Government horizon scanning - Science and Technology Committee Contents


2  Horizon scanning in government

The need for effective horizon scanning in government

6. The Government describes horizon scanning as "an overall term for analysing the future".[9] It states that it is used to consider "how emerging trends and developments might potentially affect current policy and practice", so that policy-makers can "take a longer-term strategic approach" and develop policies that are "more resilient to future uncertainty".[10] Horizon scanning currently supports three main types of activity across government:

a)  strategy development, where horizon scanning is used to support the "central business planning process, where high-level, long-term objectives are set and where corporate level risks can be identified, monitored and where necessary, mitigated against";[11]

b)  policy-making, where horizon scanning "provides a vital function in future proofing policy and making it resilient against future uncertainty";[12] and

c)  operational delivery, where horizon scanning and modelling techniques are used to "test a number of hypotheses on a particular system" and "explore interdependencies and their comparative weightings in a variety of situations".[13]

The Government pointed out that horizon scanning had been conducted by the Civil Service "in one form or another for many years" and that policy-level horizon scanning, in particular, was "a well-established practice across many departments".[14] It stated that these activities had led to "a number of notable successes" in the past and highlighted that in today's "tight economic climate" it was "more important than ever" for policy-makers to "have the best possible understanding of the world around us, and how that world is changing" in order to prioritise and adapt effectively.[15]

7. Witnesses considered the Government's interest in horizon scanning to be well founded and agreed that, used well, it could enhance decision-making. The Royal Society described horizon scanning as "an important strategic tool for government decision-making" and Dr Martyn Thomas, Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng), pointed out that evidence-based policy-making required "appropriate evidence" to be collected "about what the future is likely to be like".[16] Cranfield University's Centre for Environmental Risks and Futures (CERF) highlighted the economic argument in favour of horizon scanning, stating that the policies that it informed could be "more sustainable and adaptable to changing circumstances", allowing for "more efficient and effective use of diminishing resources".[17]

8. Nevertheless, witnesses were also keen to point out horizon scanning's limitations. CERF stated that the future was "generally not predictable" and described horizon scanning as "a tool" which enabled policy-makers to reflect on how their decisions "might unfold in a number of possible futures", rather than as an attempt to predict a single version of it.[18] Professor Steve Rayner, University of Oxford,[19] agreed that "the most surprising future would be a future without surprises" and that we would therefore "be wise to recognise the limits" of our ability to predict it.[20] Rather, we should design policies that are "robust to unanticipated futures" and "arm ourselves with flexibility to address the unexpected".[21]

9. Although a strong advocate for horizon scanning, the Minister also recognised its limits, acknowledging that it was not a way of "predicting the future with certainty".[22] However, the Government's description of horizon scanning as a way of "future proofing" policy does suggest that it placed a high level of confidence in its outcomes.[23] The risk that horizon scanning might give "politicians and officials a false sense of security" was highlighted by the Public Administration Select Committee in 2012, in its inquiry into Strategic thinking in government.[24] The Committee stated that it was "concerned" that the rise in government horizon scanning might lead policy-makers to believe that they were "prepared for all eventualities" and recommended "a greater recognition of the unpredictable nature of the issues which face us as a nation".[25]

10. We agree with the Government that horizon scanning is a potentially valuable activity and that, used well, it can enhance both short- and long-term decision-making. However, horizon scanning cannot accurately predict the future and it cannot be used to effectively "future proof" individual policies.

Definitions and terminology

11. In his 2013 review of cross-government horizon scanning, Jon Day, Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, observed that there was currently "no set, cross-government agreed definition" of the term 'horizon scanning'.[26] He offered the following definition for future use across government:

    Government horizon scanning: A systematic examination of information to identify potential threats, risks, emerging issues and opportunities, beyond the Parliamentary term, allowing for better preparedness and the incorporation of mitigation and exploitation into the policy making process.[27]

This definition encompasses several of the techniques detailed in the Government Office for Science's (GO-Science) Horizon scanning toolkit, an online resource which describes a total of 24 different horizon scanning "tools".[28] Several of these were described in a helpful analogy contained within the Public Administration Select Committee's 2007 report, Governing the future:

    Let us assume you are standing on the bridge of a ship. You scan the horizon (Horizon Scanning) and see an iceberg and your supply ship. You work out the likely speeds and direction of the iceberg and supply ship (trend analysis) and put the information into the ship's computer (modelling) and then plot a course (roadmapping) so that you meet with the supply ship and not the iceberg. While you are doing this you dream of eating some nice chocolate that you hope is on the supply ship (visioning).

    You realise that the speeds and directions of the iceberg and the supply ship might change, so you work out the range of options to make sure you have the greatest chance of meeting the supply ship (scenarios). Even with all of this planning, you know there is a chance of the unexpected and hitting the iceberg so you get the crew to do an evacuation drill (gaming). While they are doing it, you work back from the most likely future position of the supply ship to work out the steps you need to get there (backcasting).[29]

Given the large number of these tools—of which, according to GO-Science, "horizon scanning" itself is one[30]—several witnesses criticised the Government's use of 'horizon scanning' as "an overall term for analysing the future".[31] English Heritage "noted the confusion" that surrounded "the different usages of the term 'horizon scanning'"[32] and Fiona Lickorish, Centre for Environmental Risks and Futures (CERF), pointed out that there was:

    an inconsistency of the use of the term "horizon scanning" between government and external practitioners. External practitioners tend to use the term "horizon scanning" to mean a particular methodology [...] whereas in government the term is often used interchangeably with "futures analysis", "foresight", "forward-looking" and "intelligence".[33]

Ms Lickorish warned that such "inconsistency" could "lead to misunderstandings between practitioners and government when [government officials] ask for horizon scanning, and that is not really what they are looking for".[34]

12. This inconsistency in terminology did not go unnoticed by Mr Day. In his review, he explained that "for the practitioner" horizon scanning was "part of the Futures tool kit" while "for the strategic customer" it was "an umbrella term describing the analytical activity of looking beyond the here and now".[35] Mr Day also acknowledged in his review that "this difference in terminology" was "confusing" and may have been "a factor" in why "previous attempts to embed horizon scanning into [government] decision making" had failed.[36] However, when we questioned Mr Day on this matter during our inquiry, he stated that these terms "all broadly meant the same thing" and that government spent "too much time focusing on definitions".[37] When asked whether the Government's use of the term 'horizon scanning' should be changed to more accurately reflect its usage outside of government, Mr Day replied that to "change course now" would be "more rather than less confusing" because "we have branded this [activity] within Government as horizon scanning".[38] The Minister told us that he was "really profoundly uninterested" in attempting to define horizon scanning and, when asked to do so, announced that: "my definition of 'horizon scanning' is scanning the horizon".[39] He continued:

    We all know, roughly speaking, when it is being done and when it isn't. It is about whether people are looking sensibly, intelligently and carefully at the future and making educated guesses about what might be most important and interesting about it, and then, in a systematic way, approaching the question: are we suitably adapted to deal with the uncertainties and make greatest use of the likely opportunities? If this fulfils that, whether that counts in the theology of X or Y as horizon scanning, or something else, or grand strategy, I neither know nor care.[40]

13. Unlike the Minister, we consider it important that the term 'horizon scanning' is properly defined and applied by government. Inconsistent use of this term has clearly caused confusion in the past. We remind the Government that the Day review cited it as a contributory factor in the Government's historic failure to properly embed horizon scanning into its decision-making.

14. In this report, we have had little choice but to adopt the Government's usage of the term 'horizon scanning'; however, this is by no means an endorsement. We consider the term 'futures analysis' to be a more accurate description of the suite of activities undertaken by the Government under the banner of 'horizon scanning'. We are also unconvinced by the Government's argument that its branding of horizon scanning has been so successful as to make a correction impractical. We therefore recommend that the Government rename its horizon scanning programme the "futures research programme" and clearly set out, both internally and in public, the techniques that it considers to be within the programme's remit.

Centres of horizon scanning in government

15. Horizon scanning can be conducted on a variety of topics, from the broad (for example, the impact of emerging technologies on the UK economy) to the relatively narrow (for example, the future of computer trading in financial markets).[41] Consequently, horizon scanning activity has historically taken place in two types of location within government:

a)  specialised, often centrally-located units responsible for considering cross-government themes or topics with high strategic value; and

b)  individual departments, responsible for considering more discrete, department-specific issues.

Key centres of government horizon scanning are described below.

CROSS-GOVERNMENT HORIZON SCANNING

16. Cross-government horizon scanning has recently taken place in three main centres:

The Prime Minister's Strategy Unit

17. The Prime Minister's Strategy Unit (PMSU) was created under the leadership of Tony Blair in 2002 and, for a time, was "the only body at the centre of government with the remit of future thinking".[42] It had three main roles:

a)  to carry out strategy reviews and provide policy advice in accordance with the Prime Minister's policy priorities;

b)  to support government departments in developing effective strategies and policies, including helping them to build their strategic capability; and

c)  to identify and effectively disseminate thinking on emerging issues and challenges for the UK Government, for example through occasional strategic audits.[43]

According to the Public Administration Select Committee (which scrutinised the work of the PMSU in 2006 report, Governing the future) the PMSU was seen as "a kind of internal consultancy or think-tank" and its work was "widely praised".[44] It supported policy development both at the departmental level and through its work with the Prime Minister's Policy Directorate.[45] The PMSU was dissolved by the current administration in 2010.[46]

The Strategic Horizons Unit and the Horizon Scanning Forum

18. In 2008, then Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced the creation of several new national security-focused bodies intended to help the Government "address and manage an increasingly diverse but interconnected set of security challenges and some of their underlying factors including climate change, competition for energy, poverty, and globalisation".[47] These included two new horizon-scanning bodies, both based in the Cabinet Office:

·  The Horizon Scanning Unit: Part of the Joint Intelligence Organisation of the Cabinet Office, the Horizon Scanning Unit was launched in September 2008 to "coordinate horizon scanning activity and improve its overall effectiveness across government".[48] In November 2008 it was renamed the Strategic Horizons Unit.

·  The Horizon Scanning Forum: The Horizon Scanning Forum, also part of the Cabinet Office, met for the first time in September 2008. Its role was to work "closely with the new Cabinet Office Strategic Horizons Unit to meet the National Security Strategy commitment to 'strengthen the Government's capacity for horizon-scanning, forward planning and early warning'".[49] For a time, it acted as the main commissioning and coordinating body for national security-related horizon scanning work. The forum now appears to have been dissolved.

In early 2010 the Horizon Scanning Unit/Strategic Horizons Unit was transferred to the National Security Secretariat. According to the Day review, "at this point the horizon scanning coordination function within the Cabinet Office ceased to exist".[50]

The Government Office for Science

19. Located in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), the Government Office for Science (GO-Science) is "the home of science and engineering across government".[51] The Foresight programme, established in 1994, is GO-Science's centre for futures analysis. Its role is to help "the UK Government to think systematically about the future" in order to "ensure today's decisions are robust to future uncertainties".[52] The main outputs of the Foresight programme are in-depth reports which "build a comprehensive evidence-base on major issues looking 20-80 years into the future".[53] Recent examples include: The future of manufacturing (2013), The future of identity (2013), The future of computer trading in financial markets (2012) and Reducing risks of future disasters (2012 Several witnesses to this inquiry commended the work of the Foresight programme[54] and the Public Administration Select Committee has described the programme as "a world leader in futures work".[55]

20. In its 2004 Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004-2014, the Government committed to establishing an additional "centre of excellence in science and technology horizon scanning".[56] This unit - the Horizon Scanning Centre (HSC) - now forms part of the Foresight programme and provides "training, toolkits and networks to strengthen futures thinking capacity and share best practice within and across government".[57] According to Sir Mark Walport, the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA) and the head of GO-Science, "a lot of the work of the Horizon Scanning Centre is not in producing reports; it is working with networks of people both inside Government and outside to catalyse horizon scanning work".[58] Networks currently led by the HSC include the Heads of Horizon Scanning Network, which comprises "70 representatives" from across "34 government department and agencies", and the Future Intelligence and Security Outlook Network (FUSION), "which focuses on security issues and includes more than 60 members from across 20 organisations".[59] Both the Foresight programme and the HSC continue to exist and remain key centres of government horizon scanning.

21. Since 2010, GO-Science has been the only organ of government in which cross-departmental horizon scanning has taken place. Unlike past hubs for such activity, GO-Science has performed this function from a non-central location in government. This matter is discussed further in paragraphs 34-37.

DEPARTMENTAL HORIZON SCANNING

22. Historically, horizon scanning has been conducted "to varying degrees across a number of government departments".[60] According to the Government:

    The application of horizon scanning in government departments supports the central business planning process, where high level long term objectives are set and where corporate level risks can be identified, monitored and where necessary, mitigated against. Many government departments centrally manage their horizon scanning function through a central strategy or strategic analysis team.[61]

The Government offered several examples of department-led horizon scanning to demonstrate the extent and breadth of this activity:

    In 2011, Government published the 'White Paper on the Natural Environment', the first in 20 years. The paper received input from across government, including the use of horizon scanning. The National Ecosystem Assessment, a key piece of horizon scanning-based evidence, played a substantive role in the white paper as it provided an assessment of the UK's natural environment and a future assessment of how it will change.[62]

    [...]

    The Department of Energy and Climate Change's 'Future of Heating' plan takes forecasts of likely future heat demand in the UK and considers the different technologies that could meet this demand, and how specific barriers to deployment could be addressed.[63]

    [...]

    The Ministry of Justice has carried out horizon scanning activities to identify the key drivers of civil and family justice workload and used this information to create models to estimate future demand for Ministry of Justice services.[64]

23. Departmental horizon scanning was assessed between 2003 and 2013 as part of a series of Science and Engineering Assurance Reviews conducted by GO-Science.[65] These found performance to be inconsistent. For example, while GCHQ's approach to horizon scanning was said to be "impressive"[66] and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs was considered to have "been in the vanguard"[67] of developing capability, the reviews found that the Department of Energy and Climate Change[68], the Home Office[69] and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport[70] did not, at the time, systematically conduct horizon scanning. These reviews were completed during the tenure of Sir Mark's predecessor as GCSA, Sir John Beddington. In his valedictorial session with the Committee, Sir John stated that these reviews were now "moving on to a new stage", which Sir Mark would "be expected to take forward".[71] He explained:

    We have a problem that I have characterised as the Forth [rail] bridge. By the time you finish one [of these reviews] you need to start on the [next one]. We are looking for a new system where it will be the responsibility of the chief scientific adviser in the Department to review the way in which evidence has been used, including the amount of resources, but that review would be subject to external challenge by a panel appointed by the chief scientific adviser.[72]

According to the Day review, a 2012 assessment of government horizon scanning capability found that "all departments" recognised "the value of horizon scanning" but that the resources allocated were "not generally significant" and its use was "not [...] systematic".[73]

24. The Minister acknowledged that the time spent on horizon scanning varied "very, very widely" across departments and stated that he still needed to "gain an understanding" of whether "that balance across different departments" was "right".[74] However, he stressed that the Government was "very single-mindedly" trying to concentrate on how departments were thinking about the future and whether or not they were "developing appropriately flexible and continuingly re-examined" responses to it.[75]

25. It is beyond this inquiry's remit to conduct a full review of horizon scanning across individual government departments. However, given the inconsistencies of practice and performance that have been highlighted in the past we consider it important that a mechanism for regular scrutiny is put in place. We recommend that the Government Office for Science incorporate a regular review of departmental horizon scanning into the next phase of its Science and Engineering Assurance programme.

The Day review

26. The Day review—which was one of the instigators for this inquiry—was itself brought about as a result of a recommendation made by a Select Committee. In April 2012, the Public Administration Select Committee published a report on Strategic thinking in government. In this report, the Committee concluded that policy decisions were often made "for short-term reasons, little reflecting the longer-term interests of the nation" and stated that it could have "little confidence" that government policies were informed by "a clear, coherent strategic approach".[76] It recommended "a review of the use of horizon scanning and its purpose".[77] Following publication of this report, the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Jeremy Heywood, announced that he had commissioned a review of cross-departmental horizon scanning.[78] This was carried out in late 2012 by Jon Day, a senior civil servant with a background in national security who had recently been appointed Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee. The objective of the review was to:

    consider how Departments make use of horizon scanning, to assess the capabilities and structures used by the Civil Service to anticipate risk and identify opportunities over the medium-to-long term, and to make recommendations on how best to enable effective, shared strategic analysis across government on the future challenges facing the UK.[79]

The review consisted of an examination of relevant literature and a series of "workshops, questionnaires and meetings" in which views were sought from "senior officials, policy makers and horizon scanning practitioners".[80]

27. The findings of the Day review were published in January 2013. According to Mr Day, the review demonstrated "the silo nature" of horizon scanning in government, revealing a "problem of joining up, directing and making use" of horizon scanning rather than a lack of the requisite skills or resources.[81] It stated that:

    While some horizon scanning networks coordinate and share best practice, a lack of truly cross-governmental oversight and coordination has prevented cross-cutting horizon scanning work reaching the relevant audiences. This has led to duplication of effort, with narrow, stove piped working which limits the relevance and impact of the output. In addition, there is a belief that horizon scanning is ignored when the strategic level is not open to challenge.[82]

The review highlighted that, since 2010, there had been no central horizon scanning coordination function in government and that previous efforts to "embed cross-cutting horizon scanning into government structures" had not met with "enduring success".[83] It recommended that a new Cabinet Office-based governance structure for cross-government horizon scanning be established, in order to "remove departmental compartmentalisation and generate an agreed view on cross-cutting issues".[84] (See Figure 1.) The new structure for cross-government horizon scanning came into existence in July 2013 and is the subject of the next chapter of this report.

28. In September 2013, the Public Administration Select Committee completed a "major inquiry on the future of the civil service".[85] It stated that it was "unconvinced" that the Government had developed "the analysis, policies and leadership to address" the problems faced by the Civil Service, highlighting the "siloed" mentality that also featured prominently in the Day review.[86] The Committee recommended "the establishment of a Parliamentary Commission into the Civil Service, in the form of a joint committee of both Houses".[87] We consider the siloed nature of the Civil Service to be a fundamental issue which should be explored in a Parliamentary Commission into its future, as recommended by the Public Administration Select Committee. Figure 1: The new structure for cross-government horizon scanning, as recommended by the Day Review[88]




9   Cabinet Office/Government Office for Science, "Horizon scanning programme: a new approach for policy making", 12 July 2013 Back

10   Cabinet Office/Government Office for Science, "Horizon scanning programme: a new approach for policy making", 12 July 2013 Back

11   GHS015 [HM Government] para 5 Back

12   GHS015 [HM Government] para 8 Back

13   GHS015 [HM Government] para 9 Back

14   GHS015 [HM Government] paras 8 and 24 Back

15   GHS015 [HM Government] para 24; Cabinet Office/Government Office for Science, "Horizon scanning programme: a new approach for policy making", 12 July 2013 Back

16   GHS009 [Royal Society] para 2; Q37 [Dr Thomas] Back

17   GHS005 [CERF] para 4.5 Back

18   GHS005 [CERF] para 4.3 Back

19   Professor Rayner submitted evidence jointly with five other academics from the University of Oxford: Professor Catherine Redgwell, Professor Julian Savulescu, Professor Richard Darton, Professor Myles Allen and Mr Tim Kruger.  Back

20   GHS004 [University of Oxford] para 20 Back

21   GHS004 [University of Oxford] para 20 Back

22   Q239 Back

23   GHS015 [HM Government] para 8 Back

24   Public Administration Select Committee, Twenty Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, Strategic thinking in Government, HC1625, para 90 Back

25   Public Administration Select Committee, Twenty Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, Strategic thinking in Government, HC1625, para 90 Back

26   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, January 2013, para 5 Back

27   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, January 2013, para 5 Back

28   Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre, "Horizon Scanning Toolkit", 2008 Back

29   Public Administration Select Committee, Second Report of Session 2006-07, Governing the Future, HC123-1, para 26 Back

30   Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre, "Horizon Scanning Toolkit", The Tools, 2008 Back

31   Cabinet Office/Government Office for Science, "Horizon scanning programme: a new approach for policy making", 12 July 2013 Back

32   GHS007 [English Heritage] para 11 Back

33   Q93 Back

34   Q93 Back

35   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, January 2013, para 5 Back

36   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, January 2013, para 5 Back

37   Q178  Back

38   Q181 Back

39   Q235 Back

40   Q235 Back

41   See Government Office for Science/Foresight, The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets: An International Perspective, October 2012 Back

42   Public Administration Select Committee, Second Report of Session 2006-07, Governing the Future, HC123-1, para 35 Back

43   The National Archives, "Prime Minister's Strategy Unit", last updated 25 January 2007, accessed March 2014http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20031220221857/cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/  Back

44   Public Administration Select Committee, Second Report of Session 2006-07, Governing the Future, HC123-1, paras 17 and 19 Back

45   Public Administration Select Committee, Second Report of Session 2006-07, Governing the Future, HC123-1, paras 20-22 Back

46   Financial Times, "Cameron to close down his strategy unit", Westminster Blog, November 15 2010 Back

47   HC Deb, 22 July 2008, col 111WS [Commons written ministerial statement] Back

48   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, "Annex A: Horizon scanning history", January 2013 Back

49   HC Deb, 9 February 2009, col 1585W [Commons written answer] Back

50   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, "Annex A: Horizon scanning history", January 2013 Back

51   Government Office for Science, "About us", accessed March 2014 Back

52   Foresight, "About Foresight", accessed March 2014 Back

53   Foresight, "About Foresight", accessed March 2014 Back

54   See for example GHS013 [AcSS] para 4; GHS002 [ITS UK] para 2.3; Q8 [Natalie Day] and Q90 [Fiona Lickorish] Back

55   Public Administration Select Committee, Second Report of Session 2006-07, Governing the Future, HC123-1, para 27 Back

56   HM Treasury/Department for Trade and Industry/Department for Education and Skills, Science and innovation investment framework: 2004-2014, July 2004  Back

57   Foresight, "About Foresight", accessed March 2014 Back

58   Q170 Back

59   Q175 Back

60   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, "Annex A: Horizon scanning history", January 2013 Back

61   GHS015 [HM Government] para 5 Back

62   GHS015 [HM Government] para 7c Back

63   GHS015 [HM Government] para 8d Back

64   GHS015 [HM Government] para 9d Back

65   Government Office for Science, "Reviewing science and engineering", accessed March 2014 Back

66   Government Office for Science, Science review of GCHQ, 2010, para 4.5 Back

67   Office of Science and Innovation, Science review of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, December 2006, para 38 Back

68   Government Office for Science, Science and engineering assurance review of the Department for Energy and Climate Change, August 2012, URN12/762, p.8 Back

69   Office of Science and Innovation, Science review of the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, December 2007, p.9 Back

70   Office of Science and Innovation, Science review of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, para 4.6 Back

71   Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 11 March 2013, HC 1052-I (2012-2013), Q11 Back

72   Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 11 March 2013, HC1052-I (2012-2013), Q11 Back

73   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, "Annex E: Literature review", January 2013, p.11 Back

74   Q225-6 Back

75   Q229 Back

76   Public Administration Select Committee, Twenty Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, Strategic thinking in Government, HC1625, p.3 Back

77   Public Administration Select Committee, Twenty Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, Strategic thinking in Government, HC1625, para 90 Back

78   Oral evidence taken before the Public Administration Select Committee on 24 May 2012, HC133-i (2012-2013), Q27 Back

79   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, January 2013, para 2 Back

80   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, January 2013, para 7 Back

81   Q176-177 Back

82   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, January 2013, para 6 Back

83   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, January 2013, para 5. See also Annex A: Horizon scanning history Back

84   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, January 2013, para 12 Back

85   Public Administration Select Committee, "Future of the civil service", accessed March 2014 Back

86   Public Administration Select Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2013-14, Truth to power: how Civil Service reform can succeed, HC74, summary (p.3) and para 157 Back

87   Public Administration Select Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2013-14, Truth to power: how Civil Service reform can succeed, HC74, summary (p.3) Back

88   Cabinet Office, Review of cross-government horizon scanning, January 2013, p.5 Back


 
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