Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013) - Committee on Arms Exports Control Contents


7  Arms Exports Agreements

UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty

165.  The Treaty on UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation (DTCT) aims to streamline defence export procedures between the two countries. The Treaty sets out a framework for arms trade and technology transfer between the UK and the US. The Government's Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Treaty states:

The Treaty only covers defence articles listed on the United States Munitions List. It does not cover the export or transfer of defence articles for use by other nations, nor certain highly-sensitive technologies that will be specified in the implementing arrangements.[235]

Under the Treaty exports from the US to the UK will emulate the current practice for authorising UK defence exports to the US, that is, the majority will be undertaken through open, as opposed to individual, licensing arrangements. The existing export control system for the UK will remain in force together with the Treaty, and UK arms exports to the US under the Treaty will still need to meet the Government's export control criteria.[236]

166.  The Treaty was initially signed in 2007 by the then Prime Minister Tony Blair and then US President George W Bush, and was ratified by the US Senate and House of Representatives on 29 September 2010, after a three-year delay by the United States. The Treaty was ratified by the UK in early 2008.

167.  The Committees' two Recommendations on the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report:

a)  states when it will be providing the further note to the Committees as to whether the Treaty processes are robust and effective following completion of the Pathfinder testing and Approved Community trials; and

b)  sets out the latest position on the Government's development of a Treaty-specific UK Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for use by UK members of the Approved Community.[237]

The Government's Response:

The US-UK Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty was finally brought in force on 13 April 2012 through an Exchange of Notes with the US Government. The key parts of the Treaty are currently being worked through and we are reassured that the process for adding projects to the list of UK Government end uses and intermediate consignees has already been successfully tested and proven by the Pathfinder projects outlined in the Annex to the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Committees of 30 September 2011. The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills granted on 16 May 2012 an Open General Export Licence for Exports under the US-UK Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty. The licence is published on the Government's Business Link website and on registration is available for use by UK members of the Treaty Approved Community.[238]

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out in what precise ways, if any, the coming into effect of the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty will reduce the UK Government's controls over arms exports from the UK to the US, and the transparency of such exports to Parliament and the public.[239]

The Government's Response:

The entry into force on 13 April 2012 of the US-UK Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty does not reduce the Government's control over exports of military goods and technology from the UK to the US. Treaty items remain under UK export control. The exporter needs to have an appropriate UK export licence in place, the details of which are reported as they are now. In the case of Open General Export Licence use, the Business Secretary's Written Ministerial Statement of 13 July this year proposed that consideration be given to inserting into all open export licences a provision requiring the exporter to report periodically on transactions undertaken under these licences. The Government will then publish this information.[240]

168.  Following analysis of the Government's Response the Committees put a further question to the Government on the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty. The Committees' question and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Has the Government now decided to insert into all open export licences a provision requiring the exporter to report periodically on transactions undertaken under these licences when used in accordance with the terms of the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty? If so, what will be the frequency of this periodic reporting requirement, and when and where will the Government be publishing this information?

The Government's answer:

Under the Transparency Initiative announced by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Government intends to insert a condition into open licences requiring the exporter to report periodically on transactions undertaken under those licences. This will include transactions under the OGEL (Exports under the US-UK Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty). As explained in the Secretary of State's Written Ministerial Statement of 13 July, the information will be published in aggregate form and will be searchable through the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website. We are now working on the detailed implementation of this initiative, which we expect to be complete by April 2013. However, we currently have no plans to require exporters to declare that a particular export was made under the US/UK Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty.[241]

169.  EGAD told us in its Written evidence that it continued to work closely with the UK Ministry of Defence on the promotion of the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty (DTCT), so that UK companies can make informed commercial decisions about whether they can actually make practical use of it. This work had included a symposium and planning for regional events in the UK. It said that it has received a "strong need for there to be greater awareness raising efforts on the DTCT in the USA." EGAD had also identified the need for clear guidance to be drafted and to be made available to companies in both the UK and USA and it would be seeking to work with the Ministry of Defence to draft this information. EGAD pointed out that it had been assured by both Governments that the highly complex "Implementing Arrangements" were not "set in stone" and that they could be modified with the benefit of practical experience to enhance the utility of the Treaty and the benefits of its associated "Approved Community" membership status. EGAD believed that such flexibility would be essential if utilisation of the Treaty was to be increased.[242]

170.  When the Committees asked the representatives of EGAD, in the evidence session on 3 December 2012, how the implementation of the Treaty was progressing, Mr David Hayes told us that "slowly would be the best was to describe it." He informed the Committees that there were four confirmed members of the UK approved community, with another "20-something in the pipeline". He continued by saying that "there is certainly not huge enthusiasm on the part of UK industry to become part of the approved community and work under the Treaty." He said that the problem lay not in the Treaty but in the implementing arrangements. (In Written evidence EGAD had stated that: "the extent of the technologies excluded from its scope would significantly limit the potential utility of the Treaty, and severely reduce the number of UK companies who could make any practical use of it."[243]) When he was asked what could be done to improve the situation, he responded that "Ideally, renegotiate the implementing arrangements." Mr Michael Bell, independent Exports Controls Consultant, added that EGAD had put to the British and American co-chairmen of the treaty management committee a series of proposals for making the Treaty more user-friendly. These were being considered. When Michael Bell was asked if he felt frustrated with the process, he replied that he was "both sceptical and frustrated." He pointed out that since 2007 EGAD had pointed out difficulties with the Treaty on many occasions, but nothing had happened.[244]

171.  The Committees put EGAD's comments about its members being frustrated with the implementation of the UK/US DTCT and that there was no great enthusiasm on the part of UK industry to become part of the Approved Community to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, at the evidence session on 19 December 2012. The Committees asked the Secretary of State what the Government would do to improve the implementation process and to increase the enthusiasm of the UK industry to become part of the Treaty's Approved Community. The Secretary of State told the Committees that the general approach to the Treaty was that the Government was pleased that it had got so far and that it encouraged the Treaty. He said that the Government's reservations were that it was "cast very narrowly." Mr Christopher Chew, Head of Policy, ECO, added that he was aware of the shortcomings of the Treaty. He said that it had been a long process of negotiating the Treaty and getting the implementing arrangements in place. Mr Chew added that now that the Treaty was in force some "shortcomings" had been identified and they were working with the US on these. He stated that the MoD was in the lead on this issue, but that work was ongoing to try to address some of the problems and to help industry understand how they could make the best use of the Treaty.[245]

172.  I propose that the Committees recommend in relation to the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty (DTCT) that the Government in its Response:

a)  states how many UK members of the DTCT Approved Community have been registered to use the Treaty-specific UK Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for exports under the Treaty;

b)  lists the complete membership of the Treaty Approved Community;

c)  states whether, in accordance with the Government's Transparency Initiative, the detailed implementation of public reporting of transactions undertaken under this Treaty's OGEL licences on the Government's Strategic Export Controls website was completed by April 2013 as planned and, if not, when it will be;

d)  states the reasons, notwithstanding its Transparency Initiative, the Government is not requiring exporters to declare that a particular export was made under the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty;

e)  states what specific steps it will take to make the Treaty more user-friendly; and

f)  states how satisfactorily or not the Treaty is working as far as British companies are concerned.

US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)

173.  The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) are the set of US Government regulations that control the import and export of defence related items and services as listed on the United States Munitions List (USML). A UK company which exports controlled military goods to the United States will need to comply with ITAR controls. The requirement to comply with ITAR is in addition and separate to any responsibilities for applying for a UK export licence resulting from UK export control legislation as administered by the Export Control Organisation. ITAR specifies that information and material concerning defence and military related technology (for items on the US Munitions List) may only be shared with US persons, unless authorisation is received from the US Department of State or a special exemption is used. In 2011 the US Department of State issued a rule change to ITAR which provides an exemption for UK end user and consignee companies only. This removes the need to obtain prior approval from the US Department of State for transfers of unclassified defence articles (including unclassified technical data) to dual and third-country national employees of foreign business entities, foreign government entities or international organisations that are approved end users or consignees for such defence articles.[246]

174.  EGAD's written submission to our current inquiry included an annex listing a number of issues it had with ITAR. It stated that "the main difficulty for the UK does not relate to rates of refusals or (currently) processing times, but rather, to regulations which extend US jurisdiction to UK companies, and are loosely drafted and arbitrarily interpreted." The US administration had recognised these difficulties and had introduced a "far reaching Export Control Reform (ECR) programme."[247] EGAD reported that the practical benefits from ECR had, so far, been very limited. EGAD's submission included the following issues relating to ITAR:

  • Extraterritoriality—The US Government asserted XT [extraterritorial] jurisdiction over all ITAR-controlled items wherever they were in the world and throughout their life. Prior authority was required from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) before they were re-exported to any other destination or transferred to any other entity.
  • Specifically designed or modified for military use—The US Munitions List (USML) currently covered quantities of components of limited military value which were controlled in the same way as their end forms.
  • Commodity Jurisdiction—The process of determining whether an item should be on the USML was slow, costly and complicated. US exporters often treated modified components as ITAR to avoid the trouble and expense of Commodity Jurisdiction.
  • "See through"—All components or end items with ITAR content, no matter how small, had to be treated as subject to ITAR access, re-export or transfer rules. Thus, any UK-designed, developed and manufactured item with any ITAR content required authorisation from the DDTC to send it to Australia, for example, for trials.
  • "Tainting"—ITAR transfer rules applied not only to US origin technical data but also to data derived from it. Thus an item of UK design incorporating US-origin modifications was permanently subject to ITAR.
  • Dual and Third Country Nationals—It was ITAR policy to control access by third-country nationals to ITAR material, and to treat dual nationals as if they had the least favourable nationality. Thus a French/South African dual national would be treated as South African in France and as French in South Africa. Discrimination on grounds of nationality was contrary to EU and UK law.
  • Defence Services—ITAR controlled not only the export of hardware and technical data, but also the provision of know-how in all aspects of the design, development, manufacture and use of a "defence article".
  • Brokering—ITAR defined a broker as a person who acted as an agent for others in negotiating or arranging contracts, purchases, sales or transfers of defence articles or defence services in return for a fee, commission or other consideration. Brokering was held to apply to direct US exports. Brokers were required to register with the DDTC and, in certain circumstances, required to seek prior DDTC authority for marketing activity. Proposals for amending this part of ITAR were released in December 2011 and found to be seriously flawed.
  • Awareness—Many UK companies had to make considerable efforts to try to mentor US companies through their own [US] national export control regulations, which added cost and resource in using lower-level US suppliers in a UK contractor's supply chain.
  • "Fending off" non-US Companies—US firms had been able to use ITAR as a smokescreen to hide behind when they want to fend off approaches from non-US firms who wanted to do business with them, claiming that ITAR would prevent this and would make it impossible.
  • UK MoD Procurement—The announcement in mid-2012 that the UK MoD's Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) organisation might be being changed to a Government-owned/Contractor-operated (GOCO) organisation could well cause very severe, and unanticipated problems. There was a precedent, on a smaller scale, from the privatisation of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, now QinetiQ, in 2001. EGAD believed it certain that, unless some special arrangement was negotiated in advance, the contractor(s) operating the DE&S would be treated by DDTC on the same footing as any other contractor with access to ITAR materiel or technology, which could impose severe limitations on the UK MoD's freedom of action.[248]

175.  EGAD stated that many of the problems outlined above are now in the process of being addressed, and companies around the world are supportive of these efforts. There were proposals on the table which would improve, if not entirely solve, most of them. But there was opposition to liberalisation, and progress had been slow. EGAD believed that in some instances (e.g. the case of the US Administration's initial proposed changes in the nationality rules and brokering) the "cure has risked being worse than the disease". EGAD stated that until these changes happened UK industry would be severely disadvantaged and the "feet draggers" were doing the best they could to prevent them happening at all. It stated that UK industry had done all it could to support genuine reform, but the US Administration needed, and deserved, the firm, continuing, high-level and informed support of the governments of its closest allies to make it happen.[249]

176.  In the Oral evidence session on 3 December 2012 the Committees asked EGAD to expand on the concerns regarding ITAR it had set out in its Written submission to the inquiry. Mr David Hayes told us that:

There is an almost inverse relationship between the current review of US export controls and what we understand will ultimately move from the US Munitions List under ITAR to the Commerce Control List under the export administration regulations. As we understand it, a fairly significant percentage of work that is currently under ITAR and involves UK industry will move over to the Commerce Control List. That will put it completely outside the scope of the treaty [UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty], of course, because the treaty is confined to items on the US Munitions List.

On the other side of the coin, it will in the longer term make things easier for industry. However, there will be a lot of pain to go through in the transitional period, while companies come to terms with exactly which items have moved and exactly what the rules are that apply to their inventory now that those rules have changed.

There is a bigger, more strategic concern, which is that the reality from a business perspective is that export control systems are effectively competing systems at national level. For many years, the Americans have been on the back foot because ITAR has been putting off buyers—to the extent that it has been saying, "Oh no, no, no. We don't want to buy it, because it is ITAR. The current export control system of the UK and the EU could be seen as being less competitive in relation to a number of countries than the revamped export control system of the US post-reform. I am not sure that that situation is being sufficiently grasped or responded to in order to keep us competitive as a nation.[250]

177.  Mr Barry Fletcher, Executive Committee Member of EGAD, added that he had a different concern to Mr Hayes. He said that there are some UK companies that would get very confused "because goods will be arriving into the UK as non-military controlled goods but will still be controlled if they need to be re-exported from the UK as military controlled goods."[251] When asked what the UK Government should be doing to clarify this Mr Fletcher responded by saying: "Certainly not jumping on the bandwagon and getting Wassenaar to change everything to fall in line with the USA." Mr Hayes added that there needed to be a greater standardisation. He said:

To give you a practical example, there are particular components, even before export control reform has gone through, largely because of a change of climate rather than policy in the State Department, where the US is taking the position that a particular component of a military aircraft, although specially designed for a military aircraft and therefore apparently falling under ITAR control, has no military significance—that is the terminology that it uses—and it therefore does not place it on the Commerce Control List under a category that allows it to be exported without a licence to all but five countries in the world. Meanwhile, the UK treats the same item as being controlled as a specially designed component of a military aircraft that requires a licence to go anywhere outside the UK.[252]

178.  When asked if there should be some discussion between the UK and US Governments about a similarity of approach Mr David Barber, UTC Aerospace Systems, said: "If we could come to a conclusion that the US and UK Governments would accept the export ratings as issued by the foreign Government, that would certainly help."[253] Mr Hayes added: "there is a level of difference beyond which I think the system will not survive, in the sense that we cannot have a situation where the same part requires a licence to everywhere from the UK and virtually nowhere from the United States, and for that system to continue to be tenable."[254]

179.  I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response sets out fully its response to the criticisms of the US International Traffic in Arms regulations (ITAR) made by the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) in EGAD's written and oral evidence to this inquiry, and says what specific action the Government is taking to address each of those criticisms.

UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty

180.  The Government's Explanatory Memorandum to the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty, which was signed by the Prime Minister and the French President on 2 November 2010, states that the Treaty:

provides an over-arching framework for defence and security consultation and co-operation, including for the long-term strengthening of operational co-operation between UK and French Armed Forces, sharing and pooling of material and equipment, building joint facilities, ensuring mutual access to each other's defence markets, and industrial and technological co-operation.

181.  The Explanatory Memorandum states that the Treaty provides "a legal framework for delivering the commitments made in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review for the UK to create stronger strategic defence relationships with our main allies whose security interests and military capabilities are closest to our own."[255]

182.  The Committees' Recommendation on the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out in what precise ways, if any, the coming into effect of the UK/France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty will reduce the UK Government's controls over arms exports from the UK to France, and the transparency of such exports to Parliament and the public.[256]

The Government's Response:

The entry into force on 2 November 2010 of the UK-France Defence Co-operation Treaty does not reduce the Government's control over exports of strategically controlled goods and technology from the UK to France. Items remain under UK export control. The exporter needs to have an appropriate UK export licence in place, the details of which are reported as they are now. In the case of Open General Export Licence use, the Business Secretary's Written Ministerial Statement of 13 July 2012 proposed that consideration be given to inserting into all open export licences a provision requiring the exporter to report periodically on transactions undertaken under these licences. The Government will then publish this information.[257]

183.  Following analysis of the Government's Response the Committees put a further question to the Government on the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty. The Committees' question and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Has the Government now decided to insert into all open export licences a provision requiring the exporter to report periodically on transactions undertaken under these licences when used in accordance with the terms of the UK-France Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty? If so, what will be the frequency of this periodic reporting requirement, and when and where will the Government be publishing this information?

The Government's answer:

Under the Transparency Initiative announced by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Government intends to insert a condition into open licences requiring the exporter to report periodically on transactions undertaken under those licences. As explained in the Secretary of State's Written Ministerial Statement of 13 July the information, will be published in aggregate form and will be searchable through the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website. We are now working on the detailed implementation of this initiative, which we expect to be complete by April 2013. However, we currently have no plans to require exporters to declare that a particular export was made under the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty.[258]

184.  When the Committees asked EGAD, in the Oral evidence session on 3 December 2012, if there had been any progress on the UK/France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty Mr David Hayes, told us that there had been "a couple of meetings, but they has not been a lot of progress on it." He added that the ability of the "UK to export to France for French Government end-use is broadly very easy to work with. In the reciprocal direction, less so."[259]

185.  I propose that the Committees recommend in relation to the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty that the Government in its Response states:

a)  how many UK companies have been registered to use the Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for exports under the Treaty;

b)  the reasons, notwithstanding its Transparency Initiative, the Government is not requiring exporters to declare that a particular export was made under the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty; and

c)  how satisfactorily or not the Treaty is working as far as British companies are concerned.

The Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU

186.  In 2009 the Commission of the European Union adopted Directive 2009/43/EC. The Directive's aims are to simplify the terms and conditions of Intra-Community transfers of defence-related products. The Directive promises to facilitate significantly certain types of Intra-Community transfers of products listed in the Common Military List of the European Union. Arms exports within the EU are currently subject to 27 national licensing regimes, which diverge widely. EU Member States have acknowledged that these disparities may impede the movement of defence-related products and distort competition within the internal market. The Transfer Directive requires Member States to facilitate Intra-Community transfers by introducing a system of general and global licences. Member States may even entirely exempt certain Intra-Community transfers from the licence requirement.[260] The Directive came into effect in all EU countries on 30 June 2012.[261] The Directive was implemented into UK legislation on 10 August 2012 via an amendment to the Export Control Order 2008.[262]

187.  In our previous inquiry EGAD expressed its disappointment at the slow progress that has been made towards the adoption of the new Intra-Community Transfer arrangements. It remained convinced that progress could have been faster. EGAD pointed out the "considerable potential benefits that the ICT presents in significantly reduced nugatory bureaucracy for companies across the EU". It believed adoption of the Directive would speed up the European supply chains for UK companies.[263]

188.  The Committees' Recommendations on the Intra-Community Transfer Directive on arms transfers within the EU in their 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendations:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states precisely what legislative and procedural changes the Government will be making to its arms export controls in order to implement and comply with the EU Directive on Intra-Community Transfers of defence-related products. The CAEC further recommends that the Government monitors compliance with the Directive by other EU Member States and reports back to the Committees on any breaches of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports as a result of this Directive of which it becomes aware.[264]

The Government's Response:

Details of legislative changes are set out in the Export Control (Amendment) (No.2) Order 2012—SI 2012 No.1910. Information on other changes can be found in Notice to Exporters No 2012/37 on the BIS website

[http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/eco/docs/notices-to-exporters/2012/notice-to-exporters-2012-37-ict-directive-implementation.doc

The Government does not expect the Directive to lead to any breaches of the EU Common Position on arms exports. We will continue to raise any concerns regarding possible breaches of the EU Common Position on arms exports by other Member States through the EU Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM).[265]

The Committees' Recommendation:

Finally, the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out in what precise ways, if any, the coming into effect of the EU Intra-Community Directive will reduce the UK Government's controls over arms exports from the UK to EU Member States, and the transparency of such exports to Parliament and the public.[266]

The Government's Response:

The implementation of the ICT Directive (2009/43/EC) has led to minimal change to our export licensing system as the ICT model is heavily UK-inspired. Controls on military items will remain the same. Exports from the UK to EU Member States made under this Directive will continue to be made public as now.[267]

189.  Following analysis of the Government's Responses the Committees put a further question to the Government on the Intra-Community Transfer Directive on arms transfers within the EU. The Committees' question and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

The Government has not responded to the Committees' recommendation that it reports back to the Committees on any breaches of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports as a result of the Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU. Please could it do so in its reply to this letter.

The Government's answer:

The measures introduced by Member States to implement the Directive have only been applied from 30 June 2012. The Government does not anticipate the implementation of these measures to lead to any breaches of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports. As we said in our previous answer, where we have any concerns about possible breaches of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, we judge the most appropriate place for these to be raised is the EU Council Working Group on Conventional Arms (COARM).[268]

190.  When the Committees questioned EGAD about the Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive during the Oral evidence session on 3 December 2012 Mr Michael Bell, Exports Controls Consultant, told us that the ICT did not make much difference to the United Kingdom as the UK already does substantially more than the ICT requires. He continued:

In terms of freeing up exports by other member states, particularly those imported by UK companies, so far we have not noticed much difference but we know that these things happen slowly in the European Union, so we are not totally without hope that progress will be made. As you know, there is a system of certified companies that permits freer imports into member states. There is only a handful of such companies so far in the EU, but there seem to be some advantages. We hope that more states and more companies will take advantage of it.[269]

Mr David Barber UTC Aerospace Systems, added:

The ECO has issued an OGEL for certified companies, which UK companies can use, but at the last count published by the ECO only seven European companies have registered as certified. There may be some benefit in UK companies becoming certified if our European customers and suppliers are going to be using the new certified licence from the Community.[270]

191.   I propose that the Committees recommend in relation to the EU Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU that the Government in its Response states:

a)  how many times it has raised concerns about possible breaches of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports in relation to ICTs in the EU Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports, and in relation to which EU Member States and what defence-related products;

b)  how many UK companies have been approved to use Open General Export Licences under the EU ICT Directive;

c)  how many companies in the EU have been approved to use Open General Export Licences under the EU ICT Directive and how many of these are British companies; and

d)  how satisfactorily or not the EU ICT Directive is working as far as British companies are concerned.


235   Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Explanatory Memorandum on the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, September 2007, para 5 Back

236   Defence Committee, Third Report of Session 2007-08, UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, HC 107, para 48 Back

237   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 132 Back

238   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 18 Back

239   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 135 Back

240   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 18 Back

241   Annex 2-The Committee' questions on the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337) and the Government's answers, p 464 Back

242   Ev w47-48 Back

243   Ev w49 Back

244   Qq 56-59 Back

245   Q 104 Back

246   Exporting military goods to the United States, Department for Business, Innovations and Skills website, https://www.gov.uk/exporting-military-goods-to-the-united-states Back

247   Ev w48 Back

248   Ev w48-49 Back

249   Ev w49 Back

250   Q 60 [Mr Hayes] Back

251   Q 60 [Mr Fletcher] Back

252   Q 62 [Mr Hayes] Back

253   Q 63 [Mr Barber] Back

254   Q 65 [Mr Hayes] Back

255   Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Explanatory Memorandum on the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty, page 1 Back

256   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 139 Back

257   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, pages 18-19 Back

258   Annex 3- The Committee' questions on the Government's Response (Cm 8441) to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and the Government's answers, p 465 Back

259   Q 68 Back

260   Hammonds, Review: The European Union facilitates intra-Community transfer of defence-related products, June 2009 Back

261   European Commission Directive 2010/80/EU Back

262   Department for Business, Innovation and Skills website, Intra-Community Transfer Directive 2009/43/EC, https://www.gov.uk/intra-community-transfer-directive-2009-43-ec,  Back

263   See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419- Ev 42 Back

264   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 144 Back

265   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 19 Back

266   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 143 Back

267   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 19 Back

268   Annex 3- The Committee' questions on the Government's Response (Cm 8441) to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and the Government's answers, p 465 Back

269   Q 69 [Mr Bell] Back

270   Q 69 [Mr Barber] Back


 
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Prepared 17 July 2013