9 Arms export control policies
Arms exports and human rights
317. In their 2011 report (HC 686) the Committees
stated:
We recommend that the Government in its response
to this report sets out how it intends to reconcile the potential
conflict of interest between increased emphasis on promoting arms
exports with the staunch upholding of human rights.[404]
In its Response (Cm8079) the Government replied:
"The Government believes that its security, prosperity and
values agendas are mutually reinforcing." The Government
went on to say: "Respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms are mandatory considerations for all export licence applications."[405]
318. The Committees' Conclusions on arms export
and human rights in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's
Response (Cm8441) were as follows:
The Committees' Conclusions:
The Committees conclude that, whilst the promotion
of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate
Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge
that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting
arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising
their lack of human rights at the same time. The Committees further
conclude that whilst the Government's statement that "respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms are mandatory considerations
for all export licence applications" is welcome, those considerations
do not appear to have weighed sufficiently heavily on either the
present Government or on its predecessor given the unprecedented
scale of arms export licence revocations that the Government has
made since the "Arab Spring"—the stated reason
for revocation being in every single case "that this licence
now contravenes Criteria 2 and 3".[406]
Criteria 2 is headed "The respect of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the country of final destination", and Criteria
3 is headed "The internal situation in the country of final
destination, as a function of the existence of tensions, or armed
conflicts."[407]
The Government's Response:
The Government does not accept these conclusions
as it made clear in its reply to the Committees previous report
(Cm 8079 of 2011) and also in its reply to the Committees of 7
January 2012 (Annex 11, page 267).[408]
319. I propose that the Committees continue to
conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding
of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government
would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict
between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes
whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the
same time rather than claiming, as the Government continues to
do, that these two policies "are mutually reinforcing".
Overseas Security and Justice
Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance
320. Giving overseas Governments assistance with
improving their security and administration of justice may involve
the UK Government supporting the commercial export or gifting
of goods subject to export licensing. Table 2.4 of the Government's
Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337) details
equipment gifted by the Government in 2011.[409]
321. On 15 December 2011 the Foreign Secretary
in a Written Ministerial Statement announced the publication of
the Government's Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA)
Human Rights Guidance.[410]
322. The Committees' Recommendations on Overseas
Security and Justice Assistance Human Rights Guidance in its 2012
Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were
as follows:
The Committees' Recommendations:
The Committees recommend that the OSJA Human Rights
Guidance is amended to make it prominently and unequivocally clear
that if military or security equipment is being exported in an
Overseas Security and Justice Assistance programme, the decision
as to whether or not to approve such exports must be made solely
and wholly in accordance with the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing
Criteria and procedures. The Committees further recommend that
the requirement on officials in the current guidance merely to
consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria in such
export cases should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly
to the Licensing Criteria and procedures.[411]
The Government's Response:
We welcome the Committees' engagement on the Overseas
Security and Justice Assistance guidance and their specific recommendation
to amend the guidance to give greater prominence and clarity to
the requirements of the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria
and procedures. The recommendation is timely given our review
of the guidance, and we are giving it full consideration as part
of this process.[412]
323. Following receipt of the Government's Response
I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 7 November 2012 with two further
questions on the Government's Overseas Security and Justice Assistance
Human Rights Guidance. The Committees' questions and the Government's
answers in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 December 2012 were
as follows:
The Committees' questions:
i) What is the outcome of the Government's "full
consideration" of the Committees' recommendation that the
requirement on officials in the current Guidance merely to consult
the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria if military and
security equipment is being exported in an Overseas Security and
Justice Assistance Programme should be replaced by a requirement
to adhere strictly to the Licensing Criteria and procedures? If
the outcome is still not yet known, the Committees wish to be
informed of the Government's decision on this recommendation as
soon as it is made.
ii) By what date does the Government expect its review
of its Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights
Guidance will be completed? The Committees wish to be informed
of the outcome of the review as soon as this is known.
The Government's answers
i) The review of the Overseas Security and Justice
Assistance (OSJA) will be completed shortly. The Committees and
we will be informed of the results and any recommendations, including
any in relation to the link between OSJA and the Consolidated
Arms Export Licensing Criteria.
ii) The review of the Overseas Security and Justice
Assistance (OSJA) will be completed shortly. The Committees will
be informed of the results and any recommendations as soon as
they are known.[413]
324. I propose that the Committees recommend
that the Government states in its Response by what date its review
of the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights
Guidance will be completed, and whether it has accepted the Committees'
previous recommendation that the requirement on officials in the
current OSJA Guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms
Export Licensing Criteria if military and security equipment is
being exported in an OSJA Programme should be replaced by a requirement
to adhere strictly to the Licensing Criteria and procedures.
Surveillance technology and equipment
325. In last year's Report (HC 419) the
Committees noted that it has been reported that surveillance technology
and equipment is being exported from the UK to repressive regimes
who may use it against human rights activists. The report also
referred to a letter from 10 Downing Street to Privacy International
saying that the Government was actively looking at this issue
and was working within the EU to introduce new controls on surveillance.[414]
326. The Committees' Recommendations on surveillance
technology and equipment in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and
the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendations:
The Committees recommend that the Government sets
out in its Response to this Report:
a) what changes it will make to UK export control
legislation and procedures to prevent surveillance technology
and equipment being exported from the UK to repressive regimes
who may use this technology and equipment to suppress human rights;
and
b) what action the Government is taking to prevent
such exports from EU Member States generally.[415]
The Government's Response:
The Government continues to keep this subject under
review, including through discussions with our EU and international
partners. We will update the Committees as and when any decisions
are made.[416]
327. Following receipt of the Government's Response
I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 7 November 2012 with two further
questions on surveillance technology and equipment. The Committees'
questions and the Government's answer were as follows:
The Committees' questions:
i) Why has the Government still to decide on what
changes it will make to UK export control legislation and procedures
to prevent surveillance technology and equipment being exported
from the UK to repressive regimes who may use this technology
and equipment to suppress human rights?
ii) By what date does the Government expect to update
the Committees on the outcome of its discussions with the EU on
preventing such exports from EU member states generally?
The Government's answer:
Discussions involving both EU and non-EU partners
on the subject of extending controls on the export of surveillance
technology are ongoing within the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).
The Government believes that the existence of software designed
to penetrate the defences of computers and communications devices
and to record, modify and/or relay data without the user's knowledge
poses a threat to national security, industry, and commerce, as
well as to human rights. Information security is specifically
addressed through existing WA controls and that is why we consider
the WA to be the correct forum for considering further controls
in this area. We cannot pre-judge the outcome of deliberations
at the WA but the UK is actively leading these discussions.
The Government's current view is that such concerted
action at international level is by some measure the best option,
if further regulation is required. A unilaterally imposed national
restriction on the export from the UK of surveillance equipment
without international support is unlikely to be effective, as
it could be more easily circumvented given the likelihood that
many of the companies which manufacture such equipment will have
offices in other EU and third countries. Moreover, this is a technically
complex area and there are legitimate commercial interests that
have to be taken into account. In particular, export controls
should not impose disproportionate burdens on the legitimate trade
in goods and technology. Much of the technology associated with
surveillance equipment also has perfectly legitimate uses in the
civilian telecommunications sector.
It is therefore important that we take the time to
get this right. We do not, at this time, have any plans to impose
unilateral national controls. However we will continue to keep
this option under review and we will update the Committees as
and when decisions are reached internationally.[417]
328. I propose that the Committees recommend
that in its Response to the Committees' Report the Government
states what progress has been made both within the EU and within
the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) to prevent exports of surveillance
technology and equipment to repressive regimes who may use this
technology and equipment to suppress human rights.
Export of Tasers
329. As stated by the Committees in their Report
of last year (HC 419) the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of
State at the FCO, Alistair Burt, wrote to me on 8 February 2012
notifying me that the Minister would be making a Written Ministerial
Statement the following day announcing a limited lifting of the
ban on the export of Tasers (electric shock discharge guns) from
the UK.[418] In his
Written Statement on 9 February, the Minister said that the Government
would now consider applications for the grant of a licence for
the export of Tasers, but only under the following limited circumstances:
(i) Where the export of tasers is to the police service
of a Crown Dependency or UK Overseas Territory and where it has
been specifically recommended by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of
Constabulary that such a police service adopts the use of such
equipment by trained officers as an alternative to the use of
lethal firearms, and that the use of the equipment is in line
with the accepted standards set for UK police officers; or
(ii) Where tasers constitute officially issued equipment
for use by suitably trained UK police officers who are being deployed
in support of a police operation in a Crown Dependency or Overseas
Territory, and where that deployment has been requested by the
chief police officer of the Crown Dependency or Overseas Territory;
or
(iii) Where the equipment belonging to a UK police
force, the police service of a Crown Dependency or UK Overseas
Territory, or to an authorised agent working on their behalf,
is being returned to the original manufacturer for repair, or
replacement of faulty equipment, or as unwanted goods.[419]
330. The Committees' Recommendation on the export
of Tasers in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's
Response (Cm8441) were as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that the Government informs
them promptly of any breaches of the conditions under which Tasers
may be exported under limited circumstances from the UK as set
out in the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
Alistair Burt, on 9 February 2012.[420]
The Government's Response:
An export or trade control licence for Tasers will
only be granted for transactions that satisfy the conditions set
out by Alistair Burt in his statement of 9 February 2012. Any
breach of the licence conditions or any unlicensed exports may
be a criminal offence and subject to investigation by HMRC and,
where appropriate, enforcement action including prosecution. We
will continue to report breaches of export control and on enforcement
action in the UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports.[421]
331. Following receipt of the Government's Response
I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 7 November 2012 with a further
question on the export of Tasers. The Committees' question and
the Government's answer were as follows:
The Committees' question:
Will the Government confirm that it will report breaches
of export control in relation to Tasers, and on the enforcement
action taken, in the next UK Strategic Export Controls Annual
Report following any breach, stating in each case to where the
Tasers in question were exported or were due to be exported?
The Government's answer:
The Government can confirm that it will continue
to report on all breaches of export controls, and on the enforcement
action taken, including in relation to Tasers, in the UK Strategic
Export Controls Annual Report. In this respect we note that there
has already been a successful prosecution of a UK national who
had attempted to breach the trade controls on tasers and this
is shown in Table 1.4 of the Annual Report 2011.[422]
332. I propose that the Committees continue to
recommend that the Government specifically reports breaches of
export controls in relation to Tasers, and on the enforcement
action taken, in the next UK Strategic Export Controls Annual
report following any breach, stating in each case to where the
Tasers were exported or were due to be exported.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
"Drones"
333. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are commonly known
as "drones". Drone Wars UK raised concerns that the
main international agreement controlling the proliferation of
drones, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), [423]
is coming under increasing pressure from those who see it as an
hindrance to the development of the UAV industry. The MTCR controls
two categories of delivery systems and applicable technology.
Category One systems are capable of delivering a 500 kilogram
warhead further than 300 kilometres, while Category Two covers
systems that carry a lighter warhead or have a range of less than
300km. [424] The MTCR
Guidelines state that "particular restraint will be exercised
in the consideration of Category I transfers regardless of their
purpose, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers".
The Guidance continues by stating: "The transfer of other
Category I items will be authorised only on rare occasions and
where the Government (a) obtains binding government-to-government
undertakings embodying the assurances from the recipient government,
[...]and (b) assumes responsibility for taking all steps necessary
to ensure that the item is put only to its stated end-use."[425]
The implication of the present guidance is that the MTCR controls
are less stringent for Category Two drones than for Category One.
Manufacturers are challenging the MTCR controls by modifying UAVs
to enable them to fall into Category Two.[426]
A senior US figure, Dr Richard Speier, formerly of the office
of the US Secretary of Defense, has suggested that industry provides
drone "services" to other nations rather than selling
the actual drones.[427]
It is thought that this would bypass MTCR restrictions because
the UAVs would remain under the selling country's control. the
Committees were told that the UK's Hermes 450 drones currently
being operated in Afghanistan are rented from an Israel/UK joint
venture company.[428]
334. In the Oral evidence session on 3 December
2012 Martin Butcher, Oxfam, told us that there is anecdotal evidence
that in some areas of Pakistan farmers are becoming reluctant
to use agricultural land or to work from certain kinds of buildings
for fear of attack by UAVs. He added that there "is damage
to the social fabric in villages in some of the tribal areas because
people are beginning not to attend weddings and other family events
that are extremely important in those villages." He continued:
"As more evidence becomes available [...] we would hope that
this kind of thing would be taken into account under Criterion
8 in deciding whether or not to licence the export of these things
[UAVs]." He questioned whether it might be a question for
the British Government in setting its policy on the use of drones,
"as it could be seen to be having an undermining effect on
stability-building in a country like Pakistan," where UAVs
are being used regularly.[429]
`Oliver Sprague of Amnesty International said that his organisation
had raised concerns about the use of UAVs "in a number of
different contexts, but primarily relating to the UK's supplying
of component parts and technology for the use of drones."
He said that Amnesty International had been "very critical"
of the use of drone strikes in Pakistan and which it considered
to be "extrajudicial killings and therefore illegal."
He continued by saying that drone technology was part of a wider
move towards more automisation, and he personally felt that it
raised a number of ethical and moral questions that needed to
be addressed. He called for more work to be done on "the
effect of increased automisation of weapons systems, and what
legal, moral and ethical and international human rights law safeguards
we need to have in place before that technology is implemented."
[430] Roy Isbister,
Team Leader, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, said
that his organisation was starting to examine the use of drones
from the viewpoint of the export control policy. It was trying
to determine whether the rules that exist presently are sufficient
to deal with the transfer of drones or whether new rules are required
to apply to UAVs. He said that the problem is that many states
"do not seem clear in their minds what the international
law applying to drones should be." He believed that there
was "a very lively debate" taking place within the US
Government who were trying to work out what was legal and what
was not.[431] When
questioned about the use of UK components in drones that were
operated by Israel in the Gaza Strip Oliver Sprague said that
Amnesty International had raised on a number of occasions the
role of UK components and technology in these drones. He said
that "it is probable that there have been some technology
transfers, or at least some assistance" and that "there
are some unanswered questions." He added:
Similarly, around the export of componentry to the
US, at least one of the companies involved in supplying components
still markets its components as commercial off-the-shelf. They
are not licence-required, but they are electronics that are important
to the communication and navigations systems of those drones.
Again, that raises questions around what goods are controlled
and whether we need to do further work on military end-use controls
and those sorts of issues.[432]
335. When the Committees questioned the Foreign
Secretary, William Hague, on the argument put forward by some
suppliers of drones that there should be some relaxation of the
Missile Technology Control Regime as it was damaging the market
for drones, the Committees asked him if he felt that the current
systems provided adequate control, in particular for the supply
of components. The Foreign Secretary replied:
Under the MTCR, the controls on the export of UAVs
are strong, and those capable of travelling beyond a range of
300 km and carrying a payload above 500 kg are subject, as I am
sure you know, to a strong presumption of denial for export. We
are an advocate of strong controls, and along with our partners
in the MTCR we are keen to ensure that they remain appropriately
controlled. I think that will be very important, and given that
more and more countries are interested in such technology, effective
and appropriate controls in this area will remain very important.
That is not to say that we do not need to amend them over time
as technology changes, but it will remain very important to have
strong controls.[433]
When the Foreign Secretary was asked if the British
Government would resist attempts to weaken the MTCR in relation
to drones he replied: "I am saying that there has to be a
strong regime, but I consciously say that it may have to be amended
from time to time."[434]
He continued: "our whole position on the arms trade treaty
and on arms export controls is to make things tougher over time.
I do not know what other people will describe as a weakening or
a strengthening of the position. We want to have a tough, strong
export control regime at all times into the future."[435]
336. I propose that the Committees conclude that
the Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committees with regard
to the export from the UK of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or
drones that "we want to have a tough, strong export control
regime at all times into the future" is welcome. In the light
of that policy, I propose that the Committees recommend that the
Government states in its Response:
a) what specific action it is taking within the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to ensure that the MTCR
is not weakened in relation to drones, components of drones and
drone technology; and
b) whether it considers that any changes to UK
export controls in relation to drones, components of drones and
drone technology are necessary to achieve the Government's stated
policy, and, if so, what those changes are and the date by which
they will be implemented.
337. I propose that the Committees further recommend
that the Government states its policy on approving export licences
for drones.
Arms exports to counter piracy
338. International shipping carries over 80%
of world trade and 92% of British trade. During 2011 Somali pirates
made a total of 231 attacks on merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden
and wider Indian Ocean.[436]
This number had fallen to 150 attacks in 2012, with a worldwide
total of 297 ships attacked in 2012.[437]
However, Alistair Burt, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, said in a Written Ministerial Statement
on 21 January 2013, that last year, 2012, saw a "dramatic
decline" in the number of attacks off the coast of Somalia.
He said that piracy is not a problem specific to the waters off
the coast of Somalia and that the last few years had seen a "worrying
increase in the incidence of piracy and armed robbery at sea in
the Gulf of Guinea." He said that the Government was working
with industry and international partners to establish the Maritime
Trade Information Sharing Centre for the Gulf of Guinea, which
would facilitate information-sharing and act as an early warning
system for vessels in the area. It would also assist the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community
of Central African States (ECCAS) to help them to develop and
implement their integrated maritime strategy and would be working
with West African states to improve their maritime capacity so
that they may police their own coastal waters. He said that the
UK Government was committed to continuing the fight against piracy
and maritime insecurity wherever it may occur. He continued by
announcing a package of support for the work of the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime worth £2.25 million.[438]
339. In its Quarterly report on arms export licence
approvals the Export Control Organisation within the Department
for Business, Innovations and Skills has started from Quarter
2, 2012 to indicate on the arms export licence applications which
licences relate to exported arms to be used by private security
companies for anti-piracy purposes.
340. In the Oral evidence session on 19 December
2012 the Committees asked the Foreign Secretary how sure he was
that weapons that had been exported specifically for maritime
security would not be diverted. The Foreign Secretary replied
that: "every application is assessed on a case-by-case basis
against the Criteria, taking into account risk of internal repression
in any of the destination countries and the risk of diversion."
He said that some of the destinations raised concerns against
the Criteria, "so we have to look at those Criteria."
He added that the UK Government approves licences for companies
that have signed up to the international code of conduct for private
security.[439] The
Foreign Secretary continued by saying:
the conditions we attach to open licences include
anti-piracy operations limited to vessels registered to a flag
state; equipment only used by named personnel; companies must
provide a copy of their standard operating procedures and rules
of engagement with each application; there is a limit on the number
of weapons that can be held in any one country at a time—so
that no one could form an army out of it, to respond to that point—and
weapons must be stored securely at each destination country, usually
with the country's national security organisation or in authorised
armouries. There are quite a lot of defences.[440]
341. I propose that the Committees recommend
that the Government states in its Response whether there have
been any breaches to date in the conditions the Government has
attached to licences of exported arms to be used by private security
companies for counter-piracy purposes, and, if so, what are the
breaches that have occurred and by which private security companies.
The licensing of security services
342. Following receipt of a letter from Hugh
Bayley I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 6 September 2012 asking
whether the provision of security services, as distinct from weapons
and security equipment that is in the Military List or the Dual-Use
List, falls within the ambit of present strategic export controls
legislation, and if not, whether the Government would extend legislation
to encompass security services.P440FP440FP440FP440FP440F[441]
The Foreign Secretary replied on 30 September stating:
Where UK-based private Military and Security Companies
(PMSCs) are involved in the export from the UK, or movement overseas,
of military goods, they require export or trade control licences
in the usual way. However, the provision of security services
per se does not fall within the ambit of the UK's current strategic
export controls legislation and the Government has no plans to
extend legislation to encompass them.
The question of how best to regulate the private
security industry is one that has been considered carefully by
both the previous Government and this one. Following a full public
consultation, the Government decided against statutory regulation.
Nevertheless we remain committed to promoting high standards of
conduct by PMSCs internationally, as I made clear in my Written
Ministerial Statement of 16 September 2010.
Following my statement, the Security in Complex Environments
Group (SCEG) was established on 21 June 2011 as the Government's
Industry Partner for the regulation and accreditation of private
security providers. The SCEG is working with the Government on
developing the UK's national accreditation process. This is likely
to involve certification by nationally accredited independent
auditors to internationally recognised professional standards
derived from the International Code of Conduct for private Security
Service providers (ICOC). The Government will use its leverage
as a key buyer of private security services to promote compliance
with the ICOC and to encourage other PMSC clients to do likewise.
The ICOC now has over 460 signatory companies from 60 different
countries. At an international level, the UK, along with the Swiss,
US and Australian governments is now working with non-governmental
and industry partners to establish a mechanism to monitor compliance
with the code. We hope to be in a position to establish the governance
mechanism in early 2013.[442]
343. In its Written evidence to this inquiry,
the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) said that the Labour and
Coalition Governments had moved to favour a voluntary, industry-led
scheme for the regulation of private military and security companies
and that this was being developed by the Security in Complex Environments
Group of Aerospace|Defence|Security. CAAT did not believe that
"responsibility for the oversight of a hugely complex issue
with life or death consequences" could be left to a trade
organisation and called for urgent, detailed parliamentary scrutiny.[443]
344. I propose that the Committees recommend
that the Government states in its Response:
a) whether the governance mechanism to monitor
compliance with the International Code of Conduct for private
security service providers has now been established, and, if so,
what the details of the mechanism are; and
b) whether it remains the Government's position
that it has no plans to extend legislation, other than the requirement
for export or trade control licences, to UK-based Private Military
and Security Companies (PMSCs).
Arms exports and internal repression
345. A central concern of the Committees has
been whether or not there has been a change of policy on arms
exports and internal repression by the present Government from
that adopted by the previous Government. The question as to whether
or not there had been a change of policy assumed key importance
when the present Government, following repressive violence against
civilian demonstrators in the "Arab Spring", revoked
an unprecedented number of 158 extant UK arms export licences
between January 2011 and July 2011, stating that in every single
case the licence now contravened Criteria 2 and 3 The UK Government's
Consolidated Criteria are reproduced in full at Annex 8 of this
Memorandum.
346. The previous Government's complete policy
on arms exports was set out by the then Minister of State in the
FCO, Peter Hain, in a Written Answer given on 26 October 2000.[444]
This Answer is reproduced in full in Annex 8 to this Memorandum.
In his summary of the then Government's policy in his Written
Answer, Peter Hain said: "An export licence will not be issued
if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by [...]concern that
the goods might be used for internal repression [...]". Later
in his Written Answer Peter Hain, when setting out Criterion Two,
headed "The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
in the country of final destination", also said that "the
Government will [...] not issue an export licence if there is
a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal
repression".
347. The two policy tests to be applied as set
out in Peter Hain's 26 October 2000 Written Answer were accurately
reproduced by the present Government's FCO Minister Alistair Burt
in his Press Statement of 18 February 2011 in which he said: "The
longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences
where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export
might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which
might be used to facilitate internal repression."[445]
348. The policy importance of the two separate
tests was highlighted by me in the Westminster Hall debate on
the Committees' 2011 Report, when he said, referring to the 18
February 2011 statement of the FCO Minister Alistair Burt:
That is absolutely correct wording and punctuation,
from which hon. Members will see that there are in fact two separate
tests. There is the "clear risk" test as to whether
the proposed export could aggravate conflict. If we had just the
"clear risk" test, we could probably end up justifying
the sale of pretty well anything to any country. We could say,
"Well, there's a bit of a risk, but it's not a clear risk,
so we can sell." We would probably draw the line at Chairman
Kim Jong Il in North Korea, President Mugabe and the Burmese military
junta, but for everyone else, we could say, "Well, the risk
isn't clear. Let's get on and sell."
That is why the second part—the remainder—of
the Minister's statement is critical:
"or which might be used to facilitate internal
repression."
I say very firmly to this Minister and to the House
that the Committees on Arms Export Controls attach the utmost
importance to that wording and to its retention by the British
Government, so that we can be assured that British weapons and
equipment will not be used for internal repression.[446]
349. However, it did not become unequivocally
clear that the present Government's policy on arms exports and
internal repression remained unchanged from that of the previous
Government until the Foreign Secretary gave Oral evidence to the
Committees on 7 February 2012. The key exchange was as follows:
Chair: Secretary of State, I want to start with what
is a major policy issue, if not the major policy issue for our
Committees, which is whether there has been a change in Government
policy on the approval of arms export licences for arms and ammunition
and military equipment that could be used for internal repression.
The Committees took a deliberate decision in our report of last
April to publish in full, as Annex 1, the Written Answer that
was given by the then Minister of State in the Foreign Office,
Peter Hain, on 26 October 2000 in which he set out in full the
consolidated criteria for arms exports.
As far as arms exports that involve weapons
that could be used for internal repression are concerned, your
junior Minister, Alistair Burt, in his press release statement
on 18 February last year, entirely accurately and correctly summarised
the previous Government's position carried forward by the present
Government on policy in this area. He summarised that accurately
in these words: "The longstanding British position is clear.
We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk
the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal
conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."
Foreign Secretary, has that policy changed, or is it as correctly
stated by Mr Alistair Burt?
Mr Hague: That is still the policy. The "or",
as you have pointed out on other occasions, is important.
Chair: It is profoundly important, Foreign Secretary,
and I am glad that you have acknowledged that.[447]
350. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation
on arms exports and internal repression in its 2012 Report (HC 419)
and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:
The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:
The Committees conclude that the Foreign Secretary's
statement to the Committees that there has been no change of policy
on arms exports and internal repression by the present Government
from that stated by the previous Government is welcome, the present
Government's policy being: "The longstanding British position
is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a
clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional
or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal
repression." The Committees recommend that the Government
adheres strictly to its stated policy on arms exports and internal
repression for all export licence applications.[448]
The Government's Response:
The Government accepts this recommendation and has
no plans to change its stated policy.[449]
351. I propose that the Committees conclude it
is welcome that the Government has confirmed that it has no plans
to change its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression,
that policy being: "The long-standing British position is
clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear
risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or
internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal
repression." I propose that the Committees further conclude
that the Government's acceptance of the Committees' recommendation
that it adheres strictly to its stated policy on arms exports
and internal repression for all export licence applications is
also welcome.
The Government's Arab Spring
arms export policy review
352. Shortly after the Arab Spring commenced,
in Tunisia in December 2010, the Government announced it was conducting
a review of arms exports from the UK. The first announcement of
the review was made by the FCO Minister, Alistair Burt, in a Press
Statement made on 18 February 2011, the full text of which was
as follows:
Commenting on a review of arms export in light of
recent events, Minister for the Middle East and North Africa Alistair
Burt today said:
"We are deeply concerned about the situation
in Bahrain and the events which have led to the deaths of several
protestors.
Under the legislative regime set up in 2000, exports
to Bahrain were governed by the Consolidated EU and National Arms
Export Licensing Criteria, which are administered by the Department
for BIS. There has been no change to the Criteria since the general
election.
As a result of the changing situation in Bahrain,
we have conducted an immediate and rapid review of UK export licences.
With advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department
of Business, Innovation and Skills, the licensing authority has
taken a decision to revoke 24 individual licences and 20 open
licences for Bahrain.
A separate decision has also been taken to revoke
eight individual licences for Libya. The review of export licences
to the wider region, including Yemen, is ongoing.
This Government takes extremely seriously its export
control responsibilities. Britain has some of the most rigorous
export controls in the World. All export licence applications
are considered on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated
EU and UK export licensing criteria and in the light of prevailing
circumstances, paying particular attention to allegations of human
rights abuses.
The longstanding British position is clear: We will
not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the
proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal
conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.
We have no evidence of British equipment being used
in the unrest in Bahrain."[450]
353. The Committees on Arms Export Controls compiled
a table, from the information on the BIS Department's and the
FCO's websites, detailing selected arms export licences approved
since January 2009 to countries in the Middle East and North Africa
of arms or components of arms that could be used for internal
repression. The countries in the table to whom such arms export
licences had been approved were Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. The table, covering the
period 1 January 2009 until 30 September 2010, was published on
5 April 2011 as Annex 4 to the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686).[451]
The Committees published an updated list of arms export licence
approvals to countries in the Middle East and North Africa which
might be used for internal repression for the period 1 October
201 until 31 December 2011 in Annex 6 of their 2012 Report (HC 419).[452]
A further updated list of arms export licence approvals to countries
in the Middle East and North Africa which might be used for internal
repression for the period 1 January 2012 until 30 September
2012 is included at Annex 10 to this Memorandum.
354. In its Response to the Committees' Recommendations
on the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review in their
2011 Report the Government stated that:
The Foreign Secretary has commissioned a review of
Government policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment
that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd
control goods. Although this review was originally commissioned
in response to events in the Middle East and North Africa, any
conclusions will apply to our procedures for arms exports to all
countries. The FCO is leading this internal review in close collaboration
with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS)
and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Government will be reporting
back on the review to Parliament. This will take place once the
Foreign Secretary has fully considered the findings of the review.[453]
355. The Foreign Secretary made a Written Ministerial
Statement on 18 July 2011 following, what he said at the time,
was the completion of the Government's arms export review. The
complete Statement was as follows:
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs (Mr William Hague): I told the Foreign Affairs Select
Committee on 16 March 2011 that the Government would commission
a thorough review of the UK's policy and practice with regard
to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression,
in particular crowd control goods, in the light of events in the
middle east and north Africa and concerns in Parliament and the
public about UK policy.
This review has now been completed. It was conducted
by Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials in close consultation
with their colleagues across Whitehall, and it examined our policy
on arms exports. Its purpose was to determine whether improvements
could be made to reduce further the risk of misuse of UK-origin
controlled military goods and to increase confidence that goods
exported from the United Kingdom would not be used for internal
repression. It looked specifically at events in the middle east
and north Africa region.
The review concluded that there was no evidence of
any misuse of controlled military goods exported from the United
Kingdom. There were some reports of the use of UK-origin crowd
control vehicles in Libya, but these reports remain uncorroborated.
Consultations with our overseas posts revealed no
evidence that any of the offensive naval, air or land-based military
platforms used by Governments in north Africa or the middle east
against their own populations during the Arab spring, were supplied
from the United Kingdom.
However, the review also concluded that further work
is needed on how we operate certain aspects of the controls. The
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills has responsibility
for our export licensing operations. The Secretary of State and
I will consider how this should be done, and once that process
is complete I will update the House on our proposals.[454]
No reference was made in the Statement to the UK
Government's arms export licence approvals since 1 January 2009
for lethal and non-lethal equipment that could be used for internal
repression in countries in the Middle East and North Africa as
set out in Annex 4 of the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686).[455]
356. On 13 October 2011, the Foreign Secretary
made a further Written Ministerial Statement in which he said
he was announcing the outcome of the Government's arms exports
review. The full text of the Foreign Secretary's Statement was
as follows:
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs (Mr William Hague): I am today announcing the outcome
of a review of UK defence and security export policy in the light
of events in the middle east and north Africa.
On 16 March 2011, I told the Foreign Affairs Committee
that the Government would review policy and practice with regard
to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression,
in particular crowd control goods, in the light of events in the
middle east and north Africa. Government colleagues with responsibilities
in this area, in particular the Secretary of State for Business,
Innovations and Skills who has responsibility for our export licensing
systems and operations, have been consulted in the course of this
review.
The review concluded that there are no fundamental
flaws with the UK export licensing system. But the review identified
areas where our system could be further strengthened to enable
Ministers to respond rapidly and decisively to the outbreak of
conflict, instability or unpredictable events in other countries.
Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is already a
mandatory criterion for all export licence decisions. The changes
announced today will increase our confidence that UK-origin goods
will not be misused for internal repression, and that our controls
are being applied in an orderly and systematic way, informed and
influenced by our values and interests. This will complement the
Government's efforts to build Britain's prosperity by increasing
exports and helping UK companies succeed in international markets.
The Government propose to introduce a mechanism to
allow immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing
a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Applications in
the pipeline would be stopped and no further licences issued,
pending ministerial or departmental review.
We also propose the introduction of a revised risk
categorisation, based on objective indicators and reviewed regularly,
that keeps pace with changing circumstances; enhances our assessment
against all export control criteria, including human rights violations;
and allows specifically for ministerial scrutiny of open licences
to ensure that the benefits of open licensing can be maintained
while keeping the associated risks to acceptable levels. This
will increase oversight by Ministers, including of individual
licence applications.
As a result of these changes the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office will ensure that export licensing policy is more responsive
to rapidly changing circumstances, particularly political instability;
bring more structure and consistency to the gathering of export-related
information, provide more information on the human rights situation
in country, including through following new security and justice
assistance guidance and undertake end-use monitoring of controlled
military goods, bearing in mind both the practical and resource
limitations.
The Government will continue to work to improve public
information on defence and security exports, including enhanced
transparency of routine export licensing decisions and how we
respond during a crisis. We welcome the scrutiny of the Committees
on Arms Export Controls and will continue to assist in their important
work.
The Government have also considered how we can strengthen
our decision making when we provide security and justice assistance
overseas. We must provide assistance to international partners
to tackle threats such as terrorism, serious organised crime and
conflict prevention. In doing so, we will ensure that this assistance
supports our values, is consistent with our domestic and international
human rights obligations, and seeks to promote human rights and
democracy. To this end, guidance will be issued for all HMG officials
on assessing the human rights implications of our overseas security
and justice assistance. We will make this guidance public later
this year.
We are committed to robust and effective national
and global controls to help prevent exports that could undermine
our own security or core values of human rights and democracy;
to protect our security through strategic defence relationships;
and to promote our prosperity by allowing British defence and
security industries to operate effectively in the global defence
market.
The Government are determined to learn the wider
lessons of events in the middle east and north Africa. I believe
that this package of improvements is the proper response to the
lessons of this year. This does not preclude additional measures
or further strengthening of the system.[456]
357. In my letter to the Foreign Secretary of
18 July 2011,[457]
I asked what the Government defined as "crowd control goods".
The Foreign Secretary replied in his letter of 30 September 2011
that:
There is no comprehensive list of "crowd control
goods" but some equipment carries a risk of being used for
internal repression (rather than legitimate public order needs
or external defence); this includes:
- CS grenades, tear gas canisters, crowd control
ammunition
- Water cannons
- Anti-riot shields
- Body armour
- Shotguns, small arms, semi-automatic pistols,
assault rifles, sniper rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition
- Armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting
vehicles
358. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation
on the Government's use of the phrase "crowd control goods"
in the Committees' 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's
Response (Cm8441) were as follows:
The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:
The Committees conclude that the Government's repeated
use of the phrase "crowd control goods" in the context
of its arms export review is misleading given that "crowd
control goods" are generally associated with non-lethal equipment.
The Committees further conclude that the Government's use of the
phrase "crowd control goods" to include "shotguns,
small arms, semi-automatic pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles,
submachine guns, and ammunition, armoured personnel carriers,
armoured fighting vehicles" is not one that would be acceptable
to Parliament or to the wider public. The Committees recommend
that the Government discontinues the use of the phrase "crowd
control goods" in this context, which as well as being misleading
is also profoundly disrespectful to the thousands of unarmed civilians
in the Arab Spring countries who have courageously demonstrated
for human rights and fundamental freedoms and have put their lives
at risk in doing so.[458]
The Government's Response:
The Government notes the Committees conclusions and
recommendations. It has already stopped using the phrase "crowd
control goods" in this context.[459]
359. The main outcome of the Arab Spring arms
exports review was the Government's proposal to introduce a new
mechanism to allow the immediate suspension of arms export licences
that had already been approved if "a sharp deterioration
in security or stability" took place in a given country.
The Committees noted in its 2012 Report that "little or no
consideration appears to have been given in the Government's review
as to whether the initial judgements to approve export licences
to repressive regimes in the Middle East and North Africa for
arms and equipment that might be used to facilitate internal repression
were correct or not in the first place."[460]
The limitations of a control policy relying on the suspension
or revocation of existing arms export licences was acknowledged
by the FCO Minister Alistair Burt in his Answer to a Written Question
from me when the Minister said: "While we can, under certain
circumstances, revoke export licences, we cannot recall equipment
once exported [...]"[461]
360. In the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees'
2011 Report on 20 October 2011 I said that the Foreign Secretary's
statement on 13 October that: "The Government propose to
introduce a mechanism to allow immediate licensing suspension
to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or
stability" did not address the central problem because suspension
became irrelevant once export licensed goods had left the UK.
He continued:
Suspension means that a licence has already been
granted and that the goods have left the UK and are out of the
door—the bullets have bolted and are in the hands of an
authoritarian regime. Although a better system of suspension would
provide a good safety net, it does not deal with the central issue
of making a correct initial judgment about whether to grant an
export licence.[462]
361. I also highlighted in the Westminster Hall
debate that the Government had stated in a Written Statement relating
to the Arms Export Policy Review on 18 July 2011 that: "The
review concluded that there was no evidence of any misuse of controlled
military goods exported from the United Kingdom."[463]
Sir John commented:
Of course there was no evidence. One has only to
look through the 25 pages of items that we exported to see that
their nature was overwhelmingly such that their origin could not
be identified when they reached the specified countries. They
were made up of electronics, communications equipment, cryptography,
ammunition and sniper rifles. There are no Union Jacks on bullets
and sniper rifles. The Foreign Secretary said that there was no
evidence, but of course there was no evidence, and we did not
have anyone on the ground anyway.[464]
362. The Committees examined the review process
undertaken by the Government in detail in their 2012 Report (HC 419).[465]
The Foreign Secretary said, in Oral evidence to the Committees
on 7 February 2012, that the Government had undertaken an internal
review.[466] In its
Written evidence the United Kingdom Working Group on Arms (UKWG)
expressed its disappointment that NGOs had not been consulted
during the course of the UK Government's review of arms exports
to the Middle East and North Africa. It stated that while an informal
briefing had been given to the UKWG on progress during the review,
UKWG said that there was no attempt by the UK Government to seek
input from external stakeholders such as UKWG, its members or
industry. UKWG said the "there had been undertakings by officials
that there would be external consultation regarding the elaboration
and implementation of the review outcomes [...] but one year on
[from the conclusion of the review] the UK Government has so far
not consulted with the UKWG on these steps." It continued:
"Based on previous experiences, for example the way in which
NGOs and Industry were involved in the review of the UK Export
Control Act, we remain convinced of the added value brought to
these review processes by external stakeholders." UKWG concluded
that: "implementation of the review in concert with external
stakeholders should be a matter of urgent priority."[467]
363. In the Oral evidence session on 3 December
2012 the Committees asked UKWG about their disappointment about
the failure of the Government to consult it regarding the FCO
review on the sale of arms to the Missile East and North Africa
and that it had not been involved in the implementation of the
review's recommendations. Roy Isbister, Team Leader, Small Arms
and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, told us that the UK Government
should have consulted its external stakeholders. He said: "The
idea that if there is a problem you review it yourself, you come
to conclusions yourself and you implement it yourself is generally
discredited as an approach. We would expect there to be an external
involvement, where it is recognised that a problem has existed."
He continued:
Our experience from the past was very positive. When
it was the time of the review of the Export Control Act, there
were trilateral discussions going on with industry, NGOs and the
Government, and that was a very positive experience. I have recommended
that in other countries of the world as a good way to behave.
It has been disappointing that we seem to have gone backwards,
and gone back to being told what the outcomes will be and what
the outcomes are instead of being involved in the actual process.
We have seen in the statement in the annual report
this year—the Strategic Export Controls annual report—what
has been done to implement it. Again, that raises as many questions
as it answers, so there is still a role to play for external stakeholders
to look at that.[468]
Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International, told us:
It is worth noting that when the Foreign Secretary
first announced the results of his inquiry into the MENA licences,
there were seven areas that the Government were going to look
at in light of that review. Those seven areas contain some pretty
meaty and important issues. We were told that we would be consulted
in the implementation phase, through being consulted as stakeholders,
but we have not yet been consulted. It is worth saying that some
of those things included a new process to suspend licences, a
revised categorisation of countries at risk, and an enhanced risk
assessment that would be carried out by licensing officials.[469]
364. When the Committees asked the Foreign Secretary
about the arms export policy review during the Oral evidence session
on 19 December 2012, he told us that:
I want you to know that we have done the things that
we said we were going to do. We have introduced a suspension mechanism,
we have a new country risk categorisation, we have the increased
ministerial oversight that I just mentioned, we have new requirements
on FCO posts overseas to report on their concerns, and, I hope,
we have better presentation of public information on arms exports,
including giving more information to this Committee. So we have
set about it energetically, and I am pleased with the progress
we have made internally over the past year.[470]
365. The Committees' further Conclusions and
Recommendation on the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy
review in their 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's
Response (Cm8441) were as follows:
The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation:
The Committees conclude that the Government's review
of its policies and practices on arms exports following the Arab
Spring should not have been carried out merely as "an internal
review" and should instead have been the subject of public
consultation in accordance with the Government's stated policy
of transparency on arms exports. The Committees further conclude
that whilst the Government's introduction of a new licence suspension
mechanism is welcome, this is not sufficient to ensure that arms
exported from the UK are not used for internal repression overseas
because in many, if not most, cases the arms will have left the
UK before suspension occurs. The Committees recommend that the
Government in its response to this Report sets out whether the
"revised risk categorisation" proposed by the Foreign
Secretary in his Written Ministerial Statement of 13 October 2011
will, or will not, be applied to arms export licence applications
when initially made, and whether he will make public the "revised
risk categorisation" and explain fully how it would be applied
to arms export licence decisions.[471]
The Government's Response:
The Government does not accept the Committees' conclusion
about the FCO Review. As the Foreign Secretary explained to the
Committees on 7 February 2012, this was an internal review that
constituted advice provided to him by officials in his Department,
consulting other Government departments as necessary.
The Committees' conclusion about the introduction
of a new export licence suspension mechanism appears to be based
on a misunderstanding about how the mechanism will work. The mechanism,
now in place, allows Ministers to quickly suspend licensing to
countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability.
Work on applications that are still being considered by the Government
(the goods have not yet been shipped because no licensing decision
has yet been taken) would be stopped and no further licences issued,
pending Ministerial or departmental review. Depending on the change
in circumstances, any extant licences would be subject to further
scrutiny and considered case-by-case against the Consolidated
EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. If the change
in circumstances was such that a licence no longer met the Criteria,
then that licence would be revoked.
Suspension would be lifted (or partially lifted)
where BIS Ministers on the advice of relevant departments consider
it appropriate to do so taking account of all the circumstances.
Once the suspension is lifted, applications already in the pipeline
would not be required to be resubmitted.
The Government has an internal system of risk categorisation
based on objective indicators and reviewed quarterly. The system
is a tool designed to help the Government's export licensing community
deal effectively with the volume of licences while paying due
regard to the export licensing criteria. The risk categorisation
is applied to export licence applications at the beginning of
the assessment process. The objective indicators used include
the FCO's list of human rights 'Countries of Concern' and information
gathered under the UK's Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS).[472]
The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation:
The Committees conclude that whilst the Government's
revocation of an unprecedented number of 158 arms export licences
following the Arab Spring is welcome, the scale of the revocations
is demonstrable evidence that the initial judgements to approve
the applications were flawed. The Committees further conclude
that there were no significant changes in the repressive regimes
concerned between the British Government's approval of the arms
export licences in question and the start of the Arab Spring in
December 2010, and that the Arab Spring simply exposed the true
nature of the repressive regimes which had been the case all along.
The Committees recommend that the Government should apply significantly
more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence
applications for goods to authoritarian regimes "which might
be used to facilitate internal repression" in contravention
of British Government policy.[473]
The Government's Response:
The Government has addressed the issue of revocations
of export licences around the time of the Arab Spring previously,
including when responding to the Committees' questions on the
UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010 (see page 268
of Annex 11 of the Committees' Annual Report 2012 referring to
'Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.1'), as well as questions
119-121 inclusive of the Foreign Secretary's oral evidence session
with the Committees on 7 February 2012 (see Ev 26 of Volume II
of the Committees' Annual Report 2012).
The Government does not accept the Committees' conclusion
that revocation of export licences means that policy misjudgements
have occurred. When deciding whether to award an export licence,
the Government considers each application case-by-case against
the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.
These take into account, inter alia, the UK's national and international
commitments, the risk of the goods being used for internal repression
or to aggravate existing tensions within the destination country,
whether the export would affect regional stability, the UK's national
security, the behaviour of the recipient country with regard to
the international community, the risk that the equipment will
be diverted and the compatibility of the arms export with the
technical and economic capacity of the recipient country.
It would be irresponsible of the Government not to
revoke an extant export licence if this no longer met the Criteria
because of a change in circumstances. Revoking licences is not
a failure of our export licensing system, nor does it imply that
the initial decisions were wrong, given the circumstances prevailing
at the time they were taken. This demonstrates that the licensing
system is working by adapting quickly to new circumstances.
It remains the case that there is no corroborated
evidence that any UK-supplied equipment was used to facilitate
internal repression in the Middle East and North Africa during
the Arab Spring.
The issues underlying the Arab Spring have been well-documented
in UNDP's series of Arab Human Development reports. As a result
of policy work begun in late 2009 on the growing drivers of discontent
in the MENA region, the Government had set up the Arab Human Development
(AHD) team in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at the end of
2010. The existence of the AHD team (now the Arab Partnership
Department) was critical to the Government's rapid and effective
response to the Arab Spring, and built on our understanding of
the underlying dynamics in the region.
When the Arab Spring began, we were able to react
quickly as we had already laid important foundations on which
to build our strategic response. A part of this was the decision
to revoke some extant export licences which no longer met the
above Criteria due to fast-changing risks of violence and harsh
government responses to protests.P473FP473FP473FP473FP473F[474]
366. Following receipt of the Government's Responses
to the Committees Recommendations I wrote to the Foreign Secretary
on 7 November 2012 with two further questions on the Government's
Arab Spring arms export policy review. The Committees' questions
and the Government's answers were as follows:
The Committees' question:
The Committees conclusion that "whilst the Government's
introduction of a new licence suspension mechanism is welcome,
this is not sufficient to ensure that arms exported from the UK
are not used for internal repression overseas because in many,
if not most cases, the arms will have left the UK before suspension
occurs" is not, as claimed by the Government, "based
on a misunderstanding about how the mechanism will work".
The Government's answer:
The Government notes the Committees conclusion.
The Committees' question:
For what reasons are the Government, in accordance
with its stated policy of transparency on arms exports, not making
public its revised risk categorisation?
The Government's answer:
As the Government most recently stated in the Annex
to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 12 November 2012, we do not
disclose information about how risk is assessed for individual
countries. This is in order to protect our national interests,
including economic and commercial interests, and bilateral relations.
It could also place the UK defence and security industry at a
disadvantage in a competitive market. It would, therefore, not
be in the national interest for the Government to provide the
information requested by the Committees.[475]
367. Following analysis of the Government's United
Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337)
published in July 2012 I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 18
September 2012 asking two further questions about the steps being
taken by the Government to implement the outcome of the Government's
Arab Spring arms export policy review. The Committees' questions
and the Government's answers were as follows:
The Committees' question:
When suspending licences to countries experiencing
sharp deterioration in security or stability does the Government
have any procedures in place to prevent the shipment of arms for
which licence approval has already been given, but not shipped?
The current wording appears only to apply to the suspension of
applications in the pipeline, not to those already approved but
with the goods not shipped?
The Government's answer:
Yes, the Committees' understanding is correct. The
suspension mechanism deals with applications that are still being
processed. As explained in Cm 8441 (the Government's reply to
the Committees' Annual Report), the mechanism allows Ministers
to quickly suspend licensing to countries experiencing a sharp
deterioration in security or stability. Work on applications that
are still being considered by the Government (the goods have not
yet been shipped because no licensing decision has yet been taken)
would be stopped and no further licences issued, pending Ministerial
or departmental review. Suspension would be lifted (or partially
lifted) where BIS Ministers on the advice of relevant departments
consider it appropriate to do so taking account of all the circumstances.
Once the suspension is lifted, applications already in the pipeline
would not be required to be resubmitted. In cases where licences
have been approved but where the goods have not been shipped,
the Government can consider revocation and has revoked in such
situations in the past.
The Committees' question:
In what risk category was each country to which the
Government approved UK arms exports in 2011 placed?
The Government's answer:
As the Government stated in the Annex to the Foreign
Secretary's letter of 7 January 2012, we do not disclose information
about how risk is assessed for individual countries. This is in
order to protect our national interests, including economic and
commercial interests, and bilateral relations. It could also place
the UK defence and security industry at a disadvantage in a competitive
market. It would, therefore, not be in the national interest for
the Government to provide the information requested by the Committees.[476]
368. I propose that the Committees recommend
that in its Response to the Committees' Report the Government
states:
a) how many arms export licence applications
to date have been suspended using the Government's new suspension
mechanism; and
b) the nature of the goods and country of export
destination in each case.
Arms export licence revocations
369. A complete list of the 209 Government's
arms export revocations since the start of the Arab Spring is
at Annex 12 of the Memorandum, stating in each case the end-user
country, the military equipment concerned and the reason for revocation.
370. The Committees recommended in their 2011
Report (HC 686) that: "The Government provides us with
full details on arms export licences it has revoked since the
beginning of January 2011 when the recent uprisings and demonstrations
in the Middle East and North Africa started."[477]
The information requested was provided in the Government's Response
(Cm8079) to the Committee's Report and is set out in full on pages
21-45 of that Response.[478]
In the case of each and every one of the 158 arms export licence
revocations listed, the reason given by the Government for the
revocation was that the licence now contravened both Criteria
2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging
armed conflict). The Government cited the end user countries to
be Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar and Tunisia.
371. I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 19 October
2011[479] asking if
the Government accepted that the scale and content of its revocation
of extant arms export licences to countries in the Middle East
and North Africa represented a serious failure by the Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International
Development, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and the UK Border
Agency to fulfil their first Guiding Principle of the Export Licensing
Community's Joint Mission Statement, namely: "We shall implement
effectively the UK's framework of strategic export controls so
as to ensure that sensitive goods and technology are kept out
of the wrong hands [...]"P479FP479FP479FP479FP479F[480]
The Foreign Secretary replied on 7 January 2012 saying that the
revocations showed how seriously the Government took the Guiding
Principle. He continued: "Given the significant changes in
the region, it would seem entirely right and reasonable that risk
assessments should be updated and, in some cases, lead to a change
in decision where the licence is no longer consistent with the
Consolidated Criteria."[481]
372. As in the Committees' 2011 and 2012 Reports
the Committees have again scrutinised closely the Government's
approval of export licences to countries in the Middle East and
North Africa of arms and controlled goods that might be used to
facilitate internal repression. An Annex setting out some of these
licence approvals from 1 January 2012 until 30 September 2012
can be found at Annex 10 of this Memorandum. Similar licence approvals
from 1 October 2010 to 31 December 2011 is at Annex 6 of the Committees'
2012 Report (HC 419),[482]
and updates Annex 4 of the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686).[483]
373. The Committees' Recommendation on the arms
export licence revocations in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and
the Government's Response (Cm8441) was as follows:
The Committees' Recommendation:
The Committees recommend that the Government continues
to monitor all extant licences for arms exports to authoritarian
regimes worldwide which might be used to facilitate internal repression
in contravention of British Government policy and to make public
promptly any further revocations that it makes.[484]
The Government's Response:
The Government accepts this recommendation and will
continue to give public notice of any export licence revocations.[485]
374. Following receipt of the Government's Response
I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 7 November 2012 with a further
question on the Government's arms export licence revocations.
The Committees' question and the Foreign Secretary's answer of
6 December 2012 were as follows:
The Committees' question:
What arms export licence revocations has the Government
made worldwide since those listed in Cm8079, and will the Government
list those revocations under the same headings as in Cm8079?
The Government's answer:
A table of revocations since the last update in Cm
8079 is attached at Annex B. (N.B. Annex B of the Foreign Secretary's
letter dated 6 December 2012 can be found at the end of Annex
3 of this Report).[486]
375. In the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 December
2012 Annex B of the letter contained a list of arms export licence
revocations since those published by the Government in its Response
(Cm8079) to the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686). The countries
that had arms export licences revoked during this period were:
Argentina (37 licences), Belarus (1 licence), China (2 licences);
Iraq (1 licence), Syria (1 licence) and Zambia (1 licence).[487]
376. On 7 May 2013 I wrote to the Foreign Secretary
asking what further arms export licences the Government had revoked
worldwide subsequent to those listed in the Government's response
to the Committees' 2011 Report (Cm8079) and at Annex B of the
Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 December 2012.[488]
The Foreign Secretary replied on 16 May detailing 5 further revocations
between 1 December 2012 and 15 May 2013. The majority of the licences
concerned were for equipment intended for use in maritime security,
specifically anti-piracy activities. The reasons for the revocations
were in 4 cases—2 to Oman,1 to Mauritius and 1 to South
Africa—for risk of diversion (Criterion 7) and for 1 case,
to China, for risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology
transfer (Criterion 5c) together with risk of diversion (Criterion
7).[489]
377. Since January 2011 the Government has now
made 209 revocations of extant arms export licences to 16 countries
as follows:
Table 4: Revocations of extant arms export licences
| Country | Number of revocations
|
| Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar
| 2 |
| Argentina | 37
|
| Bahrain | 39
|
| Bahrain/Egypt | 4
|
| Belarus | 1
|
| China | 3
|
| Egypt | 43
|
| Iraq | 1
|
| Libya | 72
|
| Mauritius | 1
|
| Oman | 2
|
| South Africa | 1
|
| Syria | 1
|
| Tunisia | 1
|
| Zambia | 1
|
| Total | 209
|
Source: Government response to CAEC, First Joint
Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011):
UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports
for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation,
Cm8079, Annex 1; Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the CAEC
Chairman dated 6 December 2012, Annex B; and Letter from Foreign
Secretary to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013
378. I propose that the Committees recommend
that the Government informs them of all strategic export licence
revocations as soon as each revocation is made stating in each
case, as in Annex 1 of Cm8079:
a) the End-user Country;
b) the Annual Report Summary;
c) the rating; and
d) the reason for revocation.
Exports of gifted equipment
379. The Government's policy on the gifting of
surplus MoD assets can be found in chapter 16 of the Joint Service
Publication (JSP) 462: Financial Management Policy Manual: Policy,
rules and guidance on the conduct of financial management in the
MOD. Gifts over £250,000 require Treasury and Parliamentary
approval. Parliamentary approval can either be sought through
Main or Supplementary Estimates or, more usually, by laying a
Departmental Minute. The MoD has delegated authority from the
Treasury for gifts up to that amount.[490]
Gifts cannot be made to individuals, companies or charities but
can be given to foreign governments. The following rules are also
relevant:
7. As part of the gifting approval process, gifts
of export controlled equipment made to a foreign government or
overseas end user must be assessed on a case-by-case basis against
the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria,
taking into account relevant arms embargoes. This is to ensure
that gifts are scrutinised according to the same standards as
export licence applications. This process is managed by Export
Policy and Assurance (EPA), in the Capability area of MOD Head
Office, who should be contacted when gifting is being considered.
8. Some departmental or cross-governmental funds,
such as the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the Stabilisation
Aid Fund or the Defence Assistance Fund may be used to fund or
subsidise the procurement of equipment for gifting to other nations.
All such cases still require formal approval as gifts from FMPA
Finance Policy, and from Treasury and Parliament if the gift exceeds
£250,000 in value.
9. In certain circumstances, such as major overseas
exercises or in operational theatres, gifting of non-warlike equipment
may be undertaken where this offers a cost effective alternative
to local sale or return to UK, or where such gifting is coherent
with the aims of a particular operation. Delegated authority for
such gifting may be granted by FMPA Finance Policy to in-theatre
Civil Secretaries; in the absence of any delegation, all cases
should be referred to FMPA Finance Policy and are subject to the
normal requirement for Treasury and Parliamentary approval.[491]
380. The Government provides details of gifted
equipment to overseas government in support of wider security
and foreign policy aims in its Strategic Export Controls Annual
Report. In the Government's 2011 Annual Report the list of gifts
approved by the Government in 2011 is located in Table 2.4 on
pages 24 and 25.[492]
381. Following analysis of the Government's United
Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337)
I wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 18 September 2012 asking four
questions about gifted equipment. The Committees' questions and
the Government's answers were as follows:
The Committees' question:
Last year the Committees asked: "Is the Government
requiring from governments to whom it is gifting equipment the
same end-use declaration it introduced from 1 July 2010 for commercial
exports as described in paragraph 1.4 of the Annual Report 2010".
The Government replied: "[...] we are content to consider
whether there would be benefit in requiring end-user undertakings
from recipients of gifts and will advise the Committees of our
findings". What are the Government's findings?
The Government's answer:
The Committees refer to the end-use declaration introduced
for export licensing in July 2010 and the Government's consideration
of whether it might be applied in the case of gifts of controlled
military equipment made by the Government.
All proposals to gift military equipment are assessed
against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing
Criteria. The Government intends to extend to gifting the provision
that equipment should not be re-exported or otherwise re-sold
or transferred to a destination subject to a UN, EU or OSCE embargo
where to do so would be a breach of the terms of that embargo.
A change will be made to the decision letter to instruct
Government sponsors of gifting cases that are approved to advise
the foreign recipient that this is the basis on which the gift
is being made.
The Committees' question:
What was the requirement under HM Treasury guidelines
that required 5,000 sets of body armour for the Libyan National
Transitional Council to be "granted", whilst 3,000 sets
were "gifted"?
The Government's answer:
In line with our assessment of the National Transitional
Council (NTC) as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people,
the Government provided non-lethal assistance to the NTC to protect
civilians. The body armour enabled the NTC police to help protect
civilians and civilian populated areas in Libya under threat of
attack and to carry out their functions more securely throughout
the country. This was fully in line with the UK's obligations
under the UN arms embargo. Under the HM Treasury guidelines referred
to (Managing Public Money http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/psr_managingpublicmoney_publication.htm),
the means by which this equipment was supplied was considered
a grant-in-aid to the NTC and not a gift. Therefore Crown immunity
applied to the supply of body armour and an export licence was
not required. In the latter case, the same circumstances did not
apply and the equipment was considered under the guidelines outlined
in paragraph 2.15 of the Annual Report.
The Committees' questions:
Why is the value of the Communications equipment
gifted to the US Air Force not known?; and
Why is the UK Government gifting communications equipment
to the US Air Force given the amount that the USA spends on its
own defence budget?
The Government's answer:
At the time of assessment of this proposal the MOD
sponsor considered that gifting the equipment would be the most
appropriate way to transfer it, as one of the options was for
the US Government to take ownership of the item. However, discussions
have advanced and it has been decided that the MOD will now retain
ownership of the item while it is held on the collaborative register
in the USA.
The equipment will be used for trials activities
in the USA under the auspices of the Rivet Joint Sustainment and
Follow-on Development Memorandum of Understanding.
In March 2010, the MOD signed a bilateral agreement
with the US Government to procure three Rivet Joint aircraft and
associated training and ground systems to replace the Nimrod R1
aircraft. This is known in the UK as the Airseeker project.
The outcomes from the trials activities will include:
informing future Rivet Joint development and in-turn our Airseeker
capability, and potentially provide support to on-going coalition
operations. As gifting is no longer applicable, instead the equipment
will be transferred under Crown exemption from export controls.
An amendment to remove the entry from the gifting
table will be reflected in the next Annual Report.[493]
382. In the Oral evidence session with the Foreign
Secretary on 19 December 2012 the Committees asked him if export
licences will have to be issued for any goods that are gifted
to Afghanistan when British troops withdraw from the country in
2014. The Foreign Secretary informed us that there would be "every
opportunity for parliamentary consideration and debate."
Richard Tauwhare, Head of Arms Export Policy Department, FCO added
that "where gifts are approved, the transfer of the equipment
from the UK takes place under Crown immunity so it does not require
an export licence. [...] If the gift is above a certain value,
Parliament is informed in advance."[494]
383. I propose that the Committees recommend
that they are informed of all gifts of military goods requiring
Parliamentary approval at the same time as the relevant Main or
Supplementary estimate, or departmental Minute is laid. I propose
that the Committees further recommend that the Government states
in its Response to the their Report whether all gifted military
goods are subject to the same arms export policy as commercial
military goods, namely compliance with:
a) the Government's stated policy that "We
will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the
proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal
conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.";
and
b) the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's
Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position
and whether it is satisfied that this is still the
case with all approved gifts of military goods that have not yet
left the UK Government's control.
404 Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint
Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls
(2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly
reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control
legislation, HC 686, para 18 Back
405
Government response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First
Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls
(2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly
reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control
legislation, Cm 8079, p4 Back
406
The arms export licence revocations in question and the reason
for revocation in each case are detailed in Annex 5 of Committees
on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny
of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010,
Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September
2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East
and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, HC 419. Back
407
Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12,
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual
Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January
to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to
the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues,
HC 419, para 176 Back
408
Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First
Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012):
UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports
for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's
Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and
wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 26 Back
409
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for
International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls
Annual Report 2011, HC 337, pages 24-25 Back
410
HC Deb, 15 December 2011, cols 123-124 Back
411
Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12,
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual
Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January
to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to
the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues,
HC 419, para 181 Back
412
Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First
Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012):
UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports
for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's
Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and
wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 27 Back
413
Annex 3-The Committee' questions on the Government's Response
(Cm 8441) to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and
the Government's answers, p 470 Back
414
"UK 'exporting surveillance technology to brutal regimes':
Fears software is being supplied to repressive governments that
use it to monitor dissidents", The Observer, 8 April 2012 Back
415
Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12,
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual
Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January
to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to
the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues,
HC 419, para 183 Back
416
Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First
Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012):
UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports
for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's
Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and
wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 27 Back
417
Annex 3-The Committee' questions on the Government's Response
(Cm 8441) to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and
the Government's answers, p 471 Back
418
See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session
2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls
Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010
and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms
exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control
issues, HC 419, Ev 164-Letter from Alistair Burt dated
8 February 2012 Back
419
HC Deb, 9 February 2012, cols 46-47WS Back
420
Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12,
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual
Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January
to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to
the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues,
HC 419, para 185 Back
421
Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First
Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012):
UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports
for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's
Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and
wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 27 Back
422
Annex 3-The Committee' questions on the Government's Response
(Cm 8441) to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and
the Government's answers, p 472 Back
423
The Missile Technology Control regime is a non-binding voluntary
agreement to curb the spread of unmanned delivery systems capable
of delivering weapons of mass destruction. It was established
in 1987 by Canada, France Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom
and the United States, but has since grown to a total of 34 countries.
Back
424
Ev w44-AEC 01-Drone Wars UK, para 2-4 Back
425
"Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers",
Missile Technology Control Regime website, http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidetext.htm Back
426
Category One systems are capable of delivering a 500Kilogram warhead
further than 300 kms. Category two systems carry a lighter warhead
or have a range less than 300km. Back
427
"IISS Defence and Military Analysis Programme Inaugurated",
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, http://www.iiss.org/~/media/Silos/Newsletters/2011/Spring-Newsletter-2011/Spring-Newsletter-2011.pdf Back
428
Ev w44-AEC 01-Drone Wars UK, para 7 Back
429
Q 33 [Mr Butcher] Back
430
Q 33 [Mr Sprague] Back
431
Q 34 Back
432
Q 36 Back
433
Q 149 Back
434
Q 151 Back
435
Q 152 Back
436
"Maritime Security and Defence", Maritime UK, http://www.maritimeuk.org/2012/01/maritime-security-and-defence/
Back
437
"Piracy falls in 2012, but seas off East and West Africa remain dangerous, says IMB",
ICC Commercial Crime Services, http://www.icc-ccs.org.uk/news/836-piracy-falls-in-2012-but-seas-off-east-and-west-africa-remain-dangerous-says-imb Back
438
HC Deb, 21 January 2013, cols 1-2WS Back
439
Q 146 Back
440
Q 148 Back
441
Ev w 90-Letter from Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export
Controls to William Hague dated 6 September 2012 Back
442
Ev w97-Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees
on Arms Export Controls dated 30 September 2012 Back
443
Ev w65 Back
444
HC Deb, 26 October 2000, cols 199-203W Back
445
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Notice, "Foreign Office
Minister comments on review of arms exports", http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=553955182# Back
446
HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 244WH Back
447
See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session
2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls
Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010
and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms
exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control
issues, HC 419, Q 109 Back
448
Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12,
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual
Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January
to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to
the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues,
HC 419, para 191 Back
449
Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First
Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012):
UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports
for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's
Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and
wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 28 Back
450
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Notice-http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=553955182# Back
451
Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session
2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic
Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010,
licensing policy and review of export control legislation,
HC 686, Annex 4 Back
452
Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12,
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual
Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January
to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to
the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues,
HC 419, Annex 6. Back
453
Government response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First
Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls
(2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly
reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control
legislation, Cm 8079, pp18-19 Back
454
HC Deb, 18 July 2011, cols 78-79WS Back
455
Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session
2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic
Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010,
licensing policy and review of export control legislation,
HC 686, Annex 4 Back
456
HC Deb, 13 October 2011, Cols 41-42WS Back
457
See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session
2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls
Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010
and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms
exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control
issues, HC 419, Ev 63-Letter from the Chairman to the
Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011 Back
458
Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12,
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual
Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January
to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to
the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues,
HC 419, para 197 Back
459
Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First
Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012):
UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports
for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's
Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and
wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 28 Back
460
Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12,
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual
Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January
to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to
the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues,
HC 419, para 200 Back
461
HC Deb, 16 April 2012, col 198W Back
462
HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 341WH Back
463
HC Deb, 18 July 2011, col 79WS Back
464
HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 340WH Back
465
See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session
2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls
Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010
and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms
exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control
issues, HC 419, paras 203-206 Back
466
See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session
2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls
Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010
and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms
exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control
issues, HC 419, Q 113 Back
467
Ev w71 Back
468
Q 11 [Mr Isbister] Back
469
Q 11 [Mr Sprague] Back
470
Q 116 Back
471
Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12,
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual
Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January
to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to
the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues,
HC 419, para 207 Back
472
Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First
Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012):
UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports
for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's
Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and
wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 29 Back
473
Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12,
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual
Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January
to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to
the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues,
HC 419, para 208 Back
474
Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls S, First
Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012):
UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports
for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's
Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and
wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, pages 30-31 Back
475
Annex 3-The Committee' questions on the Government's Response
(Cm 8441) to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and
the Government's answers, p 472 Back
476
Annex 2-The Committee' questions on the Government's United
Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337)
and the Government's answers, p 419 Back
477
Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session
2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic
Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010,
licensing policy and review of export control legislation,
HC 686, para 135 Back
478
Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First
Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls
(2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly
reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control
legislation, Cm 8079, pp21-45 Back
479
See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session
2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls
Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010
and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms
exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control
issues, HC 419, Ev 143-Letter from the Chairman to the
Foreign Secretary dated 19 October 2011 Back
480
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for
International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls
Annual Report 2010, HC 1402, page 3 Back
481
See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session
2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls
Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010
and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms
exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control
issues, HC 419, Annex 11-Letter from the Foreign Secretary
dated 7 January 2012, Annex A Back
482
Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12,
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual
Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January
to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to
the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues,
HC 419, Annex 6 Back
483
Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session
2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2011): UK Strategic Export
Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010, licensing
policy and review of export control legislation, HC 686,
Annex 4 Back
484
Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010-12,
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual
Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January
to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to
the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues,
HC 419, para 213 Back
485
Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First
Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012):
UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports
for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's
Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and
wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, page 31 Back
486
Annex 3-The Committee' questions on the Government's Response
(Cm 8441) to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and
the Government's answers, p 452473 Back
487
Ev w129-Letter from Foreign Secretary to the Chairman of the Committees
on Arms Export Controls dated 6 December 2012, Annex B Back
488
Ev w170-Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export
Controls to the Foreign Secretary dated 7 May 2013 Back
489
Ev w262-Letter from Foreign Secretary to the Chairman of the Committees
on Arms Export Controls dated 16 May 2013 Back
490
MoD website, "Joint Service Publication (JSP) 462: Financial
Management Policy Manual: Policy, rules and guidance on the conduct
of financial management in the MOD", issue 8, April 2012,
Chapter 16 part 1 Back
491
MoD website, "Joint Service Publication (JSP) 462: Financial
Management Policy Manual: Policy, rules and guidance on the conduct
of financial management in the MOD", issue 8, April 2012,
Chapter 16 part 1. Annex C provides a flow-chart Back
492
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for
International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
Ministry of Defence, Strategic Export Control: United Kingdom
Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011, HC 337,
Table 2.4 Back
493
Annex 2-The Committee' questions on the Government's United
Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337)
and the Government's answers, p 442 Back
494
Qq 154-157 Back
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