Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013) - Committee on Arms Exports Control Contents

10 Arms exports to Countries of concern

384. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office publish a list of "Countries of concern" in its annual Human Rights Report. The 27 countries identified as Countries of human rights concern in its latest, 2012, Report published in April 2013 are: Afghanistan; Belarus; Burma; China; Colombia; Cuba; Democratic Republic of Korea; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Eritrea; Fiji; Iran; Iraq; Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories; Libya; Pakistan; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Somalia; South Sudan; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Syria; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan; Vietnam; Yemen and Zimbabwe. Chad was listed as a Country of concern in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights Report, but has been removed from the list this year.

385. I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills on 23 April 2013 and 25 April 2013 requesting a list of all extant arms export licences for both the FCO's "Countries of concern" and also for 5 other countries — Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Madagascar and Tunisia—which are not included in the FCO's "Countries of concern" but about which the Committees have arms export concerns.[495] The BIS Secretary of State replied to the 23 April letter on 10 May 2013 and to the 25 April letter on 20 May 2013. The details of the extant licences for the FCO's 27 "Countries of concern" and for the other 5 Countries of concern identified by the Committees, making 32 countries in all, can be found at Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

386. I propose that the Committees conclude that in his letter of 10 May 2013, the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, states that there are over 3,000 Standard Individual and Open Individual Export Licences (SIELs and OIELs) that remain extant to the FCO's 27 Countries of human rights concern. According to the Business Secretary's letter the total value of the UK's SIELs to these 27 Countries is some £12,331,621,526 as set out below. The Government does not provide values for OIELs because of their open nature.

FCO Countries of Human Rights concern—extant licences

Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs) Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)

Afghanistan 23,847,337 80 Pakistan 49,802,833 219

Belarus 128,042 11 Russia 86,329,387 271

Burma 3,332,192 8 Saudi Arabia 1,863,182,251 417

China 1,486,415,462 1163 Somalia 1,914,694 26

Colombia 20,089,524 53 South Sudan 0 0

Cuba 0 3 Sri Lanka 8,084,759 49

Democratic People's Republic of Korea 0 0 Sudan 7,642,480 14

Democratic Republic of Congo 2,127,980 20 Syria 143,867 3

Eritrea 960,031 6 Turkmenistan 1,022,016 17

Fiji 35,555 4 Uzbekistan 7,405,718 19

Iran 803,440,351 62 Vietnam 13,371,242 74

Iraq 15,915,430 69 Yemen 64,784 10

Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories 7,878,776,714 381 Zimbabwe 2,992,390 46

Libya 54,583,388 49 Total 12,331,621,526 3,074

It should be stressed that a considerable number of the above extant licences will be for dual-use goods or military goods not readily usable for internal repression.

387. I propose that the Committees conclude that in his letter of 20 May 2013, the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, states that there are around 400 Standard Individual and Open Individual Export Licences (SIELs and OIELs) that remain extant to the five additional Countries of concern highlighted by the Committees (Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Madagascar and Tunisia). According to the Business Secretary's letter the total value of the UK's SIELs to these 5 countries is some £111,657,154 as set out below. The Government does not provide values for OIELs because of their open nature.

Other Countries of concern—extant licences

Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences (SIELS and OIELs)

Argentina 7,543,100 57 Madagascar 24,348,066 40

Bahrain 13,630,375 105 Tunisia 7,062,299 51

Egypt 59,073,314 134 Total 111,657,154 387

It should be stressed that a considerable number of the above extant licences will be for dual-use goods or military goods not readily usable for internal repression.

I propose that the Committees make individual Recommendations in respect of 16 out of the 32 Countries of concern. These 16 Countries of concern are: Afghanistan, China, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Madagascar and Tunisia. These individual Recommendations are set out in paragraphs 387 to 503 below.

With regard to the other 16 Countries of concern which are: Belarus, Burma, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Fiji, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Vietnam and Zimbabwe, I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 772 extant UK export licences to these countries:

a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms export Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position.

Countries of concern—Middle East and North Africa

BAHRAIN

388. Bahrain is not listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published in April 2013.[496]

389. Following the Arab Spring Bahrain witnessed generally peaceful demonstrations which were responded to by often violent internal repression with deaths, imprisonments and torture. Trials in special security courts took place which, according to International Crisis Group, lacked even the semblance of due process of law, including of medical professionals who treated casualties of the protests. International Crisis Group reported that: "More significant for the long term perhaps, the violence further polarised a society already divided along sectarian lines and left hopes for political reform in tatters, raising serious questions about the island's stability."[497] In October 2012 Bahraini Interior Minister, Lieutenant-General Shaikh Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, announced that all rallies in Bahrain would be banned because of security concerns. Responding to the announcement of the ban Alistair Burt, FCO Minister, said: "I am concerned that the Government of Bahrain has decided to ban all rallies and public gatherings until further notice. We understand the Government's concerns about maintaining law and order, especially when faced with increasingly violent protests, but a blanket ban of this nature is excessive. Peaceful protest is a democratic right."[498] The Foreign Office reported, in its quarterly update of its "Countries of concern" that:

In early October [2012] the convictions and sentences against nine medical personnel for their involvement in the 2011 unrest were upheld by the Bahrain Court of Cassation. The UK recorded its disappointment at this decision and remains concerned about the disproportionate length of some of the sentences imposed. Additionally, the high appeal court announced the verdicts on the retrial in the Bahrain Teachers Association case, which saw the sentences against Jalila Al Salman and Mahdi Abu Dheeb both reduced. In October four people were arrested for defaming the King on social media and later sentenced to up to six months. In December, Nabeel Rajab's original three year sentence for comments made on social networking sites and his role in 'illegal gatherings' was reduced to two years following an appeal.

There was initially a marked increase in violence on the streets at the beginning of this period, following a period of relative calm over Ramadan. For the most part the police continue to handle provocation professionally, but instances of excessive force continue.[499]

390. In its Response (Cm8079) to the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686) the Government said that 41 arms export licences to Bahrain had been revoked because increasing tension in Bahrain put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).[500]

391. The Committees' Recommendation on Bahrain in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 97 extant UK arms export licences to Bahrain now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for assault rifles, sniper rifles, body armour, gun silencers, shotguns, small arms ammunition, pistols, weapon sights and equipment employing cryptography.[501]

The Government's Response:

As outlined in the United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337) the Government reviewed export licences to Bahrain immediately following the unrest on 14 February 2011. Any licences that no longer met the Consolidated Criteria given the changed circumstances were revoked by 18 February. This involved revoking 23 standard individual licences and removing Bahrain as a destination from 18 open licences. Since then the Government has continued to monitor the situation in Bahrain closely, paying particular attention to the risk that goods might be used in internal repression or to aggravate existing tensions in the country. The Government is satisfied that none of the extant licences for Bahrain contravene its stated policy. The Government's answers to the Committees Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Annex 1 of the Committees Annual Report (HC 419), provide more detail about individual licences.[502]

392. Following receipt of the Government's Response (Cm8441) I wrote to the Foreign Secretary with a further question on arms exports to Bahrain. The Committees' question and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Does the Government remain satisfied that none of its extant UK arms export licences to Bahrain contravenes its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression as set out in Paragraph 191 of the Committees' 2012 Report?

The Government's answer:

The Government stated in Cm8441 (published on 12 October) that it was satisfied that none of the extant licences to Bahrain contravened its stated policy. This remains the case.[503]

393. In analysing Section 2, relating to international policy, of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 published in July 2012 the Committees asked a further question relating to the Bahrain Case Study. The Committees' question and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

The Annual Report states in the context of the UK Government's arms export policy to Bahrain: "the Government of Bahrain has committed to implementing reforms based on the unprecedented Independent Commission of Inquiry to prevent future human rights abuses from occurring." Does the UK Government consider that the recent reported upholding by the appeals court in Bahrain of long prison sentences for 20 opposition figures, including 8 life sentences, is consistent with that commitment?

The Government's answer:

The decision to review the case was in line with the Government of Bahrain's commitment to implementing the recommendations of the Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). We were, however, extremely disappointed with the civilian court's decision to uphold all the sentences of the political activists; the defendants still have the right to appeal and we expect this process to be conducted thoroughly and with urgency. Recently seven officers, ranked as Lieutenants in the Ministry of the Interior, have been charged with the mistreatment and torture of medical staff whilst in detention and the appointment of a new police Ombudsman is another positive step forward in implementing BICI recommendations. The Government continues to scrutinise all export licences to Bahrain carefully. Clearly the Bahraini Government has not yet implemented the recommendations in full, and we will continue to urge more progress.[504]

394. At the Oral evidence session on 19 December 2012 with the Secretaries of State the Committees asked the Foreign Secretary if, given the recent history of human rights abuse in Bahrain, the UK Government had any misgivings about proceeding with a defence co-operation accord with Bahrain. The Committees also asked the Foreign Secretary what the accord covered as the details of the accord, and indeed its signing, had not been publicised by the UK Government. The Foreign Secretary told us:

We signed it on 11 October, and it provides a framework for current and future defence activity with Bahrain, including training and capacity building, partly in order to enhance the stability of the whole region. As the Committee will be aware, we have defence assets of our own stationed in Bahrain, our minesweepers in particular, which are responsible in any crisis for maintaining freedom of navigation in the Gulf, are physically based in Bahrain. We need regularly to update and amend our defence co-operation arrangements. We have a long history of defence engagement with Bahrain since its independence from us in 1971.

This accord complements existing agreements. It does not change our approach to export licensing in any way. Indeed, there have been export licence applications in relation to Bahrain that we have recently refused, or are in the process of refusing. It does not change our approach to export licensing in any way; it is part of a long-standing defence arrangement with a country that is an ally of ours. It has its serious internal difficulties but it is an ally of the United Kingdom.0404040404F[505]

The Foreign Secretary continued, when pressed on the human rights issues, by stating:

To the extent that the relationship includes training and capacity building, that might have benefits in the human rights area. After all, it is often argued by those in authority in Bahrain that what they need is their security forces to know what to do, to be trained in how to handle civil disorder. Although I am glad to say that the Bahrain Defence Force has not been deployed on the streets since quite near the beginning of the trouble in Bahrain in 2011. It has not been deployed at all in the past year. This defence co-operation accord does not relate to such difficulties or to export licensing.[506]

395. In a follow up to the Oral evidence session the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Committees expanding on his comments on the UK/Bahrain defence Co-operation Accord; He said:

We discussed the UK/Bahrain Defence Co-operation Accord (DCA) signed by the Secretary of State for defence and the Bahraini Foreign Minister HE Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa on 11October. I expected that the accord would be published on a Government website but I should correct this.

It is standard practice that DCAs, with any country, are not published in full in the public domain. This is to preserve confidentiality and out of respect for the country to which the agreement has been made. However I can, with this letter, provide the Committees with some information about the context of the Accord signed with Bahrain.

The UK has a long history of defence engagement with Bahrain since a treaty of friendship was signed after the declaration of independence in 1971 and we greatly value our continued close dialogue on regional defence issues. Bahrain contributes to Gulf maritime security and wider regional stability by providing vessels and regularly taking operational control of a maritime Combined Task Force on a rotational basis. Bahrain has also been a firm supporter of coalition operations in Afghanistan and has deployed forces in support of ISAF.

As I explained at our session, the DCA provides a framework for current and future defence activity with Bahrain, including training and capacity building, and complements existing agreements. DCAs are designed to enhance and strengthen the existing defence bilateral relationship through co-operation and promote co-operative activities in the field based on the principles of independence, sovereignty, mutual benefit and non-interference in the domestic affairs of each country. Participants work in accordance with national laws and international obligations, and such arrangements are intended to enhance the preservation of security and stability of the region. The DCA will not affect the way we handle strategic export licence applications for Bahrain.

I am aware of the CAEC's concerns about the exporting of equipment where there might be a risk that it will be used in internal repression. I want to reassure the Committees that in respect of Bahrain, as with any country, we take our responsibilities under the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria very seriously. All export licences are considered on a case-by-case basis against the Criteria governing arms exports, in light of the prevailing circumstances at the time of application and depending on end use. You will be aware from the statistics published quarterly of exactly the equipment we are licensing and refusing for Bahrain.

The UK will always act in compliance with our domestic and international legal obligations and our values as a nation. By co-operating closely with other countries in the field of defence to the same high standards used by UK armed forces we help to save lives and raise awareness of human rights. Our strong relationship with the Bahrainis enables us to raise concerns about human rights at the most senior levels. While some progress has been made, we are clear that more needs to be done and we continue to work closely across the board to help implement reforms and achieve long-term stability for the Bahraini people.[507]

396. On 25 April 2013 I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK strategic export control licences are currently extant for Bahrain, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[508] Details of the 105 extant licences to Bahrain can be found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

397. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 105 extant UK export licences to Bahrain:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Bahrain for cryptographic software, components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition, command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, components for pistols, pistols, weapon sights, components for machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns, gun silencers and weapon sight mounts.

EGYPT

398. Egypt is not listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[509]

399. In its Response (Cm8079) to the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686) the Government said that 47 arms export licences to Egypt had been revoked because increasing tension in Egypt put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).[510]

400. The Committees' Recommendation on Egypt in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 124 extant UK arms export licences to Egypt now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for body armour, weapon night sights, weapon sights, components for semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, combat shotguns, assault rifles, sniper rifles, pistols and cryptography.[511]

The Government's Response:

As outlined in the United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337), when violent unrest broke out in Cairo in February 2011, the Government reviewed all extant licences for Egypt and decided to revoke 36 standard individual licences and to remove Egypt as a destination from 11 open licences. Since then the Government has continued to monitor the situation in Egypt closely, paying particular attention to the risk that goods might be used in internal repression or to aggravate existing tensions in the country. The Government is satisfied that none of the extant licences for Egypt contravene its stated policy. The Government's answers to the Committees Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Annex 1 of the Committees Annual Report (HC 419), provide more detail about individual licences.[512]

401. Following receipt of the Government's Response (Cm8441) I wrote to the Foreign Secretary with a further question on arms exports to Egypt. The Committees' question and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Does the Government remain satisfied that none of its extant UK arms export licences to Egypt contravenes its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression as set out in Paragraph 191 of the Committees' 2012 Report?

The Government's answer:

The Government stated in Cm8441 (published on 12 October) that it was satisfied that none of the extant licences to Egypt contravened its stated policy. This remains the case.[513]

402. On 25 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Egypt, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[514] Details of the 134 extant export licences to Egypt can be found at Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

403. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 134 extant UK export licences to Egypt:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Egypt for cryptographic software, components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment, body armour, military helmets, components for military combat vehicles, components for pistols, pistols, acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for sniper rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon sights, components for machine guns, combat shotguns, components for rifles, rifles, general military vehicle components, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment and military communications equipment.

IRAN

404. Iran is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[515]

405. On 23 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Iran, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[516] The BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, replied on 10 May 2013 providing a list of extant arms export licence for the FCO's "Countries of concern".[517] Details of the 62 extant licences listed for Iran can found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

406. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 62 extant UK export licences to Iran:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Iran for: cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.

IRAQ

407. Iraq is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[518]

408. On 23 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Iraq, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[519] The BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, replied on 10 May 2013 providing a list of extant arms export licences for the FCO's "Countries of concern".[520] Details of the 69 extant licences listed for Iraq can found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

409. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 69 extant UK export licences to Iraq:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Iraq for: assault rifles, small arms ammunition, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, cryptographic software equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment and, weapon night sights.

ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

410. Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[521]

411. In a Written Parliamentary Question Sir Bob Russell asked what steps the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills had taken to ensure that in issuing arms export licences to Israel, notably those categorised as ML1, ML3, ML4 and ML10, weapons could not be used for internal repression. The BIS Minister Michael Fallon replied on 8 January 2013 as follows:

All export licences for military goods are assessed on a case by case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. An export licence will not be issued if the decision is not consistent with the criteria. Assessments of export licence applications for military goods to Israel will take account of the continuing tensions over Gaza.

The following criteria are relevant:

Criterion 2

The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination. A licence will not be issued if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression;

Criterion 3

The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts. The Government will not issue export licences for exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination;

Criterion 4

Preservation of regional peace, security and stability. The Government will not issue an export licence if there is a real risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country, or to assert by force a territorial claim.[522]

412. In the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees' 2012 Report Katy Clark asked the BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, whether consideration had been given by the Government to suspend the export licensing process with regard to exports to Israel in light of the hostilities between Israel and Palestine in November 2012. She continued:

On 7 February this year [2012], the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills announced that there would be a new suspension mechanism, which would allow the Government quickly to suspend the processing of pending licence applications for export to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability, and that the suspension would not be invoked automatically or lightly, but would be triggered, for example, when a conflict or crisis conditions suddenly changed the risk or made conducting a proper risk assessment difficult. The Secretary of State said that situations would be assessed case by case, to determine whether a licensing suspension was appropriate.

Will the Minister use this opportunity to address the approach to Israel that has been taken over the past few weeks? Surely the sudden intensification of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and, in particular, the Israeli bombing campaign in Gaza—there has been further action since—must qualify as a crisis condition. It would be helpful if the Minister could outline what the thinking was and what the Government's actions were in relation to the matter. If the view was that in the particular circumstances such a suspension was not appropriate, will he outline what types of circumstances would trigger suspension of the licensing process?[523]

In replying to Katy Clark's comments above the BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, said:

Israel, of course, faces security threats, and we do not think that an arms embargo would increase our influence or lead to progress in the peace process. Where appropriate, we can and do refuse export licences to Israel. We have refused them in the past and will continue to do so if the criteria are not met. I do not want to go into detail about individual licences.[524]

413. In the Oral evidence session on 19 December 2012 Katy Clark took the opportunity to question the Foreign Secretary on the actions the Government was taking in relation to arms exports to Israel. The Foreign Secretary responded:

we are always careful right across the board about licences to Israel. We constantly monitor the situation. We take into account any changes in circumstances. In the recent conflict last month, the British embassy in Tel Aviv monitored the situation closely and the effect of the use of Israeli defence forces weaponry. We called on the Israeli authorities throughout, including in my own conversations with the Israeli Foreign Minister, to abide by international humanitarian law and to avoid civilian casualties.[525]

414. Richard Burden followed the Foreign Secretary's reply by asking whether any items of equipment or components that originated in the UK were used in the conflict in Gaza in November 2012. The Foreign Secretary answered as follows: "We have no assessment to date of whether UK weapons or components were used [...]" Richard Burden then asked if components or equipment that originated in the UK had been used by the IDF or IAF or the Israeli navy in the conflict in Gaza and/or in its aftermath, would that have been acceptable under licensed equipment. The Foreign Secretary replied: "I think we would have to look at that. We have no evidence to date of any UK weapons or components in this situation. If we did, we would then assess them against the criteria. That is what has happened in previous conflicts, and that is what would happen in this one."[526]

415. On 23 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[527] The BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, replied on 10 May 2013 providing a list of extant export licences for the FCO's "Countries of concern".[528] Details of the 381 extant licences listed for Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories can found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

416. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 381 extant UK export licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories for: all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection; body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, components for pistols, components for body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, general military vehicle components, military support vehicles, small arms ammunition, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, weapon sights, military communications equipment and components for small arms ammunition.

LIBYA

417. Libya is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[529]

418. In its Response (Cm8079) to the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686) the Government said that 72 arms export licences to Libya had been revoked because increasing tension in Libya put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).[530]

419. The Committees' recommendation on Libya in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 24 extant UK arms export licences to Libya now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and cryptography.[531]

The Government's Response:

As outlined in the United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 (HC 337), as demonstrations against the Qadhafi regime escalated in mid-February 2011, the Government immediately reviewed all valid licences for Libya decided to revoke 63 standard individual licences and to remove Libya as a destination from 7 open licences. The UN imposed an arms embargo on Libya through UNSCR 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) on 26 February and 17 March respectively which were brought into force in the UK by EU Council Decisions and Regulations. These prohibited the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material to Libya unless allowed by the terms of the embargo—for example for humanitarian purposes, or for protective clothing for the media and UN personnel. UNSCR 2009 (2011) of 16 September reflected further developments in Libya through the introduction of new exemptions for the provision of arms and related material intended solely for security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities. Export licence applications to Libya are now being closely assessed against these provisions, as well as the further changes in UNSCR 2040 (2012), and in line with the Consolidated Criteria. The Government is satisfied that none of the extant licences for Libya contravene its stated policy. The Government's answers to the Committees Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Annex 1 of the Committees Annual Report (HC 419), provide more detail about individual licences.[532]

420. Following receipt of the Government's Response (Cm8441) I wrote to the Foreign Secretary with a further question on arms exports to Libya. The Committees' question and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Does the Government remain satisfied that none of its extant UK arms export licences to Libya contravenes its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression as set out in Paragraph 191 of the Committees' 2012 Report?

The Government's answer:

The Government stated in Cm8441 (published on 12 October) that it was satisfied that none of the extant licences to Libya contravened its stated policy. This remains the case.[533]

421. On 23 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Libya, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[534] The BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, replied on 10 May 2013 providing a list of extant export licences for the FCO's "Countries of concern".[535] Details of the 49 extant licences listed for Libya can found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

422. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 49 extant UK export licences to Libya:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Libya for: gun mountings, military helmets, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of pistols, pistols, small arms ammunition, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, hand grenades, combat shotguns, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, command communications control and intelligence software, military communications equipment, military software, software for military communications equipment.

SAUDI ARABIA

423. Saudi Arabia is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[536]

424. In Annex 6 to its 2012 Report (HC 419), the Committees listed selected UK arms export licence approvals to countries in the Middle East and North Africa of arms or components of arms that could be used for internal repression. Those listed as approved for Saudi Arabia for the period 1 October 2010 until 31 December 2011 included: components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, flash suppressers, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, technology for military communications equipment, technology for sniper rifles, technology for the use of sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights, military helmets, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, ballistic shields, body armour, civil body armour, components for body armour, command communications control and intelligence software, components for water cannons, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, hand grenades, weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, components for machine guns, components for military support vehicles, military combat vehicles, equipment for the use of machine guns, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.[537]

425. Those listed and approved for the period 1 January 2012 until 30 September 2012 (See Annex 10 of this Report) included: ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, body armour, components for military communications equipment, equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for military combat vehicles, gun silencers, software for military communications equipment, radio jamming equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, components for body armour, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, weapon night sights and weapon sights.

426. The Committees' Recommendation on Saudi Arabia in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it applies different or the same considerations in deciding whether or not to approve arms export licences to Saudi Arabia to those applied to other countries in the region and, if different, what those considerations are. The Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 288 extant UK arms export licences to Saudi Arabia now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for:

Components for armoured fighting vehicles, components for armoured personnel carriers, armoured personnel carriers, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for water cannon, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon sights, weapon sights, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, technology for military communications equipment, technology for sniper rifles, technology for the use of sniper rifles, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, hand grenades, components for machine guns, components for military support vehicles, military combat vehicles.[538]

The Government's Response:

As stated in Annex A of the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 February 2012 which was published in the Committees Report (see Ev 156, Vol II of HC 419), "export licences for Saudi Arabia are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground." The Government is satisfied that none of the extant licences for Saudi Arabia contravene its stated policy. The Government applies the same considerations to Saudi Arabia as to the other states in the region.[539]

427. Following receipt of the Government's Response (Cm8441) I wrote to the Foreign Secretary with two further questions on arms exports to Saudi Arabia. The Committees' questions and the Government's answers were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Does the Government remain satisfied that none of its extant UK arms export licences to Saudi Arabia contravenes its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression as set out in Paragraph 191 of the Committees' 2012 Report?

The Government's answer:

The Government stated in Cm8441 (published on 12 October) that it was satisfied that none of the extant licences to Saudi Arabia contravened its stated policy. This remains the case.

The Committees' question:

Does the Government apply the same stated policy on arms exports and internal repression as set out in Paragraph 191 of the Committees' 2012 Report to Saudi Arabia as to other states in the region?

The Government's answer:

Yes, the Government applies the same stated policy on arms exports and internal repression as it does to the other states in the region and to states worldwide.[540]

428. In his reply of 6 February 2012 to my letter of 16 January 2012, the Foreign Secretary acknowledged that at the time of the Arab Spring in Bahrain "Saudi forces were deployed to protect installations as part of the Peninsular Shield Force, at the legitimate request of the Bahraini Government".[541] As was widely reported at the time, the Saudi forces included British-made armoured vehicles.[542] This deployment of Saudi forces "to protect installations" released Bahraini security forces from having to do so and enabled Bahraini forces to concentrate on ending, sometimes violently, predominantly peaceful demonstrations.

429. On 23 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Saudi Arabia, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[543] The BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, replied on 10 May 2013 providing a list of extant export licences for the FCO's "Countries of concern".[544] The 417 extant licences listed for Saudi Arabia can found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

430. The Committees have noted the Government's answer that it applies the same stated policy on arms exports and internal repression to Saudi Arabia as it does to the other states in the region and to states worldwide. I propose that, however, the Committees conclude that that does not appear to have been so in the case of the deployment of Saudi forces in British armoured vehicles to Bahrain to protect installations, thereby enabling Bahraini security forces to end, sometimes violently, predominantly peaceful demonstrations. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 417 extant UK export licences to Saudi Arabia:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Saudi Arabia for: body armour, anti riot/ballistic shields, components for body armour, military helmets, components for all-wheel vehicles with ballistic protection, general military vehicle components, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for military support vehicles, components for military communications equipment, crowd control ammunition, hand grenades, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training crowd control ammunition, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, gun silencers, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, components for machine guns, machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military combat vehicles and military support vehicles.

SYRIA

431. Syria is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[545]

432. In its Response (Cm8079) to the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686) the Government indicated that no arms export licences to Syria had been revoked.[546] However, the Foreign Secretary in Table 1 of his letter to me dated 30 September 2011, entitled SIEL revocations since 18 February 2011, provided details of one licence to Syria for military cargo vehicles and components for military cargo vehicles that had been revoked.[547] The Committees in their 2012 report (HC 419) gave details of 9 extant arms export licences approved by the British Government that were still extant.[548]

433. The Committees' Recommendation on Syria in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 9 extant UK arms export licences to Syria now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and cryptography.[549]

The Government's Response:

As stated in Annex A of the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 February 2012 which was published in the Committees Report (see Ev 156, Vol II of HC 419), "export licences for Syria are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground." The Government is satisfied that none of the extant licences for Syria contravene its stated policy.[550]

434. Following the Government's Response (Cm8441)) I wrote to the Foreign Secretary with a further question on arms exports to Syria. The Committees' question and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Does the Government remain satisfied that none of its extant UK arms export licences to Syria contravenes its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression as set out in Paragraph 191 of the Committees' 2012 Report?

The Government's answer:

The Government stated in Cm8441 (published on 12 October) that it was satisfied that none of the extant licences to Syria contravened its stated policy. This remains the case.[551]

435. On 18 July 2012 I wrote in detail to the Foreign Secretary regarding the extant arms export licences to Syria as follows:

In the Report of the Committees on Arms Export Controls published on July 13 (HC 419), the Committees gave details of the 9 extant arms export licences to Syria approved by the British Government. The information in the Report was as given by the Business Minister, Mark Prisk, in his Written Answer of 27 March this year to my Parliamentary Question.

The Committees wish to have further information about these approved export licences as follows:

"Chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes"—two Standard Individual Export Licences (SIEL)

The further information required is:

1. The names of the individual chemicals for which UK Government export licence approval was given.

2. The reasons why each of the chemicals concerned are subject to export licence approval.

3. The internal repression purposes to which each of the chemicals concerned could be put.

4. The quantities of each of the chemicals concerned for which export licence approval was given.

5. The names of the individuals, companies or organisations to whom the chemicals were being exported.

6. The extent to which those named individuals, companies or organisations are subject to the influence, ownership or control of the Syrian Government.

7. The last known location in Syria of the chemicals for which UK Government export licence approval was given.

8. The dates of approval of each of the chemical export licences concerned, whether any have now been revoked and, if so, on what date.

9. Which, if any, of the chemical export licence applications concerned were put to Ministers for approval.

10. Copies of each of the chemical export licence applications concerned and of each of the approval decisions with any conditions attached—to be provided to the Committees on a classified or non-classified basis as necessary.

"Heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays"—one Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL)

The further information required is:

1. The reasons why the Government considers that its improvement of Syria's anti-submarine warfare capabilities is compatible with UK and EU arms export control policies.

2. The reasons why the Government approved an Open Individual Export Licence for the hydrophone sensors concerned rather than requiring the submission of a Standard Individual Export Licence application instead.

3. The number of hydrophone sensors for which export licence approval was given.

4. The names of the individuals, companies or organisations to whom the hydrophone sensors were being exported.

5. The extent to which those named individuals, companies or organisations are subject to the influence, ownership or control of the Syrian Government.

6. The date of approval of the hydrophone sensors export licence concerned, whether it has now been revoked and, if so, on what date.

7. Whether the hydrophone sensors export licence application concerned was put to Ministers for approval.

8. A copy of the hydrophone sensors export licence application concerned and the approval decision with any conditions attached—to be provided to the Committees on a classified or non-classified basis as necessary.

"Equipment employing cryptology—one Standard Individual Export Licence" (SIEL)

The further information required is:

1. The purpose and function of the cryptographic equipment concerned.

2. Whether the cryptographic equipment concerned could be used by military or security forces.

3. The names of the individuals, companies or organisations to whom the cryptographic equipment was being exported.

4. The extent to which those named individuals, companies or organisations are subject to the influence, ownership or control of the Syrian Government.

5. The date of approval of the cryptographic equipment export licence concerned, whether it has now been revoked and, if so, on what date.

6. Whether the cryptographic equipment export licence application concerned was put to Ministers for approval.

7. A copy of the cryptographic equipment licence application concerned and of the approval decision with any conditions attached—to be provided to the Committees on a classified or non-classified basis as necessary.

"All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection"—two Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCL) and one Open Individual Trade Control Licence (OITCL)

The further information required is:

1. The reasons why the Government approved two Standard Individual Trade Control Licences and one Open Individual Trade Control Licence for the vehicles with ballistic protection rather than requiring the submission of Standard Individual Export Licence applications instead.

2. The number of vehicles with ballistic protection for which export licence approval was given.

3. The names of the individuals, companies or organisations to whom the vehicles with ballistic protection were being exported.

4. The extent to which those named individuals, companies or organisations are subject to the influence, ownership or control of the Syrian Government.

5. The dates of approval of each of the vehicles with ballistic protection export licences concerned, whether any have now been revoked and, if so, on what date.

6. Which, if any, of the vehicles with ballistic protection export licence applications concerned were put to Ministers for approval.

7. Copies of each of the vehicles with ballistic protection export licence applications concerned and of each of the approval decisions with any conditions attached—to be provided to the Committees on a classified or non-classified basis as necessary.

"Components for general industrial production equipment"—one Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL)

The further information required is:

1. Details of the components concerned.

2. Whether the components concerned could be used for the production of goods that might be used to facilitate internal repression in contravention of British Government policy.

3. The reasons why each of the components concerned are subject to export licence approval.

4. The quantities of each of the components concerned for which export licence approval was given.

5. The names of the individuals, companies or organisations to whom the components were being exported.

6. The extent to which those named individuals, companies or organisations are subject to the influence, ownership or control of the Syrian Government.

7. The date of approval of the components export licence concerned, whether it has now been revoked and, if so, on what date.

8. Whether the components export licence application concerned was put to Ministers for approval.

9. A copy of the components export licence application concerned and of the approval decision with any conditions attached—to be provided to the Committees on a classified or non-classified basis as necessary.

"Personal Protective Equipment"—one Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL)

The further information required is:

1. The items of personal protective equipment for which UK Government export licence approval was given.

2. The quantities of each of the items of personal protective equipment concerned for which export licence approval was given.

3. The names of the individuals, companies or organisations to whom the items of personal protective equipment were being exported.

4. The extent to which those named individuals, companies or organisations are subject to the influence, ownership or control of the Syrian Government.

5. The date of approval of the personal protective equipment export licence concerned, whether it has now been revoked and, if so, on what date.

6. Whether the personal protective equipment export licence application concerned was put to Ministers for approval.

7. A copy of the personal protective equipment export licence application concerned and of the approval decision with any conditions attached—to be provided to the Committee on a classified or non-classified basis as necessary.

The Committees wish to have the above information no later than Friday August 17.

I am copying this letter to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for International Development.

In accordance with the general practice of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, this letter will be made public.5151515151F[552]

436. The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, replied on 6 September 2012 as Minister with responsibility for strategic exports. He replied as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 18 July to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, requesting further information about export licences to Syria. I am replying as the Minister with statutory authority for strategic export controls and I apologise for the delay in responding,

Much of the information the Committees have requested is likely to be commercially sensitive, or has been provide in confidence to the Government by the licence applicant. I understand the Committees will want to publish this letter. Accordingly, I have limited my answers below to the information that it would be appropriate to make public but I have asked my officials to provide you with further information on a classified basis. I trust that this is acceptable to the Committees as the best balance between transparency and the protection of sensitive information.

"Chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes"—two Standard Individual Export Licences (SIEL)

These licences were issued on 17 and 18 January 2012 and authorised the export of dual-use chemicals to a private company for use in industrial processes. The chemicals were sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride.

These chemicals have legitimate commercial uses — for example, sodium fluoride is used in the fluoridation of drinking water and the manufacture of toothpaste; and potassium fluoride has applications in the metallurgical industry and the manufacture of pesticides. However, they could also be used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons which is why they are included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursors list and are listed in Annex 1 of Council Regulation 428/2009, meaning a licence is required for their export from the EU.

In these cases the chemicals were to be used for metal finishing of aluminium profiles used for making aluminium showers, windows, etc. Each licence applications was assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export licensing Criteria, including whether there was a clear risk that they might be used for internal repression or be diverted for such and end-use. The licences were granted because at the time there were no grounds for refusal.

Subsequently, the European Union imposed new sanctions on Syria via Council Regulation (EU) No. 509/2012 which came into force on 17 June 2012. The sanctions included prohibitions on the sale, supply, transfer or export of certain dual-use items and chemicals (including sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride) which might be used for internal repression or in the manufacture of items which might be used for internal repression. As a result, these licences were revoked on 30 July 2012.

"Heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays"—one Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL)

This licence for dual-use goods was issued on 10 June 2010. The goods are for use by the UK company's own seismic vessels which may be awarded work acquiring seismic data in various countries' territorial waters or in waters close to various countries, including Syria. The need for the licence to cover multiple destinations was the reason an OIEL was granted rather than SIELs for each individual destination. The UK company will supply its vessels with the equipment vis one of the countries specified on the OIEL but the goods will not enter local commerce or be supplied to the Syrian government. The licence application was assessed against the Consolidated Criteria, including an assessment of the risk of diversion to the Syrian government. The goods are not caught by sanctions and there are no grounds to revoke the licence or to remove Syria as a permitted destination.

Given the nature of the goods and their end-use, the Committees' assertion that these goods would lead to the "improvement of Syria's anti-submarine warfare capabilities" is inaccurate and misleading. As ever, should the Committee have concerns of this nature my officials stand ready to discuss then with you before those concerns are made public so that our work in this area is not misunderstood.

"Equipment employing cryptology—one Standard Individual Export Licence" (SIEL)

This SIEL was issued on 20 May 2010 and has now expired. This licence was for standard telecoms equipment for commercial use at a land-based oil field in Syria. The goods were controlled because they contained some cryptographic (information security) functionality which is usual for this type of equipment. The licence application was assessed against the Consolidated Criteria, including an assessment of the risk of diversion to the Syrian military or security forces. The licence remained consistent with the Consolidated Criteria until its expiry; there was no basis for revocation.

"All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection"—two Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCL) and one Open Individual Trade Control Licence (OITCL)

One SITCL was issued on 26 January 2012 and the other on 12 March 2012. The second SITCL was for insurance related to the supply of the vehicle under the first SITCL. The OITCL was issued on 18 October 2011. All of these licences relate to the supply of civilian vehicles fitted with ballistic protection to be used for the protection of foreign diplomatic staff in Syria. The licence applications were assessed against the Consolidated Criteria, including an assessment of the risk of diversion to the Syrian military or security forces and in view of the EU sanctions against Syria—such supply is exempted from EU sanctions on humanitarian or protective grounds. In any event the vehicles have not been delivered because the countries in question have closed their Missions in Syria and withdrawn their diplomatic staff.

Note: In these cases trade licences were issued because they authorised the supply by a UK entity of vehicles from an overseas country to another overseas country, i.e. they were for activities controlled under the UK's trade controls. An export licence (SIEL or OIEL) is only appropriate where the goods are to be exported from the UK.

"Components for general industrial production equipment"—one Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL)

This licence was issued on 3 October 2011 and was for gearboxes for machines used in the production of olive oil. These goods do not normally require an export licence and are not caught by sanctions but in this case were made licensable under the WMD End-use controls because of concerns that they may be diverted to a programme of concern in Syria. The licence application was assessed against the Consolidated Criteria, including an assessment of whether there was a clear risk that they might be used in a programme of concern or be diverted to the Syrian military or security forces. The licence was granted because there were no grounds for refusal.

"Personal Protective Equipment"—one Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL)

This licence was issued on 20 July 2010 and has now expired. It permitted the export of radiation contamination monitors with calibration source and accessories for the measurement of naturally occurring radioactive material at a petroleum plant. These goods do not normally require an export licence and are not caught by the sanctions in place against Syria but in this case were made licensable under the WMD End-use controls because of concerns that they may be diverted to a programme of concern in Syria. The licence application was assessed against the Consolidated Criteria, including an assessment of whether there was a clear risk that they might be used in a programme of concern or be diverted to the Syrian military or security forces. The licence was granted because there were no grounds for refusal.

I hope you find this information useful.

I am copying this letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and to the Secretary of State for International Development.[553]

437. In the Westminster Hall debate on 13 December 2012, Mike Gapes raised the issue of the European Union arms embargo on Syria. He asked the Minister what the British Government's position was on "the future of arms controls and exports and the supply of weaponry to elements within Syria." The BIS Minister replying to the debate, Michael Fallon, said that the UK Government had recognised the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people on 20 November 2012. The UK Government had provided equipment, such as water purification kits, portable power generators and communications equipment, to unarmed civilian opposition groups in Syria. He stated that these groups had been carefully selected as influential civil society and opposition organisations engaged in vital work in some of the areas worst affected by violence in Syria. He concluded by saying that there were no plans for arming the Syrian opposition being made by the European Union, at that time, and that any change to that policy would be announced in Parliament.[554]

438. On 10 January 2013, the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, in an Oral Statement to the House, stated that the UK Government had, up to that date, provided £7.4 million of non-lethal support to the Syrian opposition, civil society and human rights defenders. He announced that an additional £2 million of support would be provided. He said that the UK Government's assistance was "designed to help save lives, to mitigate the impact of the conflict or to support people trying to achieve a free and democratic Syria." The assistance would include solar powered lighting, generators, communications equipment and water purification kits to help opposition groups. In addition satellite communication devices would be provided for activists to document human rights violations and abuses.[555]

439. On 27 February 2013 I wrote to the Foreign Secretary requesting answers to a number of questions relating to the UK Government's provision of non-lethal support to the Syrian opposition. My letter was as follows:

In your statement to the House of Commons on January 10 you said: "We have provided £7.4 million of non-lethal support to the Syrian opposition, civil society and human rights defenders".

I should be grateful for your answers to the following questions:

1. At the February 18 Foreign Affairs Council did the British Government attempt to change EU policy to allow military assistance and/or lethal equipment to be supplied to the Syrian opposition?

2. If so, why have the Committees on Arms Export Controls not been informed of this significant change of policy as the Committees were, for example, with regard to the Government's change of policy on arms to Argentina.

3. If the British Government advocated a change of policy at the Foreign Affairs Council on February 18:

a) is the Government satisfied that the policy change would have been compatible with both the UK's Consolidated Criteria on arms exports and the EU Council Common Position on arms exports?

b) if the British Government's change of policy had been agreed by the Council, what types of equipment and military assistance would the Government have been able to supply to the Syrian opposition that it would not have been able to supply under its previous policy of only "non-lethal support"?

c) to which elements and parties within the Syrian opposition would the British Government have been willing to supply the wider range of equipment and military assistance than that supplied previously?

d) would the wider range of equipment and military assistance have been supplied commercially by export licence approval, or by British Government gift, or by both?

The Committees on Arms Export Controls wish to be kept closely informed about any changes, or attempted changes, to the Government's policy of providing equipment and/or military assistance to the Syrian opposition.

I should be grateful for your reply to this letter by March 12.[556]

The Foreign Secretary replied on 25 March. The text of his letter was as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 27 February. I understand that the Clerk to the Committees informed you that I would be providing an update to Parliament on our Syria policy on 6 March. I can now answer your more detailed questions.

At the 18 February Foreign Affairs Council the UK led efforts to secure an amendment to the EU sanctions package on Syria. You will recall that I informed the House in January that we would seek to do this in order to open up the possibility of further assistance if the situation deteriorated.

The amendment allows us to provide a greater range of non-lethal equipment to help the opposition protect civilians. The amendment also allows for the provision of technical assistance for the protection of civilians. As I made clear in my statement to the House on 6 March such technical assistance can include assistance, advice and training on how to maintain security in areas no longer controlled by the regime, on coordination between civilian and military councils, on how to protect civilians and minimise the risk to them, and how to maintain security during a transition. We will now provide such assistance, advice and training.

The detail of the amendment to the sanctions package was not finalised until 28 February. The amendments to the EU sanctions did not represent a change in UK policy but instead provided us with the conditions to consider such a change. Following discussions with Secretary of State John Kerry and the Syrian opposition at the Friends of Syria meeting in Rome last week, I decided that our policy could not remain static in the face of the appalling and ongoing violence. I took the earliest opportunity to inform Parliament of the amendments that we supported and of the step change in our support to the Syrian opposition.

The Consolidated EU and national Arms Export Licensing Criteria remain and important consideration. In my statement to the House I announced that we would provide 4x4 vehicles with ballistic protection and personal protective equipment, including body armour, to the National Coalition's relief unit: the Assistance Co-ordination Unit (ACU). I can assure you that I considered the risks laid out under the Consolidated Criteria before taking that decision.

The arms embargo as it previously stood allowed for non-lethal support in a caveated manner. We felt that these caveats prevented us from providing the types of support outlined above. As a result we have not previously supplied any controlled equipment or military assistance to the Syrian opposition. We are now looking at providing the protective equipment outlined above, as well as other non-licensable equipment—for example equipment to help stem the spread of disease—to the ACU. The ACU is the body charged by the National Coalition to provide information about the situation on the ground and facilitate access for international NGOs. With its establishment, it could, if formed in the right way and provided with the right resources, deliver practical results by improving co-ordination of the humanitarian operation and providing services to emerging local administration.

Officials have now worked up the detail of these packages of support and the equipment would constitute a British Government gift. I have copied to you a letter to the Committee of Public Accounts on the gifting of this equipment to the Syrian opposition. My letter requests the Committee to consider the proposal on behalf of Parliament.

I am conscious that this is not the normal practice. I have exceptionally agreed this process with the Treasury given the urgent need to provide this support to the opposition.

I would be happy to discuss with you any questions or concerns you and the Arms Export Controls Committees may have about our intention to gift non-lethal support to the Syrian opposition.[557]

440. On 15 April the Foreign Secretary in a Written Ministerial Statement stated:

I informed the House on 6 March 2013, Official Report, column 961, that I intended to provide additional non-lethal equipment to the Syrian opposition in order to help save lives. I have today laid a departmental minute containing details of that gift.

The gift includes:

five 4x4 vehicles with ballistic protection and 20 sets of body armour to the Syrian opposition National Coalition's assistance co-ordination unit;

three 25-tonne trucks, one 20-tonne truck, four 12-tonne trucks, six 4x4 SUVs, five pick-ups, one recovery vehicle and four forklifts to ensure that the assistance co-ordination unit has the means to deliver assistance in the quantities necessary to have an impact on the suffering in Syria; and

three advanced civil resilience kits for regional hubs and 22 basic civil resilience kits for other local councils; 107 generators; 130 solar powered batteries; hundreds of radios, water purification kits and rubbish collection kits; as well as basic administrative equipment—laptops, VSATs and printers. This equipment will support local administrative councils, through the National Coalition, to extricate the injured from the rubble in the aftermath of a mortar attack and to provide clean water and refuse management equipment to prevent the spread of disease.

Making the gift was a matter of special urgency because of the appalling and deteriorating situation on the ground and the urgent need to help the Syrian opposition deliver support to civilians. Owing to the Easter recess, this gift was notified to the Committee of Public Accounts to consider on Parliament's behalf. I also wrote to the Chairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Defence Committee and Committee on Arms Export Controls to inform them of this process. As no objections were received, we have now proceeded with the arrangements to make these gifts.[558]

441. On 23 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Syria, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[559] The BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, replied on 10 May 2013 providing a list of extant arms export licences for the FCO's "Countries of concern".[560] Details of the 3 extant licences listed for Syria can found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

442. In his Oral Statement in the House of Commons on 20 May the Foreign Secretary said:

The case for further amendments to the EU arms embargo on Syria is compelling, in order to increase the pressure on the regime and give us the flexibility to respond to continued radicalisation and conflict. We have to be open to every way of strengthening moderates and saving lives, rather than the current trajectory of extremism and murder. We have not sent arms to any side during the conflicts of the Arab spring. No decision has been made to go down that route, and if we were to pursue this, it would be under the following conditions: in co-ordination with other nations; in carefully controlled circumstances; and in accordance with our obligations under national and international law. The United Kingdom and France are both strongly of the view that changes to the embargo are not separate from the diplomatic work, but essential to it. We must make it clear that if the regime does not negotiate seriously at the Geneva conference, no option is off the table.[561]

443. On 28 May 2013 the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, issued the following statement:

Tonight EU (European Union) nations agreed to bring the arms embargo on the Syrian opposition to an end. This was the outcome that the United Kingdom wanted. It was a difficult decision for some countries, but it was necessary and right to reinforce international efforts to reach a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Syria.

It was important for Europe to send a clear signal to the Assad regime that it has to negotiate seriously, and that all options remain on the table if it refuses to do so. Tonight EU nations have done just that.

The other elements of EU sanctions on the Assad regime will be retained. EU nations also agreed a common framework for those member states who, in the future, may decide to supply military equipment to the Syrian National Coalition. These agreed safeguards would ensure that any such equipment would only be supplied to the National Coalition, for the protection of civilians. This does not mean that we have made any decision as the United Kingdom to send arms to the National Coalition, but we now have the flexibility to respond in the future if the situation continues to deteriorate and if the Assad regime refuses to negotiate.[562]

444. On 3 June 2013 in a statement to the House of Commons, the Prime Minister, David Cameron said:

We must be clear: unless we do more to support the official Opposition, the humanitarian crisis will continue, the political transition that we want to see will not happen, and the extremists will continue to flourish. That is why I believe it is right to lift the EU arms embargo on the Syrian Opposition. There must be a clear sense that Assad cannot fight his way to victory or use the talks to buy more time to slaughter Syrians in their own homes and on their streets.

I regret to say that the EU arms embargo served the extremists on both sides. It did not stop Assad massacring his people, it did not stop the Russians sending him arms, and it did not stop Islamist extremists getting their hands on weapons either. It just sent a signal that for all its words, the EU had no real ability to support the reasonable opposition that could be the basis of an inclusive transition. That is why the Foreign Secretary and the French Foreign Minister secured agreement to lift the arms embargo in Brussels last week.

I believe we should also be clear about the Syrian National Coalition. It has declared its support for democracy, human rights, and an inclusive future for all minorities, and we—not just in Britain but across the EU—have recognised it as a legitimate representative of the Syrian people. The EU has agreed a common framework for those who, in the future, may decide to supply it with military equipment, and there are clear safeguards to ensure that any such equipment would be supplied only for the protection of civilians, and in accordance with international law. That does not mean that we in the UK have made any decision to send arms, but we now have the flexibility to respond if the situation continues to deteriorate.[563]

445. On 13 June 2013 the US Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, Ben Rhodes, announced a change of US Government policy on military support for the Supreme Military Council (SMC) in Syria. Mr Rhodes said: "[...]the President has made a decision about providing more support to the opposition. That will involve providing direct support to the SMC. That includes military support. I cannot detail for you all of the types of that support for a variety of reasons, but suffice it to say this is going to be different in both scope and scale in terms of what we are providing to the SMC than what we have provided before." On the issue of a no-fly zone Mr Rhodes went on to say:

[...] a no-fly zone, while there is a contingency plan for many different things, would carry with it great and open-ended costs for the United States and the international community. It's far more complex to undertake the type of effort, for instance, in Syria than it was in Libya. But furthermore, there's not even a clear guarantee that it would dramatically improve the situation on the ground where you have regime forces and irregular regime-associated forces essentially comingled with opposition forces in a civilian population. That is a very hard challenge to get at from the air. That doesn't mean that we've ruled anything out other than the provision of U.S. boots on the ground — which nobody has suggested — but it does mean that I think people need to understand that not only are there huge costs associated with the no-fly zone, not only would it be difficult to implement, but the notion that you can solve the very deeply rooted challenges on the ground in Syria from the air are not immediately apparent.[564]

At the time the Committees agreed their Report, 1 July 2013, no material change in the UK Government's policy on the supply of military equipment to the Syrian National Coalition, as set out above, had been announced.

446. I propose that the Committees recommend that when the Government in its quarterly reports on the BIS website publishes export licence approvals of dual-use items that are frequently associated with military use, such as hydrophone arrays, hydrophones and towed-hydrophone arrays, it should make clear whether or not these are for civil use only, in order to avoid misleading the public.

447. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that neither of the 3 extant UK export licences to Syria or any goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists gifted, or planned to be gifted, to those in Syria:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including the extant licences to Syria for components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection.

448. I propose that the Committees further recommend that in its Response the Government states:

a) whether, since the BIS Secretary of State's letter of 10 May 2013, any UK Strategic Export Control licences for goods to Syria have been approved stating the application type, Annual Report summary and goods value in the case of each licence;

b) whether, since the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, on 15 April and his Oral Statement on 20 May, any additional non-lethal equipment, or any goods subject to UK Strategic Export Controls have been gifted to Syria, and, if so, to state the nature of the equipment and goods, and their value; and

c) the Government's present policy on the supply, whether by sale or gift, and whether directly or indirectly, of goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists to Syria.

TUNISIA

449. Tunisia is not listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[565]

450. In its Response (Cm8079) to the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686) the Government stated that 2 arms export licences to Tunisia had been revoked because increasing tension in Tunisia put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).[566]

451. The Committees' Recommendation on Tunisia in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 47 extant UK arms export licences to Tunisia now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for military support vehicles, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, small arms ammunition and cryptography.66666[567]

The Government's Response:

Increased tension in January 2011 led the Government to reassess the level of risk associated with extant export licence applications destined for Tunisia. As a result the Government revoked 1 standard individual licence and 1 open licence with Tunisia as a destination. The Government has closely monitored the situation in Tunisia since then and is satisfied that none of the extant licences for Tunisia contravene its stated policy.[568]

452. Following the Government's Response I wrote to the Foreign Secretary with a further question on arms exports to Tunisia. The Committees' question and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Does the Government remain satisfied that none of its extant UK arms export licences to Tunisia contravenes its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression as set out in Paragraph 191 of the Committees' 2012 Report?

The Government's answer:

The Government stated in Cm8441 (published on 12 October) that it was satisfied that none of the extant licences to Tunisia contravened its stated policy. This remains the case.[569]

453. On 25 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Tunisia, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[570] Details of the 51 extant arms export licences to Tunisia can be found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

454. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 51 extant UK export licences to Tunisia:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Tunisia for: cryptographic software, components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, small arms ammunition, command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment, weapon night sights, military support vehicles, components for military support vehicles, anti-armour ammunition and small arms ammunition.

YEMEN

455. Yemen is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[571]

456. In its Response (Cm8079) to the Committees' 2011 Report (HC 686) the Government indicated that no arms export licences to Yemen had been revoked.[572]

457. The Committees' Recommendation on Yemen in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) was as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 11 extant UK arms export licences to Yemen now contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" including those licences for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components and equipment for military cameras and cryptographic equipment and technology.[573]

The Government's Response:

As stated in Annex A of the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 February 2012 which was published in the Committees Report (see Ev 156, Vol II of HC 419), "export licences for Yemen are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground." The Government is satisfied that none of the extant licences for Yemen contravene its stated policy.[574]

458. Following the Government's Response (Cm8441) I wrote to the Foreign Secretary with a further question on arms exports to Yemen. The Committees' question and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Does the Government remain satisfied that none of its extant UK arms export licences to Yemen contravenes its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression as set out in Paragraph 191 of the Committees' 2012 Report?

The Government's answer:

The Government stated in Cm8441 (published on 12 October) that it was satisfied that none of the extant licences to Yemen contravened its stated policy. This remains the case.[575]

459. On 23 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Yemen, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[576] The BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, replied on 10 May 2013 providing a list of extant export licences for the FCO's "Countries of concern".[577] Details of the 10 extant licences listed for Yemen can found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

460. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that neither of the 10 extant UK export licences to Yemen:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including the extant licence to Yemen for body armour.

Other Countries of concern

AFGHANISTAN

461. Afghanistan is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[578]

462. The Ministry of Defence estimates that Britain has a total of 3,000 armoured vehicles and 11,000 containers of equipment worth an estimated £4 billion based in Afghanistan that need to be shipped home as the British Government signals the end of its military involvement in the long-running Afghan conflict.[579]

463. The Armed Forces Minister Nick Harvey said on 23 February 2012:

It is too early to state what equipment we plan to retain and whether any will be gifted to the Afghans. We are conscious that uncoordinated gifting could put ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] sustainability at risk; the underlying requirement is that all gifted equipment is sustainable in terms of cost of ownership, support and enduring training. Our approach on gifting will, therefore, be co-ordinated with that of NATO and ISAF. Decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis using the principles of operational priority and value for money to the UK taxpayer.[580]

464. When the Committees asked the Foreign Secretary, in the Oral evidence session on 19 December 2012, about the removal of military equipment from Afghanistan when UK troops withdrawal he said that the Defence Secretary had told the House that: "Our intention is to extract all equipment whose value to the armed forces is greater than the cost of extraction or recuperation." The Foreign Secretary said that: "As things stand, there are no firm plans to leave equipment behind. [...] If we do that, all the relevant issues will have to be looked at. However, if we leave it to the Afghan forces, we will regard it in the same way as gifting to other states."[581] When the Committees asked if export licences would have to be issued for the goods that were to be gifted and whether there would be a need for parliamentary approval for such gifted equipment, the Foreign Secretary told us: "There will be every opportunity for parliamentary consideration and debate—or, indeed, in these Committees."[582] Richard Tauwhare, Head of Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, continued: "The line is that, where gifts are approved, the transfer of the equipment from the UK takes place under Crown immunity so it does not require an export licence. [...] If the gift is above a certain value, Parliament is informed in advance."[583]

465. British military equipment formerly in Afghanistan which is to be gifted to Uzbekistan is discussed in paragraphs 500 to 503 below.

466. On 23 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Afghanistan, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[584] The BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, replied on 10 May 2013 providing a list of extant export licences for the FCO's "Countries of concern".[585] Details of the 80 extant licences listed for Afghanistan can found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

467. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report lists the items of military equipment and their values that it has gifted or it intends to gift to the Government of Afghanistan and its agencies as British military forces withdraw.

468. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of its items of gifted military equipment and none of the 80 extant UK export licences to Afghanistan or any goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists gifted, or planned to be gifted, to Afghanistan:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Afghanistan for: body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, components for all-wheel vehicles with ballistic protection, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for machine guns, machine guns, small arms ammunition, components for pistols, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, general military vehicle components, military support vehicles and technology for military support vehicles.

ARGENTINA

469. Argentina is not listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[586]

470. The Committees have compiled from the Government's quarterly arms export reports details of the arms export licences to Argentina that the Government approved from 1 January 2012 up to 30 September 2012. These are set out in Annex 14 below.

471. On 26 April 2012, the Foreign Secretary wrote to me advising the Committees of a change in the Government's export controls to Argentina and of a Written Ministerial Statement being made by the Business Secretary that day.[587] The Foreign Secretary's letter was as follows:

I am writing to advise you about a change in our export controls to Argentina.

The Business Secretary has today laid before the House a Written Ministerial Statement relating to a tightening of our export controls to Argentina. I enclose a copy. Since 1998 our approach has been to refuse exports which would allow Argentina to enhance her military capabilities but to approve licences for goods which maintained existing capability. As members of the Committees are aware from our response to questions on the BIS quarterly reports, our exports to Argentina have included components for aircraft and naval vessels for maintenance purposes.

In view of recent Argentine actions aimed at the economic interests of the Falkland Islanders, the Government has concluded that it is now appropriate to review this policy. With effect from today we are introducing new restrictions on the export of licensable trade and brokering to the Argentine military. In future no licences will be granted for military or dual use goods for military end users in Argentina unless there are compelling exceptional reasons to do so. Extant licences will be reviewed with a view to revoking any which are not consistent with this new policy.

The Business Secretary's Written Ministerial Statement was as follows:

Export Control Policy

The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (Vince Cable): I would like to inform the House of a change of policy on the licensing of exports of, and trade by British persons (trafficking and brokering) in, controlled goods and technology to military end-users in Argentina. Previous policy dating from 1998 required the refusal of licences for exports and trade which would enhance Argentine military capabilities but permitted licences for goods which maintained existing capability. In practice this has meant the authorisation of the export and trade of components for maintenance purposes.

The Government have reviewed this policy in the light of recent actions by the Argentine Government aimed at harming the economic interests of the Falkland Islanders. We are determined to ensure that no British licensable exports or trade have the potential to be used by Argentina to impose an economic blockade on the Falkland Islanders or inhibit their legitimate rights to develop their own economy.

New restrictions on the export and trade of licensable goods with the Argentine military will now be introduced with immediate effect. In future no licences shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods and technology being supplied to military end-users in Argentina, except in exceptional circumstances. We will review extant licences for military goods to the Argentine armed forces with a view to revoking any that are not consistent with the revised policy. This decision will not affect licences for items intended for end-users other than the Argentine military.[588]

472. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on Argentina in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:

The Committees conclude that the Government's decision to tighten controls on the licensing of, and trade in (trafficking and broking), controlled goods and technology to military end users in Argentina is welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:

a) what are the exceptional circumstances in which the Government is still willing to consider approving export licences for military or dual-use goods being supplied to military end users in Argentina;

b) what licences for military goods to Argentine armed forces have been revoked;

c) what UK strategic export control licences for Argentina remain extant; and

d) what steps the Government is taking to get the US Government, the Governments of EU Member States, and the Governments of other countries who export military goods, military technology and dual-use goods to Argentina to make the same change of policy as that announced by the British Government.[589]

The Government's Response:

a) It is difficult to envisage in advance which exceptional circumstances might lead to the Government approving such export licences but, for example, we might require the flexibility to issue licences in compelling humanitarian circumstances.

b) The Government has revoked 37 SIELs for military goods including: components for military radars, components for ejector seats, components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft, components for body armour, components for military transport aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military training aircraft, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military radars, military radars, components for combat naval vessels, components for destroyers components for naval engines As is standard practice the Government will be publishing more detailed information about these revocations in its Quarterly Report in due course.

c) See Table at Annex B. [See Government Response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues, Cm 8441, Annex B]

d) The Government is not lobbying other governments to implement a similar policy change. Our action was taken in the context of Argentine measures targeting the interests of the Falkland Islanders. However, we encourage all countries to take a responsible approach to export licensing and would expect them to take the Argentine government's actions into consideration when assessing applications.[590]

473. Following the Government's Response I wrote to the Foreign Secretary with 8 further questions on arms exports to Argentina. The Committees' questions and the Government's answers were as follows:

The Committees' question:

What was the date of approval of each of the 37 export licences for military goods to Argentina that have now been revoked?

The Government's answer:

Please refer to the table at Annex C. [See Annex 3 to this Report]

The Committees' question:

In which of the 37 cases of revocation had the military goods left the UK before the licence was revoked?

The Government's answer:

The Government reviewed all extant licences for the export of military goods destined to the Argentine armed forces following the policy change announced by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills on 26 April 2012. 37 extant SIELs were revoked. If all the goods covered by a SIEL have been exported then that licence would be fully exhausted and no longer show up as extant on the licensing database. Therefore, all 37 licence records showed that there were some goods remaining to be exported and that was why those licences were revoked, to prevent export of the type of equipment covered by the change in policy. Of course, revocation could not prevent the shipment of goods already exported included in those licences. We do not have access to data showing how much goods and equipment covered by these SIELs had already been shipped.

The Committees' question:

Why in each of the 37 cases of revocation was an export licence approved in the first place?

The Government's answer:

At the time these licences were approved, Government policy (dating from 1998) was to refuse licences for exports and trade which would enhance Argentine military capabilities, but to permit licences for goods which maintained existing capability. In practice this meant the authorisation of the export and trade of components for maintenance purposes. A change of policy was announced by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in his Written Ministerial Statement of 26 April 2012. New restrictions on the export and trade of licensable goods with the Argentine military resulted from this policy change and as a result all extant licences were reviewed and those which were not consistent with the new policy were revoked.

The Committees' question:

Why in each of the 37 cases of revocation was the export licence not revoked earlier?

The Government's answer:

Until the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills' announcement of 26 April, these 37 licences were consistent with Government policy and the Consolidated Criteria. There were no grounds for revoking these licences before this policy change was implemented.

The Committees' question:

Does the Government remain satisfied that none of the extant UK arms export licences to Argentina, as detailed in Annex B of the Government's Response (Cm8441), contravenes either the UK's Consolidated Criteria for arms exports or the Criteria in the EU Council Common Position on Arms Exports?

The Government's answer:

Yes, the Government is satisfied that none of the extant licences listed contravenes the Consolidated Criteria nor the Common Position.

The Committees' question:

Why is the Government not lobbying other Governments who export arms to Argentina to make the same change of policy as that announced by the British Government?

The Government's answer:

This policy change was made in response to actions by the Argentine government aimed at harming the economic interests of the Falkland Islanders. We do not believe that an international embargo is an appropriate response to these circumstances but we do expect all countries to take the actions of the Argentine government into account when considering export licence applications.

The Committees' question:

Which of the Criteria numbered 1 to 8 in the UK's Consolidated National Criteria for arms exports, and which of the Criteria numbered 1 to 8 in the EU's Common Position on arms exports, did the Government consider would be breached if it failed to revoke the 37 arms export licences to Argentina in question?

The Government's answer:

The 37 licences were revoked because they were no longer consistent with the UK's revised policy towards Argentina announced to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills on 26 April 2012. In that sense, Criterion 1c—"national embargoes observed by the UK and other commitments regarding the application of strategic export controls"—is the relevant Criterion.

The licences were not in breach of the EU Common Position as Criterion 1 of the Common Position does not refer to national embargoes or national policies on arms exports. The UK's policy towards Argentina is a more restrictive policy than is set out in the Common Position. However Article 3 of the Common Position permits Member States to adopt more restrictive national policies.

The Committees' question:

Which countries are continuing to export to Argentina those military goods for which the UK Government has revoked 37 extant export licences?

The Government's answer:

There is no UN, EU or any other international embargo against arms exports to Argentina. Therefore states would consider any exports to Argentina in the light of their own export controls and decide whether to approve export of such equipment. As stated in Cm 8441, the Government encourages all countries to take a responsible approach to export licensing and would expect them to take the Argentine government's actions into consideration when assessing applications.[591]

474. In the Oral evidence session on 19 December 2012 the Committees asked the Foreign Secretary if there was not an apparent inconsistency in the Government's position with regard to it not lobbying other governments to introduce similar restrictions to the sale of arms to Argentina as the UK had done. The Foreign Secretary replied:

No, I do not think so. Our policy was changed in response to the steady change in Argentine actions, which have been aimed at harming the economic interests of the Falkland Islands. We have a particular interest in that as the United Kingdom. We expect all countries to take the actions of the Argentine Government into account when considering export licence applications, but they have to make their own assessments of that. [...]. I do not think that other EU countries would readily adopt this position, nor are there exports on a huge scale—from what one can see—to Argentina at the moment, so I do not think that that would be a very productive use of our time, as things stand.[592]

I, in response to the Foreign Secretary's comment, said:

[...] given the circumstances when, in that war, British ships were sunk with French missiles, I find it extraordinary that the British Government are apparently not willing at least to try to persuade other arms suppliers to Argentina to adopt the more restrictive policy that is now being followed rightly by the British Government. I find it extraordinary, against the history, that you should not be willing to exert yourself in that way.[593]

475. During a visit to the UK the Argentinean Foreign Minister, Hctor Timerman ruled out a military solution to the sovereignty dispute regarding the Falkland Islands, but claimed that the world increasingly recognised that the islands were a product of colonialism. He said that the Falkland Islands would be under the control of Argentina within 20 years. During his visit to the UK Mr Timerman refused to meet the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, after the Foreign Office insisted that representatives of the Falkland Islands attend the meeting.[594]

476. On 25 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Argentina, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[595] Details of the 57 extant licences listed for Argentina can found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

477. I propose that the Committees conclude that it is reprehensible that the Government, given the relatively recent history of British ships being sunk in the Falklands War by missiles supplied by a fellow NATO member and the statement by the Argentinean Foreign Minister, as reported on 5 February 2013, regarding Argentinian control of the Falkland Islands, when he said "I don't think it will take another 20 years", is unwilling to lobby other Governments to make the same change in arms exports policy to Argentina as that announced by the British Government on 26 April 2012. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government should do so.

478. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 57 extant UK export licences to Argentina:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Argentina for: cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography.

CHINA

479. China is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[596]

480. The EU arms embargo on China was adopted by the European Council on 27 June 1989 in response to the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989.[597] The arms embargo, was adopted in the form of a European Council Declaration (or Common Policy) prior to the creation of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and so is not legally binding on Member States. Our predecessor Committees examined the arms embargo in detail and concluded that it was of political importance in that it provided a strong message in relation to the promotion of human rights in China.[598]

481. The potential lifting of the embargo was first discussed at an EU-level in 2004, when both France and Germany argued that the reasons for first imposing the embargo (chiefly Tiananmen Square) were out-dated. The 2004 European Council "reaffirmed the political will to continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo" and recalled the importance of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports in particular criteria regarding human rights, stability and security in the region and the national security of friendly and allied countries in preventing an increase in arms sales to China from EU Member States.[599] Some in the EU, led by France and Spain, have again called for the lifting of the embargo.[600]

482. The Committees' Recommendation on China in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees conclude that given the lack of clear progress on civil and political rights in China, the Government's support for the EU Arms Embargo on China to continue is welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government provides in its Response to this Report an explanation as to why, according to the EU's latest Report, the UK Government in 2010 gave a larger number of arms export licence approvals to China than any other EU Member State notwithstanding the EU Arms Export Embargo on China.[601]

The Government's Response:

The Government gave the Committees a detailed explanation of our implementation of the EU Arms Embargo on China in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 February (reproduced in paragraph 163 of the Committees Report HC 419). As stated in that letter many of the applications received by the Government are for end users in the commercial, low-cost/mass production, industrial or scientific research and development fields and for goods that are not covered by the Arms Embargo.[602]

483. Following the Government's Response I wrote to the Foreign Secretary with a further question on arms exports to China. The Committees' question and the Government's answer were as follows:

The Committees' question:

Is the Government satisfied that none of the extant UK arms export licences to China contravene:

a) The EU Arms Embargo on China, or

b) The Government's stated policy on UK arms exports and internal repression as set out in Paragraph 191 of the Committees' 2012 Report?

The Government's answer:

Yes, the Government is satisfied that none of the UK's extant licences to China contravene the EU Arms Embargo or the UK's stated policy on arms exports and internal repression.[603]

484. In the Westminster Hall debate on 14 March 2013 on the Foreign Affairs Committee's Report on The FCO's human rights work in[604] I, commenting on China, said:

Rightly and necessarily, it continues to feature in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's list of countries of concern with regards to human rights. [...] China is rightly subject to an arms embargo. However, in the latest figures published by the Government on the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills website, for the third quarter of 2012, the Government have stated that they approved arms export licences for components for military electronic equipment; equipment for the use of military communications equipment; military communications equipment; military electronic equipment; and technology for military communications equipment. Will the Minister explain how it is that when the British Government have signed up to the EU arms embargo on China, they are still none the less approving military arms export licences to China for the type of equipment that, on the face of it, could be used for internal repression and the violation of human rights purposes?[605]

In responding to the points I had made, FCO Minister Hugo Swire replied on 27 March:

You asked about exports to China. The export of the items you referred to in the debate fall outside of the terms of the EU Arms Embargo. Some of the items you referred to are assessed to be military-rated items for non-lethal purposes. We consider applications for the export of equipment that is not covered by the EU Arms Embargo on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated European Union and National Arms Export licensing Criteria, depending on the proposed end-use and the circumstances prevailing at the time of application. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are mandatory considerations for all export licence applications. We will not issue a licence when there is a clear risk that the equipment might be used for internal repression. As part of our assessment we also carefully consider the possibility of diversion. This includes, in the case of China, to the Chinese military.[606]

485. On 23 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for China, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[607] The BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, replied on 10 May 2013 providing a list of extant export licences for the FCO's "Countries of concern".[608] Details of the 1163 extant licences listed for China can found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

486. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 1163 extant UK export licences to China:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to China for: body armour, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for ground vehicle communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of equipment employing software, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for the production of military communications equipment, weapon sights.

487. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will seek to widen the EU arms embargo on China to include

a) all military goods; and

b) all listed goods which "might be used to facilitate internal repression" contrary to the UK Government's stated policy.

MADAGASCAR

488. Madagascar is not listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[609]

489. The elected government of Madagascar was overthrown in 2009 and Andry Rajoelina appointed himself president. Following the government's overthrow the African Union suspended Madagascar and almost all international donors halted their aid programmes in the country. Amnesty International stated in its 2011 Annual Report that regular public demonstrations organised by the opposition had been violently dispersed by security forces resulting in deaths and injuries; those responsible enjoyed impunity. It also reported that political opponents and supporters of the previous President had been arbitrarily arrested and detained by security forces, with some people arrested in 2009 still in detention. Journalists had been victims of harassment and intimidation, and trials had not met international standards of fairness.[610] In November 2012 Amnesty International posted further accounts of human rights abuses on its website. It stated that Madagascar's security forces had undertaken "widespread state killings of civilians" and had "failed to protect hundreds from mass communal murder" Amnesty International claimed that during an operation to reduce cattle theft "elderly people, the physically disabled, children, and others unable to flee their homes were burned alive when security forces indiscriminately set fire to villages as part of the military operation." It called on the government to rein in its security forces and launch and independent investigation into the allegations.[611]

490. In the Oral Evidence session with the Foreign Secretary on 19 December we asked William Hague what assurances he could provide assurance that arms exports which had been exported specifically for maritime security (including to Madagascar) would not be diverted. The Foreign Secretary replied:

The two things to say [...] are, first of all, that every application is assessed on a case-by-case basis against the criteria, taking into account the risk of internal repression in any of the destination countries and the risk of diversion. Some of the destinations raise concerns against our criteria, so we have to look at those criteria. Secondly, subject to that, we approve licences for companies that have signed up to the international code of conduct for private security.[612]

He continued: "weapons must be stored securely at each destination country, usually with the country's national security organisation or in authorised armouries."[613]

491. On 25 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Madagascar, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[614] Details of the 40 extant licences to Madagascar can be found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

492. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 40 extant UK export licences to Madagascar:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Madagascar for: cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, combat shotguns, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, pistols, sniper rifles and weapon night sights.

SRI LANKA

493. Sri Lank is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[615]

494. In the Westminster Hall debate on 13 December 2012 on the Committees' 2012 Report (HC 419) Mike Gapes said:

A few years ago, during the civil war in Sri Lanka, an arms embargo was put in place and yet when there was a ceasefire, that embargo was not maintained—this was under the previous Government—and the Sri Lankan Government bought all kinds of things, including ammunition, small arms, components and a huge amount of hardware that was used by their armed forces. That ceasefire broke down after 2002, and in 2009 we saw scenes of absolute carnage and brutality when the Sri Lankan armed forces decided to eliminate the Tamil Tigers. I am not here to speak for or defend the Tamil Tigers, but it is clear that there is strong case for the Sri Lankan Government to participate in a proper independent international inquiry into the war crimes that were carried out. Many of those crimes were carried out using weaponry that had been imported from around the world. Officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were unable to tell us whether UK-supplied ammunition, components or weapons were used by Sri Lankan Government forces, but I suspect that they were.[616]

In replying to the debate the BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, commented regarding Mike Gapes' statement that: "I regard him as one of the most well informed, perhaps the best informed, Member of the House on Sri Lanka, and we should take careful note of what he said on that subject today."[617]

495. On 18 February 2013 The Independent newspaper published an article stating that the UK Government had sold arms to the Sri Lankan regime. This was "despite the countries dire human rights record. Figures taken from the ECO database showed that the UK Government had sold over £3 million worth of small arms and weaponry [in the period July to September 2012]. These included pistols, rifles, assault rifles, body armour and combat shotguns. The article stated that: "The sales indicate how far President Mahinda Rajapaksa's government has been welcomed back into the international fold by Britain, despite the behaviour of his armed forces during the brutal last few months of the 2009 civil war." The article continued by claiming that both sides in the civil war had been accused of human rights abuses and that the Sri Lankan government had resisted international calls for an independent investigation into well-documented allegations that Sri Lankan Army soldiers were involved in rape, torture, extra-judicial killings and the deliberate targeting of civilians.[618]

496. The FCO Minister, Alistair Burt, issued a press notice on 20 February 2013 rebutting the Independent article. He said that he was "disappointed to read the article [...] which misrepresented the UK's export control policy towards Sri Lanka." He stated that: "The article suggested the UK had changed its policy towards Sri Lanka and was focused on selling more arms to the Sri Lankan military." The Minister went on to say: "During the period your article covered, [1 July -30 September 2012] only 2 licences were approved to the Sri Lankan military. One licence related to shotgun cartridges for sporting use and the other for communications equipment for a transport aircraft." He continued by stating that the small arms mentioned in the article were for export to private maritime security companies engaged in legitimate work countering the threat of piracy in the region. He said that the export licence applications had been "considered thoroughly" against the UK's export licensing criteria".[619]

497. The ECO quarterly reports on arms export licences for the period 1 January 2012 until 30 September 2012 indicate the following licences approved and refused to Sri Lanka for goods which might be used for internal repression:

2012 Quarter 1 (1 January-31 March 2012)

Licences approved:

SIELs (total value £1,732,115)

Acoustic device for riot control

Body armour

Combat shotguns (160)

Rifles (130)

Small arms ammunition

Weapon sights

2012 Quarter 2 (1 April-30 June 2012)

Licences approved:

SIELs (total value £192,159)

Body armour

Military helmets

OIELs

Body armour

Military helmets

Licences refused

OIELs

Assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, machine guns, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights.

2012 Quarter 3 (1 July-30 September 2012)

Licences approved:

SIELs (total value £3,741,334)

Assault rifles (600)

Body armour

Combat shotguns (50)

Components for assault rifles

Components for body armour

Components for military communications equipment

Components for pistols

Components for rifles

Military helmets

Pistols (100)

Rifles (550)

Small arms ammunition

Weapon sights

OIELs

Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptographic software.

Body armour, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets.

Assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, small arms ammunition, weapon sights.

Military helmetsP619FP619FP619FP619FP619F[620]

498. On 23 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Sri Lanka, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.P620FP620FP620FP620FP620F[621] The BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, replied on 10 May 2013 providing a list of extant export licences for the FCO's "Countries of concern".P621FP621FP621FP621FP621F[622] Details of the 49 extant licences listed for Sri Lanka can found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

499. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response how the statement made by the FCO Minister Alistair Burt on 20 February 2013 that during the period 1 July-30 September 2012 only 2 arms export licences were approved to the Sri Lankan military can be reconciled with the information put on the BIS website for licences approved to Sri Lanka in this period as reproduced in paragraph 496 of this Memorandum.

500. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 49 extant UK export licences to Sri Lanka:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Sri Lanka for: acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, military helmets, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, military support vehicles, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights, combat shotguns and equipment employing cryptography.

UZBEKISTAN

501. Uzbekistan is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published April 2013.[623]

502. On 13 February 2013 the Secretary of State for Defence, Phillip Hammond said in a Written Ministerial Statement said:

I have today laid before Parliament three bilateral reverse transit agreements with the Republic of Uzbekistan; and a Ministry of Defence departmental minute describing a gifting package which the UK intends to make to the Republic of Uzbekistan.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat operations are due to be completed by the end of 2014. The Government have announced that UK troop numbers in Afghanistan, currently at around 9,000, are due to fall to about 5,200 by the end of 2013 with further significant reductions planned for 2014. The MOD has begun to plan for the recovery of some £4 billion of inventory deployed to Afghanistan. On current estimates, this could amount to the equivalent of about 6,500 twenty- foot containers of equipment, together with about 2,500 vehicles. The draw down operation is made even more challenging by Afghanistan's remote geographical location, difficult terrain and potentially unstable regional security conditions.

Currently, the only surface option for the recovery of UK equipment from Afghanistan is by the southern transit route through Pakistan. We are in the process of opening this reverse transit route with the Pakistani Government. However, this route will be hard pressed to meet the capacity demands that ISAF draw down will generate. We have therefore been seeking to diversify our potential equipment recovery options by establishing reverse transit routes (surface and air) through the central Asian Republics and Russia—collectively known as the Northern Lines of Communication (NLOC).

Three reverse transit agreements have been concluded with the Republic of Uzbekistan, enabling the recovery of non-war like stores and, separately, motorised armoured vehicles, by rail; and equipment (including war-like stores and ammunition) and personnel by air. These are being published as Command Papers (Cm 8522, 8523 and 8524) and are today being laid before Parliament, each with an accompanying explanatory memorandum. These agreements have already completed Uzbek parliamentary ratification procedures and will enter into force once the UK formally notifies the Republic of Uzbekistan that our internal clearance procedures are complete.

My Right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe's written statement of 23 February 2012, Official Report, column 83WS set out the broader context of the UK's engagement with central Asia, noting that underpinning the UK's growing prosperity and security interests in the region is our commitment to promote core values of the rule of law, human rights and democracy. As part of our promotion of regional security and stability, we will continue to engage with the Republic of Uzbekistan on these core values and on a range of security-related issues, including counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and border security, continued support to Afghanistan stabilisation, conflict prevention and crisis management work, counter-radicalisation and some aspects of defence reform and co-operation.

The Republic of Uzbekistan has already played a constructive role in helping to secure Afghanistan's stability but will face increased security challenges once ISAF has withdrawn from Afghanistan. We have therefore been examining options for gifting surplus UK equipment to help meet those challenges. The departmental minute which I have today laid before Parliament describes a gifting package to the Republic of Uzbekistan of surplus Leyland DAF trucks and Land Rover spares that is intended to contribute to this. Both items have been examined and cleared against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria, which include an assessment of whether the equipment might be used for human rights violations or internal repression. Subject to completion of the departmental minute process, delivery will be undertaken progressively during 2013.[624]

503. On 23 April I wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable requesting that he state which UK Strategic Export Control licences are currently extant for Uzbekistan, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence.[625] The BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, replied on 10 May 2013 providing a list of extant arms export licences for the FCO's "Countries of concern".[626] Details of the 19 extant licences listed for Uzbekistan can found in Annex 13 of this Memorandum.

504. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to the Committees' Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 19 extant UK export licences to Uzbekistan or any goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists gifted, or planned to be gifted, to Uzbekistan:

b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position.

Arms exports to authoritarian regimes and to Countries of concern worldwide

505. On 18 February 2011, Alistair Burt, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, FCO, issued a press notice on the FCO website that announced a review of UK arms export licences. The Government followed the statement by revoking 158 licences for countries in North Africa and the Middle East. In their 2011 Report the Committees recommended that the "Government extends immediately its review of UK arms export licences [...] to authoritarian regimes worldwide in respect of arms which could be used for internal repression."[627]

506. The Government responded to the Recommendation by saying:

The Foreign Secretary has commissioned a review of Government policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods. Although this review was originally commissioned in response to events in the Middle East and North Africa, any conclusions will apply to our procedures for arms exports to all countries. The FCO is leading this internal review in close consultation with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).[628]

507. In the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees' Report of 2011 on 20 October 2011 the Minister was asked if any conclusions from the review of arms exports to countries in the Middle East and North Africa would "apply to our procedures for arms exports to all countries" and whether "the Government would extend their review to authoritarian regimes worldwide."[629]

508. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the extension of the review to authoritarian regimes and to Countries of concern worldwide in its 2012 Report (HC 419) and the Government's Response (Cm8441) were as follows:

The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees conclude that the Government's stated policy is to refuse arms export licences "which might be used to facilitate internal repression" and not merely to await internal repression becoming patently clear. The Committees therefore continue to recommend that the Government extends its arms export policy review from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian regimes and countries of human rights concern worldwide.[630]

The Government's Response:

The Foreign Secretary stated before the Committees on 7 February 2012 that "there is no limit to its geographical scope. Every kind of regime and every kind of country is captured in this review." The review has been completed and its recommendations will apply to all export licence applications regardless of destination.[631]

509. I then wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 7 November 2012 with three further questions on the extension of the review to authoritarian regimes and to Countries of concern worldwide. The Committees' three questions and the Government's answers were as follows:

The Committees' question:

The Committees recommended that "the Government extends its arms export policy review from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian regimes and countries of human rights concern worldwide". The Government's single quotation from the Foreign Secretary's Oral Evidence to the Committees on 7 February is selective and therefore misleading. The Foreign Secretary's complete Oral Evidence in relation to this recommendation was as follows:

Chair: Foreign Secretary, we are going to move on to an important recommendation which we made in our last report, in which we recommended that you should extend your review of arms export policy to authoritarian regimes worldwide.

Q134 Chris White: Secretary of State, extending that, we were just thinking it should not just be the Middle East and North Africa, it should be to authoritarian regimes worldwide. Why was this recommendation not implemented?

Mr Hague: Our review covers our global policy—covers the whole thing, whatever the nature of the regime. Of course, it is events in the Middle East and North Africa that have given rise to it. But this is a change to our procedures overall, including authoritarian regimes. As the Chairman has pointed out, such issues can arise in other countries as well. So for the purposes of this policy, we are not only concerned with authoritarian regimes. The change in procedures that I have announced and that Vince Cable has been talking about, are changes in procedures globally.

Q135 Chair: Yes, Foreign Secretary, but that does not answer the particular question that the Committees have put to you. It is one thing to look at the global application of the results of your review. We put a different recommendation to you, that you should extend your review to authoritarian regimes worldwide. Why did you not accept that recommendation?

Mr Hague: For this reason, Mr Chairman, this is a worldwide review. It is about our policy towards all regimes of any kind. If you are saying should we have had a particular study of authoritarian regimes—

Q136 Chair: That was the recommendation of this Committee. We asked you to extend your review not just to authoritarian countries in North Africa and the Middle East, but to authoritarian countries worldwide. That was our recommendation, and you chose not to accept it.

Mr Hague: Yes, because it was not confined to the Middle East. If we implement thoroughly, as we certainly intend to do, the changes in procedures that I talked about earlier—more systematic reporting of human rights risks, using a wider range of information, more systematic use of predictive tools and the requirement of end-use monitoring by overseas posts—it will capture what is going on in authoritarian regimes, as well as the rest of the world. So, of course they are included; what is going on all over the world is included in these changes of procedures.

Q137 Chair: The Committees understand that the outcome of the review is going to be applied globally by the Government, but the issue that the Committees put to you was that you should extend your review to authoritarian regimes worldwide—authoritarian regimes in Africa, in Asia and conceivably in one or two countries in South America—and ask yourselves the same questions that you have posed to yourselves on North Africa and the Middle East: do all the extant export licences that we have granted to these authoritarian regimes still comply with criteria 2 and 3? You have not done that. Why not?

Mr Hague: It is a global review. I go back to the same answer. Really you are saying that there should be a bigger change in policy.

Q138 Chair: No, we are saying that there should have been a bigger change in the geographical scope of the review that you carried out.

Mr Hague: I am saying that there is no limit to its geographical scope. Every kind of regime and every kind of country is captured in this review. Clearly, we do not have a meeting of minds here, and I have not seen any other country where we should change our policy and revoke the licences, because the circumstances have not changed. We focused the review on practical change, and I have adopted all the recommendations of the review. I think I see what the Committee is getting at, but we chose to do it in a different way. I did not agree with the recommendation of the Committee.

The Government's answer:

The Government notes the Committees comments.

The Committees' question:

In light of the Government's Response, will the Government now accept the Committees' recommendation, and extend its arms export policy review from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian regimes and countries of human rights concern worldwide?

The Government's answer:

The Review was completed and the Foreign Secretary announced the outcome to Parliament on 13 October 2011. As he stated at the Oral Evidence session on 7 February, and as shown in the transcript extract quoted above, the Foreign Secretary agreed all the recommendations of the review. These recommendations have now been fully implemented. The Foreign Secretary also clearly stated on 7 February that he did not agree with the Committees' recommendation about extending the review. The review proposals did cover our export control policy to all countries worldwide including those with authoritarian regimes and human rights concerns.

The Committees' question:

Is the Government satisfied that none of the extant UK arms export licences worldwide, in addition to those to the countries specifically referred to above, contravenes:

a) The Government's stated policy on UK arms exports and internal repression as set out in Paragraph 191 of the Committees' 2012 Report, or

b) either the UK's Consolidated Criteria for arms exports or the Criteria in the EU Council Common Position on arms exports?

The Government's answer:

The Government is satisfied that none of its extant licences contravenes its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression, the Consolidated Criteria or the Common Position. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence.[632]

510. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's answer, in response to the Committees' question, that it is satisfied that none of its extant arms export licences to authoritarian regimes and Countries of human rights concern worldwide contravenes the Government's stated policy to the Committees on arms exports and internal repression, or the UK's Consolidated Criteria on arms exports, or the EU's Common Position on arms exports is welcome. However, I propose that the Committees further conclude that the Government would have done better to have accepted the Committees' Recommendations in successive Reports that it should extend its arms export policy review from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian regimes and Countries of human rights concern worldwide rather than have disagreed with the Committees' Recommendation and then to have been obliged to extend its review worldwide in order to be able to answer the Committees' subsequent questions.

511. Given that the Government has now acknowledged that its new arms export suspension mechanism only applies to licence applications that are still being processed and not to military or dual-use goods that have already left the UK, I propose that the Committees repeat their previous recommendation that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes "which might be used to facilitate internal repression" in contravention of the Government's policy, as stated to the Committees by the Foreign Secretary on 7 February 2012.

495 Ev w169-Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 23 April 2013 and Ev w169-letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 25 April 2013. Back

496 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8593, April 2013 Back

498 Foreign and Commonwealth office Press Notice, "