statistics best meet user needs in future.
(Paragraph 62)
22. We welcome UKSA's
comments that it intends to prioritise in its workplan the reassessment
of National Statistics based on administrative datasets, taking
on board the lessons learned from the declassification of Police
Recorded Crime.
(Paragraph 64)
23. UKSA must not
in future grant to, or maintain, the kitemark of 'National Statistics'
on any set of statistics where it has failed to verify whether
the underlying data meets the standard required. They should,
as a matter of urgency, review all other similar statistics where
collection processes are beyond the control of the ONS. UKSA should
review the Code of Practice for Official Statistics to determine
whether it needs to be revised to allow for the new emphasis on
administrative data. (Paragraph 65)
Police leadership, values and culture
24. We
welcome the adoption of the new statutory Code of Ethics setting
out the principles and standards of professional behaviour expected
of the police in England and Wales. This is most important in
respect of the training of police leadership.(Paragraph
70)
25. We recommend
that the Home Office and College of Policing make a more explicit
statement of how the Code of Ethics' enforcement framework will
impose a duty of data integrity on police officers in respect
of crime recording practices, and that penalties will apply in
the event of deliberate non-compliance. They must also ensure
that officers are familiar with the victim-focussed principles
of the National Crime Recording Standard and the distinction between
recording standards and charging standards. (Paragraph 71)
26. The
vast majority of police officers joined the police in order to
serve as dedicated and courageous professionals, motivated by
their vocation to protect the public. However, targets, based
either on Police Recorded Crime data or on other internally-generated
administrative data, set by senior police officers or Police and
Crime Commissioners, tend to affect attitudes, erode data quality
and to distort individual and institutional behaviour and priorities.(Paragraph
86)
27. HM
Inspectorate of Constabulary's inspection in 2013 into the Kent
Police found clear evidence that targets are detrimental to the
integrity of crime data. We are pleased to note that when they
returned to Kent in January 2014, they found that good progress
had been made in tackling this issue. HMIC's findings in Kent
are a promising indication of how a rigorous and sustained audit
regime, combined with a clear prioritisation of data integrity
by senior leadership, can contribute to bringing about positive
change.(Paragraph 87)
28. The
attitudes and behaviours which lead to the misrecording of crime
have become ingrained, including within senior leadership, leading
to the subordination of data integrity to target-chasing. This
can present officers with a conflict between achievement of targets
and core policing values. HMIC recognises this in their first
Annual Assessment of the state of policing, but we are disappointed
that this vital issue received only cursory attention in over
200 pages.(Paragraph 88)
29. Senior
police leaders and HMIC must ensure that emphasis is placed on
data integrity and accuracy, not on the direction of recorded
crime trends. Formal performance appraisal should be based upon
these core policing values and not based on targets derived from
Police Recorded Crime data or other administrative data on their
own. We are convinced that this requires leadership in many police
forces to place new emphasis on values and ethics, especially
in the Metropolitan Police Service. We expect HMIC to lay much
stronger emphasis on this aspect of police behaviour in future
Annual Assessments. (Paragraph 89)
30. The
issues raised in this Report concerning the integrity of Police
Recorded Crime statistics demonstrate the subordination of core
policing values to the 'target culture'. This reflects broader
concerns about policing values. We recommend that the Committee
of Standards in Public Life conducts a wide-ranging inquiry into
the police's compliance with the new Code of Ethics; in particular
the role of leadership in promoting and sustaining these values
in the face of all the other pressures on the force. (Paragraph
91)
31. We recommend
that the Home Office clarify the current position about the external
bodies a police officer may approach once internal procedures
have been exhausted. We deplore the failure of the Home Office
to send us a reply in time for this Report. As soon as we receive
a reply, we will publish it on our website. (Paragraph 97)
32. We recommend
that the Home Office clarifies the route open to police whistleblowers
who have exhausted internal channels within their police forces.
Police whistleblowers should be free to refer their allegations
to the IPCC, and should, while those concerns are pending formal
investigation, enjoy immunity from disciplinary proceedings in
relation to actions taken in order to raise those concerns. (Paragraph
98)
33. We recommend
that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary should investigate
the Metropolitan Police Service in respect of the treatment of
PC Patrick and review the internal processes and procedures of
the police for dealing with whistleblowers, in order to ensure
that they are treated fairly and compassionately. We further recommend
that the Home Affairs Committee should inquire into these matters
to ensure that whistleblowers in any police force are treated
fairly and with respect and care. We have grave doubts that the
Metropolitan Police Service has treated PC Patrick fairly or with
respect and care. (Paragraph 99)
Monitoring and audit
34. We
welcome HM Inspectorate of Constabulary's decision to undertake
a data integrity inspection in 2014, and its commitment to reinstituting
an annual external audit programme. We welcome the extra funding
provided by the Home Office for regular annual audit of all forces.(Paragraph
114)
35. We recommend
that HMIC confirm that a rigorous audit of crime recording integrity
will form a permanent part of these audits. Audits should ensure
that the senior leadership within each force articulates the importance
of data integrity to its officers. It is therefore essential that
the Force Crime Registrar has not only had the requisite training
but the necessary authority within the force to do their job.
HMIC should identify a minimum suitable rank for FCRs, such as
Deputy Chief Constable or equivalent, and FCRs should report directly
to the force Commander. (Paragraph 115)
36. We recommend
that the current audit should examine the reasons for misrecording,
such as the effect of performance culture (identifying instances
where targets drive perverse incentives), poor understanding of
counting rules, inadequate training and deliberate malpractice.
(Paragraph 116)
37. The
Chief Inspector of Constabulary assured us that HMIC is "completely
independent" in its judgements and has "no allegiance,
other than to the public interest and to the law." This is
not self-evident, given the numerous instances of HMIC inspectors
moving from and into senior positions within police forces. It
is therefore vital to the credibility of HMIC's annual audit of
crime recording that this independence of judgement be maintained
and be seen to be maintained.
(Paragraph 117)
Police and Crime Commissioners
38. The
Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) role, and the political and
electoral pressures that PCCs are subject to, has the potential
to foster target cultures within forces, with consequent perverse
incentives and detrimental impact on data quality. There is considerable
variance across the country in the use of targets by PCCs.(Paragraph
126)
39. Some
PCCs consider the perverse incentives created by targets to be
so serious that they have dropped all targets. Others believe
the risk is manageable. As part of its annual audit programme,
HMIC should examine the effect of PCC target-setting on crime
recording practices and culture, and should in due course look
back at the first PCC period in office to assess the impact on
data integrity of locally-set targets.
(Paragraph 127)
40. The
Home Office, which claims credit for abolishing national numerical
targets, should make clear in its guidance to PCCs that they should
not set performance targets based on Police Recorded Crime data
as this tends to distort recording practices and to create perverse
incentives to misrecord crime. The evidence for this is incontrovertible.
In the meantime, we deprecate such target setting in the strongest
possible terms. Police Recorded Crime data should not be used
as the basis for personal performance appraisal or for making
decisions about remuneration or promotion. We regard such practice
as a flawed leadership model, contrary to the policing Code of
Ethics.(Paragraph 128))
| 
