



House of Commons  
Transport Committee

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# Ready and waiting? Transport preparations for winter weather

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**Tenth Report of Session 2013–14**

*Report, together with formal minutes relating  
to the report*

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## The Transport Committee

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## Summary

Transport is vital to economic growth and a lack of preparedness has a direct impact on both transport and on the economy as a whole. It's vital that the UK's transport infrastructure and all passenger service operators are not taken by surprise by adverse winter weather.

The last few years have seen a number of periods when severe weather has led to widespread travel disruption, exposing a lack of preparedness across all modes of transport in terms of infrastructure, resources, and looking after the interests of passengers. While there are welcome signs of progress this report makes important recommendations about how to maintain and improve the transport sector's winter preparedness over the longer term.

In our last report on this topic, we highlighted two main areas of concern: the welfare of passengers, particularly when stranded due to periods of disruption, and the provision of information to passengers ahead of, during, and in the aftermath of, a severe weather event.

While this report recognises the progress made by Government and transport providers, we identify a number of areas where is scope for further improvement:

- We support pro-active decision making by the rail and aviation industries to reduce or cancel services in anticipation of a severe weather event. When used effectively, this approach will provide greater certainty to passengers and minimises their risk of getting stranded.
- The Highways Agency should review the barriers to providing comprehensive real-time information to drivers; identify technological and other solutions for doing so, particularly during periods of disruption; and develop a strategy to implement these solutions across the strategic road network.
- The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) should ensure that train operating companies develop more robust procedures to identify how long a period of disruption is likely to last and to communicate this clearly to passengers.
- The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) should set out how it will evaluate the impact of the new airport licence conditions on passenger welfare, by Spring 2015. The CAA must also ensure that best practice on the provision of information and on passenger welfare is shared across all UK airports.

We previously raised concern about the availability of adequate supplies of salt for gritting roads. It is widely acknowledged that this problem has been addressed, in part due to the establishment of a national strategic salt reserve, held by the Highways Agency. However, there remains no room for complacency:

- Government must continue to provide annual updates to local authorities detailing how to access strategic salt stocks. We also recommend that the Highways Agency

should organise annual ‘dry runs’ to ensure that all local authorities have an up-to-date practical understanding of how to access these reserves.

We also conclude that more could be done to keep pavements clear of ice and snow. We recommend that the Government do more to actively publicise its Snow Code at the start of each winter. A national advertising campaign should highlight that the public can clear snow and ice from outside their homes without fear of legal action and should consider doing so. We also call on the Government to promote examples of good practice and innovation, such as the use by Brighton and Hove City Council of a sit-on vehicle for clearing pavements.

Progress has been made towards improving the winter resilience of the third rail network south of the Thames, which runs through rural areas that are susceptible to heavy snowfall. The planned conversion of the Southampton to Basingstoke route is a good first step. The Government should push for this conversion to take place in the early part of Control Period 5 (2014-19) in order to allow time to evaluate the benefits and build a business case for a more comprehensive third rail conversion scheme in Control Period 6.

However, winter weather is about more than just snow, as illustrated by the ‘St Jude’ storm across southern England (on 28 October 2013) and the more recent storm across the north of the UK on 5 December 2013. The transport sector must continue to work closely with the Met Office and other forecasters to understand the challenges posed by different types of severe weather.

Finally, embedding a culture of continuous review and improvement must remain a priority for both Government and the transport sector; to ensure that all modes and networks are made more robust year after year and that the sector is well placed to address further issues as and when they arise. A year or two of mild winter weather should never breed complacency or lead to a false sense of security.

# 1 Introduction

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1. The last few years have seen a number of periods of severe weather during the winter months which have led to widespread travel disruption. The impact of this bad weather came to a head in the winter of 2009-10, which was the UK's coldest for 30 years.<sup>1</sup> Significant snowfalls occurred frequently from mid-December until the end of February and every month of the winter was colder than average.<sup>2</sup> That winter there was disruption to all transport modes but the main issue at the time was the availability of adequate supplies of salt for gritting roads.

2. In March 2010 the then Government commissioned a review of winter resilience in England, led by David Quarmby CBE, chair of the RAC Foundation. The Quarmby Review was published in October 2010. Mr Quarmby was subsequently asked to undertake an "urgent audit" of how well the highway authorities and transport operators in England had coped with the period of bad weather beginning at the end of November 2010. His audit was published in December 2010. Both the Review and audit were thorough investigations into what went wrong with England's transport networks and their recommendations were accepted by the Government. Notably, the Government instructed the Highways Agency to build up a strategic stockpile of road salt to improve national resilience.

3. In December 2010, shortly after the publication of the Quarmby Review, a period of extreme cold and snowfall led to major disruptions at Heathrow Airport. One runway was closed for nearly four days and over 4,000 flights were cancelled.<sup>3</sup> Significant disruption also occurred at other UK airports. A number of individual airports subsequently carried out work on improving their resilience to severe weather conditions. For example, Heathrow commissioned Professor David Begg to establish the lessons to be learnt following this severe weather event. Professor Begg made fourteen specific recommendations relating to preparation and planning, command and control processes, communications, and passenger welfare.<sup>4</sup>

4. We also carried out a short inquiry into the impact on transport of the winter weather in December 2010. The report<sup>5</sup> we produced built on the work undertaken by Quarmby, Begg and others and identified what the Government needed to do to ensure that UK transport networks were better prepared for bad winter weather in future and that passengers were kept well informed during periods of disruption. We made recommendations on areas for additional investment and co-ordination by the Government, and we called for improved

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<sup>1</sup> Met Office, [Winter 2009/10 weather summary](#)

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> [Letter](#) from Heathrow, to the Chair of the Transport Committee, dated 4 March 2013; and Professor David Begg, [Report of the Heathrow Winter Resilience Enquiry](#), Executive Summary, March 2011

<sup>4</sup> Professor David Begg, [Report of the Heathrow Winter Resilience Enquiry](#), March 2011

<sup>5</sup> Transport Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2010-12, [Keeping the UK moving: The impact on transport of the winter weather in December 2010](#), HC 794

passenger welfare in the aviation sector and better information for passengers across all transport modes.

5. Since our report further concerns have been raised about the poor resilience of transport to winter weather. For example, in January 2013, snow and severe weather conditions led to the cancellation of hundreds of flights at Heathrow Airport over a period of four days.<sup>6</sup> We received correspondence from passengers complaining that they were left stranded on departing aircraft for long periods of time or overnight in Terminal 5. We wrote to Heathrow and British Airways to raise concerns about their winter resilience plans, passenger welfare and communication. In addition to their replies, we received further correspondence from Gatwick and Virgin Atlantic Airways about their preparedness for winter weather.<sup>7</sup> We subsequently agreed to hold a follow up inquiry into transport's winter resilience in order to scrutinise the sector's preparedness for winter 2013-14 and to assess how the concerns we raised in our earlier report have been addressed.

6. Following a call for evidence, we received a number of written submissions and heard oral evidence from local authorities, the Highways Agency, representatives from the rail and aviation industries, and the Department for Transport. We are grateful to all those who contributed to our inquiry. In the course of our inquiry we also visited Heathrow Airport, where we were able to see firsthand the equipment and processes that Heathrow and British Airways have in place to deal with severe winter weather conditions. We are grateful to Heathrow for facilitating this visit.

7. Our report focuses primarily on the issues raised in our previous inquiry. We begin by looking at how the transport sector, local authorities and the Government prepare for severe winter weather. We then discuss the provision of information on travel disruption and passenger welfare – both of these important subjects were highlighted in our earlier report as areas of weakness. Our report ends with some overarching conclusions on continuous improvement.

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<sup>6</sup> [Letter](#) from Heathrow, to the Chair of the Transport Committee, dated 4 March 2013

<sup>7</sup> [Letter](#) from Heathrow, to the Chair of the Transport Committee, dated 4 March 2013; [Letter](#) from British Airways, to the Chair of the Transport Committee, dated 25 February 2013; [Letter](#) from Virgin Atlantic, to the Chair of the Transport Committee, dated 21 January 2013; and [Letter](#) from Gatwick Airport, to the Chair of the Transport Committee, dated 21 January 2013

## 2 Preparing for winter weather

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8. History suggests that bad weather is bad for the economy. For example, following the prolonged snowfall in December 2010, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) reported that the UK's gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 0.6% in the final quarter of 2010.<sup>8</sup> The ONS attributed most of this economic contraction to the severe winter weather.<sup>9</sup> Preparations to mitigate against the impact of winter weather are therefore crucial to the health of the UK economy.

### Forecasts

9. Accurate weather forecasts and timely warnings are a critical component in ensuring the transport sector is prepared for winter weather. The Met Office provides forecasts to the Government and to a number of transport infrastructure providers and operators. Some organisations also use private sector forecasters. Broadly speaking these groups are content with the accuracy and reliability of the forecasts they receive. However, we note that areas of potential improvement include the provision of better local forecasts and more accurate longer-term forecasts.<sup>10</sup>

10. One approach that is being used to improve local forecasting is to make use of local weather station data.<sup>11</sup> The Highways Agency and Heathrow Airport also have Met Office staff embedded within their operations during the winter period. The Highways Agency told us that this enables them to “send out targeted severe weather warnings and alerts to all interested stakeholders so that appropriate actions can be taken”.<sup>12</sup> Heathrow suggested that their on-site Met Office presence provides them with more accurate forecasting in advance of severe weather events.<sup>13</sup>

11. The ability of the Met Office to make more accurate longer-term forecasts was an issue we raised in our previous report. We recommended that the Government investigate the case for providing the Met Office with additional funding to improve its long-range forecasting capability. The Met Office subsequently received funding to invest in High Performance Computing, and further support from Government has been announced in the form of a new supercomputer as part of the capital spending round for 2015/16.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Office for National Statistics, [UK output, income and expenditure 4th quarter 2010](#), 25 February 2011

<sup>9</sup> Office for National Statistics, [UK output, income and expenditure 4th quarter 2010](#), 25 February 2011

<sup>10</sup> [WRT 016](#), Overview, [Institute of Advanced Motorists]; [WRT 020](#) [RAC Motoring Services]

<sup>11</sup> [WRT 012](#), para 9 [Department for Transport]; [WRT 013](#), para 2.2.2(d) [Highways Agency]; [WRT 017](#), para 2.2 [Transport for London]; and [WRT 021](#), para 3.4.1 [Devon County Council, Plymouth City Council, Torbay Council, Somerset County Council and Cornwall Council together with the Heart of the South West and the Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Local Enterprise Partnerships]

<sup>12</sup> [WRT 013](#), para 2.2.2(d) [Highways Agency]

<sup>13</sup> [WRT 027](#) [Heathrow]; and discussions during visit to Heathrow in relation to this inquiry

<sup>14</sup> [WRT 003](#), para 21 [Met Office]



## Proactive decision making

12. The reliance of the transport sector on accurate severe weather forecasts was tested recently during the ‘St Jude’ storm, which hit the UK in the early hours of Monday 28 October, bringing with it winds gusting up to nearly 100 mph. We heard that the forecasting by the Met Office and other weather forecasters in the run-up to the storm was very good and that it enabled transport infrastructure providers and operators to make timely preparations for the storm’s impact.<sup>15</sup>

13. For example, Network Rail took pre-emptive action the day before the storm, announcing that trains would not be allowed to run until the worst of the storm had passed by mid-morning on 28 October. This meant that morning rail services that day were cancelled across the south of England. In the aftermath of the storm, there were reports in the media of passengers accusing the rail industry of overreacting. We questioned Network Rail about whether their decision to cancel morning services was justified. Dave Ward, Route Managing Director for London and South East at Network Rail, strongly defended Network Rail’s decision. He told us that in some areas winds were in excess of 90 mph and the final tally of trees removed from the railway south of Peterborough was just short of 500. Network Rail’s decision potentially prevented catastrophic collisions between trains and fallen debris. Robert Goodwill MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department for Transport (DfT) agreed that “Network Rail made absolutely the right decision”.<sup>16</sup>

14. The ability proactively to cancel services is also important in aviation, particularly where airports operate at or close to full capacity. A key recommendation of the Begg report in 2011 was for Heathrow Airport proactively to declare a reduced capacity in advance of severe weather, thereby requiring airlines to amend their schedules and giving customers advanced notification of revised schedules. Andy Lord, Director of Operations at British Airways, told us that Heathrow’s past process to manage this, through the Heathrow Air Traffic Management Demand and Capacity Balancing group (HADACAB), was not effective.<sup>17</sup> This was largely due to the fact that Heathrow was unable to mandate capacity reductions in the same way that other airports in Europe could.<sup>18</sup>

15. However, in the run up to the ‘St Jude’ storm Heathrow used a trial process that it is operating during this winter to obtain agreement with airlines and other relevant parties to manage capacity proactively during an expected period of disruption. On Sunday 27 October Heathrow took a decision to cancel 131 flights on the day of the storm, thus providing passengers with notice of disruption ahead of them travelling to the airport.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Q 2 [Graham Dalton]; Q 10 [Dana Skelley]; Q 65 [James Colman]; Q 71 [Derek Provan]; Q 123 [Dave Ward]

<sup>16</sup> Q 44 [Robert Goodwill MP]

<sup>17</sup> Q 104 [Andy Lord]

<sup>18</sup> Q 104 [Andy Lord]

<sup>19</sup> [VRT 037](#) [Heathrow]

Fewer than 10 additional flights needed to be cancelled at Heathrow on the day of the storm itself.<sup>20</sup> This trial approach was commended by British Airways.<sup>21</sup>

**16. We support proactive decision making by the rail and aviation industries to reduce or cancel services in anticipation of a severe weather event. If used effectively, this approach will provide greater certainty to passengers and minimise the risk of passengers getting stranded away from home during severe winter weather.**

17. An alternative approach would be to reduce the number of flights scheduled to arrive in capacity constrained airports during the winter months. Heathrow told us that:

This year we have reallocated, from the winter to the summer season, 1,000 scheduled flights over the entire season. There is a capacity of 1,341 flights per day on average during the summer season and 1,279 flights per day during winter. We do not believe that there is further scope to reduce the winter schedule without damaging the range of flights and destinations available to passengers.<sup>22</sup>

Flights could also, in theory, be shifted from a capacity constrained airport such as Heathrow to another nearby airport such as Gatwick or Stansted. Gatwick airport advocated this approach whilst recognising that it is ultimately airlines not airports that decide where flights are flown to and from.<sup>23</sup> The Minister agreed that this was an operational matter for the airports.<sup>24</sup> **Our view is that the relocating of flights from one airport to another during the winter months is a commercial decision best left for the airlines but we encourage airports and airlines to discuss candidly relocation options and related issues.**

## Coordination

18. The resilience of one transport mode to winter weather may depend to some extent on the resilience of other modes. For example, if the rail and road connections to an airport are disrupted, operations at the airport might also be affected due to a lack of passengers and staff. It is therefore necessary for winter resilience plans to take into account the resilience of dependent modes of transport. There is also a need for coordination across boundaries of areas of responsibility, for example, between the Highways Agency and local authorities when dealing with the gritting of roads. Transport infrastructure providers and operators are aware of these issues and there is cross-sector planning and coordination in place.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> [WRT 037](#) [Heathrow]

<sup>21</sup> Q 68 [Andy Lord]

<sup>22</sup> [WRT 039](#) [Heathrow]

<sup>23</sup> Qq 76-77 [James Colman] and [WRT 028](#), para 5.4 [Gatwick Airport]

<sup>24</sup> Q 48 [Robert Goodwill MP]

<sup>25</sup> Q 31 [Graham Dalton]; Q 106 [Derek Provan]; Q 107 [James Colman]; [WRT 002](#), para 2 [Local Government Association]; [WRT 013](#), para 2.2.2 [Highways Agency]; [WRT 014](#), para 2.9 [Chartered Institution of Highways and Transportation]; and [WRT 019](#), paras 13 & 64 [National Task Force]

## Expenditure and oversight

19. We heard concerns that there may be a risk that reductions in local government expenditure could lead to poorer winter resilience of transport networks.<sup>26</sup> However, the RAC Foundation informed us that when it consulted with local authorities on their winter plans, “every authority [reported that] no cuts have been made to the winter service in the last two years, and none are scheduled. This gives confidence that the improvements of recent years should be maintained”.<sup>27</sup> The Minister added that local authorities have been provided with some additional funding, for example to address the issue of potholes.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, “despite the fact that local authorities are under a degree of pressure, they have not cut their salt stocks”.<sup>29</sup> Salt stocks are discussed in further detail in paragraphs 25-28.

20. The Quarmby Review noted that there has been little appetite among the public to spend more on winter resilience, given the relative infrequency of severe winters, and the generally short duration of their impact. Whilst recognising this, in our previous report on this subject we expressed sympathy with the argument that targeted additional investment would nonetheless be beneficial, particularly in areas where the cost of disruption is high. We identified a number of areas where extra investment could prove useful and in the following sections we set out progress made by the Government and others in achieving this.

## Rail

21. In our 2011 report we identified significant problems with the resilience of the ‘third rail’ system south of the Thames, whereby trains are provided with electricity from an additional rail laid alongside the track. Much of the network in Kent and Sussex runs through rural areas that are susceptible to heavy snowfall. We concluded that the Government should commit to the long-term aim of replacing the existing system with a more resilient form of overhead electrification.<sup>30</sup> Mr Ward told us that Network Rail had studied the cost of replacing the third rail system but that it would for the Government and the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) to decide whether the “billions of pounds” that it would cost would be a good use of public funds.<sup>31</sup> In the meantime, the rail industry’s National Task Force (NTF) explained that since 2009-10 Network Rail has invested over £52 million in winter resilience for the third rail network, including £29 million on conductor rail heating and £11.6 million on six new Snow and Ice Treatment Trains.<sup>32</sup> The NTF also noted that the benefits of converting the third rail DC system with overhead AC

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<sup>26</sup> Q 150 [Councillor Haines]; and [WRT 002](#), para 3 [Local Government Association]

<sup>27</sup> [WRT 006](#), para 29 [RAC Foundation]

<sup>28</sup> Q 56 [Robert Goodwill MP]

<sup>29</sup> Q 56 [Robert Goodwill MP]

<sup>30</sup> Transport Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2010-12, [Keeping the UK moving: The impact on transport of the winter weather in December 2010](#), HC 794

<sup>31</sup> Q 138 [Dave Ward]

<sup>32</sup> [WRT 019](#), para 29 [National Task Force]

supply were “much more to do with train performance and maintenance costs than with the impact it would have on performance during adverse weather”.<sup>33</sup> The Government acknowledged that there may be a case for replacing the third rail system in the longer term and informed us that Network Rail’s strategic business plan included plans for the conversion of the Southampton to Basingstoke route, which would help test the business case for a more comprehensive conversion scheme.<sup>34</sup>

***22. We welcome the progress made in improving the winter resilience of the third rail network south of the Thames. The conversion of the Southampton to Basingstoke route is a good first step towards upgrading the third rail network. The Government should push for this conversion to take place in the early part of Control Period 5 (2014-19) in order to allow time to evaluate the benefits and build a business case for a more comprehensive third rail conversion scheme in Control Period 6.***

## **Aviation**

23. Following the difficulties experienced at Heathrow during snowy weather in December 2010, we concluded that, while it was for the private sector to provide investment in winter resilience for airports, the DfT should play an active role in ensuring that the required investment was delivered. Specifically, we recommended that a senior official within the DfT have oversight of snow plans and other incident recovery plans at Heathrow and the UK’s other main airports.<sup>35</sup> In its response, the Government suggested that the Civil Aviation Authority would be better placed to provide the necessary oversight of airports’ resilience plans.<sup>36</sup> More recently the Government explained that:

The Civil Aviation Act 2012 received Royal Assent in December 2012, and allows the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to include operational resilience conditions within airport operators’ licences, which could place appropriate obligations on airport operators to prepare for adverse weather and compel them to develop resilience strategies in conjunction with all service providers at the airport.<sup>37</sup>

24. The CAA told us that new airport operators’ licences “would come into force on 1 April 2014 so will not have an effect this winter, but plans and processes should be in place by October 2014”.<sup>38</sup> James Colman, Director of Corporate Affairs at Gatwick Airport, explained that airport operators are working with the CAA “to try to make sure the intent

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<sup>33</sup> [WRT 019](#), para 22 [National Task Force]

<sup>34</sup> [WRT 012](#), para 18 [Department for Transport]

<sup>35</sup> Transport Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2010-12, [Keeping the UK moving: The impact on transport of the winter weather in December 2010](#), HC 794

<sup>36</sup> Transport Committee, Sixth Special Report of Session 2010-12, [Keeping the UK moving: The impact on transport of the winter weather in December 2010: Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2010-12](#), HC 1467

<sup>37</sup> [WRT 012](#), para 30 [Department for Transport]

<sup>38</sup> [WRT 026](#), para 5.4 [Civil Aviation Authority]

of the planned [licence] condition works in practice”.<sup>39</sup> **We will review progress on the impact of introducing operational resilience conditions into airport operators’ licences late in 2014.**

## Salt

25. Salt is used on roads and pavements to help prevent ice forming and snow settling. However, it is largely ineffective against deep snow and does not work at temperatures below approximately  $-10^{\circ}\text{C}$ . Problems with the supply and distribution of salt in winter 2009-10 were the main focus of the Quarmby Review. One of the key recommendations taken forward from the Review was for the Highways Agency to establish a strategic salt reserve that can be used as a last resort in the event that domestic salt supplies are unable to meet demand. It is widely acknowledged that the problem of insufficient salt stocks has been addressed. The Highways Agency told us that it continues to maintain strategic stockpiles “amounting to 425,000 tonnes, of which 120,000 tonnes (representing 6.7 capability days) are allocated for the strategic road network and around 305,000 tonnes held for local authorities”.<sup>40</sup> Local authorities also hold their own salt stocks. The Local Government Association (LGA) estimated that:

local authorities expect to hold a similar level of salt as last year (approximately 1.2 million tonnes) as we enter the winter season – nearly twice the 700,000 tonnes used in the 2011-12 winter and about the same amount as was used in the severe winter of 2010-11.<sup>41</sup>

26. In our previous report we called on the Government to ensure that strategic salt supply arrangements were more transparent to local authorities and that new guidance on salt spreading rates was followed. Progress in both areas was highlighted in the written evidence we received. Firstly, the LGA explained that “the DfT has issued a Strategic Salt Protocol Note to councils which sets out the arrangements for allocation of strategic salt, if and when required, including the price of salt”.<sup>42</sup> Secondly, the RAC Foundation informed us that many local authorities have reviewed their salt spread rates in conjunction with the national guidance.<sup>43</sup>

27. In early 2011, we also recommended that the Government publish a written statement on the outcome of its review of the strategic salt arrangements before the winter. The Government told us this year that it continues to publish an updated note on the DfT website (at the end of each October) which provides local highway authorities with details on how to access the strategic salt stockpile if it is required.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Q 116 [James Colman]

<sup>40</sup> [WRT 013](#), para 2.2.1 [Highways Agency]

<sup>41</sup> [WRT 002](#), para 10 [Local Government Association]

<sup>42</sup> [WRT 002](#), para 11 [Local Government Association]

<sup>43</sup> [WRT 006](#), para 20 [RAC Foundation]

<sup>44</sup> [WRT 012](#), para 7(b) [Department for Transport]

**28. It is widely acknowledged that the problem of insufficient salt stocks has been addressed. This is in part due to the establishment of a national strategic salt reserve, held by the Highways Agency. However, there is no room for complacency. The Government should continue to provide annual updates on how to access strategic salt stocks. In addition to this, the Highways Agency should organise annual dry runs with local authorities to ensure that they have an up-to-date practical understanding of how to access the reserves.**

29. While salt is commonly used to treat roads we heard that its use to treat pavements and cycle paths across the country is less widespread.<sup>45</sup> Councillor Mike Haines, Deputy Chair of the LGA Economy and Transport Board, told us that there was an order of priority in terms of routes that needed to be cleared and that the main highways would be first.<sup>46</sup> He added that local authorities were thinking innovatively about how to improve the resilience of pavements. For example, Brighton & Hove City Council have invested in a new ‘sit-on Unimog vehicle’ for clearing pavements.<sup>47</sup>

30. However, Living Streets, a charity that “stands up for pedestrians” told us that:

councils could do more to help organise teams of volunteer snow wardens. Research from Independent Age reveals that only 26% of people are aware of local residents clearing pavements in their area and only two per cent have seen the volunteer snow wardens which some councils have recruited to help clear ice and snow from streets.<sup>48</sup>

Historically, there were concerns that the public were reluctant to clear snow and ice outside their homes for fear of being sued if someone walking by slipped. The DfT told us that it continues to make the public and other organisations, including local authorities, “aware of” its Snow Code, published in October 2010, which reassures the public that they can clear snow and ice from the front of their houses, pavements and other public spaces “without fear of legal action”.<sup>49</sup>

**31. The Government should more actively publicise its Snow Code at the start of each winter, for example through a national advertising campaign highlighting that the public can clear snow and ice from outside their homes without fear of legal action and should consider doing so. We also recommend that the Government promote examples of good practice and innovation, such as the use by Brighton and Hove City Council of a sit-on vehicle for clearing pavements.**

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<sup>45</sup> [WRT 007](#), para 10 [Living Streets]; and [WRT 010](#), para 17 [Professor Greg Marsden and Jeremy Shires, Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds]

<sup>46</sup> Q 152 [Councillor Haines]

<sup>47</sup> Qq 152-3 [Councillor Haines]; [WRT 002](#), para 18.3 [Local Government Association]

<sup>48</sup> [WRT 007](#), para 11 [Living Streets]

<sup>49</sup> [WRT 012](#), para 13 [Department for Transport]

## 3 Passenger welfare and the provision of information

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32. Inadequate provision of information is a perennial issue raised by passengers whose journeys are disrupted by severe winter weather. Incorrect timetables or a lack of real time information about services can lead to unnecessary journeys at a time when people should stay at home. Such journeys compromise passenger welfare and may result in a greater burden on transport operators to take care of stranded passengers. This chapter follows up on the information and welfare issues raised in our previous report.

### Rail

33. We previously concluded that the rail industry needed to do far more to look after the interests of passengers during periods of disruption. In particular, we found weaknesses in the provision of real time information to passengers. The rail industry's National Task Force told us that the rail industry has made improvements to its passenger information processes.<sup>50</sup> For example "Network Rail is now able to pre-load 'off the shelf' pre-prepared contingency plans to National Rail Enquiries by 20:00 the evening before service to provide timely information to passengers about amended and cancelled services that will be running the next day".<sup>51</sup> We were also informed that the accuracy and consistency of information has been improved by the National Rail Enquiries' Darwin system, which "takes in a number of data feeds from industry systems before putting out one single version of train running information to all National Rail Enquiries channels, various apps and also some customer information screens at stations".<sup>52</sup>

34. Passenger Focus agreed that the provision of information at times of disruption was "heading slowly in the right direction", but it explained that:

we continue to see inaccuracies, inconsistencies and ambiguities at times of disruption, whether the cause is winter weather or not. A remaining weakness is the inability to give an accurate estimate of how long a disruption will last, even some hours into an incident, let alone an indication of how long knock-on delays will continue to affect journeys.<sup>53</sup>

Some of these weaknesses were apparent during the 'St Jude' storm. Reflecting on the lessons learnt from that event, Mr Ward, from Network Rail, suggested that the rail industry needed to look at how it plans the restoration of services. He said that in the aftermath of the storm restoration was good in most places but "in some places we were struggling for information about the status of networks. That flows through to what

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<sup>50</sup> [VRT 019](#), para 8 [National Task Force]

<sup>51</sup> [VRT 019](#), para 46 [National Task Force]

<sup>52</sup> [VRT 019](#), para 49 [National Task Force]

<sup>53</sup> [VRT 022](#), para 2.7 [Passenger Focus]

information you can give to passengers”.<sup>54</sup> Chris Burchell, Chairman of the National Task Force, added that “one of the major changes since the Committee last reported on winter resilience is that we have put in place a culture of continuous improvement”.<sup>55</sup> The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) agreed that the industry updates its plans annually and takes into account “developments in technology, changes to passenger needs and lessons learnt in the light of experience”.<sup>56</sup> ORR monitors performance to ensure that all parties fulfil their resilience obligations and plans to review the code of practice on the provision of information to passengers in 2014 in order to identify whether further improvements are required.<sup>57</sup>

***35. As part of its review into the code of practice on the provision of information to passengers, the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) should ensure that train operating companies develop more robust procedures to identify how long a period of disruption is likely to last and communicate this to passengers.***

## Aviation

36. The welfare of passengers during disruption is primarily the responsibility of airlines. We previously recommended that Heathrow and other airports should develop welfare plans for passengers during periods of disruption. We were pleased to hear that airlines now have an ‘Airline Welfare Protocol’ under their licence to operate at Heathrow and that passenger welfare is a key part of Gatwick’s snow plan, which is pre-agreed with airlines and airport partners on site.<sup>58</sup> We were also pleased to hear that the CAA and members of the British Air Transport Association airlines group have developed “a short, easy to understand leaflet on passenger rights which this group of airlines have agreed to distribute to passengers in the event of flight cancellations or long delays”.<sup>59</sup> However, until the airports experience an adverse weather event on the scale of the December 2010 disruption, it will be difficult to judge how effective these changes have been. Nonetheless, the CAA considers that the fact that there has not been a repeat of the major disruption in winter 2010-11, highlights the benefits of the improvements made by the aviation sector.<sup>60</sup>

37. That is not to say that the last two winters have been without problems. Faced with disruption due to snow in January 2013, one of the main concerns raised by passengers at the time related to the provision of information from airports and airlines. We received representations from members of the public, who reported a lack of basic communication to air passengers, closed information desks and unanswered help lines. We questioned witnesses from the aviation sector about whether they could guarantee that this situation would not be repeated this winter. In response, British Airways told us that it would

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<sup>54</sup> Q 134 [Dave Ward]

<sup>55</sup> Q 134 [Chris Burchell]

<sup>56</sup> [WRT 023](#), para 24 [Office of Rail Regulation]

<sup>57</sup> [WRT 023](#), para 24 [Office of Rail Regulation]

<sup>58</sup> Q 83 [Derek Provan and James Colman]

<sup>59</sup> [WRT 026](#), para 3.5 [Civil Aviation Authority]

<sup>60</sup> [WRT 026](#), para 4.1 [Civil Aviation Authority]



“depend on the nature of the event and the time at which it occurs”, but that the organisation had “considerably more resource” than previously.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, British Airways set out a number of measures it has put in place to improve the customer experience, including the use of mobile technology in airport terminals to allow staff to take the information to the passengers rather than have passengers waiting at desks.<sup>62</sup> Gatwick and Heathrow also committed to providing timely information to passengers and to using reserve staff and volunteers to assist passengers.<sup>63</sup>

38. Since the publication of our last report, the regulatory regime applying to airports has been updated so that it takes better account of the provision of information and passenger welfare in periods of disruption. As we previously explained, airport operators are working with the CAA to ensure that the new regime is workable (see paragraphs 23-24). A concern raised by Heathrow and Gatwick is that one of the requirements of the new regime is for these airports to make contact with all passengers. However, it is the airlines that have a relationship with passengers through the booking system. It would therefore be difficult for airports to make direct contact with passengers during periods of disruption. The airports are in discussion with the CAA about this issue.<sup>64</sup>

***39. The Civil Aviation Authority’s (CAA) emphasis on service quality for passengers during disruption is a good step in the right direction. The new airport licence conditions should strengthen the approach taken to build operational resilience. The new regime must be workable and we welcome the dialogue between the CAA and the airports. We invite the CAA to set out how it will evaluate the impact of the new licence conditions on passenger welfare, by Spring 2015. We also recommend that the CAA ensure that good practice on the provision of information and passenger welfare is shared across all UK airports.***

## Roads

40. The RAC Foundation’s recent winter resilience review, *Ploughing On*, concluded that the recommendations from the 2010 Quarmby Review and subsequent Audit have been “followed through in both England and Wales, and consequently there is now, in 2013, much greater resilience in the winter service provided by the highways authorities”.<sup>65</sup> The Foundation concluded that the main lessons are for all highway authorities to “maintain their present state of readiness and resilience, and to avoid complacency, especially if there is a succession of winters when extreme conditions are not experienced”.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore,

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<sup>61</sup> Q 84 [Andy Lord]

<sup>62</sup> [VRT 030](#), para 4.4-4.5 [British Airways]; we also saw a demonstration of British Airways’ mobile technology during our visit to Heathrow

<sup>63</sup> Qq 84-85 [James Colman and Derek Provan]

<sup>64</sup> Qq 114-117 [Derek Provan and James Colman]

<sup>65</sup> [VRT 006](#), para 45 [RAC Foundation]

<sup>66</sup> [VRT 006](#), para 61 [RAC Foundation]

the “progress with community engagement, communications and information, and partnership working” was greatly welcomed.<sup>67</sup>

41. However, we were reminded that “reducing demand on the network is critical to the success of winter operations” and that providing advance information to motorists was crucial.<sup>68</sup> In our previous report we recommended that greater use be made of roadside information displays and in-car information systems to provide motorists with real time information about road conditions and disruption. In the run-up to the ‘St Jude’ storm the Highways Agency made use of “big variable electronic signs” on the motorway, which carried messages warning that high winds were expected.<sup>69</sup> The Agency also makes use of news broadcasts, television and radio,<sup>70</sup> although Graham Dalton, Chief Executive of the Highways Agency, acknowledged that insufficient use had been made of social media.<sup>71</sup> Each year the Highways Agency also proactively communicates with motorists on winter preparedness. This is done through a number of key partners—including the AA, RAC, Institute of Advanced Motorists, Road Haulage Association, the Freight Transport Association, local authorities and airports—by delivering winter messages through websites, newsletters, posters and social media channels.<sup>72</sup>

42. Despite these improvements, the provision of information to the public remains a concern.<sup>73</sup> For example, the Institute of Advanced Motorists told us that information is:

not yet tailored to the individual needs of drivers. Blanket warnings about ‘essential’ journeys are of little value without a full definition of ‘essential’. Highways authorities should actively encourage feedback from drivers on local trouble spots and micro climatic conditions.<sup>74</sup>

43. *While we welcome the progress made by the Highways Agency on proactively communicating with motorists ahead of severe winter weather, there is a need for greater emphasis on the provision of accessible real-time information about road conditions and disruption. Such information is essential to prevent motorists getting stranded in their vehicles. We recommend that the Highways Agency initiate a review to:*

- i) *Investigate the barriers to providing comprehensive real-time information to drivers;*
- ii) *Identify technological and other solutions to providing real-time information, particularly during periods of disruption; and*

<sup>67</sup> [WRT 006](#), para 62 [RAC Foundation]

<sup>68</sup> [WRT 029](#), para 3.4 [Highways Term Maintenance Association]

<sup>69</sup> Q 20 [Graham Dalton]

<sup>70</sup> Q 20 [Graham Dalton]

<sup>71</sup> Q 20 & Q 37 [Graham Dalton]

<sup>72</sup> [WRT 013](#), para 2.2.2(f) [Highways Agency]

<sup>73</sup> [WRT 005](#), para 3 [RTIG]

<sup>74</sup> [WRT 016](#), para 7.1 [Institute of Advanced Motorists]

iii) *Develop a strategy for implementing these solutions across the strategic roads network.*

*The Highways Agency should provide us with an update on its progress ahead of winter 2014-15.*

## 4 Conclusion

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44. The last few winters demonstrated a lack of preparedness across all modes of transport in terms of infrastructure, resources, and looking after the interests of passengers. However, there are welcome signs of progress. **Both the Government and transport providers have taken steps to implement our recommendations and to learn lessons from their experience of previous winters. Embedding a culture of continuous review and improvement is vital to ensure that the robustness of transport networks improves year after year and to demonstrate the willingness of the transport sector to address further issues as and when they arise.** This is “one of the major changes” put in place by the rail industry since our last report was published in 2011.<sup>75</sup> In addition to reviewing the operational response to severe weather, the rail industry also reviews how well it delivered passenger information and any lessons learnt will follow through into individual company action plans.<sup>76</sup> We were pleased to hear that others, including the Highways Agency, Heathrow and Gatwick, have also embedded continuous improvement into their winter resilience plans.<sup>77</sup> The DfT also carries out a “thorough internal review” to learn lessons after every severe period of weather and explores cost-effective ways further to enhance winter resilience.<sup>78</sup>

45. **Continuous improvement must remain a priority for both Government and the transport sector, even if the weather this winter, and in the next few, is not severe. There is a risk that a few years of mild winter weather could lead to a false sense of security and reduce the sector’s preparedness over the longer term.**

46. Winter weather is about more than just snow, as illustrated by the ‘St Jude’ storm across southern England and the more recent storm across the north of the UK on 5 December, which saw winds gusting over 100 mph in Scotland, flooding in a number of coastal areas, the biggest tidal surge for decades, major disruption to transport, and thousands of homes without power. **The transport sector must continue to work closely with the Met Office and other forecasters to understand the challenges posed by different types of severe weather. Transport is vital to growth and a lack of preparedness has a direct impact on growth and on the economy as a whole. It is vital that the UK is ready and waiting for adverse weather and not taken by surprise.**

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<sup>75</sup> Q 134 [Chris Burchell]

<sup>76</sup> Q 134 [Chris Burchell]

<sup>77</sup> [WRT 013](#), para 2.2.3 [Highways Agency]; [WRT 027](#) [Heathrow Airport]; and [WRT 028](#), para 7.6 [Gatwick Airport]

<sup>78</sup> Q 42 [Robert Goodwill MP]

## Conclusions and recommendations

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1. We support proactive decision making by the rail and aviation industries to reduce or cancel services in anticipation of a severe weather event. If used effectively, this approach will provide greater certainty to passengers and minimise the risk of passengers getting stranded away from home during severe winter weather. (Paragraph 16)
2. Our view is that the relocating of flights from one airport to another during the winter months is a commercial decision best left for the airlines but we encourage airports and airlines to discuss candidly relocation options and related issues. (Paragraph 17)
3. We welcome the progress made in improving the winter resilience of the third rail network south of the Thames. The conversion of the Southampton to Basingstoke route is a good first step towards upgrading the third rail network. The Government should push for this conversion to take place in the early part of Control Period 5 (2014-19) in order to allow time to evaluate the benefits and build a business case for a more comprehensive third rail conversion scheme in Control Period 6. (Paragraph 22)
4. We will review progress on the impact of introducing operational resilience conditions into airport operators' licences late in 2014. (Paragraph 24)
5. It is widely acknowledged that the problem of insufficient salt stocks has been addressed. This is in part due to the establishment of a national strategic salt reserve, held by the Highways Agency. However, there is no room for complacency. The Government should continue to provide annual updates on how to access strategic salt stocks. In addition to this, the Highways Agency should organise annual dry runs with local authorities to ensure that they have an up-to-date practical understanding of how to access the reserves. (Paragraph 28)
6. The Government should more actively publicise its Snow Code at the start of each winter, for example through a national advertising campaign highlighting that the public can clear snow and ice from outside their homes without fear of legal action and should consider doing so. We also recommend that the Government promote examples of good practice and innovation, such as the use by Brighton and Hove City Council of a sit-on vehicle for clearing pavements. (Paragraph 31)
7. As part of its review into the code of practice on the provision of information to passengers, the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) should ensure that train operating companies develop more robust procedures to identify how long a period of disruption is likely to last and communicate this to passengers. (Paragraph 35)
8. The Civil Aviation Authority's (CAA) emphasis on service quality for passengers during disruption is a good step in the right direction. The new airport licence conditions should strengthen the approach taken to build operational resilience. The new regime must be workable and we welcome the dialogue between the CAA and

the airports. We invite the CAA to set out how it will evaluate the impact of the new licence conditions on passenger welfare, by Spring 2015. We also recommend that the CAA ensure that good practice on the provision of information and passenger welfare is shared across all UK airports. (Paragraph 39)

9. While we welcome the progress made by the Highways Agency on proactively communicating with motorists ahead of severe winter weather, there is a need for greater emphasis on the provision of accessible real-time information about road conditions and disruption. Such information is essential to prevent motorists getting stranded in their vehicles. We recommend that the Highways Agency initiate a review to:
  - i) Investigate the barriers to providing comprehensive real-time information to drivers;
  - ii) Identify technological and other solutions to providing real-time information, particularly during periods of disruption; and
  - iii) Develop a strategy for implementing these solutions across the strategic roads network.

The Highways Agency should provide us with an update on its progress ahead of winter 2014-15. (Paragraph 43)

10. Both the Government and transport providers have taken steps to implement our recommendations and to learn lessons from their experience of previous winters. Embedding a culture of continuous review and improvement is vital to ensure that the robustness of transport networks improves year after year and to demonstrate the willingness of the transport sector to address further issues as and when they arise. (Paragraph 44)
11. Continuous improvement must remain a priority for both Government and the transport sector, even if the weather this winter, and in the next few, is not severe. There is a risk that a few years of mild winter weather could lead to a false sense of security and reduce the sector's preparedness over the longer term. (Paragraph 45)
12. The transport sector must continue to work closely with the Met Office and other forecasters to understand the challenges posed by different types of severe weather. Transport is vital to growth and a lack of preparedness has a direct impact on growth and on the economy as a whole. It is vital that the UK is ready and waiting for adverse weather and not taken by surprise. (Paragraph 46)

# Formal Minutes

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## Monday 16 December

Members present:

Mrs Louise Ellman, in the Chair

Jim Dobbin  
Jim Fitzpatrick  
Jason McCartney

Mr Adrian Sanders  
Chloe Smith  
Graham Stringer

Draft Report (*Ready and waiting? Transport preparations for winter weather*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

*Ordered*, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 46 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

*Resolved*, That the Report be the Tenth Report of the Committee to the House.

*Ordered*, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

*Ordered*, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Monday 6 January 2014 at 4.00 pm]

## Witnesses

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The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the Committee's inquiry page at <http://www.parliament.uk/transcom>.

### Monday 28 October 2013

*Question number*

|  |        |
|--|--------|
| <b>Dana Skelley</b> , Director of Roads at Transport for London, Representing the Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning & Transport (ADEPT) and <b>Graham Dalton</b> , Chief Executive, Highways Agency; <b>Robert Goodwill MP</b> , Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Transport | Q1-41  |
| <b>Robert Goodwill MP</b> , Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Transport   | Q42-61 |

### Monday 11 November 2013

|  |          |
|--|----------|
| <b>Derek Provan</b> , Director Airside Operations, Heathrow Airport, <b>Andy Lord</b> , Director of Operations, British Airways, <b>James Colman</b> , Director of Corporate Affairs, Gatwick Airport and <b>Simon Buck</b> , Chief Executive, British Air Transport Association | Q62-121  |
| <b>Chris Burchell</b> , Chairman, National Task Force, <b>Dave Ward</b> , Route Managing Director for London and South East, Network Rail, and <b>Chris Scoggins</b> , Chief Executive, National Rail Enquiries  | Q122-143 |
| <b>Councillor Mike Haines</b> , Deputy Chair of the LGA Economy and Transport Board, Local Government Association, gave evidence.  | Q144-156 |



## Published written evidence

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The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the Committee's inquiry web page at <http://www.parliament.uk/transcom>. WRT numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Lincolnshire County Council (WRT 001)
- 2 Local Government Association (WRT 002)
- 3 Met Office (WRT 003)
- 4 Confederation Of Passenger Transport (WRT 004)
- 5 RTIG (WRT 005)
- 6 RAC Foundation (WRT 006)
- 7 Living Streets (WRT 007)
- 8 Virgin Trains (WRT 008)
- 9 UK Major Ports Group (WRT 009)
- 10 Prof. Greg Marsden (WRT 010)
- 11 ABTA - The Travel Association (WRT 011)
- 12 Department For Transport (WRT 012)
- 13 Highways Agency (WRT 013)
- 14 Chartered Institution Of Highways And Transportation (WRT 014)
- 15 Virgin Atlantic Airways (WRT 015)
- 16 Institute of Advanced Motorists (IAM) (WRT 016)
- 17 Transport For London (WRT 017)
- 18 MAG (WRT 018)
- 19 National Task Force (WRT 019)
- 20 RAC Motoring Services (WRT 020)
- 21 Devon County Council, Plymouth City Council, Torbay Council, Somerset County Council and Cornwall Council together with the Heart of the South West and the Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Local Enterprise Partnerships (WRT 021)
- 22 Passenger Focus (WRT 022)
- 23 Office Of Rail Regulation (ORR) (WRT 023)
- 24 Eurostar International Ltd (WRT 024)
- 25 Norfolk County Council (WRT 025)
- 26 Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) (WRT 026)
- 27 Heathrow Airport (WRT 027)
- 28 Gatwick Airport Ltd (WRT 028)
- 29 Highways Term Maintenance Association (HTMA) (WRT 029)
- 30 British Airways (WRT 030)
- 31 Association For Public Service Excellence (WRT 031)
- 32 British Transport Police (WRT 032)
- 33 BALPA (WRT 034)
- 34 Airport Operators Association (AOA) (WRT 036)
- 35 Heathrow Airport (WRT 037)
- 36 Department for Transport (WRT 038)
- 37 Heathrow (WRT 039)

- 38 Department for Transport (WRT 040)
- 39 National Union Of Rail, Maritime & Transport (RMT) (WRT 041)

# List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

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All publications from the Committee are available on the Committee's website at <http://www.parliament.uk/transcom>.

The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

## Session 2013–14

|                        |   |                           |
|------------------------|---|---------------------------|
| Tenth Report           | Ready and waiting? Transport preparations for winter weather  | HC 681                    |
| Ninth Report           | High speed rail: on track?  | HC 851                    |
| Eighth Report          | Access to ports   | HC 266                    |
| Seventh Report         | Local authority parking enforcement   | HC 118                    |
| Seventh Special Report | The new European motorcycle test: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report of 2009–10  | HC 656                    |
| Sixth Report           | Flight Time Limitation: Follow-up   | HC 641 (HC 795)           |
| Fifth Report           | Access to transport for disabled people   | HC 116 (HC 870)           |
| Fourth Report          | Cost of motor insurance: whiplash   | HC 117 (CM 8738, HC 902)) |
| Third Report           | The work of the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency (VOSA)   | HC 583 (HC 678)           |
| Second Report          | Future programme: 2013–14   | HC 438                    |
| Fifth Special Report   | The European Commission's 4 <sup>th</sup> Railway Package: Government Response to the Committee's Twelfth Report of Session 2012–13     | HC 439                    |
| Third Special Report   | Rail 2020: Rail Delivery Group and Passenger Focus responses to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2012–13                       | HC 81                     |
| Fourth Special Report  | Land transport security—scope for further EU involvement?: Government Response to the Committee's Eleventh Report of Session 2012–13    | HC 177                    |
| Second Special Report  | Marine Pilotage: Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2012–13   | HC 79                     |
| First Report           | Aviation strategy   | HC 78 (HC 596)            |
| First Special Report   | Cancellation of the InterCity West Coast franchise competition: Government Response to the Committee's Eighth Report of Session 2012–13 | HC 80                     |

## Session 2012–13

|                      |   |                 |
|----------------------|---|-----------------|
| Twelfth Report       | The European Commission's 4 <sup>th</sup> Railway Package   | HC 1001(HC 439) |
| Eleventh Report      | Land transport security—scope for further EU involvement?   | HC 875          |
| Ninth Special Report | Rail 2020: Government and Office of Rail Regulation Responses to the Committee's Seventh Report of 2012–13        | HC 1059         |
| Tenth Report         | The Coastguard, Emergency Towing Vessels and the Maritime Incident Response Group: follow up: Government Response | HC 1018         |

|                        |   |  |
|------------------------|---|--|
|                        | to the Committee's Sixth Report of 2012–13  |  |
| Ninth Report           | Marine Pilotage   | HC 840   |
| Eighth Report          | Cancellation of the InterCity West Coast franchise competition  | HC 537   |
| Eighth Special Report  | Plug-in vehicles, plugged in policy?: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2012–13   | HC 884   |
| Seventh Report         | Rail 2020   | HC 329   |
| Sixth Report           | The Coastguard, Emergency Towing Vessels and the Maritime Incident Response Group: follow up  | HC 647   |
| Fifth Report           | Future programme: autumn and winter 2012–13   | HC 591   |
| Fourth Report          | Plug-in vehicles, plugged in policy?  | HC 239   |
| Third Report           | Competition in the local bus market   | HC 10 (HC 761)<br>(Incorporating<br>HC 1861–i–iii) |
| Fifth Special Report   | Flight Time Limitations: Government Response To The Committee's First Report Of Session 2012–13   | HC 558   |
| Fourth Special Report  | Air Travel Organisers' Licensing (Atol) Reform: Government Response To The Committee's Seventeenth Report Of Session 2010–12                              | HC 557   |
| Second Report          | Road safety   | HC 506 (HC 648)<br>Incorporating HC 1738           |
| First Report           | Flight time limitations   | HC 164<br>Incorporating HC 1838                    |
| Third Special Report   | Sulphur emissions by ships: Government Response to the Committee's Sixteenth Report of Session 2010–12  | HC 87  |
| Second Special Report  | Counting the cost: financial scrutiny of the Department for Transport 2011–12: Government Response to the Committee's Fifteenth Report of Session 2010–12 | HC 15  |
| First Special Report   | Draft Civil Aviation Bill: Pre-Legislative Scrutiny: Government Response to the Committee's Thirteenth Report of Session 2010–12                          | HC 11  |
| <b>Session 2010–12</b> |   |  |
| Seventeenth Report     | Air Travel Organisers' Licensing (ATOL) reform  | HC 1798  |
| Sixteenth Report       | Sulphur emissions by ships  | HC 1561  |
| Fifteenth Report       | Counting the cost: financial scrutiny of the Department for Transport 2011–12   | HC 1560  |
| Fourteenth Report      | Cable theft on the Railway  | HC 1609 (HC 1933)                                  |
| Thirteenth Report      | Draft Civil Aviation Bill: Pre-Legislative Scrutiny   | HC 1694  |
| Twelfth Report         | Cost of motor insurance: follow up  | HC 1451 (HC 1934)                                  |
| Eleventh Report        | Thameslink rolling stock procurement  | HC 1453 (HC 1935)                                  |
| Tenth Report           | High Speed Rail   | HC 1185–I (HC 1754)                                |
| Ninth Report           | Out of the jam: reducing congestion on our roads  | HC 872 (HC 1661)                                   |
| Eighth Report          | Bus Services after the Spending Review  | HC 750 (HC 1550)                                   |
| Seventh Report         | Taxis and private hire vehicles: the road to reform   | HC 720 (HC 1507)                                   |

|                       |  |  |
|-----------------------|--|--|
| Sixth Report          | The Coastguard, Emergency Towing Vessels and the Maritime Incident Response Group  | HC 948, incorporating HC 752-i (HC 1482) |
| Fifth Report          | Keeping the UK moving: The impact on transport of the winter weather in December 2010  | HC 794 (HC 1467)                         |
| Fourth Report         | The cost of motor insurance  | HC 591 (HC 1466)                         |
| Third Report          | Transport and the economy  | HC 473 (HC 962)                          |
| Second Report         | Financial Scrutiny of the Department for Transport   | HC 683                                   |
| First Report          | Drink and drug driving law   | HC 460 (Cm 8050)                         |
| Tenth Special Report  | The proposal for a National Policy Statement on Ports: Government Response to the Committee Fifth Report of Session 2009–10                                    | HC 1598                                  |
| Third Special Report  | The performance of the Department for Transport: Government response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2009–10                                       | HC 549                                   |
| Second Special Report | Update on the London Underground and the public-private (PPP) partnership agreements: Government response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2009–10 | HC 467                                   |
| First Special Report  | The major road network: Government response to the Committee's Eighth Report of Session 2009–10  | HC 421                                   |