House of Commons - Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013)

Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013) - Committee on Arms Export Control Contents

Annex 1: The Committees' quarterly licence questions and the Government's answers (2011 Q4, 2012 Q1, Q2 and Q3)

Following the quarterly publication of the list of licence approvals, refusals and appeals by the Export Control Organisation (ECO) within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills the Committees have compiled a series of questions to obtain more information about the licences approved, rejected or appealed.

Following discussions between the Committees and Government Departments in 2011 it was agreed that the Committees would publish the Committees' questions and the Government's non-classified answers as from Q3 2010. The Committees' questions and the Government's answers for the period covered by this Memorandum are reproduced below.

Note: The Committees' questions are in normal type and the Government's answers are in bold italic type.

Note:
OIEL: Open Individual Export Licence; SIEL: Standard Individual Export Licence; OITCL: Open Individual Trade Control Export Licence; SITCL: Standard Individual Trade Control Export Licence

The Committees' 2011 Quarter 4 (October-December) questions and the Government's answers

The Committees would be grateful for more information about why the following licences were granted or refused during the fourth quarter (October-December) of 2011:

Bahrain: Given the continued unrest and human rights violations by the security forces in Bahrain, why were SIELs granted for components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, gun silencers, pistols, small arms ammunition and sniper rifles rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2, 3 or 4 of the Consolidated Criteria?

A SIEL for Bahrain was granted for the export of a small quantity of this equipment, including one sniper rifle, one pistol and one sporting gun, to a named individual for hunting and sporting end use. The end-use/end-user did not raise any concerns under the Criteria.

Congo, Democratic Republic of: Given that the Democratic Republic of Congo is one of the FCO's "Countries of concern", as listed in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy report, the Committees wish to have further information on why SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography were granted.

This licence was for the export of radios gifted by the Government to security institutions in support of the election monitoring process. As dual-use items they are not subject to the arms embargo. Regarding the intended end use of the equipment, it was assessed under Criterion 3 that the provision of such equipment would actively contribute to increasing stability, control and discipline, and under Criterion 2 that there was not a clear risk that this equipment might be used for internal repression.

Djibouti: Given the human rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why were SIELs granted for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, military helmets, small arms ammunition and weapon sights rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? Given that the stated destinations included Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Sri Lanka why were OITCLs approved for, inter alia, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, machine guns, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition and weapon sights?

These licences were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2 & 7. PSCs require open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State: the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority: equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

Egypt: Given the revocations of arms exports to Egypt why were SIELs for components for military parachutes and equipment, military parachutes and equipment, equipment employing cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing software issued when licences for similar items were previously revoked? Why were SIELs for technology for armoured fighting vehicles and unfinished products for armoured fighting vehicles approved. Given that the stated destinations included Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Qatar and Sri Lanka why were OITCLs approved for, inter alia, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, machine guns, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights and weapon sights?

The SIELs were issued for the supply of equipment to end users, none of which had been involved in the unrest during the Egyptian revolution. With one exception, the open licences were for anti-piracy equipment.

The licence for unfinished products (castings) for armoured fighting vehicles was granted for export to an end user who was not involved in the Egyptian revolution (and had in January refused to become involved in the repression of the demonstrators). We assessed there was no clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression.

The licence for equipment employing cryptography was for communications equipment to an end user involved in VIP protection. The use of the equipment for this purpose by this end user did not give rise to any concerns under Criteria 2 or 3.

A licence for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography was for business communications equipment for use in the offices of a commercial company that had no involvement in the unrest. A licence for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography was also issued. This was for information security products for a commercial end user for use in their own offices.

The licence for components for military parachutes & equipment was for use with a trainer aircraft in service with the Egyptian Air Force. The Air Force was not deployed against protestors during the revolution and this licence raised no concerns under Criteria 2 and 3.

The licence for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection related to armoured vehicles for the protection of staff operating at the embassy and other government offices of a close partner of the UK. Supply was not permitted to other end users.

Open licences were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2 & 7. PSCs require open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State: the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority: equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

Hong Kong: Given the human rights record of the Government of China, how were concerns about diversion under Criteria 7—and then by extension, Criteria 2—of the Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIELs granted for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for military communications equipment, components for sniper rifles, military communications equipment, military helmets, small arms ammunition and sniper rifles? Why was a SIEL for items covered by EC Regulation 1236/2005 for handcuffs approved?

We assess all export licence licences to Hong Kong carefully against the Consolidated Criteria, taking into account end users and consignees. This includes assessment against Criterion 1 which covers our commitment to the EU Arms Embargo and Criterion 2, whether there is a clear risk that equipment might be used for internal repression. In view of the risk that military equipment may be diverted to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Hong Kong, and ultimately find its way to China all licences are also assessed carefully against Criterion 7.

We have few human rights concerns with Hong Kong and few concerns with the police, prison, customs, immigration or any other security services that come under the control of the Government of the Hong Kong SAR. Hong Kong also operates a robust export control system. Exports of Wassenaar-controlled and certain military equipment require a licence from the Hong Kong authorities regardless of whether the goods are for mainland China, Macau or other destinations.

Two of the licences in question (military communications equipment) were for demonstration purposes only and were being held by a globally recognised civilian end user. Five of the licences were destined for use by the police or associated departments and after consideration under the Criteria did not raise any concerns. The specific licence for handcuffs was for the Department responsible for prisons and prisoners in Hong Kong. Prison conditions generally meet international standards. We assessed that the handcuffs would be for legitimate use with prisoners and there was not a clear risk that they might be used for internal repression. One licence for a small quantity of ballistic helmets was for supply to end users who did not raise concerns under the Consolidated Criteria.

Ivory Coast: Given the arms trade sanctions against the Ivory Coast, adopted by UN Security Council resolution 1572 and EU Council Decision 2010/656/CFSP, why was a SIEL for components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection granted?

In line with the specific exemptions provided for in the UN and EU arms embargoes, this licence was granted for an armoured vehicle for the use of the United Nations Operation in the Cote d'Ivoire, UNOCI.

Jordan: Given the continued pro-democracy demonstrations in Jordan the Committees wish to have further information about why the SIELs, inter alia, were granted: components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for pistols, components for tanks, gun silencers, pistols and weapon sights rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2. Given that the stated destinations included Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Sri Lanka why were OIELs approved for, inter alia, assault rifles, body armour, machine guns, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and sniper rifles?

A licence for components for machine guns was granted for export to the armed forces who have no role in dealing with civilian unrest. A licence for components for military combat vehicles was also granted for engine cooling fans for vehicles to be used by the armed forces. In both cases the end users have not been linked to human rights abuses. These licences did not raise any concerns under Criterion 2.

A licence was issued for components for a World War II Panzer IV Tank to be used as a museum exhibit.

A licence was granted for export of components for pistols for the private arms collection of a named individual. The end use/end user raised no concerns under Criterion 2.

A licence for 3 weapon silencers, 10 hunting rifles and weapon sights was granted for export to a named private individual for his personal use. The end use/end user raised no concerns under Criterion 2.

A licence was granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2 & 7. PSCs require open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State: the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority: equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

Kenya: Given that many observers judge that there is a clear risk of renewed violence in Kenya in the context of the re-scheduled 2013 national elections, why were SIELs granted for, inter alia, body armour, components for body armour, components for sniper rifles, gun silencers, military helmets, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?

All licences for Kenya are carefully assessed against Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria, bearing in mind the post election violence and internal security operations that took place during 2007 and 2008 and the risk of renewed violence associated with the 2013 elections.

The licence for components for sniper rifles, sniper rifle, and weapon sight was for equipment to be used by a named private individual for recreational purposes (i.e. competition and target shooting). The licence was to support a legitimate sporting end use which did not raise any Criteria concerns.

The licence for body armour and components for body armour was for a ballistic helmet and vest to be used in protecting staff working for the UN when travelling through potentially hazardous areas in Kenya and Somalia.

A licence was granted for a weapons sight to be used by a named private individual for recreational purposes. This end use did not raise any Criteria concerns.

One of the licences (gun silencers, sporting guns, weapon sights) was for an air rifle, sound moderator and telescopic sight for vermin control. This equipment was for export to a named private individual. This end use did not raise any Criteria concerns.

A similar licence for an air rifle, sound moderator and telescopic sight mount to be used by a named private individual for recreational purposes (i.e. target shooting and hunting) was granted. The licence was to support a legitimate sporting end use which did not raise any Criteria concerns.

A licence was granted for the export of armoured flotation vests (body armour) to be worn by personnel of a maritime private security service provider, when undertaking anti-piracy maritime security work.

A licence for small arms ammunition for use by a named individual for sporting purposes as a professional hunter was granted. This end use did not raise any Criteria concerns.

Kuwait: Given the unrest in the country prior to and during this period, the Committees wish to have further information about why SIELs for components for machine guns, components for sniper rifles, CS hand grenades, hand grenades, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, tear gas/irritant ammunition, technology for sniper rifles, technology for the use of sniper rifles, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights and an OIEL issued for small arms ammunition were approved, rather than refused under Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria.

A licence was approved for the supply of CS hand grenades, hand grenades, illuminators, signalling devices, tear gas/irritant ammunition and training devices containing military pyrotechnic materials—these were for testing and evaluation purposes. A licence was also issued for small arms ammunition for testing and evaluation. Another licence was issued for components and technology for sniper rifles, small arms ammunition, 4 sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon night sights and weapon sights, for testing and evaluation purposes. The end user is the same for all three licences and there was no information linking this end user to human rights violations. Given the small quantities supplied and the nature of the end use for test and evaluation (rather than operational use) it was assessed that there was not a clear risk that the goods in these licences might be used for internal repression.

A temporary licence for components for sniper rifles, sniper rifles, technology for the use of sniper rifles and weapon sight mounts was granted (as was a temporary licence for sniper rifles and weapon sights). In both cases the goods were to be demonstrated by, and remain under the control of, a visiting UK based team and it was judged that these licences did not raise any Criteria concerns.

A licence for the export of components for machine guns was granted for the purpose of classroom training by the armed forces. Given this end use and the lack of any evidence linking the armed forces to human rights violations it was assessed that there was not a clear risk under Criterion 2 that these goods might be used for internal repression.

Two licences were granted for the export of sporting shotgun cartridges (small arms ammunition) for small game and clay target shooting. Another licence was issued for weapon sights for hunters and field target shooters. These end uses did not raise any concerns under the Criteria.

Netherlands: The Committees would be grateful for more information about why a SIEL and an incorporated SIEL for components for combat helicopters were refused.

These licence applications were for the supply of goods for incorporation in the Netherlands and subsequent supply to Israel. They were refused due to concerns about the ultimate end use of the equipment.

Oman: Given unrest in Oman during 2011 the Committees wish to have information about why: SIELs for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for tanks, equipment for the use of machine guns, machine guns, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, technology for assault rifles, technology for machine guns, technology for pistols, training tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition and weapon sights were granted; and an OIEL for, inter alia, rifles were issued? Given that the stated destinations included Djibouti, Egypt, and Sri Lanka why were SITCLs approved for, inter alia, assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, military helmets, pistols, small arms ammunition and weapons sights? Given that the stated destinations included Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Sri Lanka why were OITCLs approved for, inter alia, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, machine guns, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights and weapon sights?

Many of these licences were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2 & 7. PSCs require open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State: the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority: equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

Several licences were granted for components for tanks used by the armed forces of Oman. Our assessment under Criterion 2 was that there was no evidence linking the army or the use of tanks to human rights abuse. We therefore considered that there was not a clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression.

Several licences were granted for the export of: ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, machine guns, components for machine guns, technology for assault rifles and machine guns, pistols, components and technology for pistols, weapon cleaning equipment. All were for training and operational use by the armed forces. Our assessment under Criterion 2 was that this end user had not been involved in human rights abuses during the February protests and subsequent events and there was not a clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression.

Three licences were granted for components for machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, technology for machine guns, components for artillery, equipment for the use of artillery and weapon cleaning equipment. These licences were issued for the maintenance of weapons in service with the armed forces of Oman. The applications were assessed under Criterion 2 but there was no evidence that such weapons had been used for internal repression in the past and it was assessed that there was not a clear risk that this equipment might be used for internal repression by these end users in the future.

Two licences for components for military transport aircraft and spare parts for pistols were granted. This equipment was for use by the armed forces of Oman. This branch of the armed forces was not involved in policing the unrest of February 2011 or subsequent protests and there was no evidence linking this end user to human rights abuses. It was assessed that there was not a clear risk under Criterion 2 that this equipment might be used for internal repression.

A licence was issued for small arms ammunition for target rifle shooting, vermin control and hunting. This end use did not raise any Criteria concerns.

Sri Lanka: Given that Sri Lanka is listed as a "country of concern", in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy report, the Committees wish to have more information on why a SIEL for anti-riot/ballistic shields was granted; why SITCLs for assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, pistols, small arms ammunition and weapon sights were approved; and why OITCLs for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights and weapon sights were issued?

One licence was for the temporary export of an anti-riot shield for demonstration purposes, with the goods to remain under the exporter's control at all times before being returned to the UK. We assessed that there was not a clear risk that this item might be used for internal repression.

Sudan: Given the current tension on the border between Sudan and South Sudan and the sanctions imposed by EU Common Positions 1994/165/CFSP and 2005/411/CFSP, why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography issued rather than refused under Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?

This licence was issued for dual-use items not subject to the arms embargo and intended for UN Peacekeeping Forces for the purposes of secure communications. Given the nature of these items and the purposes for which they will be used this application did not raise any Criteria concerns and was therefore approved.

Sweden: The Committees wish to have information on why a SIEL for inertial equipment was refused.

This licence was for inertial equipment intended ultimately for commercial use in Iran. This equipment is covered by the Iran sanctions and the licence was refused under Criterion 1.

Syria: Given the current unrest and human rights violations by the security forces in Syria the Committees wish to know why an OITCL, with a destination listed as Jordan, for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection was issued.

An OITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection for Syria was issued for the protection of diplomatic staff working in Syria. As the vehicles are for the protective use of foreign diplomats, they are considered exempt from the EU arms embargo on Syria.

United States of America: The Committees wish to have information on why SIELs for components for combat aircraft, components for military aircraft head-up displays and components for simulators for bombs were refused; why a SIEL—incorporated for components for equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions was refused; and why a SIEL—incorporated for components for military training aircraft was refused.

These licence applications were for supply of goods for incorporation in the US and subsequent supply to Israel. They were refused due to concerns about the ultimate end use of the equipment in Israel.

Yemen: Given that Yemen is listed as a "country of concern", in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy report, the Committees wish to have more information on why a SIEL for body armour and a SITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection were issued.

These licences for export of body armour and an all-wheel drive vehicle with ballistic protection are to provide protection for staff working from UN field offices. The supply of these goods to this end user did not raise any concerns under Criterion 2.

Zimbabwe: The Committees wish to have more information on why SIELs for components for all-wheel vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour and components for body armour were approved.

In line with our international obligations all export licence applications for Zimbabwe are considered with due regard for the EU Embargo (EU Council Decision 2011/101/CFSP). However, certain exemptions under the embargo allow for the export of some items to specific end users. These licences were for the export of body armour, components for body armour, and components for all-wheel vehicles with ballistic protection for use by an international humanitarian NGO. This equipment was for protecting staff during potentially hazardous demining operations. As this is permitted under one or more of the exemptions under the EU Embargo and did not raise any Criteria concerns.

The Committees' 2012 Quarter 1 (January-March) questions and the Government's answers

Argentina: Given the current political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012 the Committees wish to know why were SIELs issued for components for military aero-engines, components for military support aircraft, equipment employing cryptography and imaging cameras during this period. The Committees also wish to know why OIELs were issued for: a) equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography and technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography; b) hydrophones and towed hydrophone arrays; and c) components for combat aircraft, components for military training aircraft; components for military electronic equipment; general military aircraft components.

At the time covered by these applications, Government policy (dating from 1998) was to refuse licences for exports and trade which would enhance Argentine military capabilities, but to permit licences for goods which maintained existing capability. In practice this meant the authorisation of the export and trade of components for maintenance purposes. As a result of the change in policy announced by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in his Written Ministerial Statement of 26 April 2012, some of these licences were subsequently revoked. The revoked SIELs were for components for military support aircraft and components for military aero-engines destined for military end users. The application for imaging cameras was for a temporary export to demonstrate goods to potential customers, which raised no Consolidated Criteria concerns. One of the licences for the export for equipment employing cryptography was for equipment to enable secure connectivity destined for commercial end use. The other licence for the export for equipment employing cryptography was for radio equipment to be used by the emergency services. Neither of the licences for equipment employing cryptography raised Criteria concerns.

The OIELs referred to in a) and b) were for the export of equipment destined for commercial end use and raised no Criteria concerns. That referred to in c) was for escape systems for aircrew which raised no Criteria concerns.

Armenia: Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 why was a SIEL for equipment employing cryptography and an OIEL for cryptographic software issued?

The SIEL was for the export of equipment for civilian end use by the Armenia government in a project related to national ID cards. Therefore it did not fall under the terms of the OSCE embargo. The OIEL was for the export of software for civil end use by a well known international media group. Therefore, it too did not fall under the terms of the OSCE embargo.

Azerbaijan: Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 why were OIELs for cryptographic software and imaging cameras, submersible equipment and underwater electronic imaging systems issued?

The OIEL for cryptographic software was for the export of software for civil end use by a well known international media group. Therefore, it did not fall under the terms of the OSCE embargo. This licence also had Armenia as a destination. The other OIEL under reference was for the export of equipment for use in the oil/gas industry and therefore was not covered by the OSCE embargo.

Bahrain: Given the recent unrest and human rights violations by security forces in Bahrain, why were SIELs granted for assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment and technology for military communications equipment issued?

The SIEL for the export of assault rifles and components of assault rifles related to a small quantity of equipment destined for private use by a member of the Bahrain Royal family for hunting and sports target shooting. Therefore, there were no Criteria concerns. The SIEL for export of communications equipment and related components, software and technology was destined for use by the armed forces. The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report noted a lack of command and control as a contributory factor in the over-reaction of security forces to the demonstrations of February 2011. Although secure communications equipment could be used for internal repression, improved command and control could also be beneficial in helping security forces to react in a proportionate manner to demonstrations. In the absence of a clear risk that these goods would be used for internal repression, the Government decided to approve the licence.

Brazil: Why was an OIEL for components for sporting guns and unfinished products for sporting guns refused?

OIELs may be considered to be too broad when it is judged that it is necessary to have information on the specific end-user within a country for certain types of goods, in order to be compliant with legal obligations. The company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods for Brazil so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.

Burma: Given the ban on the provision of all arms and related material to Burma under CFSP 2006/318 the Committees request further information on the OIEL for cryptographic software issued to Burma during this period.

The OIEL for cryptographic software was for the export of software for civil end use by a well known international media group. Therefore, it did not fall under the terms of the embargo.

China: Given the Madrid European Council arms embargo to China why were SIELs for components for air-to-air missiles and weapon sights approved? The Committees wish to know why two SIELs for semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers were revoked.

The SIEL for the export of weapon sights was intended for sporting use and had no military application. Therefore this equipment did not fall under terms of the embargo. The SIEL for components for air-to-air missiles referred to bearings destined for civil end use in marine gyro based compasses. Given this credible and legitimate civil end use, the Government was satisfied that there were no Criteria concerns and these goods were not covered by the embargo. The two SIELs for semiconductor wafers were revoked after additional information received led to a reassessment of the Criteria 7 concerns and the Government decided that there was an unacceptable risk of diversion.

Congo, Democratic Republic of: Given that the Democratic Republic of Congo is one of the FCO's "Countries of concern", as listed in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy Report, the Committees wish to know why an OIEL for cryptographic software was granted.

The OIEL for cryptographic software was for the export of software for civil end use by a well known international media group. Therefore, it did not fall under the terms of the embargo.

Cyprus: Why were OITCLs for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for body armour, military helmets, rifles and small arms ammunition refused?

The exporter asked for Cyprus (and other destinations) to be removed as a destination for this licence.

Czech Republic: Why was an OIEL for components for sporting guns and unfinished products for sporting guns refused?

OIELs may be considered to be too broad when it is judged that it is necessary to have information on the specific end-user within a country for certain types of goods, in order to be compliant with legal obligations. The company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods for the Czech Republic so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.

Djibouti: Given the human rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why was an OIEL granted for components for military support aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment and technology for military support aircraft; and OIELs granted for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, assault rifles and small arms ammunition; and OITCLs granted for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, component for rifles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights?

The OIEL for the export of components for military support aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment and technology for military support aircraft referred to equipment for use with civil-owned test aircraft. Therefore, there were no Criteria concerns.

No OIEL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection was issued during this quarter. However there was a SITCL for equipment in this category which was intended for use of diplomatic personnel. Therefore, there were no Criteria concerns.

No OIEL for assault rifles and/or small arms ammunition was issued during this period but as noted below the Government did issue OITCLs for such equipment destined for use in anti-piracy activities

The OITCLs were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2 & 7. PSCs require open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

Egypt: Given that the Government previously revoked arms export licences to Egypt why were SIELs for components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for projectile launchers, components for weapon control equipment and training small arms ammunition issued during this period? Additionally, why was one SIEL for components for pistols granted and another SIEL for components for pistols refused? Given that the stated destinations included Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Sri Lanka why were OITCLs approved for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon night sights and weapon sights? Further, why were OITCLs for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for body armour, rifles and small arms ammunition approved in some cases and refused in others?

The SIELs issued were for the supply of equipment to end users, none of which had been involved in the unrest during the Egyptian revolution. The open licences were all for anti-piracy equipment, but in one case the exporter asked for Egypt (and other destinations) to be removed from the licence.

The components for weapon control equipment were for use on naval vessels. We assessed there was no clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression.

The components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns and training small arms ammunition were intended to turn lethal firearms into non-lethal training weapons. Therefore, there was a low risk that these goods might be used for internal repression.

The components for projectile launchers were parts for use with testing equipment at various civil industrial locations, for example grain silos. Although the end user also manufactured military products, the stated end use was compatible with the civilian products they were known to produce. Therefore, there was a low risk these goods might be used for internal repression.

Two SIELs for the export of components for pistols (together with pistols) were refused. In both cases, the Government was concerned about the possibility of diversion; suspected links between elements of law enforcement agencies and counter revolutionary violence; evidence of human rights abuses; a lack of security sector reform; and the high risk of further unrest. In view of these concerns, we considered it prudent to refuse these applications as there was a clear risk under Criterion 2 and a risk that the goods would aggravate existing tensions under Criterion 3. We were unable to trace any SIEL issued for components for pistols during the quarter under review. However, we did issue a licence for the export of components for semi-automatic pistols as outlined above.

Germany: Why was an incorporated SIEL for components for military support aircraft revoked and why was an incorporated SIEL for military communications equipment refused?

The SIEL for export of military communications equipment was for the supply of goods for incorporation in Germany and subsequent supply to Israel. They were refused due to concerns about the ultimate end use of the equipment.

We have no trace of a SIEL for components for military support aircraft being revoked during this quarter.

Hong Kong: Given the human rights record of the Government of China, how were concerns about diversion under Criteria 7—and then by extension, Criteria 2—of the Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIELs granted for anti-riot/ballistic shields, components for assault rifles, components for bombs, components for exploding grenade ammunition, components for grenade launchers, components for machine guns, components for mortar bombs, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun silencers, machine guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, teargas/irritant ammunition and weapons sights?

Several of the SIELs in question were for the supply of goods and equipment destined for law enforcement agencies. As outlined above, we have few concerns with such agencies in Hong Kong.

Two of the other SIELs were for the supply of small quantities of equipment such as weapon sights, components for assault rifles, components for bombs, components for exploding grenade ammunition, components for grenade launchers, components for machine guns, components for mortar bombs, components for small arms ammunition, components for surface launched rockets, grenade launchers, gun mountings for a private military collection. All ammunition (in addition to grenade launchers) was inert and deactivated. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.

Another SIEL was for the supply of components for machine guns, components for rifles, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns and rifles to a civil end user for use in TV and film production. The end user was well established and the end use credible given the large TV and film industry in Hong Kong. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.

Finally, the SIEL for small arms ammunition was for goods destined for a well known private sporting club. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.

India: Why was an OITCL destined to Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Russia, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates for, assault rifles, body armour, civil body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon night sights and weapon sights, refused?

OIELs may be considered to be too broad when it is judged that it is necessary to have information on the specific end-user within a country for certain types of goods, in order to be compliant with legal obligations. The company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods for India so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.

Indonesia: The Committees wish to know why a SIEL for weapon sights was refused when a SIEL for weapon night sights was approved?

A SIEL for the supply of weapon sights was refused under Criteria 7 as the Government had concerns about the end user. A temporary SIEL for the supply of weapon night sights was issued because it related to a small quantity of equipment being sent for evaluation by a government end user. We assessed there was a low risk of these goods being used for internal repression and had no other Criteria concerns.

Iraq: Given that UNSCR 1546 (2004) continues the embargo on arms and related material to Iraq the Committees wish to know why SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection (2 licences), body armour and components for body armour were approved.

Exemptions to the arms embargo for Iraq are permitted by UNSC Resolution 1546. These include the sale of arms and equipment required by the Government of Iraq, sales to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), diplomatic missions in Iraq, and entities contracted or subcontracted to the Government of Iraq. The SIELs under reference were considered exempt from the embargo and there were no other Criteria concerns.

Israel: The Committees wish to know why a SIEL for components for military helicopters was approved while a SIEL for components for combat helicopters was refused.

The SIEL for the export of components for combat helicopters raised Criteria 2, 3 and 4 concerns linked to Israel's use of combat helicopters. Therefore, this licence application was refused. However, the components for military helicopters were destined for use in transport helicopters, primarily used for casualty evacuation. Therefore, the Government considered that the same Criteria concerns did not apply in this case and the licence was approved.

Jordan: Given the recent pro-democracy demonstrations in Jordan the Committees wish to know why the following SIELs were granted: body armour, components for assault rifles, components for grenade launchers, components for military combat vehicles; components for military support vehicles, components for pistols, components for rifles, equipment for the use of grenade launchers, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, grenade launchers, gun silencers, rifles, tanks, weapon night sights and weapon sights rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2. Given the stated destinations included Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Sri Lanka why were OITCLs approved for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights?

Several licences were for export of equipment destined to the armed forces. Equipment covered by these licences included, components for grenade launchers, equipment for the use of grenade launchers, grenade launchers, components for military combat vehicles and components for military support vehicles. In all cases the end users have not been linked to human rights abuses and these licences did not raise any Criteria concerns.

A licence for the export of components for assault rifles and components for pistols was approved. This equipment was for use by a law enforcement agency for safe weapons handling and tactics training. The components in question were designed to prevent live rounds firing, so there were no Criteria concerns.

The licence for the export of tanks was for vehicles that were to be part of a museum display. Therefore, there were no Criteria concerns.

Several licences were for the temporary export of equipment for demonstration at the SOFEX 2012 exhibition in Amman. These temporary exports raised no Criteria concerns.

Several licences were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2 & 7. PSCs require open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

Kuwait: Given the recent unrest in the country the Committees wish to know why SIELs for weapon night sights and weapon sights were approved, rather that refused under Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria.

These licences were for the temporary export of equipment for evaluation by government end users. Therefore, there were no Criteria concerns.

Libya: Given that Libya is an FCO "Country of Concern" and subject to arms trade sanctions, the Committees wish to know why the SIEL that was approved for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection.

These vehicles were to be exported for the use of diplomatic personnel and were therefore exempt from the sanctions regime. Given the proposed end use, there were no other Criteria concerns.

Oman: Given unrest in Oman during 2011 the Committees wish to know why: SIELs for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for hand grenades, components for military combat vehicles, components for military helicopters, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, components for tanks, crowd control ammunition, hand grenades, military communications equipment, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, training tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition and weapon sights; Mil and other SIELs for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights; and SITCLs for anti-armour ammunition, assault rifles, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition and weapon sights were approved. Given that the stated destinations included Djibouti, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman and Sri Lanka why were OITCLs approved for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon night sights and weapon sights?

Our assessment of the political situation and under Criterion 2 was that the Oman armed forces had not been involved in human rights abuses during the February 2011 protests and subsequent events, and there was not a clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression.

Several licences were for export of equipment such as components for tanks, components for military combat vehicles, components for sniper rifles and components for military helicopters for the armed forces.

A licence was granted for the export of anti-armour ammunition and small arms ammunition destined for a government end user. The end use for these goods was defensive. The stated end use was credible and we assessed there was not a clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression by the end user.

A licence was granted for export of components for hand grenades, components for training hand grenades, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition and training tear gas/irritant ammunition for use by a government end user involved in law enforcement. The equipment was stated to be for both training and operational use. Oman has embarked on a programme of comprehensive police reform and their Government has stated that it expects any response to future demonstrations to be proportionate after isolated incidents of overreaction early on during the 2011 protests. Although such equipment could be used for internal repression, we assessed that there was not a clear risk that this would be the case given the stated policy of the Oman government and our assessment of the situation there since February 2011.

Many of the licences referred to above were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2 & 7. PSCs require open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

Pakistan: Given that Pakistan is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy Report why were SIELs for anti-armour ammunition, anti-riot ballistic shields, body armour and components for body armour approved. Further, given that the destination was stated as the United States of America why was an OITCL for assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, grenade launchers, targeting equipment, weapon night sights and weapon sights refused?

One of the SIELs for the export of body armour and components for body armour was for equipment intended for the use of United Nations personnel. The equipment was for their personal protection and we had no Criteria concerns.

Another SIEL was for the export of anti-ballistic riot shields to a government end user. The stated end use was credible and there was no evidence of human rights abuse by this end user or any evidence of excessive use of force or misuse of this type of equipment. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.

A further SIEL was for the export of anti-armour ammunition for use by a military end user. This was a small quantity of ammunition for testing and evaluation purposes. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.

The Government had concerns under Criteria 2, 3, 4 and 7 about the use of the equipment in the OITCL under reference (not for the US Government). As an open licence would not allow us any scrutiny of the quantity or end users, we were not able to address satisfactorily those concerns and the licence was refused.

Russia: Given that Russia is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy Report why were SIELs for body armour, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved?

There were two SIELs for the export of weapon sights issued during this period. In one application, the equipment was destined for a commercial end user for onward sale for sporting and hunting use. The equipment had no military utility. In the other case, it was a small quantity of equipment for private use. Neither application raised Criteria concerns.

The licence for the export of small arms ammunition was for goods destined for sporting use with a major sporting federation. There were no Criteria concerns.

The licence for export of body armour was for a small quantity of equipment that was to be demonstrated and evaluated. There were no Criteria concerns.

Serbia: Why was an OIEL for components for sporting guns and unfinished products for sporting guns refused?

OIELs may be considered to be too broad when it is judged that it is necessary to have information on the specific end-user within a country for certain types of goods, in order to be compliant with legal obligations. The company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods for Serbia so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.

Seychelles: Why were OITCLs for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for body armour, military helmets, rifles and small arms ammunition approved for three applications but refused for the same items in another application?

These open licences were all for anti-piracy equipment, but in one case the exporter asked for Seychelles (and other destinations) to be removed from the licence.

Sri Lanka: Given that Sri Lanka is listed as a "country of concern", in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy Report, the Committees wish to know why SIELs for acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights were approved; why OIELs for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, military helmets, and small arms ammunition were approved; and why OITCLs for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon night sights and weapon sights were issued?

The licence for export of equipment employing cryptography was for equipment destined for civil end use in providing 3G mobile services. Therefore, there were no Criteria concerns.

All the other licences under reference were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2 & 7. PSCs require open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

Sudan: Given the current tension on the border between Sudan and South Sudan and the sanctions imposed by EU Common Positions 1994/165/CFSP and 2005/411/CFSP, why was a SIEL for weapon sight mounts issued rather that refused under Criteria of the Consolidated Criteria?

The equipment in this licence application was destined for use by UN personnel. The sanctions regime provides an exemption for such exports.

Sudan, South: Given the current tension on the border between Sudan and South Sudan and the sanctions imposed by EU Common Positions 1994/165/CFSP and 2005/411/CFSP, why were SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components for body armour and military helmets issued rather that refused under Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?

The equipment in these applications was intended for end use by well known NGOs for humanitarian purposes. The sanctions regime provides an exemption for such exports.

Syria: Given the current unrest and human rights violations by the security forces in Syria and as Syria is an FCO "Country of Concern" the Committees wish to know what were the chemicals approved in the SIEL for chemicals used for industrial/commercial purposes and why a SITCL, with a destination listed as Jordan, for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection was issued.

The two SIELs for export of chemicals used for industrial/chemical equipment were for chemicals destined for commercial end use. We assessed that this end use was credible and the licences were originally approved. Following a revision of the sanctions regime, these SIELs were revoked in July 2012.

The SITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection was for end use by diplomatic personnel. Therefore, there were no Criteria concerns.

Taiwan: The Committees wish to know why an OIEL for components for sporting guns and unfinished products for sporting guns was refused.

OIELs may be considered to be too broad when it is judged that it is necessary to have information on the specific end-user within a country for certain types of goods, in order to be compliant with legal obligations. The company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods for Taiwan so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.

Thailand: The Committees wish to know why an OIEL for components for military communications equipment and military communications equipment was refused.

OIELs may be considered to be too broad when it is judged that it is necessary to have information on the specific end-user within a country for certain types of goods, in order to be compliant with legal obligations. The company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods for Thailand so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.

Vietnam: Given that Vietnam is listed as a "country of concern", in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy report, the Committees wish to have more information on why SIELs for components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, weapons night sights and weapon sights were approved.

OIELs may be considered to be too broad when it is judged that it is necessary to have information on the specific end-user within a country for certain types of goods, in order to be compliant with legal obligations. The company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods for Vietnam so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.

The Committees' 2012 Quarter 2 (April-June) questions and the Government's answers

Argentina: Given the current political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012 the Committees wish know why was a SIEL issued for small arms ammunition and why a SIEL—transhipment for small arms ammunition was issued. The Committees also wish to know if any goods comprising the 37 revoked SIELs and the 6 revoked OIELs were shipped before the licences were revoked and if so what was shipped.

This SIEL was for the export of small arms ammunition for sporting and hunting use. It was issued before the change in policy announced by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in his Written Ministerial Statement of 26 April 2012. However, this change in policy did not require this SIEL to be revoked as it was not for equipment destined for a military end user.

There were no SIEL-transhipments for Argentina issued in Q2 2012. The only licence of this type issued in this quarter was for an end user in the United States.

The Government reviewed all extant licences for the export of military goods destined to the Argentine armed forces following the policy change announced by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills on 26 April 2012. 37 extant SIELs were revoked. If all the goods covered by a SIEL have been exported then that licence would be fully exhausted and no longer show up as extant on the licensing database. Therefore, all 37 licence records showed that there were some goods remaining to be exported and that was why those licences were revoked, to prevent export of the type of equipment covered by the change in policy. Of course, revocation could not prevent the shipment of goods already exported. We do not have access to data showing how many of the goods covered by these SIELs had already been shipped.

Armenia: Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 why was an OIEL that included all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and body armour issued?

This OIEL was for equipment destined for use by a well-known humanitarian organisation. Therefore, it was exempt from the terms of the OSCE embargo.

Azerbaijan: Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 why were SIELs for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and imaging cameras issued?

The imaging cameras were dual-use items for civil end use in the oil and gas sector and therefore do not fall within the scope of the OSCE embargo. The cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography were dual-use items for civil end use in upgrading mobile telephone networks and, therefore, also outside the scope of the OSCE embargo.

Bahrain: Given the recent unrest and human rights violations by the security forces in Bahrain and its recent inclusion in the FCO's list of "Countries of Concern", what assurances has the UK Government received that SIELs granted for assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols and small arms ammunition issued for personal sporting use will not be diverted to the Bahraini security forces, law enforcement agencies or armed forces? Why was a SIEL for equipment employing cryptography issued?

The equipment employing cryptography was destined for civil end use by a commercial airline. Therefore, the Government had no Criteria concerns.

The Government did not seek any assurances about the use of the small arms and ammunition listed above because these applications were for the export of a small quantity of expensive equipment for personal use and we had no concerns that it might be diverted and used for internal repression.

China: Given the Madrid European Council arms embargo to China why were SIELs for components for combat aircraft, components for combat naval vessels and small arms ammunition approved? The Committees wish to know why OIELs for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software and technology for software for equipment employing cryptography were issued.

The UK interpretation of Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament on 3 June 1998, was that it includes:

Lethal weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these and ammunition.

Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms.

Any equipment which might be used for internal repression.

The components for combat naval vessels—propeller shafts and seals—were not covered by the UK's interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo and were not in contravention of our licensing criteria, as they did not provide a qualitative increase in military capability.

The small arms ammunition was destined for use in sports shooting and therefore also not covered by the UK interpretation of the EU arms embargo. The components for combat aircraft were intended for temporary export for demonstration purposes at the China International Defence Electronics Exhibition (CIDEX) in Beijing. The equipment to be exported was a non-functioning model and would be returned to the UK.

All the OIELs in question were for the export of dual-use goods and software destined for civil end use and neither raised Criteria concerns nor did they fall within the scope of the EU arms embargo.

Djibouti: Given the human rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why was a SIEL granted for military combat vehicles and OITCLs granted for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights?

The SIEL was for the export of several armoured personnel carriers (APCs) intended to be used by the Djiboutian contingent operating under the auspices of the UN Mission in Darfur. Therefore we did not have any immediate Criteria concerns about the use of this equipment in Djibouti. It would, of course, be possible that the APCs could be deployed back to Djibouti at a later date but the Government assessed that there was a lack of evidence linking similar equipment with previous human rights violations. Taking into account the deployment of this equipment on humanitarian operations, along with many other progressive developments to address internal human rights concerns, we assessed it as unlikely that this export might be used for internal repression.

Several OITCLs were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards for their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2 & 7. PSCs require open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

Egypt: Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt why were SIELs for acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for pistols and pistols issued during this period?

The components for pistols and pistols were a small quantity of equipment destined for personal use. Therefore, the Government did not have any Criteria concerns.

The other equipment listed was to be used by a private security company for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2 & 7. PSCs require open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

Hong Kong: Given the human rights record of the Government of China, how were concerns about diversion under Criteria 7—and then by extension, Criteria 2—of the Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIELs granted for body armour, components for body armour, small arms ammunition and tear gas/irritant ammunition?

We have minimal Criteria concerns with the police, prison, customs, immigration or any other security services that come under the control of the Government of the Hong Kong SAR. Hong Kong also operates a robust export control system. Exports of Wassenaar-controlled and certain military equipment require a licence from the Hong Kong authorities regardless of whether the goods are for mainland China, Macau or other destinations.

The small arms ammunition and tear gas/irritant ammunition were destined for a law enforcement agency. As outlined above, we have minimal concerns with such agencies in Hong Kong.

The body armour and components for body armour were destined for civil end users whom we assessed to have a legitimate end use for such equipment. We had no Criteria concerns about the potential diversion of this equipment to undesirable end use or end users.

India: Why was an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights refused?

OIELs may be too broad when it is judged necessary to have information on the specific end-user within a country for certain types of goods. This equipment was intended for use in maritime security and the company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.

Iraq: Given that UNSCR 1546 (2004) continues the embargo on arms and related material against Iraq, the Committees wish to know why the SIELs were approved for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.

These are all dual-use items which do not fall within the scope of the arms embargo. There were no other Criteria concerns.

Isle of Man: The Committees wish to know why an OIEL for military support aircraft was revoked.

A licence is not required for export of controlled goods from the UK to the Isle of Man. In this case it was included as a permitted destination in error. The Isle of Man was subsequently removed as a permitted destination.

Jordan: Given the recent pro-democracy demonstrations in Jordan the Committees wish to know why the following SIELs were granted: components for military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, equipment employing cryptography and radio jamming equipment rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2.

The SIELs for military support vehicles and components for military combat vehicles were for the export of equipment destined for the armed forces. The end user had not been linked to human rights abuses and these applications did not raise any Criteria concerns.

SIELs for equipment employing cryptography were destined for government agencies. These SIELs were for radio equipment, which could be used, for example, to coordinate the response to demonstrations. Whilst such equipment could potentially be misused for internal repression, it can also help inform and facilitate a proportionate response to such activity. The end user had not been linked to human rights abuses and these applications did not raise any Criteria concerns.

Another SIEL for equipment employing cryptography was for equipment for civil and commercial end use by a well known international company, which raised no Criteria concerns.

The SIEL for radio jamming equipment was for a temporary export of the goods for product demonstration purposes. The equipment was to remain under control of the exporter and would be eventually returned to the UK. Therefore, there were no Criteria concerns.

Kenya: Why were SIELS for components for pistols, pistols and small arms ammunition refused while other SIELs for the same items were issued?

Two SIELs for the export of components for pistols, pistols and small arms ammunition to the same end user were refused. The end user stated that the weapons and ammunition would be held in stock for resale locally. In assessing these cases, the Government took account of the concerns over the lack of control over small arms noted by numerous sources. Therefore, we considered that the threshold of clear risk had been met under Criterion 7 and the applications were accordingly refused.

One of the SIELs issued for the export of similar equipment was for a small quantity of equipment destined for personal use. We did not consider that the same Criterion 7 concerns applied in this case. Therefore, this application was issued.

The other SIEL for similar equipment was destined for use by the Kenyan Armed Forces. We considered that the armed forces had a credible and legitimate need for this ammunition given their role in AMISOM, the African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia. Therefore, we did not have Criterion 7 concerns in this case. Although we did have concerns about human rights abuses in Kenya, there was a lack of clear evidence that these involved the armed forces. Therefore, this application was issued.

Kuwait: Given the recent unrest in the country the Committees wish to know why SIELs for weapon night sights and weapon sights were approved, rather than refused under Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria.

This SIEL was for the export of equipment destined for a government end user. Unrest in Kuwait has been low-level and of a different order to elsewhere in the Arab world. Political pluralism exists and the majority of rallies and demonstrations in the country (including large scale anti-government protests) pass peacefully. Whilst the Kuwaiti security forces have used tear gas and other non-lethal tactics to disperse protests, particularly towards the end of last year, the Government assesses that it would take events of an entirely different and more dangerous order before the use of live fire would even be considered. In light of circumstances in Kuwait the Government assesses that such an escalation is not foreseeable. We therefore assessed there was not a clear risk this equipment might be used for internal repression.

Malaysia: Why were SIELs for crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, teargas/irritant ammunition and wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition refused?

These SIELs were for the export of equipment destined for use by law enforcement agencies. The Malaysian authorities had used tear gas to disperse peaceful demonstrations as recently as July 2011. There were subsequent positive changes to public order legislation allowing public protests to take place in certain circumstances, and in accordance with specific conditions imposed by the police. A number of protests passed off without the use of force by the authorities following the enactment of these new rules, including when demonstrators failed to comply with conditions imposed. Nevertheless, we assessed it was too early to conclude that there was no clear risk that tear gas might be misused. In particular, we took account of the widespread expectation that elections might take place in 2012 (they must be held by the end of June 2013) and the associated potential for mass, anti-government demonstrations. We therefore assessed that there was a potential risk that certain items might be misused and refused these applications.

Maldives: Why was an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights refused?

Mauritius: Why was an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights refused?

Mozambique: Why was an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights refused?

Nepal: The Committees wish to know why a SIEL for components for equipment for the production of small arms ammunition and equipment for the production of small arms ammunition was refused.

The export of this equipment raised Criteria 2 (Internal Repression) and 3 (Internal Situation) concerns. The Government previously refused a similar application in May 2010 on the grounds that there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression and that the goods would prolong existing internal armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions in Nepal.

We continue to have concerns with the political situation in Nepal. Elections took place in 2008 but the Prime Minister resigned in May 2009 over the President's decision to overturn his decision to sack the Chief of Army Staff. Due to ongoing tensions between the main political parties, a new Prime Minister was only elected in August 2011. We were concerned that the peace process remained fragile and therefore refused this application on Criterion 3 grounds.

Oman: Given unrest in Oman during 2011 the Committees wish to know why SIELs for acoustic devices for riot control, components for machine guns, components for military support vehicles, components for tanks, pistols and technology for pistols were issued? Why were OITCLs issued for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon night sights and weapon sights when one of the source countries is listed as Oman?

A SIEL for the export of components for machine guns and components for pistols was issued. This equipment was destined for a military end user, which had not been involved in crowd control in the 2011 unrest. The Government assessed that the likelihood of involvement of this end user in the response to future unrest was extremely low. There has been no unrest in Oman since July 2011 when HM The Sultan introduced reforms to improve the economic situation of those affected. The current security situation in Muscat is stable. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns about this application.

A SIEL for the export of components for military support vehicles was issued. The components were parts for tracked armoured reconnaissance vehicles to be used by the military. Our assessment under Criterion 2 was that there was no evidence linking the military or the use of such vehicles to human rights abuse. We therefore considered that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression.

Two SIELs were granted for the export of components for tanks used by the armed forces. Our assessment under Criterion 2 was that there was no evidence linking the military or the use of tanks to human rights abuse. We therefore considered that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression.

A SIEL for the export of a small quantity of components for pistols, technology for pistols and pistols was issued. This equipment was for trial and evaluation by the military. The application was assessed under Criterion 2 but there was no evidence that such weapons had been used by the end user for internal repression in the past and it was assessed that there was no clear risk that this equipment might be used for internal repression in the future.

The remaining licences were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2 & 7. PSCs require open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State: the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority: equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

Pakistan: Given that Pakistan is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, sniper rifles, anti-riot/ballistic shields and body armour approved?

The SIEL for export of all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection was for a 4x4 vehicle intended for re-sale in the luxury car market in Pakistan. We had no Criteria concerns with the stated end use.

The SIEL for anti-riot ballistic shields and body armour was for the temporary export of this equipment for demonstration purposes at an exhibition. We had no Criteria concerns with the stated end use.

Two SIELs for the export of sniper rifles for use by a military end user were issued. We assessed that the stated military end use for this equipment was credible and that there was not a clear risk that this equipment might be used for internal repression.

Seychelles: Why was an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights refused?

Singapore: Why was an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights refused?

Somalia: Why was an OIEL for bomb suits, components for bomb suits, components for initiating explosives, components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military helmets, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment and non-military firing sets refused?

Somalia is subject to a UN embargo (UNSCR 733(1992)). The supply of non-lethal equipment required for humanitarian purposes is exempt provided each transfer has been approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee. An open licence in these circumstances is inappropriate given the UK's obligations under the embargo to notify, and obtain the approval of, the committee of all such transfers in advance.

South Africa: Why were SIELs for weapon sights and components for aircraft military communications equipment refused and why was an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights refused?

The SIEL for export of weapon sights was for equipment destined for resale to sport shooters in South Africa. However, the large quantities covered by this application (far more than might be expected to be sold annually) raised concerns about the possibility of diversion to undesirable end use. Therefore, in light of the Criterion 7 concerns, this application was refused.

The SIEL for components for aircraft military communications equipment was for the export of equipment eventually destined for use by the Argentine military. The Government's assessment was that the export of these components would be inconsistent with the policy announced by the Business Secretary on 26 April 2012, in particular that, "In future no licences shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods and technology being supplied to military end-users in Argentina, except in exceptional circumstances." Therefore, the application was refused under Criterion 1a.

OIELs may be too broad when it is judged necessary to have information on the specific end-user within a country for certain types of goods. This equipment was intended for use in maritime security and the company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods for South Africa so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.

Turkey: Why was a SIEL for dimensional inspection equipment refused?

The Government had Criterion 7 concerns about this application which we were unable to resolve despite detailed assessment. Therefore, the application was refused.

United Arab Emirates: Why was a SIEL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection refused and why was an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights refused?

The SIEL for the export of all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection was for armoured 4x4s that were for resale. As the eventual end users were unknown, the Government had Criteria concerns about diversion and this application was refused.

Vietnam: Given that Vietnam is listed as a "country of concern", in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy report, the Committees wish to have more information on why SIELs for military communications equipment and equipment employing cryptography were approved.

The SIEL for the export of military communications equipment was for search and rescue beacons to be used by a civil aviation company. The stated end use gave rise to no Criteria Concerns.

Two SIELs for the export of equipment employing cryptography were issued. One was for equipment to be used in network security by the local offices of a well-known international company. The other was for equipment to be used in transaction signing and private key repository by a government end user. In both cases, the stated end use gave rise to no Criteria concerns.

Zambia: The Committees wish to know why a SIEL for components for military support vehicles and military support vehicles was revoked and if the goods had been shipped before the licence was revoked.

The export was stopped at the UK border due to discrepancies between the shipping documents and the licence. The licence was revoked in order to prevent any further attempt at export while investigations were conducted.

The Committees' 2012 Quarter 3 (July-September) questions and the Government's answers

Afghanistan: Given the current conflict in Afghanistan the Committees wish to know why: SIELs for body armour, components for components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for machine guns, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, electronic warfare equipment, general military vehicle components, machine guns, military communications equipment, pistols, small arms ammunition, software for electronic warfare equipment, and technology for electronic warfare equipment; and an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography were issued?

As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the arms embargo in place for Afghanistan applies to individuals and entities designated for restrictive measures under UN Afghanistan sanctions (i.e. those individuals and entities listed in the UN's "1988 List" established by UNSCR 1988). All the SIELs referred to above were for equipment to be used by end users exempt from existing sanctions (e.g. International Security Assistance Force/Diplomatic Missions/United Nations/recognised NGOs). There were no other Criteria concerns about these exports.

The OIEL under reference was for dual use equipment (a wireless Ethernet bridge) intended for civil end use. There were no Criteria concerns.

Australia: Why was a SIEL for components for NBC detection equipment and NBC detection equipment refused?

The Government refused this application as we judged that there was a risk that UK classified material/capabilities would not be protected and this would be contrary to Criterion 5d. The activities of the intended recipient were not in direct support of the Australian Government and there was a potential requirement for use in destinations other than Australia.

Azerbaijan: Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography issued?

The equipment employing cryptography and software employing cryptography were dual-use items for civil end use and therefore outside the scope of the OSCE embargo.

Bangladesh: Why was a SIEL for components for military combat vehicles refused?

These were armoured personnel carrier (APC) components destined for a law enforcement agency. We had Criterion 2 concerns that the equipment might be used for internal repression due to previous incidents when Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies have made disproportionate use of tear gas, water cannon, and rubber bullets to break up demonstrations. Therefore, we assessed that there was a clear risk that these goods might be used to facilitate internal repression.

Benin: Why was an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, machine guns, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights refused?

This equipment was intended for use in maritime security and the company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.

Cape Verde: Why was an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, machine guns, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights refused?

This equipment was intended for use in maritime security and the company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.

China: Given the Madrid European Council arms embargo to China and that China is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy Report why were: SIELs for components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment and technology for military communications equipment; and an OIEL for components for equipment for the use of military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment and technology for military communications equipment granted?

As stated in previous responses to the Committees, the UK interpretation of Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament on 3 June 1998, is that it applies to:

Lethal weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these and ammunition.
Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms.
Any equipment which might be used for internal repression.

None of the goods and equipment under reference was covered by the UK interpretation of the Arms Embargo.

Two of the SIELs were for military electronic equipment and components for military electronic equipment intended for civil end use in air/sea rescue. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.

The SIEL for technology for military communications equipment was for technical drawings to be used in the manufacture of components to be shipped to Singapore for use in manufacturing headsets. The completed products were to be shipped to the UK. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.

The SIEL for military communications equipment was for antennae for civil end use in a radio system in a commercial plaza. Therefore we had no Criteria concerns.

The OIEL was for equipment to be used in the manufacture of headset components which would then be sent to Singapore for final assembly. The completed components would then be shipped to the UK where the headsets would be finished. Therefore we had no Criteria concerns.

Colombia: Why was an OIEL for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, components for body armour and military helmets refused?

We assessed that an open licence was not appropriate in this case where we would want to look closely at the proposed export and end user and, therefore, it was rejected.

Congo, Democratic Republic of: Given that Arms sanctions against DRC are currently in place under UN Security Council resolution 1807 (amended by UNSCR 1857, 1896, 1952 (2010 and 2021 (2011)) why was OIELs for: equipment employing cryptography; and for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography refused when a SIEL for equipment employing cryptography was issued?

The UN sanctions for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) prohibit the export of all arms and any related material, as well as the provision of any assistance, advice or training related to military activities, including financial and financial assistance, to all non-governmental entities and individual operating in the territory of the DRC. The items in the licence under reference are not caught by the embargo, however an OIEL does not allow for each application to be checked on a case-by-case basis to assess whether there is a risk of diversion to undesirable end users. Accordingly, this OIEL application was rejected on these grounds.

The SIEL was for the export of equipment intended for civil end use by a commercial airline. These dual use goods were not military rated and therefore not covered by the arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns in relation to this end user or end use.

Djibouti: Given the human rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why were SIELs granted for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon night sights and weapon sights? Why were OIELs granted for: cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography; and body armour, direct view imaging equipment and military helmets?

Many of these licences were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2, 5 & 7. PSCs seek open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met; activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

The OIEL for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography was for goods intended for civil end use in network management and securing company communications. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.

Ecuador: Why was an OIEL for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, components for body armour and military helmets refused?

We assessed that an open licence was not appropriate in this case where we would want to look closely at the proposed export and end user and, therefore, it was rejected.

Egypt: Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt and the current unrest in the country why were SIELs for components for machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns and machine guns issued during this period? Why were SIELs for body armour, components for body armour, components for military combat vehicles, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon night sights and weapon night sights refused when OIELs for, inter alia, body armour, assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, small arms ammunition and weapon sights were granted?

The OIELs under reference were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2, 5 & 7. PSCs seek open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met; activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

One of the SIELs for components for machine guns was for equipment destined for use in training by a military end user. These components were to be used to convert lethal firearms into non-lethal training weapons. Therefore, it was assessed there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression and the licence was issued.

Another SIEL was for components for machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns and machine guns. This equipment was destined for armoured cars used by a military end user involved in border security. This end user had not been involved in crowd control during unrest in Egypt. Therefore, we assessed that there was no clear risk of these goods being used for internal repression and the licence was issued.

In the cases of the other SIELs referred to, we assessed there was a clear risk that the equipment could be used for internal repression, given the potential end use by the security forces in further crowd control activities, and therefore these applications were refused.

India: Why was a SIEL for military guidance/navigation equipment and technology for military guidance/navigation equipment refused?

After conducting a detailed assessment, including requesting additional information from the exporter, the Government was unable to resolve concerns under Criteria 5 and 7. Therefore the application was refused.

Iraq: Given that UNSCR 1546 (2004) continues the embargo on arms and related material against Iraq the Committees wish to know why SIELs were approved for body armour, components for body armour, military helmets and weapon night sights and an OIEL for components for military support aircraft.

The licences under reference were for exports exempt under the UK interpretation of the Iraq arms embargo (see Written Ministerial Statement of 11 November 2010). There were no other Criteria concerns about these applications and the licences were issued.

Israel: Why was a SIEL (incorporation) for components for electronic warfare equipment revoked and why was a SIEL (incorporation) for military aero-engines refused?

The SIEL (incorporation) for military aero-engines was refused as the ultimate destination for these goods was Azerbaijan and their export would have breached the 1992 OSCE embargo for that country.

We have no trace of a SIEL for components for electronic warfare being revoked during this quarter.

Ivory Coast: Given the arms trade sanctions adopted by 2004/852/CFSP and UN Security Council resolution 1572 and amended by UN Security Council resolution 1946 and 1980 (2011) and EU Council Decisions 2010/656/CFSP and 2011/142/CFSP why were SIELs for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography and OIELs for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography granted?

All of these licence applications were for non-military rated, dual-use equipment which is not covered by the UN embargo. None of the equipment falls on Annex I of EU Council Regulation No 174/2005, therefore none is caught by the EU embargo on equipment that might be used for internal repression. As there were no other Criteria concerns, these licences were issued.

Jordan: Given the recent pro-democracy demonstrations in Jordan and the Government's policy as stated to the Committees by the Foreign Secretary of not exporting goods "which may be used to facilitate internal repression", the Committees wish to know why the following SIELs were granted: blank/inert ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for machine guns, components for pistols, equipment for the use of machine guns, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, weapon night sights and weapon sights.

The SIEL for blank/inert ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for machine guns, components for pistols, equipment for the use of machine guns was for equipment destined for use in training by a military end user. These components were to be used to convert lethal firearms into non-lethal training weapons. Therefore, it was assessed there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression and the licence was issued.

The SIEL for equipment for the use of weapon night sights, weapon night sights and weapon sights was for the temporary export of this equipment for evaluation purposes. The equipment would be returned to the UK following evaluation. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns and the licence was issued.

Kenya: Given the imminence of the Kenyan election and the possibility of political violence associated with it why were SIELs for body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for general purpose machine guns, components for military support vehicles, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of weapon sight mounts, general purpose machine guns, grenade launchers, gun silencers, military helmets, small arms ammunition, technology for the use of general purpose machine guns, training exploding grenade ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights issued? Why was an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, small arms ammunition and weapon sights granted?

One of the SIELs for components for body armour and military helmets was destined for use by the UN in protecting their civilian staff. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns. One of the SIELs and the OIEL under reference were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, private security companies (PSCs) are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against Criteria 1, 2 & 7. PSCs require open licences to give them the flexibility to respond quickly to a request for an armed presence on vessels. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised under an open licence if the following strict conditions are met; activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).

The other SIELs were for equipment destined for use by the Kenyan Armed Forces. We considered that the armed forces had a credible and legitimate need for this equipment given their role in AMISOM, the African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia, and this was consistent with the stated end use. Although there have been reports of human rights abuses by the armed forces in Kenya, there was a lack of clear and unambiguous evidence that they had been involved in such abuse. We also took into account the armed forces culture of accountability and the human rights training that they have received. Therefore, this application was issued.

Kuwait: Given the recent unrest in the country the Committees wish to know why SIELs for small arms ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights were approved, rather than refused in accordance with the Government's policy as stated to the Committees by the Foreign Secretary of not exporting goods "which may be used to facilitate internal repression". Why was an OIEL for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment, employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography issued?

Several of the SIELs under reference were for equipment destined for government and military end users. Kuwait has generally not been subject to the levels of unrest affecting other parts of the Middle East but whilst the Kuwaiti security forces have used tear gas and other non-lethal tactics to disperse protests during some recent demonstrations, the Government assesses that it would take events of an entirely different and more dangerous order before the use of live fire would even be considered. In light of circumstances in Kuwait the Government assesses that such an escalation is not likely. We therefore assessed there was not a clear risk this equipment might be used for internal repression.

There were two SIELs for the export of weapon sights. In both cases these were destined for hunting and sporting use. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns and these licences were issued.

The OIEL was for the export of software and equipment for civil and commercial end use in networking and telecommunications operations. There were no Criteria concerns and this licence was issued.

Oman: Given unrest in Oman during 2011 the Committees wish to know why SIELs for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, general military vehicle components, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights and equipment for the use of weapon night sights and an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, components for sporting guns, military helmets, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights were granted.

Most of the other SIELs were for the export of goods and equipment for use by military end users. Our assessment under Criterion 2 was that there was no evidence linking the military to human rights abuses. We therefore considered that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression.

One SIEL was for the export of pistols for use by a law enforcement agency. These pistols were to be used in training and evaluation. Oman has embarked on a programme of comprehensive police reform and their Government has stated that it expects any response to future demonstrations to be proportionate after isolated incidents of overreaction early on during the 2011 protests. Although such equipment could be used for internal repression, we assessed that there was not a clear risk that this would be the case given the stated policy of the Oman government and our assessment of the situation there since February 2011.

Pakistan: Given that Pakistan is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy Report why were SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, anti-riot/ballistic shields, components for small arms ammunition, rifles and small arms ammunition approved?

The SIEL for anti/riot ballistic shields was for the export of equipment for use in protecting naval equipment. There was no evidence of this end user being involved in human rights abuses and given the stated end use we did not assess a clear risk of this equipment being used for internal repression.

The SIEL for components for small arms ammunition, rifles and small arms ammunition were for the export of equipment destined for personal sporting use. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.

The SIEL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection was for the export of equipment for use by a diplomatic mission. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.

Peru: Why was an OIEL for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, components for body armour and military helmets refused?

We assessed that an open licence was not appropriate in this case where we would want to look closely at the proposed export and end user and, therefore, it was rejected.

Russia: Given that Russia is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy Report why were SIELs for body armour, components for sniper rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights granted?

The licence for export of body armour was for a small quantity of equipment that was to be demonstrated and evaluated. There were no Criteria concerns.

The other licences were for the export of equipment for sporting and hunting use. Sport shooting is a popular activity in Russia and we assessed the stated end use in these applications as credible. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns with these applications.

Somalia: Given the Arms trade sanctions against Somalia adopted by UN Security Council resolution 733 in 1992 and amended in 2002 by Security Council resolution 1425, resolutions 1356 (2001), 1772 (2007), 1851 (2008), 1907 (2009), 1916 (2010), 2002 (2011) why were SIELs for assault rifles, body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, pistols, small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography issued?

Most of the licences under reference were for equipment destined for end users or end uses exempt from the arms embargo. There were no other Criteria concerns about these applications and the licences were issued.

The SIELs for radios and related software were for export of equipment that is not military rated and therefore not caught by the UN arms embargo for Somalia.

Sri Lanka: Given that Sri Lanka is listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights and Democracy Report and the Government's policy as stated to the Committees by the Foreign Secretary of not exporting goods "which may be used to facilitate internal repression", why were SIELs for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols, rifles and weapon sights granted?

Spain: Why was an OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, machine guns, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights refused?

This equipment was intended for use in maritime security and the company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.

Syria: What chemicals for industrial/commercial processes were specified in the licences that have now been revoked. Why have these licences been revoked now and why were they not revoked earlier?

Please refer to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills' letter of 6 September 2012 to Sir John Stanley, which gives detailed information on these two licences.

Togo: Why was the OIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, machine guns, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights refused?

This equipment was intended for use in maritime security and the company was asked to submit a SIEL application for these goods so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis.



© Parliamentary copyright 2013	Prepared 17 July 2013