Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013) - Committee on Arms Exports Control Contents


9  Arms export control policies

Arms exports and human rights

317.  In their 2011 report (HC 686) the Committees stated:

We recommend that the Government in its response to this report sets out how it intends to reconcile the potential conflict of interest between increased emphasis on promoting arms exports with the staunch upholding of human rights.[404]

In its Response (Cm8079) the Government replied: "The Government believes that its security, prosperity and values agendas are mutually reinforcing." The Government went on to say: "Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are mandatory considerations for all export licence applications."[405]

318.  The Committees' Conclusions on arms export and human rights in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Conclusions:

The Committees conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time. The Committees further conclude that whilst the Government's statement that "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are mandatory considerations for all export licence applications" is welcome, those considerations do not appear to have weighed sufficiently heavily on either the present Government or on its predecessor given the unprecedented scale of arms export licence revocations that the Government has made since the "Arab Spring"—the stated reason for revocation being in every single case "that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 and 3".[406] Criteria 2 is headed "The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination", and Criteria 3 is headed "The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions, or armed conflicts."[407]

The Government's Response:

The Government does not accept these conclusions as it made clear in its reply to the Committees previous report (Cm 8079 of 2011) and also in its reply to the Committees of 7 January 2012 (Annex 11, page 267).[408]

319.  I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time rather than claiming, as the Government continues to do, that these two policies "are mutually reinforcing".

Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance

320.  Giving overseas Governments assistance with improving their security and administration of justice may involve the UK Government supporting the commercial export or gifting of goods subject to export licensing. Table 2.4 of the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337) details equipment gifted by the Government in 2011.[409]

321.  On 15 December 2011 the Foreign Secretary in a Written Ministerial Statement announced the publication of the Government's Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance.[410]

322.  The Committees' Recommendations on Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Human Rights Guidance in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendations:

The Committees recommend that the OSJA Human Rights Guidance is amended to make it prominently and unequivocally clear that if military or security equipment is being exported in an Overseas Security and Justice Assistance programme, the decision as to whether or not to approve such exports must be made solely and wholly in accordance with the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria and procedures. The Committees further recommend that the requirement on officials in the current guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria in such export cases should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the Licensing Criteria and procedures.[411]

The Government's Response:

We welcome the Committees' engagement on the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidance and their specific recommendation to amend the guidance to give greater prominence and clarity to the requirements of the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria and procedures. The recommendation is timely given our review of the guidance, and we are giving it full consideration as part of this process.[412]

323.  Following receipt of the Government's Response I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 7 November 2012 with two further questions on the Government's Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Human Rights Guidance. The Committees' questions and the Government's answers in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 December 2012 were as follows:

The Committees' questions:

i) What is the outcome of the Government's "full consideration" of the Committees' recommendation that the requirement on officials in the current Guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria if military and security equipment is being exported in an Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Programme should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the Licensing Criteria and procedures? If the outcome is still not yet known, the Committees wish to be informed of the Government's decision on this recommendation as soon as it is made.

ii) By what date does the Government expect its review of its Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance will be completed? The Committees wish to be informed of the outcome of the review as soon as this is known.

The Government's answers

i) The review of the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) will be completed shortly. The Committees and we will be informed of the results and any recommendations, including any in relation to the link between OSJA and the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria.

ii) The review of the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) will be completed shortly. The Committees will be informed of the results and any recommendations as soon as they are known.[413]

324.  I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response by what date its review of the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance will be completed, and whether it has accepted the Committees' previous recommendation that the requirement on officials in the current OSJA Guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria if military and security equipment is being exported in an OSJA Programme should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the Licensing Criteria and procedures.

Surveillance technology and equipment

325.  In last year's Report (HC 419) the Committees noted that it has been reported that surveillance technology and equipment is being exported from the UK to repressive regimes who may use it against human rights activists. The report also referred to a letter from 10 Downing Street to Privacy International saying that the Government was actively looking at this issue and was working within the EU to introduce new controls on surveillance.[414]

326.  The Committees' Recommendations on surveillance technology and equipment in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendations:

The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response to this Report:

a) what changes it will make to UK export control legislation and procedures to prevent surveillance technology and equipment being exported from the UK to repressive regimes who may use this technology and equipment to suppress human rights; and

b) what action the Government is taking to prevent such exports from EU Member States generally.[415]

The Government's Response:

The Government continues to keep this subject under review, including through discussions with our EU and international partners. We will update the Committees as and when any decisions are made.[416]

327.  Following receipt of the Government's Response I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 7 November 2012 with two further questions on surveillance technology and equipment. The Committees' questions and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' questions:

i) Why has the Government still to decide on what changes it will make to UK export control legislation and procedures to prevent surveillance technology and equipment being exported from the UK to repressive regimes who may use this technology and equipment to suppress human rights?

ii) By what date does the Government expect to update the Committees on the outcome of its discussions with the EU on preventing such exports from EU member states generally?

The Government's answer:

Discussions involving both EU and non-EU partners on the subject of extending controls on the export of surveillance technology are ongoing within the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). The Government believes that the existence of software designed to penetrate the defences of computers and communications devices and to record, modify and/or relay data without the user's knowledge poses a threat to national security, industry, and commerce, as well as to human rights. Information security is specifically addressed through existing WA controls and that is why we consider the WA to be the correct forum for considering further controls in this area. We cannot pre-judge the outcome of deliberations at the WA but the UK is actively leading these discussions.

The Government's current view is that such concerted action at international level is by some measure the best option, if further regulation is required. A unilaterally imposed national restriction on the export from the UK of surveillance equipment without international support is unlikely to be effective, as it could be more easily circumvented given the likelihood that many of the companies which manufacture such equipment will have offices in other EU and third countries. Moreover, this is a technically complex area and there are legitimate commercial interests that have to be taken into account. In particular, export controls should not impose disproportionate burdens on the legitimate trade in goods and technology. Much of the technology associated with surveillance equipment also has perfectly legitimate uses in the civilian telecommunications sector.

It is therefore important that we take the time to get this right. We do not, at this time, have any plans to impose unilateral national controls. However we will continue to keep this option under review and we will update the Committees as and when decisions are reached internationally.[417]

328.  I propose that the Committees recommend that in its Response to the Committees' Report the Government states what progress has been made both within the EU and within the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) to prevent exports of surveillance technology and equipment to repressive regimes who may use this technology and equipment to suppress human rights.

Export of Tasers

329.  As stated by the Committees in their Report of last year (HC 419) the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the FCO, Alistair Burt, wrote to me on 8 February 2012 notifying me that the Minister would be making a Written Ministerial Statement the following day announcing a limited lifting of the ban on the export of Tasers (electric shock discharge guns) from the UK.[418] In his Written Statement on 9 February, the Minister said that the Government would now consider applications for the grant of a licence for the export of Tasers, but only under the following limited circumstances:

(i) Where the export of tasers is to the police service of a Crown Dependency or UK Overseas Territory and where it has been specifically recommended by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary that such a police service adopts the use of such equipment by trained officers as an alternative to the use of lethal firearms, and that the use of the equipment is in line with the accepted standards set for UK police officers; or

(ii) Where tasers constitute officially issued equipment for use by suitably trained UK police officers who are being deployed in support of a police operation in a Crown Dependency or Overseas Territory, and where that deployment has been requested by the chief police officer of the Crown Dependency or Overseas Territory; or

(iii) Where the equipment belonging to a UK police force, the police service of a Crown Dependency or UK Overseas Territory, or to an authorised agent working on their behalf, is being returned to the original manufacturer for repair, or replacement of faulty equipment, or as unwanted goods.[419]

330.  The Committees' Recommendation on the export of Tasers in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government informs them promptly of any breaches of the conditions under which Tasers may be exported under limited circumstances from the UK as set out in the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Alistair Burt, on 9 February 2012.[420]

The Government's Response:

An export or trade control licence for Tasers will only be granted for transactions that satisfy the conditions set out by Alistair Burt in his statement of 9 February 2012. Any breach of the licence conditions or any unlicensed exports may be a criminal offence and subject to investigation by HMRC and, where appropriate, enforcement action including prosecution. We will continue to report breaches of export control and on enforcement action in the UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports.[421]

331.  Following receipt of the Government's Response I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 7 November 2012 with a further question on the export of Tasers. The Committees' question and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Will the Government confirm that it will report breaches of export control in relation to Tasers, and on the enforcement action taken, in the next UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report following any breach, stating in each case to where the Tasers in question were exported or were due to be exported?

The Government's answer:

The Government can confirm that it will continue to report on all breaches of export controls, and on the enforcement action taken, including in relation to Tasers, in the UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report. In this respect we note that there has already been a successful prosecution of a UK national who had attempted to breach the trade controls on tasers and this is shown in Table 1.4 of the Annual Report 2011.[422]

332.  I propose that the Committees continue to recommend that the Government specifically reports breaches of export controls in relation to Tasers, and on the enforcement action taken, in the next UK Strategic Export Controls Annual report following any breach, stating in each case to where the Tasers were exported or were due to be exported.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) "Drones"

333.  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are commonly known as "drones". Drone Wars UK raised concerns that the main international agreement controlling the proliferation of drones, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), [423] is coming under increasing pressure from those who see it as an hindrance to the development of the UAV industry. The MTCR controls two categories of delivery systems and applicable technology. Category One systems are capable of delivering a 500 kilogram warhead further than 300 kilometres, while Category Two covers systems that carry a lighter warhead or have a range of less than 300km. [424] The MTCR Guidelines state that "particular restraint will be exercised in the consideration of Category I transfers regardless of their purpose, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers". The Guidance continues by stating: "The transfer of other Category I items will be authorised only on rare occasions and where the Government (a) obtains binding government-to-government undertakings embodying the assurances from the recipient government, [...]and (b) assumes responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its stated end-use."[425] The implication of the present guidance is that the MTCR controls are less stringent for Category Two drones than for Category One. Manufacturers are challenging the MTCR controls by modifying UAVs to enable them to fall into Category Two.[426] A senior US figure, Dr Richard Speier, formerly of the office of the US Secretary of Defense, has suggested that industry provides drone "services" to other nations rather than selling the actual drones.[427] It is thought that this would bypass MTCR restrictions because the UAVs would remain under the selling country's control. the Committees were told that the UK's Hermes 450 drones currently being operated in Afghanistan are rented from an Israel/UK joint venture company.[428]

334.  In the Oral evidence session on 3 December 2012 Martin Butcher, Oxfam, told us that there is anecdotal evidence that in some areas of Pakistan farmers are becoming reluctant to use agricultural land or to work from certain kinds of buildings for fear of attack by UAVs. He added that there "is damage to the social fabric in villages in some of the tribal areas because people are beginning not to attend weddings and other family events that are extremely important in those villages." He continued: "As more evidence becomes available [...] we would hope that this kind of thing would be taken into account under Criterion 8 in deciding whether or not to licence the export of these things [UAVs]." He questioned whether it might be a question for the British Government in setting its policy on the use of drones, "as it could be seen to be having an undermining effect on stability-building in a country like Pakistan," where UAVs are being used regularly.[429] `Oliver Sprague of Amnesty International said that his organisation had raised concerns about the use of UAVs "in a number of different contexts, but primarily relating to the UK's supplying of component parts and technology for the use of drones." He said that Amnesty International had been "very critical" of the use of drone strikes in Pakistan and which it considered to be "extrajudicial killings and therefore illegal." He continued by saying that drone technology was part of a wider move towards more automisation, and he personally felt that it raised a number of ethical and moral questions that needed to be addressed. He called for more work to be done on "the effect of increased automisation of weapons systems, and what legal, moral and ethical and international human rights law safeguards we need to have in place before that technology is implemented." [430] Roy Isbister, Team Leader, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, said that his organisation was starting to examine the use of drones from the viewpoint of the export control policy. It was trying to determine whether the rules that exist presently are sufficient to deal with the transfer of drones or whether new rules are required to apply to UAVs. He said that the problem is that many states "do not seem clear in their minds what the international law applying to drones should be." He believed that there was "a very lively debate" taking place within the US Government who were trying to work out what was legal and what was not.[431] When questioned about the use of UK components in drones that were operated by Israel in the Gaza Strip Oliver Sprague said that Amnesty International had raised on a number of occasions the role of UK components and technology in these drones. He said that "it is probable that there have been some technology transfers, or at least some assistance" and that "there are some unanswered questions." He added:

Similarly, around the export of componentry to the US, at least one of the companies involved in supplying components still markets its components as commercial off-the-shelf. They are not licence-required, but they are electronics that are important to the communication and navigations systems of those drones. Again, that raises questions around what goods are controlled and whether we need to do further work on military end-use controls and those sorts of issues.[432]

335.  When the Committees questioned the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, on the argument put forward by some suppliers of drones that there should be some relaxation of the Missile Technology Control Regime as it was damaging the market for drones, the Committees asked him if he felt that the current systems provided adequate control, in particular for the supply of components. The Foreign Secretary replied:

Under the MTCR, the controls on the export of UAVs are strong, and those capable of travelling beyond a range of 300 km and carrying a payload above 500 kg are subject, as I am sure you know, to a strong presumption of denial for export. We are an advocate of strong controls, and along with our partners in the MTCR we are keen to ensure that they remain appropriately controlled. I think that will be very important, and given that more and more countries are interested in such technology, effective and appropriate controls in this area will remain very important. That is not to say that we do not need to amend them over time as technology changes, but it will remain very important to have strong controls.[433]

When the Foreign Secretary was asked if the British Government would resist attempts to weaken the MTCR in relation to drones he replied: "I am saying that there has to be a strong regime, but I consciously say that it may have to be amended from time to time."[434] He continued: "our whole position on the arms trade treaty and on arms export controls is to make things tougher over time. I do not know what other people will describe as a weakening or a strengthening of the position. We want to have a tough, strong export control regime at all times into the future."[435]

336.  I propose that the Committees conclude that the Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committees with regard to the export from the UK of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones that "we want to have a tough, strong export control regime at all times into the future" is welcome. In the light of that policy, I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

a)  what specific action it is taking within the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to ensure that the MTCR is not weakened in relation to drones, components of drones and drone technology; and

b)  whether it considers that any changes to UK export controls in relation to drones, components of drones and drone technology are necessary to achieve the Government's stated policy, and, if so, what those changes are and the date by which they will be implemented.

337.  I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states its policy on approving export licences for drones.

Arms exports to counter piracy

338.  International shipping carries over 80% of world trade and 92% of British trade. During 2011 Somali pirates made a total of 231 attacks on merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden and wider Indian Ocean.[436] This number had fallen to 150 attacks in 2012, with a worldwide total of 297 ships attacked in 2012.[437] However, Alistair Burt, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said in a Written Ministerial Statement on 21 January 2013, that last year, 2012, saw a "dramatic decline" in the number of attacks off the coast of Somalia. He said that piracy is not a problem specific to the waters off the coast of Somalia and that the last few years had seen a "worrying increase in the incidence of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea." He said that the Government was working with industry and international partners to establish the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre for the Gulf of Guinea, which would facilitate information-sharing and act as an early warning system for vessels in the area. It would also assist the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to help them to develop and implement their integrated maritime strategy and would be working with West African states to improve their maritime capacity so that they may police their own coastal waters. He said that the UK Government was committed to continuing the fight against piracy and maritime insecurity wherever it may occur. He continued by announcing a package of support for the work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime worth £2.25 million.[438]

339.  In its Quarterly report on arms export licence approvals the Export Control Organisation within the Department for Business, Innovations and Skills has started from Quarter 2, 2012 to indicate on the arms export licence applications which licences relate to exported arms to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy purposes.

340.  In the Oral evidence session on 19 December 2012 the Committees asked the Foreign Secretary how sure he was that weapons that had been exported specifically for maritime security would not be diverted. The Foreign Secretary replied that: "every application is assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Criteria, taking into account risk of internal repression in any of the destination countries and the risk of diversion." He said that some of the destinations raised concerns against the Criteria, "so we have to look at those Criteria." He added that the UK Government approves licences for companies that have signed up to the international code of conduct for private security.[439] The Foreign Secretary continued by saying:

the conditions we attach to open licences include anti-piracy operations limited to vessels registered to a flag state; equipment only used by named personnel; companies must provide a copy of their standard operating procedures and rules of engagement with each application; there is a limit on the number of weapons that can be held in any one country at a time—so that no one could form an army out of it, to respond to that point—and weapons must be stored securely at each destination country, usually with the country's national security organisation or in authorised armouries. There are quite a lot of defences.[440]

341.  I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether there have been any breaches to date in the conditions the Government has attached to licences of exported arms to be used by private security companies for counter-piracy purposes, and, if so, what are the breaches that have occurred and by which private security companies.

The licensing of security services

342.  Following receipt of a letter from Hugh Bayley I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 6 September 2012 asking whether the provision of security services, as distinct from weapons and security equipment that is in the Military List or the Dual-Use List, falls within the ambit of present strategic export controls legislation, and if not, whether the Government would extend legislation to encompass security services.P440FP440FP440FP440FP440F[441] The Foreign Secretary replied on 30 September stating:

Where UK-based private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are involved in the export from the UK, or movement overseas, of military goods, they require export or trade control licences in the usual way. However, the provision of security services per se does not fall within the ambit of the UK's current strategic export controls legislation and the Government has no plans to extend legislation to encompass them.

The question of how best to regulate the private security industry is one that has been considered carefully by both the previous Government and this one. Following a full public consultation, the Government decided against statutory regulation. Nevertheless we remain committed to promoting high standards of conduct by PMSCs internationally, as I made clear in my Written Ministerial Statement of 16 September 2010.

Following my statement, the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG) was established on 21 June 2011 as the Government's Industry Partner for the regulation and accreditation of private security providers. The SCEG is working with the Government on developing the UK's national accreditation process. This is likely to involve certification by nationally accredited independent auditors to internationally recognised professional standards derived from the International Code of Conduct for private Security Service providers (ICOC). The Government will use its leverage as a key buyer of private security services to promote compliance with the ICOC and to encourage other PMSC clients to do likewise. The ICOC now has over 460 signatory companies from 60 different countries. At an international level, the UK, along with the Swiss, US and Australian governments is now working with non-governmental and industry partners to establish a mechanism to monitor compliance with the code. We hope to be in a position to establish the governance mechanism in early 2013.[442]

343.  In its Written evidence to this inquiry, the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) said that the Labour and Coalition Governments had moved to favour a voluntary, industry-led scheme for the regulation of private military and security companies and that this was being developed by the Security in Complex Environments Group of Aerospace|Defence|Security. CAAT did not believe that "responsibility for the oversight of a hugely complex issue with life or death consequences" could be left to a trade organisation and called for urgent, detailed parliamentary scrutiny.[443]

344.  I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

a)  whether the governance mechanism to monitor compliance with the International Code of Conduct for private security service providers has now been established, and, if so, what the details of the mechanism are; and

b)  whether it remains the Government's position that it has no plans to extend legislation, other than the requirement for export or trade control licences, to UK-based Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs).

Arms exports and internal repression

345.  A central concern of the Committees has been whether or not there has been a change of policy on arms exports and internal repression by the present Government from that adopted by the previous Government. The question as to whether or not there had been a change of policy assumed key importance when the present Government, following repressive violence against civilian demonstrators in the "Arab Spring", revoked an unprecedented number of 158 extant UK arms export licences between January 2011 and July 2011, stating that in every single case the licence now contravened Criteria 2 and 3 The UK Government's Consolidated Criteria are reproduced in full at Annex 8 of this Memorandum.

346.  The previous Government's complete policy on arms exports was set out by the then Minister of State in the FCO, Peter Hain, in a Written Answer given on 26 October 2000.[444] This Answer is reproduced in full in Annex 8 to this Memorandum. In his summary of the then Government's policy in his Written Answer, Peter Hain said: "An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by [...]concern that the goods might be used for internal repression [...]". Later in his Written Answer Peter Hain, when setting out Criterion Two, headed "The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination", also said that "the Government will [...] not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression".

347.  The two policy tests to be applied as set out in Peter Hain's 26 October 2000 Written Answer were accurately reproduced by the present Government's FCO Minister Alistair Burt in his Press Statement of 18 February 2011 in which he said: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."[445]

348.  The policy importance of the two separate tests was highlighted by me in the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees' 2011 Report, when he said, referring to the 18 February 2011 statement of the FCO Minister Alistair Burt:

That is absolutely correct wording and punctuation, from which hon. Members will see that there are in fact two separate tests. There is the "clear risk" test as to whether the proposed export could aggravate conflict. If we had just the "clear risk" test, we could probably end up justifying the sale of pretty well anything to any country. We could say, "Well, there's a bit of a risk, but it's not a clear risk, so we can sell." We would probably draw the line at Chairman Kim Jong Il in North Korea, President Mugabe and the Burmese military junta, but for everyone else, we could say, "Well, the risk isn't clear. Let's get on and sell."

That is why the second part—the remainder—of the Minister's statement is critical:

"or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."

I say very firmly to this Minister and to the House that the Committees on Arms Export Controls attach the utmost importance to that wording and to its retention by the British Government, so that we can be assured that British weapons and equipment will not be used for internal repression.[446]

349.  However, it did not become unequivocally clear that the present Government's policy on arms exports and internal repression remained unchanged from that of the previous Government until the Foreign Secretary gave Oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012. The key exchange was as follows:

Chair: Secretary of State, I want to start with what is a major policy issue, if not the major policy issue for our Committees, which is whether there has been a change in Government policy on the approval of arms export licences for arms and ammunition and military equipment that could be used for internal repression. The Committees took a deliberate decision in our report of last April to publish in full, as Annex 1, the Written Answer that was given by the then Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Peter Hain, on 26 October 2000 in which he set out in full the consolidated criteria for arms exports.

  As far as arms exports that involve weapons that could be used for internal repression are concerned, your junior Minister, Alistair Burt, in his press release statement on 18 February last year, entirely accurately and correctly summarised the previous Government's position carried forward by the present Government on policy in this area. He summarised that accurately in these words: "The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." Foreign Secretary, has that policy changed, or is it as correctly stated by Mr Alistair Burt?

Mr Hague: That is still the policy. The "or", as you have pointed out on other occasions, is important.

Chair: It is profoundly important, Foreign Secretary, and I am glad that you have acknowledged that.[447]

350.  The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on arms exports and internal repression in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:

The Committees conclude that the Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committees that there has been no change of policy on arms exports and internal repression by the present Government from that stated by the previous Government is welcome, the present Government's policy being: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." The Committees recommend that the Government adheres strictly to its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression for all export licence applications.[448]

The Government's Response:

The Government accepts this recommendation and has no plans to change its stated policy.[449]

351.  I propose that the Committees conclude it is welcome that the Government has confirmed that it has no plans to change its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression, that policy being: "The long-standing British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." I propose that the Committees further conclude that the Government's acceptance of the Committees' recommendation that it adheres strictly to its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression for all export licence applications is also welcome.

The Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review

352.  Shortly after the Arab Spring commenced, in Tunisia in December 2010, the Government announced it was conducting a review of arms exports from the UK. The first announcement of the review was made by the FCO Minister, Alistair Burt, in a Press Statement made on 18 February 2011, the full text of which was as follows:

Commenting on a review of arms export in light of recent events, Minister for the Middle East and North Africa Alistair Burt today said:

"We are deeply concerned about the situation in Bahrain and the events which have led to the deaths of several protestors.

Under the legislative regime set up in 2000, exports to Bahrain were governed by the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, which are administered by the Department for BIS. There has been no change to the Criteria since the general election.

As a result of the changing situation in Bahrain, we have conducted an immediate and rapid review of UK export licences. With advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, the licensing authority has taken a decision to revoke 24 individual licences and 20 open licences for Bahrain.

A separate decision has also been taken to revoke eight individual licences for Libya. The review of export licences to the wider region, including Yemen, is ongoing.

This Government takes extremely seriously its export control responsibilities. Britain has some of the most rigorous export controls in the World. All export licence applications are considered on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU and UK export licensing criteria and in the light of prevailing circumstances, paying particular attention to allegations of human rights abuses.

The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.

We have no evidence of British equipment being used in the unrest in Bahrain."[450]

353.  The Committees on Arms Export Controls compiled a table, from the information on the BIS Department's and the FCO's websites, detailing selected arms export licences approved since January 2009 to countries in the Middle East and North Africa of arms or components of arms that could be used for internal repression. The countries in the table to whom such arms export licences had been approved were Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. The table, covering the period 1 January 2009 until 30 September 2010, was published on 5 April 2011 as Annex 4 to the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686).[451] The Committees published an updated list of arms export licence approvals to countries in the Middle East and North Africa which might be used for internal repression for the period 1 October 201 until 31 December 2011 in Annex 6 of their 2012 Report (HC 419).[452] A further updated list of arms export licence approvals to countries in the Middle East and North Africa which might be used for internal repression for the period 1 January 2012 until 30 September 2012 is included at Annex 10 to this Memorandum.

354.  In its Response to the Committees' Recommendations on the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review in their 2011 Report the Government stated that:

The Foreign Secretary has commissioned a review of Government policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods. Although this review was originally commissioned in response to events in the Middle East and North Africa, any conclusions will apply to our procedures for arms exports to all countries. The FCO is leading this internal review in close collaboration with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Government will be reporting back on the review to Parliament. This will take place once the Foreign Secretary has fully considered the findings of the review.[453]

355.  The Foreign Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement on 18 July 2011 following, what he said at the time, was the completion of the Government's arms export review. The complete Statement was as follows:

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague): I told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 16 March 2011 that the Government would commission a thorough review of the UK's policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods, in the light of events in the middle east and north Africa and concerns in Parliament and the public about UK policy.

This review has now been completed. It was conducted by Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials in close consultation with their colleagues across Whitehall, and it examined our policy on arms exports. Its purpose was to determine whether improvements could be made to reduce further the risk of misuse of UK-origin controlled military goods and to increase confidence that goods exported from the United Kingdom would not be used for internal repression. It looked specifically at events in the middle east and north Africa region.

The review concluded that there was no evidence of any misuse of controlled military goods exported from the United Kingdom. There were some reports of the use of UK-origin crowd control vehicles in Libya, but these reports remain uncorroborated.

Consultations with our overseas posts revealed no evidence that any of the offensive naval, air or land-based military platforms used by Governments in north Africa or the middle east against their own populations during the Arab spring, were supplied from the United Kingdom.

However, the review also concluded that further work is needed on how we operate certain aspects of the controls. The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills has responsibility for our export licensing operations. The Secretary of State and I will consider how this should be done, and once that process is complete I will update the House on our proposals.[454]

No reference was made in the Statement to the UK Government's arms export licence approvals since 1 January 2009 for lethal and non-lethal equipment that could be used for internal repression in countries in the Middle East and North Africa as set out in Annex 4 of the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686).[455]

356.  On 13 October 2011, the Foreign Secretary made a further Written Ministerial Statement in which he said he was announcing the outcome of the Government's arms exports review. The full text of the Foreign Secretary's Statement was as follows:

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague): I am today announcing the outcome of a review of UK defence and security export policy in the light of events in the middle east and north Africa.

On 16 March 2011, I told the Foreign Affairs Committee that the Government would review policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods, in the light of events in the middle east and north Africa. Government colleagues with responsibilities in this area, in particular the Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills who has responsibility for our export licensing systems and operations, have been consulted in the course of this review.

The review concluded that there are no fundamental flaws with the UK export licensing system. But the review identified areas where our system could be further strengthened to enable Ministers to respond rapidly and decisively to the outbreak of conflict, instability or unpredictable events in other countries. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is already a mandatory criterion for all export licence decisions. The changes announced today will increase our confidence that UK-origin goods will not be misused for internal repression, and that our controls are being applied in an orderly and systematic way, informed and influenced by our values and interests. This will complement the Government's efforts to build Britain's prosperity by increasing exports and helping UK companies succeed in international markets.

The Government propose to introduce a mechanism to allow immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Applications in the pipeline would be stopped and no further licences issued, pending ministerial or departmental review.

We also propose the introduction of a revised risk categorisation, based on objective indicators and reviewed regularly, that keeps pace with changing circumstances; enhances our assessment against all export control criteria, including human rights violations; and allows specifically for ministerial scrutiny of open licences to ensure that the benefits of open licensing can be maintained while keeping the associated risks to acceptable levels. This will increase oversight by Ministers, including of individual licence applications.

As a result of these changes the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will ensure that export licensing policy is more responsive to rapidly changing circumstances, particularly political instability; bring more structure and consistency to the gathering of export-related information, provide more information on the human rights situation in country, including through following new security and justice assistance guidance and undertake end-use monitoring of controlled military goods, bearing in mind both the practical and resource limitations.

The Government will continue to work to improve public information on defence and security exports, including enhanced transparency of routine export licensing decisions and how we respond during a crisis. We welcome the scrutiny of the Committees on Arms Export Controls and will continue to assist in their important work.

The Government have also considered how we can strengthen our decision making when we provide security and justice assistance overseas. We must provide assistance to international partners to tackle threats such as terrorism, serious organised crime and conflict prevention. In doing so, we will ensure that this assistance supports our values, is consistent with our domestic and international human rights obligations, and seeks to promote human rights and democracy. To this end, guidance will be issued for all HMG officials on assessing the human rights implications of our overseas security and justice assistance. We will make this guidance public later this year.

We are committed to robust and effective national and global controls to help prevent exports that could undermine our own security or core values of human rights and democracy; to protect our security through strategic defence relationships; and to promote our prosperity by allowing British defence and security industries to operate effectively in the global defence market.

The Government are determined to learn the wider lessons of events in the middle east and north Africa. I believe that this package of improvements is the proper response to the lessons of this year. This does not preclude additional measures or further strengthening of the system.[456]

357.  In my letter to the Foreign Secretary of 18 July 2011,[457] I asked what the Government defined as "crowd control goods". The Foreign Secretary replied in his letter of 30 September 2011 that:

There is no comprehensive list of "crowd control goods" but some equipment carries a risk of being used for internal repression (rather than legitimate public order needs or external defence); this includes:

  • CS grenades, tear gas canisters, crowd control ammunition
  • Water cannons
  • Anti-riot shields
  • Body armour
  • Shotguns, small arms, semi-automatic pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition
  • Armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting vehicles

358.  The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the Government's use of the phrase "crowd control goods" in the Committees' 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:

The Committees conclude that the Government's repeated use of the phrase "crowd control goods" in the context of its arms export review is misleading given that "crowd control goods" are generally associated with non-lethal equipment. The Committees further conclude that the Government's use of the phrase "crowd control goods" to include "shotguns, small arms, semi-automatic pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition, armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting vehicles" is not one that would be acceptable to Parliament or to the wider public. The Committees recommend that the Government discontinues the use of the phrase "crowd control goods" in this context, which as well as being misleading is also profoundly disrespectful to the thousands of unarmed civilians in the Arab Spring countries who have courageously demonstrated for human rights and fundamental freedoms and have put their lives at risk in doing so.[458]

The Government's Response:

The Government notes the Committees conclusions and recommendations. It has already stopped using the phrase "crowd control goods" in this context.[459]

359.  The main outcome of the Arab Spring arms exports review was the Government's proposal to introduce a new mechanism to allow the immediate suspension of arms export licences that had already been approved if "a sharp deterioration in security or stability" took place in a given country. The Committees noted in its 2012 Report that "little or no consideration appears to have been given in the Government's review as to whether the initial judgements to approve export licences to repressive regimes in the Middle East and North Africa for arms and equipment that might be used to facilitate internal repression were correct or not in the first place."[460] The limitations of a control policy relying on the suspension or revocation of existing arms export licences was acknowledged by the FCO Minister Alistair Burt in his Answer to a Written Question from me when the Minister said: "While we can, under certain circumstances, revoke export licences, we cannot recall equipment once exported [...]"[461]

360.  In the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees' 2011 Report on 20 October 2011 I said that the Foreign Secretary's statement on 13 October that: "The Government propose to introduce a mechanism to allow immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability" did not address the central problem because suspension became irrelevant once export licensed goods had left the UK. He continued:

Suspension means that a licence has already been granted and that the goods have left the UK and are out of the door—the bullets have bolted and are in the hands of an authoritarian regime. Although a better system of suspension would provide a good safety net, it does not deal with the central issue of making a correct initial judgment about whether to grant an export licence.[462]

361.  I also highlighted in the Westminster Hall debate that the Government had stated in a Written Statement relating to the Arms Export Policy Review on 18 July 2011 that: "The review concluded that there was no evidence of any misuse of controlled military goods exported from the United Kingdom."[463] Sir John commented:

Of course there was no evidence. One has only to look through the 25 pages of items that we exported to see that their nature was overwhelmingly such that their origin could not be identified when they reached the specified countries. They were made up of electronics, communications equipment, cryptography, ammunition and sniper rifles. There are no Union Jacks on bullets and sniper rifles. The Foreign Secretary said that there was no evidence, but of course there was no evidence, and we did not have anyone on the ground anyway.[464]

362.  The Committees examined the review process undertaken by the Government in detail in their 2012 Report (HC 419).[465] The Foreign Secretary said, in Oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012, that the Government had undertaken an internal review.[466] In its Written evidence the United Kingdom Working Group on Arms (UKWG) expressed its disappointment that NGOs had not been consulted during the course of the UK Government's review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa. It stated that while an informal briefing had been given to the UKWG on progress during the review, UKWG said that there was no attempt by the UK Government to seek input from external stakeholders such as UKWG, its members or industry. UKWG said the "there had been undertakings by officials that there would be external consultation regarding the elaboration and implementation of the review outcomes [...] but one year on [from the conclusion of the review] the UK Government has so far not consulted with the UKWG on these steps." It continued: "Based on previous experiences, for example the way in which NGOs and Industry were involved in the review of the UK Export Control Act, we remain convinced of the added value brought to these review processes by external stakeholders." UKWG concluded that: "implementation of the review in concert with external stakeholders should be a matter of urgent priority."[467]

363.  In the Oral evidence session on 3 December 2012 the Committees asked UKWG about their disappointment about the failure of the Government to consult it regarding the FCO review on the sale of arms to the Missile East and North Africa and that it had not been involved in the implementation of the review's recommendations. Roy Isbister, Team Leader, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, told us that the UK Government should have consulted its external stakeholders. He said: "The idea that if there is a problem you review it yourself, you come to conclusions yourself and you implement it yourself is generally discredited as an approach. We would expect there to be an external involvement, where it is recognised that a problem has existed." He continued:

Our experience from the past was very positive. When it was the time of the review of the Export Control Act, there were trilateral discussions going on with industry, NGOs and the Government, and that was a very positive experience. I have recommended that in other countries of the world as a good way to behave. It has been disappointing that we seem to have gone backwards, and gone back to being told what the outcomes will be and what the outcomes are instead of being involved in the actual process.

We have seen in the statement in the annual report this year—the Strategic Export Controls annual report—what has been done to implement it. Again, that raises as many questions as it answers, so there is still a role to play for external stakeholders to look at that.[468]

Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International, told us:

It is worth noting that when the Foreign Secretary first announced the results of his inquiry into the MENA licences, there were seven areas that the Government were going to look at in light of that review. Those seven areas contain some pretty meaty and important issues. We were told that we would be consulted in the implementation phase, through being consulted as stakeholders, but we have not yet been consulted. It is worth saying that some of those things included a new process to suspend licences, a revised categorisation of countries at risk, and an enhanced risk assessment that would be carried out by licensing officials.[469]

364.  When the Committees asked the Foreign Secretary about the arms export policy review during the Oral evidence session on 19 December 2012, he told us that:

I want you to know that we have done the things that we said we were going to do. We have introduced a suspension mechanism, we have a new country risk categorisation, we have the increased ministerial oversight that I just mentioned, we have new requirements on FCO posts overseas to report on their concerns, and, I hope, we have better presentation of public information on arms exports, including giving more information to this Committee. So we have set about it energetically, and I am pleased with the progress we have made internally over the past year.[470]

365.  The Committees' further Conclusions and Recommendation on the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review in their 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation:

The Committees conclude that the Government's review of its policies and practices on arms exports following the Arab Spring should not have been carried out merely as "an internal review" and should instead have been the subject of public consultation in accordance with the Government's stated policy of transparency on arms exports. The Committees further conclude that whilst the Government's introduction of a new licence suspension mechanism is welcome, this is not sufficient to ensure that arms exported from the UK are not used for internal repression overseas because in many, if not most, cases the arms will have left the UK before suspension occurs. The Committees recommend that the Government in its response to this Report sets out whether the "revised risk categorisation" proposed by the Foreign Secretary in his Written Ministerial Statement of 13 October 2011 will, or will not, be applied to arms export licence applications when initially made, and whether he will make public the "revised risk categorisation" and explain fully how it would be applied to arms export licence decisions.[471]

The Government's Response:

The Government does not accept the Committees' conclusion about the FCO Review. As the Foreign Secretary explained to the Committees on 7 February 2012, this was an internal review that constituted advice provided to him by officials in his Department, consulting other Government departments as necessary.

The Committees' conclusion about the introduction of a new export licence suspension mechanism appears to be based on a misunderstanding about how the mechanism will work. The mechanism, now in place, allows Ministers to quickly suspend licensing to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Work on applications that are still being considered by the Government (the goods have not yet been shipped because no licensing decision has yet been taken) would be stopped and no further licences issued, pending Ministerial or departmental review. Depending on the change in circumstances, any extant licences would be subject to further scrutiny and considered case-by-case against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. If the change in circumstances was such that a licence no longer met the Criteria, then that licence would be revoked.

Suspension would be lifted (or partially lifted) where BIS Ministers on the advice of relevant departments consider it appropriate to do so taking account of all the circumstances. Once the suspension is lifted, applications already in the pipeline would not be required to be resubmitted.

The Government has an internal system of risk categorisation based on objective indicators and reviewed quarterly. The system is a tool designed to help the Government's export licensing community deal effectively with the volume of licences while paying due regard to the export licensing criteria. The risk categorisation is applied to export licence applications at the beginning of the assessment process. The objective indicators used include the FCO's list of human rights 'Countries of Concern' and information gathered under the UK's Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS).[472]

The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation:

The Committees conclude that whilst the Government's revocation of an unprecedented number of 158 arms export licences following the Arab Spring is welcome, the scale of the revocations is demonstrable evidence that the initial judgements to approve the applications were flawed. The Committees further conclude that there were no significant changes in the repressive regimes concerned between the British Government's approval of the arms export licences in question and the start of the Arab Spring in December 2010, and that the Arab Spring simply exposed the true nature of the repressive regimes which had been the case all along. The Committees recommend that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes "which might be used to facilitate internal repression" in contravention of British Government policy.[473]

The Government's Response:

The Government has addressed the issue of revocations of export licences around the time of the Arab Spring previously, including when responding to the Committees' questions on the UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010 (see page 268 of Annex 11 of the Committees' Annual Report 2012 referring to 'Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.1'), as well as questions 119-121 inclusive of the Foreign Secretary's oral evidence session with the Committees on 7 February 2012 (see Ev 26 of Volume II of the Committees' Annual Report 2012).

The Government does not accept the Committees' conclusion that revocation of export licences means that policy misjudgements have occurred. When deciding whether to award an export licence, the Government considers each application case-by-case against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. These take into account, inter alia, the UK's national and international commitments, the risk of the goods being used for internal repression or to aggravate existing tensions within the destination country, whether the export would affect regional stability, the UK's national security, the behaviour of the recipient country with regard to the international community, the risk that the equipment will be diverted and the compatibility of the arms export with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country.

It would be irresponsible of the Government not to revoke an extant export licence if this no longer met the Criteria because of a change in circumstances. Revoking licences is not a failure of our export licensing system, nor does it imply that the initial decisions were wrong, given the circumstances prevailing at the time they were taken. This demonstrates that the licensing system is working by adapting quickly to new circumstances.

It remains the case that there is no corroborated evidence that any UK-supplied equipment was used to facilitate internal repression in the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring.

The issues underlying the Arab Spring have been well-documented in UNDP's series of Arab Human Development reports. As a result of policy work begun in late 2009 on the growing drivers of discontent in the MENA region, the Government had set up the Arab Human Development (AHD) team in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at the end of 2010. The existence of the AHD team (now the Arab Partnership Department) was critical to the Government's rapid and effective response to the Arab Spring, and built on our understanding of the underlying dynamics in the region.

When the Arab Spring began, we were able to react quickly as we had already laid important foundations on which to build our strategic response. A part of this was the decision to revoke some extant export licences which no longer met the above Criteria due to fast-changing risks of violence and harsh government responses to protests.P473FP473FP473FP473FP473F[474]

366.  Following receipt of the Government's Responses to the Committees Recommendations I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 7 November 2012 with two further questions on the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review. The Committees' questions and the Government's answers were as follows:

The Committees' question:

The Committees conclusion that "whilst the Government's introduction of a new licence suspension mechanism is welcome, this is not sufficient to ensure that arms exported from the UK are not used for internal repression overseas because in many, if not most cases, the arms will have left the UK before suspension occurs" is not, as claimed by the Government, "based on a misunderstanding about how the mechanism will work".

The Government's answer:

The Government notes the Committees conclusion.

The Committees' question:

For what reasons are the Government, in accordance with its stated policy of transparency on arms exports, not making public its revised risk categorisation?

The Government's answer:

As the Government most recently stated in the Annex to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 12 November 2012, we do not disclose information about how risk is assessed for individual countries. This is in order to protect our national interests, including economic and commercial interests, and bilateral relations. It could also place the UK defence and security industry at a disadvantage in a competitive market. It would, therefore, not be in the national interest for the Government to provide the information requested by the Committees.[475]

367.  Following analysis of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337) published in July 2012 I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 18 September 2012 asking two further questions about the steps being taken by the Government to implement the outcome of the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review. The Committees' questions and the Government's answers were as follows:

The Committees' question:

When suspending licences to countries experiencing sharp deterioration in security or stability does the Government have any procedures in place to prevent the shipment of arms for which licence approval has already been given, but not shipped? The current wording appears only to apply to the suspension of applications in the pipeline, not to those already approved but with the goods not shipped?

The Government's answer:

Yes, the Committees' understanding is correct. The suspension mechanism deals with applications that are still being processed. As explained in Cm 8441 (the Government's reply to the Committees' Annual Report), the mechanism allows Ministers to quickly suspend licensing to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Work on applications that are still being considered by the Government (the goods have not yet been shipped because no licensing decision has yet been taken) would be stopped and no further licences issued, pending Ministerial or departmental review. Suspension would be lifted (or partially lifted) where BIS Ministers on the advice of relevant departments consider it appropriate to do so taking account of all the circumstances. Once the suspension is lifted, applications already in the pipeline would not be required to be resubmitted. In cases where licences have been approved but where the goods have not been shipped, the Government can consider revocation and has revoked in such situations in the past.

The Committees' question:

In what risk category was each country to which the Government approved UK arms exports in 2011 placed?

The Government's answer:

As the Government stated in the Annex to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 7 January 2012, we do not disclose information about how risk is assessed for individual countries. This is in order to protect our national interests, including economic and commercial interests, and bilateral relations. It could also place the UK defence and security industry at a disadvantage in a competitive market. It would, therefore, not be in the national interest for the Government to provide the information requested by the Committees.[476]

368.  I propose that the Committees recommend that in its Response to the Committees' Report the Government states:

a)  how many arms export licence applications to date have been suspended using the Government's new suspension mechanism; and

b)  the nature of the goods and country of export destination in each case.

Arms export licence revocations

369.  A complete list of the 209 Government's arms export revocations since the start of the Arab Spring is at Annex 12 of the Memorandum, stating in each case the end-user country, the military equipment concerned and the reason for revocation.

370.  The Committees recommended in their 2011 Report (HC 686) that: "The Government provides us with full details on arms export licences it has revoked since the beginning of January 2011 when the recent uprisings and demonstrations in the Middle East and North Africa started."[477] The information requested was provided in the Government's Response (Cm8079) to the Committee's Report and is set out in full on pages 21-45 of that Response.[478] In the case of each and every one of the 158 arms export licence revocations listed, the reason given by the Government for the revocation was that the licence now contravened both Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict). The Government cited the end user countries to be Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar and Tunisia.

371.  I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 19 October 2011[479] asking if the Government accepted that the scale and content of its revocation of extant arms export licences to countries in the Middle East and North Africa represented a serious failure by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Development, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and the UK Border Agency to fulfil their first Guiding Principle of the Export Licensing Community's Joint Mission Statement, namely: "We shall implement effectively the UK's framework of strategic export controls so as to ensure that sensitive goods and technology are kept out of the wrong hands [...]"P479FP479FP479FP479FP479F[480] The Foreign Secretary replied on 7 January 2012 saying that the revocations showed how seriously the Government took the Guiding Principle. He continued: "Given the significant changes in the region, it would seem entirely right and reasonable that risk assessments should be updated and, in some cases, lead to a change in decision where the licence is no longer consistent with the Consolidated Criteria."[481]

372.  As in the Committees' 2011 and 2012 Reports the Committees have again scrutinised closely the Government's approval of export licences to countries in the Middle East and North Africa of arms and controlled goods that might be used to facilitate internal repression. An Annex setting out some of these licence approvals from 1 January 2012 until 30 September 2012 can be found at Annex 10 of this Memorandum. Similar licence approvals from 1 October 2010 to 31 December 2011 is at Annex 6 of the Committees' 2012 Report (HC 419),[482] and updates Annex 4 of the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686).[483]

373.  The Committees' Recommendation on the arms export licence revocations in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) was as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government continues to monitor all extant licences for arms exports to authoritarian regimes worldwide which might be used to facilitate internal repression in contravention of British Government policy and to make public promptly any further revocations that it makes.[484]

The Government's Response:

The Government accepts this recommendation and will continue to give public notice of any export licence revocations.[485]

374.  Following receipt of the Government's Response I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 7 November 2012 with a further question on the Government's arms export licence revocations. The Committees' question and the Foreign Secretary's answer of 6 December 2012 were as follows:

The Committees' question:

What arms export licence revocations has the Government made worldwide since those listed in Cm8079, and will the Government list those revocations under the same headings as in Cm8079?

The Government's answer:

A table of revocations since the last update in Cm 8079 is attached at Annex B. (N.B. Annex B of the Foreign Secretary's letter dated 6 December 2012 can be found at the end of Annex 3 of this Report).[486]

375.  In the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 December 2012 Annex B of the letter contained a list of arms export licence revocations since those published by the Government in its Response (Cm8079) to the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686). The countries that had arms export licences revoked during this period were: Argentina (37 licences), Belarus (1 licence), China (2 licences); Iraq (1 licence), Syria (1 licence) and Zambia (1 licence).[487]

376.  On 7 May 2013 I wrote to the Foreign Secretary asking what further arms export licences the Government had revoked worldwide subsequent to those listed in the Government's response to the Committees' 2011 Report (Cm8079) and at Annex B of the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 December 2012.[488] The Foreign Secretary replied on 16 May detailing 5 further revocations between 1 December 2012 and 15 May 2013. The majority of the licences concerned were for equipment intended for use in maritime security, specifically anti-piracy activities. The reasons for the revocations were in 4 cases—2 to Oman,1 to Mauritius and 1 to South Africa—for risk of diversion (Criterion 7) and for 1 case, to China, for risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer (Criterion 5c) together with risk of diversion (Criterion 7).[489]

377.  Since January 2011 the Government has now made 209 revocations of extant arms export licences to 16 countries as follows:

Table 4: Revocations of extant arms export licences
CountryNumber of revocations
Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar 2
Argentina37
Bahrain39
Bahrain/Egypt4
Belarus1
China3
Egypt43
Iraq1
Libya72
Mauritius1
Oman2
South Africa1
Syria1
Tunisia1
Zambia1
Total209

Source: Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm8079, Annex 1; Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the CAEC Chairman dated 6 December 2012, Annex B; and Letter from Foreign Secretary to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013

378.  I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government informs them of all strategic export licence revocations as soon as each revocation is made stating in each case, as in Annex 1 of Cm8079:

a)  the End-user Country;

b)  the Annual Report Summary;

c)  the rating; and

d)  the reason for revocation.

Exports of gifted equipment

379.  The Government's policy on the gifting of surplus MoD assets can be found in chapter 16 of the Joint Service Publication (JSP) 462: Financial Management Policy Manual: Policy, rules and guidance on the conduct of financial management in the MOD. Gifts over £250,000 require Treasury and Parliamentary approval. Parliamentary approval can either be sought through Main or Supplementary Estimates or, more usually, by laying a Departmental Minute. The MoD has delegated authority from the Treasury for gifts up to that amount.[490] Gifts cannot be made to individuals, companies or charities but can be given to foreign governments. The following rules are also relevant:

7. As part of the gifting approval process, gifts of export controlled equipment made to a foreign government or overseas end user must be assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, taking into account relevant arms embargoes. This is to ensure that gifts are scrutinised according to the same standards as export licence applications. This process is managed by Export Policy and Assurance (EPA), in the Capability area of MOD Head Office, who should be contacted when gifting is being considered.

8. Some departmental or cross-governmental funds, such as the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the Stabilisation Aid Fund or the Defence Assistance Fund may be used to fund or subsidise the procurement of equipment for gifting to other nations. All such cases still require formal approval as gifts from FMPA Finance Policy, and from Treasury and Parliament if the gift exceeds £250,000 in value.

9. In certain circumstances, such as major overseas exercises or in operational theatres, gifting of non-warlike equipment may be undertaken where this offers a cost effective alternative to local sale or return to UK, or where such gifting is coherent with the aims of a particular operation. Delegated authority for such gifting may be granted by FMPA Finance Policy to in-theatre Civil Secretaries; in the absence of any delegation, all cases should be referred to FMPA Finance Policy and are subject to the normal requirement for Treasury and Parliamentary approval.[491]

380.  The Government provides details of gifted equipment to overseas government in support of wider security and foreign policy aims in its Strategic Export Controls Annual Report. In the Government's 2011 Annual Report the list of gifts approved by the Government in 2011 is located in Table 2.4 on pages 24 and 25.[492]

381.  Following analysis of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337) I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 18 September 2012 asking four questions about gifted equipment. The Committees' questions and the Government's answers were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Last year the Committees asked: "Is the Government requiring from governments to whom it is gifting equipment the same end-use declaration it introduced from 1 July 2010 for commercial exports as described in paragraph 1.4 of the Annual Report 2010". The Government replied: "[...] we are content to consider whether there would be benefit in requiring end-user undertakings from recipients of gifts and will advise the Committees of our findings". What are the Government's findings?

The Government's answer:

The Committees refer to the end-use declaration introduced for export licensing in July 2010 and the Government's consideration of whether it might be applied in the case of gifts of controlled military equipment made by the Government.

All proposals to gift military equipment are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. The Government intends to extend to gifting the provision that equipment should not be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred to a destination subject to a UN, EU or OSCE embargo where to do so would be a breach of the terms of that embargo.

A change will be made to the decision letter to instruct Government sponsors of gifting cases that are approved to advise the foreign recipient that this is the basis on which the gift is being made.

The Committees' question:

What was the requirement under HM Treasury guidelines that required 5,000 sets of body armour for the Libyan National Transitional Council to be "granted", whilst 3,000 sets were "gifted"?

The Government's answer:

In line with our assessment of the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people, the Government provided non-lethal assistance to the NTC to protect civilians. The body armour enabled the NTC police to help protect civilians and civilian populated areas in Libya under threat of attack and to carry out their functions more securely throughout the country. This was fully in line with the UK's obligations under the UN arms embargo. Under the HM Treasury guidelines referred to (Managing Public Money http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/psr_managingpublicmoney_publication.htm), the means by which this equipment was supplied was considered a grant-in-aid to the NTC and not a gift. Therefore Crown immunity applied to the supply of body armour and an export licence was not required. In the latter case, the same circumstances did not apply and the equipment was considered under the guidelines outlined in paragraph 2.15 of the Annual Report.

The Committees' questions:

Why is the value of the Communications equipment gifted to the US Air Force not known?; and

Why is the UK Government gifting communications equipment to the US Air Force given the amount that the USA spends on its own defence budget?

The Government's answer:

At the time of assessment of this proposal the MOD sponsor considered that gifting the equipment would be the most appropriate way to transfer it, as one of the options was for the US Government to take ownership of the item. However, discussions have advanced and it has been decided that the MOD will now retain ownership of the item while it is held on the collaborative register in the USA.

The equipment will be used for trials activities in the USA under the auspices of the Rivet Joint Sustainment and Follow-on Development Memorandum of Understanding.

In March 2010, the MOD signed a bilateral agreement with the US Government to procure three Rivet Joint aircraft and associated training and ground systems to replace the Nimrod R1 aircraft. This is known in the UK as the Airseeker project.

The outcomes from the trials activities will include: informing future Rivet Joint development and in-turn our Airseeker capability, and potentially provide support to on-going coalition operations. As gifting is no longer applicable, instead the equipment will be transferred under Crown exemption from export controls.

An amendment to remove the entry from the gifting table will be reflected in the next Annual Report.[493]

382.  In the Oral evidence session with the Foreign Secretary on 19 December 2012 the Committees asked him if export licences will have to be issued for any goods that are gifted to Afghanistan when British troops withdraw from the country in 2014. The Foreign Secretary informed us that there would be "every opportunity for parliamentary consideration and debate." Richard Tauwhare, Head of Arms Export Policy Department, FCO added that "where gifts are approved, the transfer of the equipment from the UK takes place under Crown immunity so it does not require an export licence. [...] If the gift is above a certain value, Parliament is informed in advance."[494]

383.  I propose that the Committees recommend that they are informed of all gifts of military goods requiring Parliamentary approval at the same time as the relevant Main or Supplementary estimate, or departmental Minute is laid. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response to the their Report whether all gifted military goods are subject to the same arms export policy as commercial military goods, namely compliance with:

a)  the Government's stated policy that "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."; and

b)  the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

and whether it is satisfied that this is still the case with all approved gifts of military goods that have not yet left the UK Government's control.


404   Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC 686, para 18 Back

405   Government response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p4 Back

406   The arms export licence revocations in question and the reason for revocation in each case are detailed in Annex 5 of Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419. Back

407   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 176 Back

408   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 26 Back

409   Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011, HC 337, pages 24-25 Back

410   HC Deb, 15 December 2011, cols 123-124  Back

411   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 181 Back

412   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 27 Back

413   Annex 3-The Committee' questions on the Government's Response (Cm 8441) to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and the Government's answers, p 470 Back

414   "UK 'exporting surveillance technology to brutal regimes': Fears software is being supplied to repressive governments that use it to monitor dissidents", The Observer, 8 April 2012 Back

415   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 183 Back

416   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 27 Back

417   Annex 3-The Committee' questions on the Government's Response (Cm 8441) to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and the Government's answers, p 471 Back

418   See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, Ev 164-Letter from Alistair Burt dated 8 February 2012 Back

419   HC Deb, 9 February 2012, cols 46-47WS Back

420   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 185 Back

421   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 27 Back

422   Annex 3-The Committee' questions on the Government's Response (Cm 8441) to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and the Government's answers, p 472 Back

423   The Missile Technology Control regime is a non-binding voluntary agreement to curb the spread of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. It was established in 1987 by Canada, France Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, but has since grown to a total of 34 countries.  Back

424   Ev w44-AEC 01-Drone Wars UK, para 2-4 Back

425   "Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers", Missile Technology Control Regime website, http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidetext.htm Back

426   Category One systems are capable of delivering a 500Kilogram warhead further than 300 kms. Category two systems carry a lighter warhead or have a range less than 300km. Back

427   "IISS Defence and Military Analysis Programme Inaugurated", The International Institute for Strategic Studies, http://www.iiss.org/~/media/Silos/Newsletters/2011/Spring-Newsletter-2011/Spring-Newsletter-2011.pdf Back

428   Ev w44-AEC 01-Drone Wars UK, para 7 Back

429   Q 33 [Mr Butcher] Back

430   Q 33 [Mr Sprague] Back

431   Q 34 Back

432   Q 36 Back

433   Q 149 Back

434   Q 151 Back

435   Q 152 Back

436   "Maritime Security and Defence", Maritime UK, http://www.maritimeuk.org/2012/01/maritime-security-and-defence/  Back

437   "Piracy falls in 2012, but seas off East and West Africa remain dangerous, says IMB", ICC Commercial Crime Services, http://www.icc-ccs.org.uk/news/836-piracy-falls-in-2012-but-seas-off-east-and-west-africa-remain-dangerous-says-imb Back

438   HC Deb, 21 January 2013, cols 1-2WS Back

439   Q 146 Back

440   Q 148 Back

441   Ev w 90-Letter from Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 6 September 2012 Back

442   Ev w97-Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 30 September 2012 Back

443   Ev w65 Back

444   HC Deb, 26 October 2000, cols 199-203W Back

445   Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Notice, "Foreign Office Minister comments on review of arms exports", http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=553955182# Back

446   HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 244WH Back

447   See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, Q 109 Back

448   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 191 Back

449   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 28 Back

450   Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Notice-http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=553955182# Back

451   Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC 686, Annex 4 Back

452   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, Annex 6. Back

453   Government response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, pp18-19 Back

454   HC Deb, 18 July 2011, cols 78-79WS Back

455   Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC 686, Annex 4 Back

456   HC Deb, 13 October 2011, Cols 41-42WS Back

457   See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, Ev 63-Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011 Back

458   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 197 Back

459   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 28 Back

460   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 200 Back

461   HC Deb, 16 April 2012, col 198W Back

462   HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 341WH Back

463   HC Deb, 18 July 2011, col 79WS Back

464   HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 340WH Back

465   See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, paras 203-206 Back

466   See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, Q 113 Back

467   Ev w71 Back

468   Q 11 [Mr Isbister] Back

469   Q 11 [Mr Sprague] Back

470   Q 116 Back

471   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 207 Back

472   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 29 Back

473   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 208 Back

474   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls S, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, pages 30-31 Back

475   Annex 3-The Committee' questions on the Government's Response (Cm 8441) to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and the Government's answers, p 472 Back

476   Annex 2-The Committee' questions on the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337) and the Government's answers, p 419 Back

477   Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC 686, para 135 Back

478   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, pp21-45 Back

479   See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, Ev 143-Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 19 October 2011 Back

480   Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, HC 1402, page 3 Back

481   See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, Annex 11-Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 7 January 2012, Annex A  Back

482   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, Annex 6 Back

483   Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC 686, Annex 4 Back

484   Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419, para 213 Back

485   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 31 Back

486   Annex 3-The Committee' questions on the Government's Response (Cm 8441) to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and the Government's answers, p 452473 Back

487   Ev w129-Letter from Foreign Secretary to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 December 2012, Annex B Back

488   Ev w170-Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to the Foreign Secretary dated 7 May 2013 Back

489   Ev w262-Letter from Foreign Secretary to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 16 May 2013 Back

490   MoD website, "Joint Service Publication (JSP) 462: Financial Management Policy Manual: Policy, rules and guidance on the conduct of financial management in the MOD", issue 8, April 2012, Chapter 16 part 1  Back

491   MoD website, "Joint Service Publication (JSP) 462: Financial Management Policy Manual: Policy, rules and guidance on the conduct of financial management in the MOD", issue 8, April 2012, Chapter 16 part 1. Annex C provides a flow-chart  Back

492   Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, Strategic Export Control: United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011, HC 337, Table 2.4 Back

493   Annex 2-The Committee' questions on the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337) and the Government's answers, p 442 Back

494   Qq 154-157 Back


 
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Prepared 17 July 2013