3 Defence budget and division of assets
The defence budget
28. UK Defence spending in 2012-13 was more than
Professor Chalmers could not see Scotland spending more than the
NATO average of 1.4% of GDP on defence, and that would mean a
budget of somewhere between £1.7 billion to £2.1 billion
a year. This is not
too dissimilar from that proposed by Stuart Crawford and Richard
Marsh, in their paper, A' The Blue Bonnets, Defending an Independent
model outlined a Scottish defence force on a budget of £1.8
billion a year, or 1.3% of GDP.
29. The SNP defence motion said a separate Scotland,
led by the SNP, would "commit to an annual defence and security
budget of £2.5 billion".
The SNP defence motion does not give any detail as to how the
£2.5 billion figure has been calculated. The SNP defence
motion said further that the budget of £2.5 billion represented
"an annual increase of more than £500 million on recent
UK levels of defence spending in Scotland but nearly £1bn
less than Scottish taxpayers currently contribute to UK defence
30. It is difficult to say with any confidence
what the level of defence spending in Scotland is. As Professor
Ron Smith said "The whole system is so interdependent that
it is very hard to track down regionally. Some of it you can.
We do not know whether the £2.5 billion will be more or less
than is spent in Scotland at the moment; there is real uncertainty
about it." Richard
Marsh, co-author of the Crawford model, used a figure for current
Scottish defence expenditure of nearly £3.3 billion in 2010-11,
and said that the £3.3 billion figure came from a Scottish
Government publication, Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland,
looks at all the money spent for the benefit of Scotland.
It specifically identifies defence expenditure, so that is defence
expenditure spent for the benefit of Scotland.
31. The allocation of expenditure does not equate
to the level of security on a regional basis, not least because
an amount of Ministry of Defence expenditure is spent overseas,
for example to support The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards based in
as part of the UK is defended by the sum of UK assets and the
collective defence that comes with being a member of NATO. The
UK's commitment to NATO may require its assets and personnel to
be outside the UK. Expenditure on the defence of Scotland is not
limited to the assets based in Scotland. As Stuart Crawford pointed
the defence of Scotland does not necessarily mean
that the forces have to be deployed in Scotland per se; they have
to be deployed where Scotland's interests are best protected.
Acceptance of this was implied in the 2009 Scottish
Government paper, Your Scotland, Your Voice, which said:
Defence spending is intended to benefit the whole
of the United Kingdom, through providing security and stability,
but defence spending also has a positive economic impact on the
regions and countries where it takes place.
Professor Chalmers suggested that a relevant comparison
would be the proportion of the current UK defence budget according
to Scotland's population, or 8.5% of £38 billion,
or £3.23 billion. He said that, if a separate Scotland matched
the proportion of GDP spent by the UK, it would have an annual
defence budget of between £2.6 billion and £3.1 billion.
The Scottish Government's document, Scotland's Balance Sheet,
said that, if Scotland reached the EU-15 average of 1.5% of GDP,
it would suggest defence expenditure of approximately £2.2
32. Stuart Crawford indicated, however, that,
despite the different methodologies in calculating likely defence
spending, the estimated budgets were similar:
The model presented here indicates an annual defence
budget of £1.6-£1.8 billion, which represents some 1.3
per cent of an independent Scotland's estimated GDP. This compares
to the £2.5 billion of the current SNP model and the £1.7-£2.1
billion estimate by Malcolm Chalmers, so there is a broad agreement
on the ballpark figures amongst those who have, so far, dared
to make an estimate.
33. It is virtually impossible
to determine how much money is spent specifically in Scotland
for the defence of Scotland, as at present the defence of Scotland
is inextricably linked with the defence of the rest of the UK.
By population share, over £3.2 billion is currently spent
on the defence of Scotland.
The UK Government Scotland Analysis paper on Defence
included data on various European countries with similar populations
|Defence budgets, 2012
|Defence budget, % GDP
|Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8714, Annex B 
34. Norway clearly spends the most, nearly £4.4 billion
a year, and maintains
a military with F-16 fighter jets, frigates, diesel electric submarines,
and 25,000 regular and 45,000 reserve personnel.
Denmark spends about £2.8 billion a year, maintaining an
air force which includes F-16 jets and a navy which includes frigates.
It also has 18,600 regular and over 50,000 reserve personnel.
Both Norway and Denmark have built up capable armed forces, and
currently spend 1.4% of their GDP on defence, but they have had
many years to build up their military.
The defence budget for Norway is far above anything we have seen
proposed for Scotland.
35. Some of the evidence suggested Ireland or
Denmark would be closer comparators.
Professor Chalmers said:
There is a lot of discussion about how Ireland, Norway,
Denmark and sometimes Sweden are models, and you can look at how
much they spend on defence. It is possible that an independent
Scotland, looking at how difficult transition would be, would
adopt the Irish option.
36. Ireland is not a member of NATO. It has a
small defence budget, less than £1 billion a year, and has
reduced its military to a small territorial defence force, with
a navy that patrols its coastline, and a minimal air force.
Ireland takes part in peacekeeping roles, but does not retain
the capability to deploy substantial forces away from Ireland.
Francis Tusa said the ambition of a country to send its armed
forces abroad was reflected in its budget:
a Scottish self-defence force that is not even going
to be spending 1.4% of GDP on defence will not want to be sending
much more than a couple of observers on UN missions, and most
of the forces will stay within the 12-mile limit.
37. There are further difficulties in estimating
a Scottish defence budget because the costs associated with the
transition from the status quo to a free standing defence force
are unknown. UK defence spending is used for many things including
the recruitment, training, and housing of personnel; equipment
procurement and development; support capabilities such as medical
care and logistics; headquarters facilities for command and control,
and the Ministry of Defence civil service.
These services would have to be replicated in Scotland, without
the same economies of scale.
Professor Smith said:
For a country of 5 million to spend £2.5 billion
on defence with armed forces of 15,000, it is perfectly understandable
and seems quite reasonable in a steady state. The real difficulty
is going to be getting there from here, because most of the equipment
they inherit will be inappropriate.
Professor Chalmers said:
Anything is possible, but it is difficult for me
to imagine, given the very difficult economic circumstances an
independent Scotland would face, especially in the transition
but perhaps also longer term, that it would be prepared to give
defence as high a relative priority as the rest of the UK.
38. The UK Government has pointed out that of
the similar European countries used as comparators for Scotland,
none of Denmark (£2.8 billion), Norway (£4.4 billion),
Finland (£2.3 billion) nor Ireland (£0.7 billion) has
had to contend with the start-up costs of recently becoming a
newly separated state.
39. It is a matter of great
concern to us that it remains unclear as to whether or not an
assessment has been made of the potential aims of a separate Scottish
Defence Force and the personnel and equipment which would be necessary
to meet those aims. This matter needs to be clarified by the Scottish
Government as a matter of urgency. If an assessment has been made
of the assets which the Scottish Government would ask the Ministry
of Defence to transfer, then this detail must be made available.
If no such assessment has been made, then how the £2.5 billion
figure has been calculated is a mystery.
40. It is unclear as to whether
this £2.5 billion budget is the budget of a separate Scottish
State defence force, wholly independent of the UK Ministry of
Defence; whether this budget makes any allowance for the transitional
period; or on which assumptions about the division of assets the
figure is based. This is wholly unacceptable, and we seek clarity
from the Scottish Government as a matter of urgency in its forthcoming
THE COST OF INTELLIGENCE
41. The UK has developed an intelligence infrastructure
to address security threats such as terrorism and cyber threats,
including a domestic security service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS, also known as MI6), and the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ). The Foreign Secretary has ministerial responsibility
for the SIS and GCHQ. The Home Office has responsibility for MI5.
The UK budget for its entire security network is over £2
billion a year. Its cyber security programme alone costs £860
million. The Ministry
of Defence has a role in UK cyber security.
42. Nicola Sturgeon noted that:
In terms of security and intelligence, I would envisage
Scotland having independent domestic intelligence machinery in
Scotland sitting alongside our police service.
However, developing a network to gather intelligence
on an international scale is expensive and, in the case of the
UK, has been built up over many years. It would take time to replicate.
Professor Ron Smith told us:
It is not primarily to do with money. You just cannot
buy those cryptanalysts, cryptographers and the experience of
the whole structure. That is just a vast knowledge base that is
shared with NSA [National Security Agency in the US] and the other
groups there. You could spend vast amounts of money, as GCHQ has
done, but the crucial thing is not so much the equipment, but
the skills involved in it.
George Grant also made the point that recruitment
of cyber security experts is difficult because there are so few
of them with the requisite specialist skills.
43. In purely budgetary terms, the SNP Defence
Policy Update said it would include:
A cyber security and intelligence infrastructure
to deal with new threats and protect key national economic and
It is unclear if the £2.5 billion budget is
supposed to include this cyber security and intelligence infrastructure.
Professor Chalmers said:
I have the resolution in front of me. It talks about
an annual defence and security budget of £2.5 billion, so
my understanding is that it doesn't only include defence, but
also includes intelligence services. Whether it includes an element
for the counter-terrorist aspects of the police I do not know.
44. Dr Murrison MP said that, while it would
not be normal practice,
he understood the £2.5 billion budget to be for defence and
security, so that would include intelligence and cyber security.
Professor Chalmers calculated an approximate contribution of the
UK £2 billion security budget, based on Scotland being 8.5%
of the population, to be a little under £200 million. If
this amount was subtracted from the proposed total £2.5 billion
defence and security budget, then that left for defence would
be nearer £2.3 billion.
Again, this presumes a steady state budget and does not appear
to include any start-up costs.
45. The Crawford model, with a budget of £1.8
billion, does not include the cost of security and intelligence
gathering. On recreating something like GCHQ he said:
In my opinion, there is absolutely no question that
Scotland would be able to replicate GCHQ and all its tentacles
because the budget would be prohibitivenot just the capital
cost of setting up a GCHQ in Scotland, but also the running costs,
which I understand on the UK budget are in the order of £200 million
a year on top of the build. It is a hugely expensive project for
a small country.
46. In the event of separation,
the Scottish Government would have to make an assessment of the
role and nature of the security services it would require in order
to address security threats such as terrorism and cyber attack,
and how such services should be paid for.
47. The UK administration has
considerable experience in the area of counter-terrorism, and
invests £2 billion a year in its security and intelligence
services. This is in addition to the UK's £34 billion annual
spend on defence. Should the Scottish Government spend a proportionate
amount, this would amount to £200 million a year on security
and intelligence services. This figure, however, does not take
into account the start-up costs for an entirely new intelligence
infrastructure. The Independence White Paper should make clear
whether the proposed defence and security budget would include
spending on the equivalent of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. This is essential
in order to evaluate fully whether the security of a separate
Scottish State would be diminished compared to that of Scotland
in the UK.
48. Countries share intelligence with one another.
The question is whether a separate Scotland would rely upon other
countries for intelligence because it did not have certain capabilities,
such GCHQ. Professor Chalmers said that smaller countries tended
to adopt this approach:
They get by partly by partnership with others, being
friendly with others, heeding the wishes of bigger powers with
more capabilities, and sometimes by having some degree of specialism
so they have something particular to offer.
But he warned that, again, it would depend on Scotland's
That degree of interdependence in security capabilities
will constrain the ability of a Scottish Government to pursue
a radically different foreign and security policy agenda, because
that could have consequences for the willingness of the rest of
the UK to continue with it.
Stuart Crawford said that, due to the cost:
An independent Scotland would have to rely on intelligence
being fed down from the rest of the UK.
49. When asked about the investment to create
the necessary security infrastructure to persuade allies to share
intelligence, the Deputy First Minister told the Foreign Affairs
There is capability we would have from day one. There
would be capability we would develop over time. There would be
continued shared arrangements with the rest of the UK regardless
of our independent capability.
50. It is not a case of sharing all or nothing.
The country with the intelligence determines how much it shares
with which another country. Such intelligence relationships allow
the UK, and others, to determine how much it shares with individual
countries as appropriate to the relationship with that country.
The UK is also part of the Five Eyes arrangement to share intelligence
with the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
It is highly unlikely that a separate Scotland would be allowed
access to such privileged intelligence as that acquired by the
UK through the Five Eyes arrangement. The views of the other members
of the Five Eyes arrangement would be critical when considering
what intelligence could be shared with Scotland.
51. It is possible, post separation,
that the Scottish Government could argue it has contributed to
the international networks, experience and relationships that
the UK has built up over time. However, just as it is not possible
simply to break off 8.5% of GCHQ, it would also not be possible
to continue with the existing relationship as if nothing has happened.
Intelligence exchange is based on mutual interest and established
networks. In the event of separation, the Scottish Government
would have to negotiate access to intelligence from the UK. Scotland
would not automatically access privileged information from other
countries on the same basis as the UK services currently do. The
Independence White Paper should make clear how the Scottish Government
would establish its future intelligence relationship with the
UK and other key allies.
52. It is difficult to establish
the cost of intelligence and security, and the cost of the transition
period, upon the proposed defence budget for Scotland. It is likely
that such costs would place pressure upon the proposed £2.5
billion budget. If we accept £200 million as the cost of
a very basic intelligence and security service, this would leave
£2.3 billion per annum for defence purposes.
The division of assets
53. Most of our witnesses indicated that if Scotland
left the UK it would seek a share of the current UK MoD assets,
valued at around £88 billion.
Sir Nick Harvey acknowledged that what Scotland would want would
be a matter for a future separate Scottish Government to decide
"but I suppose their starting point would be that they would
aspire to use existing defence assets or at least some of them."
Keith Brown MSP, Minister for Transport and Veterans, Scottish
Government, told the Defence Committee he felt Scotland would
be entitled to "between £7 billion and £8 billion
54. There would be an economic incentive for
Scotland to acquire as much as possible through negotiation rather
than have to spend resources on new equipment. Stuart Crawford's
model relied upon it:
We do not assume in our figures that anything is
paid for up front. One would imagine that much of the equipment
of an independent Scottish defence force would inevitably be negotiated
as part of the socalled share of the UK defence force.
55. However, Keith Brown MSP told the Defence
We do not think it is possible to have an agreed
division of assets that would give us all that we need, so we
will be looking for further procurement.
The SNP defence motion said capability gaps would
be filled through a Scottish defence industrial strategy, and
both joint procurement and sharing with allies, including the
56. There are precedents from other countries.
Professor Smith said that in the examples of the Soviet Union
and Czechoslovakia, there was an element of trying to "make
things up as you go along".
One of the lessons from other countries is there is a big difference
between negotiating over something which both parties want, and
negotiating over something only one side wantsor neither
57. Dividing assets according to where everything
lay on a particular date, would be simple and quick, and makes
sense for physical assets, e.g. Fort George barracks, home of
3 Scots, near Inverness. However, that method would be unlikely
to produce what either a separate Scotland or the UK would want,
and might just extend the negotiations as each side made claims
for what had been left on the 'wrong' side of the border. Scotland
may want particular aircraft, such as Hawk jets, but these are
not based in Scotland. Similarly, under this principle, all the
Royal Navy submarines would be part of the Scottish equation.
After the SNP Conference in 2012, the First Minister said:
The nuclear weapons concerned are not Scotland's
nuclear weapons, [...] If they are regarded as an asset, which
I would find difficult to regard it as, then I am quite certain
that we can trade that asset for something more useful.
58. Alternatively, the assets could be divided
according to population share, Scotland being 8.5% of the UK population.
However, some items are easier to divide into equal whole numbers
than others. Francis Tusa said Scotland could get 15 Tornadoes,
one third of an aircraft carrier, and one and three quarters of
a Type 23 Frigate.
In addition to inheriting fractions of warships, which the Secretary
of State for Defence referred to as "clearly a technical
many of the UK assets would be too expensive to operate for a
country with a smaller budget. Professor Chalmers said:
If a Scottish Government, in such a scenario, were
to be strategic, it would look at all the sorts of calculations
Francis has done in relation to how many Tornadoes Scotland would
be entitled to and so on, and then say, "Could we afford
to maintain those Tornadoes? Could we afford to train their personnel?"
The running costs of a lot of these high value assets are much
bigger than the capital costs.
59. Professor Chalmers concluded that a mis-match
would be inevitable between the UK assets and what Scotland would
want or inherit: "It would want 5% rather than 10% of the
total" and it might want to trade that for something else.
This may include accepting cash in lieu.
When Keith Brown MSP went before the Defence Committee, he said
it was difficult to provide more detail as to what assets Scotland
would have in its defence force because the Ministry of Defence
would not enter into discussions with Scottish Government officials
in advance of the referendum. These would be discussions, not
60. Nevertheless we can see
no reason why the Scottish Government should not spell out, clearly,
how it would wish to see assets allocated and which additional
equipment it would wish to claim, having seen these as desirable.
Such information is crucial, not least because there will be a
consequential impact upon procurement decisions. To give a recent
example, the number of ships a Scottish navy would seek to inherit
will undoubtedly impact upon the number it might subsequently
wish to build. In these circumstances we can see no reason why
the MoD should not provide factual details in response to reasonable
requests from the Scottish Government.
THE DIVISION OF ASSETS AND INTEGRATED
61. The Ministry of Defence has said that dividing
up the UK Armed Forces would be difficult, because of their integrated
nature. The Secretary of State for Defence has described the UK
Armed Forces as "a highly integrated and sophisticated fighting
force," and "the idea that you can sort of break off
a little bit, like a square on a chocolate bar and that would
be the bit that went north of the border, is frankly laughable."
Professor Chalmers said:
There is not very much the UK deploys that is only
for the purposes of Scotland. All of the assets the UK deploys
in Scotland, Faslane most obviously, will still be required by
the UK, but that is also true of air defence assets and so on
to a very significant, if not total, extent.
62. We visited several defence establishments
in Scotland which demonstrated this. The radar station at RAF
Clettraval on North Uist is part of a UK-wide network feeding
into RAF Bulmer, in Northumberland, which monitors UK airspace
and is essential for the operation of the Qinetiq missile range
on Benbecula. RAF Leuchars is one of only two bases that provide
24 hour Quick Reaction Alert air policing over the UK, DM Beith
is one of eight munitions stores spread around the UK, HMNB Clyde
is due to become the only Royal Navy base for submarines in the
UK. If Scotland left the UK, the Ministry of Defence would have
to recreate facilities such as these south of the border. At the
same time, a new separate Scottish State would be duplicating
similar facilities that already exist in the UK.
63. The division of assets would be subject to
negotiation between two governments and, as Dr Murrison told us:
"It is important to record that a yes vote next year would
be the start of the process and not the end of one." He also
repeated the problem of dividing up complex platforms and added
that the same would be true of units of the British Army.
Similarly, Dr Patrick Mileham, former officer in the Royal Tank
Regiment and military historian, told us it would be unlikely
for the Ministry of Defence to allow the transfer of the Royal
Regiment of Scotland, the Scots Guards and the Royal Scots Dragoon
Guards because they are in the Order of Battle and the British
Army would be making plans on the assumption they will remain.
THE DIVISION OF ASSETS AND THE TRANSITION
64. In the event of a yes vote, there would be
a transition period during which the UK and Scotland separated
themselves. In practical terms, there would have to be an audit
of assets and valuations, negotiations and agreement on what was
disputed. This would be immensely complex. For example, the value
of Coulport and Faslane are difficult to determinewould
the nuclear facilities be priced at replacement costs, construction
costs or value to a future Scottish Government? Similarly legislation
that had been drafted on the presumption of the United Kingdom
would have to be untangled.
The British Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force would have to
adjust to operating without the use of bases and territory in
Scotland. Scotland would have to create its own structures according
to what a separate Scotland wanted. Professor Chalmers said:
It would not be an overnight job. Thinking about
what Scotland would ideally want, it will not get what it ideally
decides for another 20 or 30 years in a rapidly changing world.
The Scottish Government has proposed that, in the
event of a yes vote on 18 September 2014, then negotiations would
take place and agreement would be reached with the UK Government,
in time to enable independence day to be at some time in March
2016. The Scottish Government paper, Scotland's Future: from
the Referendum to Independence and a Written Constitution,
Following a vote for independence in 2014, agreements
will be reached between the Scottish and UK Governments, in the
spirit of the Agreement, setting the parameters for Scotland's
transition to independence. These agreements would establish:
- The timetable towards independence daywhich
the Scottish Government would intend to be in March 2016, just
before the start of the 2016 election campaign;
And these negotiations would include:
- the division of financial and
other assets and liabilities (including oil revenues and assignation
of other tax revenues, military bases and overseas assets), the
transfer to the Scottish Parliament and Government of political
authority over institutions previously controlled at Westminster,
the ongoing co-operative arrangements that the peoples of Scotland,
England, Wales and Northern Ireland would share, and the timetable
for the speediest safe removal of weapons of mass destruction
Of course, some matters may continue to be discussed
after independence (as was the case, for example, with the Czech
Republic and Slovakia).
65. How Scotland acquired those assets it did
not inherit would be for Scotland to decide over a period of time.
As Professor Smith said:
There is a temptation to adopt what is called in
the trade a conspiracy of optimism and say, "It will all
work out okay. Maybe we will be able to afford that." That
is where the transition will be really hard.
A separate Scotland could buy second hand, it could
tender for new items and, depending on Scotland's industrial policy,
possibly build what it wanted domestically. The defence industry
across the UK, including Scotland, has evolved to meet the needs
of the British Army, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy.
It would not necessarily make the things that Scotland would want.
66. We have heard no evidence
that would lead us to believe that negotiations on such complex
matters could be even close to resolution in such a restricted
time period. Experience in dispute resolution leads us to believe
that when one party has a deadline and the other has not, then
the closeness of the deadline undermines the position of the party
to whom it is important. In this context, of course an agreement
could always be reached in time, but this would be likely to involve
substantial concessions by those to whom the deadline is essential.
67. Like all UK taxpayers, people
in Scotland have contributed over the years to the development
of the current defence assets of the UK; the Scottish share of
these assets has been estimated at between £7 billion and
£8 billion. However, the division of defence assets would
not be straightforward and would be subject to difficult and complex
68. The Scottish Government
would need to take into account whether it could afford the ongoing
operating costs for any equipment inherited, and whether it had
the necessary skilled personnel to operate this equipment.
60 Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8174, executive
Q 158 Back
Crawford and Marsh, A' The Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012,
This updated the earlier Crawford paper, written under the pseudonym
Jack Hawthorn, Some Thoughts on an Independent Scottish Defence
Force, 1997 Back
Crawford and Marsh, A The Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012. See
Scotland could afford 'regional defence force', 17 October 2012,
SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 Back
SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 Back
Q 2175 Back
Q 2346 Back
Q 2356 Back
Your Scotland, Your Voice, 2009, page 121 Back
Q 2182. Professor Chalmers used his own estimate of £38
billion for UK defence spending Back
Chalmers, End of an Auld Sang, 2012. (In 2015 but at 2010 prices). Back
Scottish Government, Scotland's Balance Sheet, April 2013. (2010-11
figures) EU-15 (Members of the EU upto April 2004) are Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United
Crawford and Marsh, A' the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012 Back
See also Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, RUSI, April 2012,
and Francis Tusa, Defence Analysis, Scottish Independence Issues,
January 2007, Vol. 10 Issue 1; and Francis Tusa, Defence Analysis,
Scottish Independence: The Defence Equation, February 2012, Vol.
15 Issue 2; Briefing: Separation anxiety, Jane's Defence Weekly,
14 June 2012 Back
See Q 153 and Q 158 Back
Q 158 Back
Military Balance 2012. Note Norway has conscription. Back
Military Balance 2012 Back
Q 2289 Back
For example, see Scotland Institute, Defence and Security in
an Independent Scotland, June 2013, pages 28-29 Back
Q 2157 Back
Q 187. See also Q 158, and Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang,
RUSI, April 2012 Back
Q 178 Back
Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8174, para 1.58 Back
Cm 8174, para 1.53 Back
Q 2157 Back
Q 187 Back
Cm 8174, para 1.68 Back
Scotland Analysis: Security, Cm 8741, page 7. Q 2172 Back
Oral evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 January
2013, Q 310 Back
Q 2168 Back
Q 3485 Back
SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 Back
Q 2171 Back
Q 3936 Back
Q 3940 Back
Q 2172 Back
Scotland Analysis: Security, Cm 8741, paras 2.25-2.27 Back
Q 2308 Back
Scotland Analysis: Security, Cm 8741, paras 2.17-2.19, and paras
Q 2168. See also Scottish civil servants probe plans for 'Nordic' intelligence services after independence,
The Herald, 27 July 2013 Back
Q 2168 Back
Q 2308 Back
FAC, Q 316 Back
Cm 8174, para 1.62. See also Q 201 Back
Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8714 Back
Sixth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2012-13,
Foreign policy considerations for the UK and Scotland in the event
of Scotland becoming an independent country, HC 643, paras 135-136.
Q 201, Qq 2333-2335, Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8714, paras
Q 158 Professor Chalmers quoted this value as "after depreciation".
Q 353 Back
Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 326 Back
Q 158, Q 2322 Back
Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 295 Back
Q 2173 Back
Qq 2293-2296 Back
Q 158 Back
Alex Salmond: Independent Scotland could trade its share of Trident,
STV News, 18 July 2012 Back
Q 168 Back
Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 387 Back
Q 169 Back
Q 170 Back
Q 158 Back
Oral Evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 261,
Q 268, Q 282 Back
How would an independent Scotland defend itself? The Guardian,
1 March 2012; Briefing: Separation anxiety, Jane's Defence
Weekly, 14 June 2012 Back
Q 187 Back
Q 3946 Back
Q 3790 Back
Qq 174-175 Back
Q 158 Back
Scottish Government, Scotland's Future: from the Referendum
to Independence and a Written Constitution, February 2013 Back
Q 2188 Back
Eighth Report of 2012-13, HC 957 Back