The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: A Defence Force for Scotland-A Conspiracy of Optimism? - Scottish Affairs Committee Contents


3  Defence budget and division of assets

The defence budget

28.  UK Defence spending in 2012-13 was more than £34 billion.[60] Professor Chalmers could not see Scotland spending more than the NATO average of 1.4% of GDP on defence, and that would mean a budget of somewhere between £1.7 billion to £2.1 billion a year.[61] This is not too dissimilar from that proposed by Stuart Crawford and Richard Marsh, in their paper, A' The Blue Bonnets, Defending an Independent Scotland.[62] Their model outlined a Scottish defence force on a budget of £1.8 billion a year, or 1.3% of GDP.[63]

29.  The SNP defence motion said a separate Scotland, led by the SNP, would "commit to an annual defence and security budget of £2.5 billion".[64] The SNP defence motion does not give any detail as to how the £2.5 billion figure has been calculated. The SNP defence motion said further that the budget of £2.5 billion represented "an annual increase of more than £500 million on recent UK levels of defence spending in Scotland but nearly £1bn less than Scottish taxpayers currently contribute to UK defence spending."[65]

30.  It is difficult to say with any confidence what the level of defence spending in Scotland is. As Professor Ron Smith said "The whole system is so interdependent that it is very hard to track down regionally. Some of it you can. We do not know whether the £2.5 billion will be more or less than is spent in Scotland at the moment; there is real uncertainty about it."[66] Richard Marsh, co-author of the Crawford model, used a figure for current Scottish defence expenditure of nearly £3.3 billion in 2010-11, and said that the £3.3 billion figure came from a Scottish Government publication, Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland, which:

looks at all the money spent for the benefit of Scotland. It specifically identifies defence expenditure, so that is defence expenditure spent for the benefit of Scotland.[67]

31.  The allocation of expenditure does not equate to the level of security on a regional basis, not least because an amount of Ministry of Defence expenditure is spent overseas, for example to support The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards based in Germany.[68] Scotland as part of the UK is defended by the sum of UK assets and the collective defence that comes with being a member of NATO. The UK's commitment to NATO may require its assets and personnel to be outside the UK. Expenditure on the defence of Scotland is not limited to the assets based in Scotland. As Stuart Crawford pointed out:

the defence of Scotland does not necessarily mean that the forces have to be deployed in Scotland per se; they have to be deployed where Scotland's interests are best protected.[69]

Acceptance of this was implied in the 2009 Scottish Government paper, Your Scotland, Your Voice, which said:

Defence spending is intended to benefit the whole of the United Kingdom, through providing security and stability, but defence spending also has a positive economic impact on the regions and countries where it takes place.[70]

Professor Chalmers suggested that a relevant comparison would be the proportion of the current UK defence budget according to Scotland's population, or 8.5% of £38 billion,[71] or £3.23 billion. He said that, if a separate Scotland matched the proportion of GDP spent by the UK, it would have an annual defence budget of between £2.6 billion and £3.1 billion.[72] The Scottish Government's document, Scotland's Balance Sheet, said that, if Scotland reached the EU-15 average of 1.5% of GDP, it would suggest defence expenditure of approximately £2.2 billion.[73]

32.  Stuart Crawford indicated, however, that, despite the different methodologies in calculating likely defence spending, the estimated budgets were similar:

The model presented here indicates an annual defence budget of £1.6-£1.8 billion, which represents some 1.3 per cent of an independent Scotland's estimated GDP. This compares to the £2.5 billion of the current SNP model and the £1.7-£2.1 billion estimate by Malcolm Chalmers, so there is a broad agreement on the ballpark figures amongst those who have, so far, dared to make an estimate.[74]

33.  It is virtually impossible to determine how much money is spent specifically in Scotland for the defence of Scotland, as at present the defence of Scotland is inextricably linked with the defence of the rest of the UK. By population share, over £3.2 billion is currently spent on the defence of Scotland.

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS

The UK Government Scotland Analysis paper on Defence included data on various European countries with similar populations to Scotland.
CountryDefence budgets, 2012 Defence budget, % GDP
Denmark
£2.8 billion
1.4
Norway
£4.4 billion
1.4
Slovakia
£0.6 billion
1.1
Finland
£2.3 billion
1.5
Ireland
£0.7 million
0.6
Croatia
£0.6 billion
1.7
Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8714, Annex B [75]

34.  Norway clearly spends the most, nearly £4.4 billion a year,[76] and maintains a military with F-16 fighter jets, frigates, diesel electric submarines,[77] and 25,000 regular and 45,000 reserve personnel.[78] Denmark spends about £2.8 billion a year, maintaining an air force which includes F-16 jets and a navy which includes frigates. It also has 18,600 regular and over 50,000 reserve personnel.[79] Both Norway and Denmark have built up capable armed forces, and currently spend 1.4% of their GDP on defence, but they have had many years to build up their military.[80] The defence budget for Norway is far above anything we have seen proposed for Scotland.[81]

35.  Some of the evidence suggested Ireland or Denmark would be closer comparators.[82] Professor Chalmers said:

There is a lot of discussion about how Ireland, Norway, Denmark and sometimes Sweden are models, and you can look at how much they spend on defence. It is possible that an independent Scotland, looking at how difficult transition would be, would adopt the Irish option.[83]

36.  Ireland is not a member of NATO. It has a small defence budget, less than £1 billion a year, and has reduced its military to a small territorial defence force, with a navy that patrols its coastline, and a minimal air force.[84] Ireland takes part in peacekeeping roles, but does not retain the capability to deploy substantial forces away from Ireland. Francis Tusa said the ambition of a country to send its armed forces abroad was reflected in its budget:

a Scottish self-defence force that is not even going to be spending 1.4% of GDP on defence will not want to be sending much more than a couple of observers on UN missions, and most of the forces will stay within the 12-mile limit.[85]

TRANSITIONAL COSTS

37.  There are further difficulties in estimating a Scottish defence budget because the costs associated with the transition from the status quo to a free standing defence force are unknown. UK defence spending is used for many things including the recruitment, training, and housing of personnel; equipment procurement and development; support capabilities such as medical care and logistics; headquarters facilities for command and control, and the Ministry of Defence civil service.[86] These services would have to be replicated in Scotland, without the same economies of scale.[87] Professor Smith said:

For a country of 5 million to spend £2.5 billion on defence with armed forces of 15,000, it is perfectly understandable and seems quite reasonable in a steady state. The real difficulty is going to be getting there from here, because most of the equipment they inherit will be inappropriate.[88]

Professor Chalmers said:

Anything is possible, but it is difficult for me to imagine, given the very difficult economic circumstances an independent Scotland would face, especially in the transition but perhaps also longer term, that it would be prepared to give defence as high a relative priority as the rest of the UK.[89]

38.  The UK Government has pointed out that of the similar European countries used as comparators for Scotland, none of Denmark (£2.8 billion), Norway (£4.4 billion), Finland (£2.3 billion) nor Ireland (£0.7 billion) has had to contend with the start-up costs of recently becoming a newly separated state.[90]

39.  It is a matter of great concern to us that it remains unclear as to whether or not an assessment has been made of the potential aims of a separate Scottish Defence Force and the personnel and equipment which would be necessary to meet those aims. This matter needs to be clarified by the Scottish Government as a matter of urgency. If an assessment has been made of the assets which the Scottish Government would ask the Ministry of Defence to transfer, then this detail must be made available. If no such assessment has been made, then how the £2.5 billion figure has been calculated is a mystery.

40.  It is unclear as to whether this £2.5 billion budget is the budget of a separate Scottish State defence force, wholly independent of the UK Ministry of Defence; whether this budget makes any allowance for the transitional period; or on which assumptions about the division of assets the figure is based. This is wholly unacceptable, and we seek clarity from the Scottish Government as a matter of urgency in its forthcoming White Paper.

THE COST OF INTELLIGENCE

41.  The UK has developed an intelligence infrastructure to address security threats such as terrorism and cyber threats, including a domestic security service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also known as MI6), and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The Foreign Secretary has ministerial responsibility for the SIS and GCHQ. The Home Office has responsibility for MI5. The UK budget for its entire security network is over £2 billion a year. Its cyber security programme alone costs £860 million.[91] The Ministry of Defence has a role in UK cyber security.[92]

42.  Nicola Sturgeon noted that:

In terms of security and intelligence, I would envisage Scotland having independent domestic intelligence machinery in Scotland sitting alongside our police service.[93]

However, developing a network to gather intelligence on an international scale is expensive and, in the case of the UK, has been built up over many years. It would take time to replicate. Professor Ron Smith told us:

It is not primarily to do with money. You just cannot buy those cryptanalysts, cryptographers and the experience of the whole structure. That is just a vast knowledge base that is shared with NSA [National Security Agency in the US] and the other groups there. You could spend vast amounts of money, as GCHQ has done, but the crucial thing is not so much the equipment, but the skills involved in it.[94]

George Grant also made the point that recruitment of cyber security experts is difficult because there are so few of them with the requisite specialist skills.[95]

43.  In purely budgetary terms, the SNP Defence Policy Update said it would include:

A cyber security and intelligence infrastructure to deal with new threats and protect key national economic and social infrastructure.[96]

It is unclear if the £2.5 billion budget is supposed to include this cyber security and intelligence infrastructure. Professor Chalmers said:

I have the resolution in front of me. It talks about an annual defence and security budget of £2.5 billion, so my understanding is that it doesn't only include defence, but also includes intelligence services. Whether it includes an element for the counter-terrorist aspects of the police I do not know.[97]

44.  Dr Murrison MP said that, while it would not be normal practice,[98] he understood the £2.5 billion budget to be for defence and security, so that would include intelligence and cyber security.[99] Professor Chalmers calculated an approximate contribution of the UK £2 billion security budget, based on Scotland being 8.5% of the population, to be a little under £200 million. If this amount was subtracted from the proposed total £2.5 billion defence and security budget, then that left for defence would be nearer £2.3 billion.[100] Again, this presumes a steady state budget and does not appear to include any start-up costs.[101]

45.  The Crawford model, with a budget of £1.8 billion, does not include the cost of security and intelligence gathering. On recreating something like GCHQ he said:

In my opinion, there is absolutely no question that Scotland would be able to replicate GCHQ and all its tentacles because the budget would be prohibitive—not just the capital cost of setting up a GCHQ in Scotland, but also the running costs, which I understand on the UK budget are in the order of £200 million a year on top of the build. It is a hugely expensive project for a small country.[102]

46.  In the event of separation, the Scottish Government would have to make an assessment of the role and nature of the security services it would require in order to address security threats such as terrorism and cyber attack, and how such services should be paid for.

47.  The UK administration has considerable experience in the area of counter-terrorism, and invests £2 billion a year in its security and intelligence services. This is in addition to the UK's £34 billion annual spend on defence. Should the Scottish Government spend a proportionate amount, this would amount to £200 million a year on security and intelligence services. This figure, however, does not take into account the start-up costs for an entirely new intelligence infrastructure. The Independence White Paper should make clear whether the proposed defence and security budget would include spending on the equivalent of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. This is essential in order to evaluate fully whether the security of a separate Scottish State would be diminished compared to that of Scotland in the UK.

SHARING INTELLIGENCE

48.  Countries share intelligence with one another.[103] The question is whether a separate Scotland would rely upon other countries for intelligence because it did not have certain capabilities, such GCHQ. Professor Chalmers said that smaller countries tended to adopt this approach:

They get by partly by partnership with others, being friendly with others, heeding the wishes of bigger powers with more capabilities, and sometimes by having some degree of specialism so they have something particular to offer.[104]

But he warned that, again, it would depend on Scotland's foreign policy:

That degree of interdependence in security capabilities will constrain the ability of a Scottish Government to pursue a radically different foreign and security policy agenda, because that could have consequences for the willingness of the rest of the UK to continue with it.[105]

Stuart Crawford said that, due to the cost:

An independent Scotland would have to rely on intelligence being fed down from the rest of the UK.[106]

49.  When asked about the investment to create the necessary security infrastructure to persuade allies to share intelligence, the Deputy First Minister told the Foreign Affairs Committee:

There is capability we would have from day one. There would be capability we would develop over time. There would be continued shared arrangements with the rest of the UK regardless of our independent capability.[107]

50.  It is not a case of sharing all or nothing. The country with the intelligence determines how much it shares with which another country. Such intelligence relationships allow the UK, and others, to determine how much it shares with individual countries as appropriate to the relationship with that country.[108] The UK is also part of the Five Eyes arrangement to share intelligence with the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.[109] It is highly unlikely that a separate Scotland would be allowed access to such privileged intelligence as that acquired by the UK through the Five Eyes arrangement. The views of the other members of the Five Eyes arrangement would be critical when considering what intelligence could be shared with Scotland.[110]

51.  It is possible, post separation, that the Scottish Government could argue it has contributed to the international networks, experience and relationships that the UK has built up over time. However, just as it is not possible simply to break off 8.5% of GCHQ, it would also not be possible to continue with the existing relationship as if nothing has happened. Intelligence exchange is based on mutual interest and established networks. In the event of separation, the Scottish Government would have to negotiate access to intelligence from the UK. Scotland would not automatically access privileged information from other countries on the same basis as the UK services currently do. The Independence White Paper should make clear how the Scottish Government would establish its future intelligence relationship with the UK and other key allies.

52.  It is difficult to establish the cost of intelligence and security, and the cost of the transition period, upon the proposed defence budget for Scotland. It is likely that such costs would place pressure upon the proposed £2.5 billion budget. If we accept £200 million as the cost of a very basic intelligence and security service, this would leave £2.3 billion per annum for defence purposes.

The division of assets

53.  Most of our witnesses indicated that if Scotland left the UK it would seek a share of the current UK MoD assets, valued at around £88 billion.[111] Sir Nick Harvey acknowledged that what Scotland would want would be a matter for a future separate Scottish Government to decide "but I suppose their starting point would be that they would aspire to use existing defence assets or at least some of them."[112] Keith Brown MSP, Minister for Transport and Veterans, Scottish Government, told the Defence Committee he felt Scotland would be entitled to "between £7 billion and £8 billion of assets."[113]

54.  There would be an economic incentive for Scotland to acquire as much as possible through negotiation rather than have to spend resources on new equipment. Stuart Crawford's model relied upon it:

We do not assume in our figures that anything is paid for up front. One would imagine that much of the equipment of an independent Scottish defence force would inevitably be negotiated as part of the so­called share of the UK defence force.[114]

55.  However, Keith Brown MSP told the Defence Committee that:

We do not think it is possible to have an agreed division of assets that would give us all that we need, so we will be looking for further procurement.[115]

The SNP defence motion said capability gaps would be filled through a Scottish defence industrial strategy, and both joint procurement and sharing with allies, including the UK.

56.  There are precedents from other countries. Professor Smith said that in the examples of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, there was an element of trying to "make things up as you go along".[116] One of the lessons from other countries is there is a big difference between negotiating over something which both parties want, and negotiating over something only one side wants—or neither side wants.[117]

57.  Dividing assets according to where everything lay on a particular date, would be simple and quick, and makes sense for physical assets, e.g. Fort George barracks, home of 3 Scots, near Inverness. However, that method would be unlikely to produce what either a separate Scotland or the UK would want, and might just extend the negotiations as each side made claims for what had been left on the 'wrong' side of the border. Scotland may want particular aircraft, such as Hawk jets, but these are not based in Scotland. Similarly, under this principle, all the Royal Navy submarines would be part of the Scottish equation.[118] After the SNP Conference in 2012, the First Minister said:

The nuclear weapons concerned are not Scotland's nuclear weapons, [...] If they are regarded as an asset, which I would find difficult to regard it as, then I am quite certain that we can trade that asset for something more useful.[119]

58.  Alternatively, the assets could be divided according to population share, Scotland being 8.5% of the UK population. However, some items are easier to divide into equal whole numbers than others. Francis Tusa said Scotland could get 15 Tornadoes, one third of an aircraft carrier, and one and three quarters of a Type 23 Frigate.[120] In addition to inheriting fractions of warships, which the Secretary of State for Defence referred to as "clearly a technical problem",[121] many of the UK assets would be too expensive to operate for a country with a smaller budget. Professor Chalmers said:

If a Scottish Government, in such a scenario, were to be strategic, it would look at all the sorts of calculations Francis has done in relation to how many Tornadoes Scotland would be entitled to and so on, and then say, "Could we afford to maintain those Tornadoes? Could we afford to train their personnel?" The running costs of a lot of these high value assets are much bigger than the capital costs.[122]

59.  Professor Chalmers concluded that a mis-match would be inevitable between the UK assets and what Scotland would want or inherit: "It would want 5% rather than 10% of the total" and it might want to trade that for something else.[123] This may include accepting cash in lieu.[124] When Keith Brown MSP went before the Defence Committee, he said it was difficult to provide more detail as to what assets Scotland would have in its defence force because the Ministry of Defence would not enter into discussions with Scottish Government officials in advance of the referendum. These would be discussions, not pre-negotiations.[125]

60.  Nevertheless we can see no reason why the Scottish Government should not spell out, clearly, how it would wish to see assets allocated and which additional equipment it would wish to claim, having seen these as desirable. Such information is crucial, not least because there will be a consequential impact upon procurement decisions. To give a recent example, the number of ships a Scottish navy would seek to inherit will undoubtedly impact upon the number it might subsequently wish to build. In these circumstances we can see no reason why the MoD should not provide factual details in response to reasonable requests from the Scottish Government.

THE DIVISION OF ASSETS AND INTEGRATED ARMED FORCES

61.  The Ministry of Defence has said that dividing up the UK Armed Forces would be difficult, because of their integrated nature. The Secretary of State for Defence has described the UK Armed Forces as "a highly integrated and sophisticated fighting force," and "the idea that you can sort of break off a little bit, like a square on a chocolate bar and that would be the bit that went north of the border, is frankly laughable."[126] Professor Chalmers said:

There is not very much the UK deploys that is only for the purposes of Scotland. All of the assets the UK deploys in Scotland, Faslane most obviously, will still be required by the UK, but that is also true of air defence assets and so on to a very significant, if not total, extent.[127]

62.  We visited several defence establishments in Scotland which demonstrated this. The radar station at RAF Clettraval on North Uist is part of a UK-wide network feeding into RAF Bulmer, in Northumberland, which monitors UK airspace and is essential for the operation of the Qinetiq missile range on Benbecula. RAF Leuchars is one of only two bases that provide 24 hour Quick Reaction Alert air policing over the UK, DM Beith is one of eight munitions stores spread around the UK, HMNB Clyde is due to become the only Royal Navy base for submarines in the UK. If Scotland left the UK, the Ministry of Defence would have to recreate facilities such as these south of the border. At the same time, a new separate Scottish State would be duplicating similar facilities that already exist in the UK.

63.  The division of assets would be subject to negotiation between two governments and, as Dr Murrison told us: "It is important to record that a yes vote next year would be the start of the process and not the end of one." He also repeated the problem of dividing up complex platforms and added that the same would be true of units of the British Army.[128] Similarly, Dr Patrick Mileham, former officer in the Royal Tank Regiment and military historian, told us it would be unlikely for the Ministry of Defence to allow the transfer of the Royal Regiment of Scotland, the Scots Guards and the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards because they are in the Order of Battle and the British Army would be making plans on the assumption they will remain.[129]

THE DIVISION OF ASSETS AND THE TRANSITION

64.  In the event of a yes vote, there would be a transition period during which the UK and Scotland separated themselves. In practical terms, there would have to be an audit of assets and valuations, negotiations and agreement on what was disputed. This would be immensely complex. For example, the value of Coulport and Faslane are difficult to determine—would the nuclear facilities be priced at replacement costs, construction costs or value to a future Scottish Government? Similarly legislation that had been drafted on the presumption of the United Kingdom would have to be untangled.[130] The British Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force would have to adjust to operating without the use of bases and territory in Scotland. Scotland would have to create its own structures according to what a separate Scotland wanted. Professor Chalmers said:

It would not be an overnight job. Thinking about what Scotland would ideally want, it will not get what it ideally decides for another 20 or 30 years in a rapidly changing world.[131]

The Scottish Government has proposed that, in the event of a yes vote on 18 September 2014, then negotiations would take place and agreement would be reached with the UK Government, in time to enable independence day to be at some time in March 2016. The Scottish Government paper, Scotland's Future: from the Referendum to Independence and a Written Constitution, said:

Following a vote for independence in 2014, agreements will be reached between the Scottish and UK Governments, in the spirit of the Agreement, setting the parameters for Scotland's transition to independence. These agreements would establish:

  • The timetable towards independence day—which the Scottish Government would intend to be in March 2016, just before the start of the 2016 election campaign;

And these negotiations would include:

  • the division of financial and other assets and liabilities (including oil revenues and assignation of other tax revenues, military bases and overseas assets), the transfer to the Scottish Parliament and Government of political authority over institutions previously controlled at Westminster, the ongoing co-operative arrangements that the peoples of Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland would share, and the timetable for the speediest safe removal of weapons of mass destruction from Scotland.

It conceded:

Of course, some matters may continue to be discussed after independence (as was the case, for example, with the Czech Republic and Slovakia).[132]

65.  How Scotland acquired those assets it did not inherit would be for Scotland to decide over a period of time. As Professor Smith said:

There is a temptation to adopt what is called in the trade a conspiracy of optimism and say, "It will all work out okay. Maybe we will be able to afford that." That is where the transition will be really hard.[133]

A separate Scotland could buy second hand, it could tender for new items and, depending on Scotland's industrial policy, possibly build what it wanted domestically. The defence industry across the UK, including Scotland, has evolved to meet the needs of the British Army, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy.[134] It would not necessarily make the things that Scotland would want.

66.  We have heard no evidence that would lead us to believe that negotiations on such complex matters could be even close to resolution in such a restricted time period. Experience in dispute resolution leads us to believe that when one party has a deadline and the other has not, then the closeness of the deadline undermines the position of the party to whom it is important. In this context, of course an agreement could always be reached in time, but this would be likely to involve substantial concessions by those to whom the deadline is essential.

67.  Like all UK taxpayers, people in Scotland have contributed over the years to the development of the current defence assets of the UK; the Scottish share of these assets has been estimated at between £7 billion and £8 billion. However, the division of defence assets would not be straightforward and would be subject to difficult and complex negotiations.

68.  The Scottish Government would need to take into account whether it could afford the ongoing operating costs for any equipment inherited, and whether it had the necessary skilled personnel to operate this equipment.


60   Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8174, executive summary Back

61   Q 158 Back

62   Crawford and Marsh, A' The Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012, This updated the earlier Crawford paper, written under the pseudonym Jack Hawthorn, Some Thoughts on an Independent Scottish Defence Force, 1997 Back

63   Crawford and Marsh, A The Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012. See Scotland could afford 'regional defence force', 17 October 2012, www.defencemanagement.com  Back

64   SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 Back

65   SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 Back

66   Q 2175 Back

67   Q 2346 Back

68   www.army.mod.uk/armoured/regiments/26871.aspx Back

69   Q 2356 Back

70   Your Scotland, Your Voice, 2009, page 121 Back

71   Q 2182. Professor Chalmers used his own estimate of £38 billion for UK defence spending Back

72   Chalmers, End of an Auld Sang, 2012. (In 2015 but at 2010 prices). Back

73   Scottish Government, Scotland's Balance Sheet, April 2013. (2010-11 figures) EU-15 (Members of the EU upto April 2004) are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom  Back

74   Crawford and Marsh, A' the Blue Bonnets, RUSI, October 2012 Back

75   See also Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, RUSI, April 2012, and Francis Tusa, Defence Analysis, Scottish Independence Issues, January 2007, Vol. 10 Issue 1; and Francis Tusa, Defence Analysis, Scottish Independence: The Defence Equation, February 2012, Vol. 15 Issue 2; Briefing: Separation anxiety, Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 June 2012 Back

76   See Q 153 and Q 158 Back

77   Q 158 Back

78   Military Balance 2012. Note Norway has conscription. Back

79   Military Balance 2012 Back

80   Q 2289 Back

81   For example, see Scotland Institute, Defence and Security in an Independent Scotland, June 2013, pages 28-29 Back

82   Q 2157 Back

83   Q 187. See also Q 158, and Chalmers, The End of an Auld Sang, RUSI, April 2012 Back

84   www.military.ie/ Back

85   Q 178 Back

86   Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8174, para 1.58 Back

87   Cm 8174, para 1.53 Back

88   Q 2157 Back

89   Q 187 Back

90   Cm 8174, para 1.68 Back

91   Scotland Analysis: Security, Cm 8741, page 7. Q 2172 Back

92   www.gov.uk/government/news/reserves-head-up-new-cyber-unit  Back

93   Oral evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 January 2013, Q 310 Back

94   Q 2168 Back

95   Q 3485 Back

96   SNP Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update, October 2012 Back

97   Q 2171 Back

98   Q 3936 Back

99   Q 3940 Back

100   Q 2172 Back

101   Scotland Analysis: Security, Cm 8741, paras 2.25-2.27  Back

102   Q 2308 Back

103   Scotland Analysis: Security, Cm 8741, paras 2.17-2.19, and paras 3.26-3.30 Back

104   Q 2168. See also Scottish civil servants probe plans for 'Nordic' intelligence services after independence, The Herald, 27 July 2013 Back

105   Q 2168 Back

106   Q 2308 Back

107   FAC, Q 316 Back

108   Cm 8174, para 1.62. See also Q 201 Back

109   Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8714 Back

110   Sixth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2012-13, Foreign policy considerations for the UK and Scotland in the event of Scotland becoming an independent country, HC 643, paras 135-136. Q 201, Qq 2333-2335, Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8714, paras 2.23-2.24 Back

111   Q 158 Professor Chalmers quoted this value as "after depreciation".  Back

112   Q 353 Back

113   Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 326 Back

114   Q 158, Q 2322 Back

115   Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 295 Back

116   Q 2173 Back

117   Qq 2293-2296 Back

118   Q 158 Back

119   Alex Salmond: Independent Scotland could trade its share of Trident, STV News, 18 July 2012 Back

120   Q 168 Back

121   Oral evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 387 Back

122   Q 169 Back

123   Q 170 Back

124   Q 158 Back

125   Oral Evidence before the Defence Committee, 2 July 2013, Q 261, Q 268, Q 282  Back

126   How would an independent Scotland defend itself? The Guardian, 1 March 2012; Briefing: Separation anxiety, Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 June 2012 Back

127   Q 187 Back

128   Q 3946 Back

129   Q 3790 Back

130   Qq 174-175 Back

131   Q 158 Back

132   Scottish Government, Scotland's Future: from the Referendum to Independence and a Written Constitution, February 2013 Back

133   Q 2188 Back

134   Eighth Report of 2012-13, HC 957 Back


 
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