Transport CommitteeWritten evidence from Heathrow Hub Ltd (AS 80)


1. Heathrow Hub Ltd is pleased to have the opportunity of responding to the Committee’s Inquiry. To briefly describe our interest in the Government’s Aviation Strategy, the company is the promoter and developer of Heathrow Hub, a proposed multimodal integrated transport interchange, located on a site approx. 3.5km north of Heathrow’s Terminal 5—about the same distance as that between the existing T5 and T2 (currently under construction). The interchange, including an airport processor, would be located on the existing UK rail and motorway network, allowing passengers to seamlessly transfer between road, rail and the airport, check-in for their flight, pass through security and board a fast transit system taking them, (and, on a separate system, their baggage), directly to new and existing aircraft satellites located within Heathrow’s existing site.

2. By providing new terminal capacity outside the existing constrained airport site, (one of the smallest of any major international airport),1 more space is created for aircraft—the one activity that cannot move. It also enables the existing T5 (and proposed T2) “toastrack” satellite layout to be extended across the airfield, allowing more efficient airport operations, reducing environmental impacts and creating a better passenger experience.

3. London First concluded that Heathrow’s congestion and consequent lack of resilience is a result of its inefficient layout and constrained site, not just runway capacity.2 BAA similarly confirms that runways are only one element affecting capacity. 3

4. By creating space within the airfield to allow pre-sorting of departing aircraft by weight, and removing runway crossings, it may also be possible to achieve additional runway capacity and/or resilience. Research by NATS and the Smith Institute concluded a more efficient layout could allow increases in the runway service rate, reducing delays and potentially increasing capacity. 4

5. Rerouting HS2 via Heathrow Hub would additionally increase Heathrow’s capacity by allowing high-speed rail to replace short haul flights. This follows the success of European airport interchanges such as Schiphol, Frankfurt and Charles de Gaulle.

6. We were pleased to be invited to provide oral evidence at the Committee’s 2011 Inquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail. The Committee concluded, “The Government needs to make clear how HS2 fits into its wider aviation strategy” and recommended that “Government set out more clearly for comparison the costs and benefits of routing HS2 via Heathrow (and of making it the principal interchange to the west of London) so that there can be a better understanding of the pros and cons of different options.” 5

7. We believe that Heathrow Hub is relevant to the current Inquiry as it shows the benefits of the integrated, intermodal approach that has contributed to the success of continental airports and which is also mandated by EC policy. 6 This stands in stark contrast to the UK Government’s separate, silo planning of air and rail networks, highlighted by the decision to proceed with HS2 being taken before the Davies Commission on aviation capacity has even started its work.

8. The first phase of HS2 does not serve Heathrow directly, with airport passengers required to change trains to Crossrail at a remote interchange at Old Oak Common. In a possible second phase, perhaps by 2033, HS2 would connect to Heathrow via a spur (branch line). However, European experience clearly shows that, for modal shift and air/rail substitution to be effective, airports must be served by interchanges located directly on the through high speed line, allowing much higher service frequencies (essential for time-sensitive airport passengers). This is also a more efficient way of serving airports, since even major traffic generators like Heathrow would struggle to fill trains with airport traffic alone, at the frequencies required to be attractive to passengers and in numbers sufficient to generate adequate revenues to offset operating costs.

9. Oxford University’s Transport Studies Unit,7 Jim Steer,8 Greengauge 219 and indeed DfT10 all agree on this issue.

10. It therefore appears perverse that HS2 deliberately bypasses the world’s busiest international airport, (and perhaps the one most in need of capacity and environmental improvements).

11. By the time HS2 propose to develop a Heathrow spur, in 2033, Heathrow is forecast to be handling perhaps as many as 95 million terminal passengers per annum, a significant increase on current numbers of ca. 70m. Yet air quality around Heathrow already exceeds legal limits, whilst airline’s use of increasingly larger aircraft, (responsible for the forecast passenger increase), increases pressure on both the local road network and the airport’s operational efficiency.

12. As an example of the effect of this increase in Heathrow’s traffic, (whilst still restricted to two runways and a cap of 480,000 ATM’s (Air Transport Movements) per annum), an increase to 95 million passengers would result in a 41% increase in private road vehicles accessing Heathrow. This assumes public transport’s modal share would increase to 41.5%, following completion of Crossrail, (although the London Assembly’s report suggests that withdrawal of the existing Heathrow Express service, as proposed by Network Rail and following demolition of the Heathrow Express depot to allow construction of HS2), could reduce rail’s mode share of Heathrow passengers by 3%.11

13. The estimated increase in road traffic may also understate the real impacts of passenger growth since each return passenger journey by taxi or minicab actually generates double the number of road trips. 12

14. We therefore believe that Government’s current approach to aviation strategy both ignores the challenges presented by Heathrow’s short-term growth, and fails to adopt the necessary intermodal, integrated strategy necessary to ensure optimum long term planning.

Responses to the Committee’s Questions

Q1—What should be the objectives of Government policy on aviation?
(a) How important is international aviation connectivity to the UK aviation industry?

15. International connectivity is clearly vital to the UK aviation industry. In particular, Heathrow provides the UK with a unique asset, one of the world’s most important hub airports. We believe that it is essential that Government policy recognize the particular characteristics that have been responsible for Heathrow’s success, and the risks inherent in suggesting that these might easily be transplanted, replaced or duplicated elsewhere. Policy should therefore carefully consider issues such as airport catchment, connectivity, competitiveness, efficiency, environmental impacts and passenger experience, as well as the runway capacity issue that, to date, appears to have dominated the aviation debate.

(b) What are the benefits of aviation to the UK economy?

16. The connectivity that aviation provides is of vital, and growing importance to the UK economy in an increasingly competitive and connected global market. Whilst airlines have the benefit of the most mobile of assets, the UK, occupying a relatively peripheral location off the coast of North West Europe, is almost entirely reliant on aviation for its connectivity.

17. HS1 and the Channel Tunnel provide only limited access by rail from London and the South East to near-Europe, whilst the UK’s regions currently lack any current direct link to HS1. HS2 does include a link between HS2 and HS1. However, whilst providing a physical connection, it is intended to provide only a single track, shared over part of its length with existing North London Line freight and passenger services. Hence, it will provide only very limited capacity, effectively relegating the vast majority of the UK to a location at the end of a single track branch line from Europe.

18. The European airspace closure that followed the Eyjafjallajökull volcanic eruption in 2010 highlighted the need for resilience in the UK’s transport networks, and might reasonably be thought to influence a decision to ensure adequate rail capacity between the UK and Europe. There is speculation that another Icelandic volcano might erupt soon, potentially with far greater impacts.13

19. Within the UK’s aviation system, Heathrow occupies a unique position. It is the country’s single largest traffic generator,14 world’s busiest international airport,15 and UK’s only hub, directly contributing around 1% of GDP.16 Despite capacity constraints and recent route consolidation, it retains the highest business connectivity score amongst major European hubs,17 with Heathrow located on seven out of the top 10 business routes in the world.18 Together with the English language, legal system and time zone, it provides the UK with a significant competitive advantage.

20. Research consistently shows that access to Heathrow is one of the most important issues for UK regional economic competiveness,19 and a major factor in business location decisions.20 This was recognized by the Coalition Government’s first Secretary of State for Transport who emphasized the need to “think about the UK through the prism of Heathrow.”21

21. It therefore seems perverse that Government’s plans for HS2 will result in a passenger landing at Heathrow having a very different experience to one landing at Frankfurt, Schiphol or Charles de Gaulle airports. At these airports, the integrated railway station would show very frequent departures to a large number of domestic and international destinations. In contrast, Heathrow would require passengers to travel by Crossrail to Old Oak Common, where a change of trains would be required for destinations other than central London.

22. We do not believe that this provides a competitive and attractive offer today, when compared to the connectivity offered by Heathrow’s competitors, but the difference will be even greater in 2026 when HS2 is due to be completed.

23. By pursuing separate and disconnected strategies for air and rail, Government ignores the synergistic benefits to the UK economy of an integrated approach. The latest Secretary of State does appear to recognize the inherent flaws in pursuing air and rail strategies to entirely different timescales, stating that HS2 may need to be “adapted” once the recommendations of the Davies Commission were known.22 However, by the time the Commission reports, in late 2015, £0.75 billion of public monies will have been spent (by May 2015) on developing plans for HS2.23 There is therefore a real risk of abortive cost if HS2 does indeed require adaption to suit aviation policy.

24. For example, if growth is to take place at Heathrow, it would seem perverse to continue to propose to serve the airport by a remote interchange or spur, (branch line), off the main HS2 route. Alternatively, if Heathrow were to be replaced by a new hub airport to the east of London, then the proposed single track cross-London link between HS2 and HS1 would be clearly inadequate in terms of the surface access that would be required between the UK regions and a Thames Estuary airport.

(c) What is the impact of Air Passenger Duty on the aviation industry?

25. Whilst not claiming to be expert in the field of taxation, we suggest that it is important that Government consider this as part of the integrated policy framework that we believe is required to guide and assess transport strategy, and which should also include environmental, economic and spatial planning considerations. Clearly, as transport investment involves long term decision-making, spanning many Parliaments, there are significant benefits in achieving a cross-party consensus on these policy issues.

(d) How should improving the passenger experience be reflected in the Government’s aviation strategy?

26. Government’s silo planning approach ignores the need for a “whole-journey” approach to the passenger experience in an increasingly competitive global aviation market. Amadeus’s recent research24 highlighted passengers’ sensitivity to friction at each point in their journey, from home or work, via the airport access journey, through the airport and onto the aircraft. The optimum passenger experience can only be achieved by an integrated intermodal approach to transport planning, and the technologies used in, for example, ticketing, security and baggage handling.

27. Instead, projects appear to be brought forward by Government without proper consideration of the passenger experience. For example, Government’s proposed western rail access to Heathrow claims to allow access to Heathrow from South Wales,25 and the West and South West of England. However, this is unlikely to allow through trains from points beyond Reading, requiring passengers from further afield to change trains to reach the airport. It is therefore important to recognize the impact of interchange (and service frequency) penalties which BAA,26 Star Alliance27 and others28 recognise act as severe deterrents to passengers choosing rail for time sensitive, luggage laden airport access journeys. HS2 Ltd’s own research similarly confirms the particular sensitivity of airport passengers making international journeys.29

28. British Airways have also expressed concern that HS2’s apparent disregard of the impact of interchange penalties adversely affects the passenger experience30 whilst the Coalition’s first Secretary of State for Transport concluded that an interchange at Old Oak Common was “not an option.”31

29. The proposed connections between HS2 and Heathrow, whether via Old Oak Common or the proposed spur, clearly provide a sub-optimum passenger experience. It is surprising that this is seen as acceptable, particularly as HS2, (even using Government’s estimates), represents the UK’s largest ever investment of public monies in a single project,32 and one presumably designed to equip the UK to compete on a world stage well into the next century.

(e) Where does aviation fit in the overall transport strategy?

30. It is difficult to answer this question due to the lack of any overall transport strategy for the UK, as the Select Committee has repeatedly noted, for example, in its various Inquiries into Transport and the Economy,33 High Speed Rail34 and DfT.35

31. The documents accompanying Government’s January 2012 decision to proceed with HS2 suggest that DfT’s Business Plan provides the necessary strategic context within which to examine transport projects.36 However, this simply contains a list of projects, with a brief summary of the Coalition Governments priorities.37

32. The HS2 decision documents also refer to the need for “co-ordination of the National Infrastructure Plan, the Growth Review and National Policy Statements—the national networks statement in particular relates to HS2.”38 This is consistent with HS2 Ltd’s assumptions, at an early stage in their developing proposals for high speed rail, that a national strategy would be necessary to provide a context within which HS2 could be properly considered—the expectation being that this would take the form of a National Policy Statement on national networks.39 However, at the time of writing, the National Networks National Policy Statement does not appear to have been published, even in draft for consultation.40

33. We suggest that there continues to be an urgent need for a national transport strategy, and that this should be subject to proper democratic scrutiny, leading to a cross-party consensus on both strategy and funding before aviation and rail proposals are then assessed. This appears better aligned with the recommendations of the Eddington study than the current approach.41

34. It is also increasingly critical when HS2 Ltd. is progressing against a background of considerable scepticism, absent of any aviation strategy and where increasingly large sums of public money are being spent.

35. Significant investment is also proposed for other transport projects, despite the lack of any overall strategy or apparent scrutiny. For example the proposed western rail access to Heathrow, included in the 2012 HLOS, requires £0.5 billion of public money,42 when its benefits are unclear, and there is the possibility of a requirement for ongoing revenue support. In addition the project is only required as HS2 Ltd. admitted ignoring their specific remit43 to consider access to Heathrow from the west in developing HS2.44

36. We suggest that a UK transport strategy should adopt the principles of EC intermodal policies, as set out in the European Commission’s 2011 White Paper.45 The benefits of this approach are made clear in various non-technical documents published by the Commission,46 and illustrating in particular the benefits arising from integration of high-speed railways and major airports at, for example, Frankfurt, Schiphol and Charles de Gaulle.

Q2—How should we make the best use of existing aviation capacity?
(a) How do we make the best use of existing London airport capacity? Are the Government’s current measures sufficient? What more could be done to improve passenger experience and airport resilience?

37. London airport capacity is only an issue in terms of Heathrow, which requires a long-term strategic and deliverable approach to ensure the UK’s future hub capability. A hub requires a dominant base carrier, with a critical mass of slots, feeding long haul flights with an extensive short haul network, offering competitive frequencies and connection times through co-ordinated “waves” of arriving and departing flights. In the UK, only Heathrow provides such capacity and functionality.

38. We do not believe that Government’s current measures are sufficient to ensure that Heathrow can continue to provide this capability. The lack of an integrated approach to air and rail strategy exacerbates the challenge, preventing HS2 from delivering the very significant potential capacity benefits that air/rail substitution could deliver in the short-medium term, replacing short haul domestic and near-Europe flights and releasing capacity for long haul services to support economic competitiveness and enhance the UK’s global connectivity.

39. Air/rail substitution has been claimed as a benefit of HS2.47 However, an optimum solution is unlikely because of the way in which HS2 has been planned, without representation from the UK aviation industry48 or acceptance of the industry’s clear recommendations49 (perhaps in part because the response of Heathrow’s airline representatives to Government’s HS2 consultation was one of those found to have been mislaid and not therefore considered prior to the Secretary of State’s decision).50

40. Government appears to acknowledge the benefits of air/rail substitution. For example, last year’s aviation consultation stated that “in the longer term, much of the demand for domestic aviation and for near-European short-haul aviation could be met by high speed rail.”51

41. However, the proposed spur serving Heathrow as a branch off the main HS2 line is, we believe, unlikely to ever be built, due to its high cost, and lack of any conceivable business case (with viability dependent on airport traffic alone generating load factors sufficient to justify the high service frequency necessary to attract time-sensitive airport passengers). In addition, Heathrow’s competitiveness may well be severely weakened long before 2033, making the cost of a spur, and the loss of HS2 capacity, difficult to justify.

42. Even if built, a spur would not be completed until 2033, when Heathrow requires urgent, short-term measures to increase capacity and resilience. And even if the spur was brought forward to phase 1 of HS2, this would provide only a north facing junction with the main HS2 line, allowing trains to only serve Birmingham and the north. It would not therefore be possible to replace short haul European flights with rail until and unless the spur was extended to form the loop that HS2 propose (at an even later date than 2033).

43. Government estimates the cost of a spur at between £2.5 billion–£3.9 billion,52 with an expectation that at least part of the cost of a spur would be met by users53 , 54 (presumably referring to airlines through Heathrow’s user charges). Any significant contribution appears unlikely, however, in view of Heathrow already having the 4th highest user charges in the world,55 and the concerns already expressed by the airport56 and airlines.57 If a spur is, in due course, indeed found not to be fundable, viable or otherwise deliverable, Heathrow would be condemned to reliance solely on a remote interchange at Old Oak Common.

44. Even if airlines did agree to the necessary funding contributions, (potentially including revenue support for train services over the spur), this would significantly increase the RAB,58 which, together with HS2’s phasing, could place Heathrow at a significant competitive disadvantage.59 In contrast, locating a Heathrow interchange on the through high speed line, in the first phase of HS2 as proposed by Heathrow Hub, allows very significant benefits, enabling the earliest possible modal shift from both air and road to rail.60

(b) Does the Governments current strategy make the best use of existing capacity at airports outside the south east? How could this be improved?

45. Regional airports, and indeed many South East airports, have very significant spare capacity. Making better use of such capacity appears is clearly a commendable objective. This could, for example, reduce the pressure on capacity constrained airports, improve regional connectivity and increase customer choice.

46. However, it is less clear how this could be achieved. Historic data shows that regional—and some South East—airports have suffered a steady decline in traffic. Whilst Heathrow grew 3.9% between 2001 and 2011, (from 458,000 to 476,000 ATM’s), Manchester declined 15.2% (182,000–158,000 ATM’s), Stansted declined 9.2% (151,000 to 137,000) and Birmingham declined 24.3% (111,000–84,000 ATM’s).61

47. The result is that the UK’s regional airports have very substantial spare capacity. However, this is a result of airlines, operating in a free and highly competitive market and with the benefit of the most mobile of assets, choosing to use these assets in other markets, whether elsewhere in the UK or overseas. This reflects network airlines increasingly focusing on major hub airports, leaving regional airports served mainly by point to point or interline services.

48. European hubs also follow this pattern, and explain major airport’s growing focus on maximizing the size of their catchment, and reaching markets with the highest propensity of people to fly, in order to fill increasingly large aircraft on long haul services at commercially attractive yields.

49. It may be that airline economics change as a result of the long range and fuel efficiency of the new generation of mid-size aircraft, for example the B787 “Dreamliner.” However, it would be a significant risk to the UK’s future hub capability if attempts were made to distort market forces, and actively seek to weaken Heathrow by diverting growth to other airports. Reducing Heathrow’s competitiveness may not strengthen other UK airports.

50. Government in any case has only a very limited ability to influence airline’s commercial decisions, perhaps through differential taxation or financial subsidy as means of seeding otherwise uneconomic services to meet wider policy objectives.

51. Historically, the UK has only been willing to consider very limited interventions, through imposing a PSO (Public Service Obligation) on carriers to operate specific services in remote areas and in return for financial compensation (subsidy). Other European countries appear to have taken a very different approach, with extensive use of PSO-type subsidies on domestic scheduled air services.62 It is however difficult to see that such an approach is either practical or beneficial. Instead, effort should be directed to improving access to, and the efficiency and capacity of successful international gateways.

(c) How can surface access to airports be improved?

52. Airport surface access should be considered as part of an integrated intermodal strategy, with particular attention to the overall passenger experience, rather than as separate road and rail projects in isolation. It is also important to consider surface access, not only in terms of modal shift from road to rail, but also in terms of its potential to increase UK regional competitiveness through improved access to global markets, and to enable air/rail substitution.

53. Improving surface access to Heathrow would particularly enhance hub operations.63 This is also increasingly important as the combination of fewer domestic air routes and the legacy of poor or non-existent rail surface access isolate Heathrow from markets64—adversely affecting the UK’s regions connectivity with global markets,65 regional competiveness66 and inward investment.67

54. One significant benefit of the UK coming late to decisions on airport capacity and high speed rail is the ability to learn from European examples and transport policy. These lessons do not appear to be reflected in current Government plans for HS2, western access to Heathrow and other projects.

Q3—What constraints are there on increasing UK aviation capacity?
(a) Are the Government’s proposals to manage the impact of aviation on the local environment sufficient, particularly in terms of reducing the impact of noise on local residents?
(b) Will the Government’s proposals help reduce carbon emissions and manage the impact of aviation on climate change? How can aviation be made more sustainable?

55. As discussed earlier, we suggest that an intermodal strategy, specifically designed to enable modal shift in airport access journeys from road, is essential, not only to provide a platform for forecast growth but to enable current operations within legally binding air quality limits. In addition, measures should be taken, particularly at constrained airports such as Heathrow, to reduce environmental impacts by improving operational efficiency, for example, removing runway crossings, reducing taxiing distances, minimizing holding time for aircraft on the ground68 and increasing the number of pier served stands.

(c) What is the relationship between the Government’s strategy and EU aviation policies?

56. Whilst Government’s strategy appears to be broadly aligned with EU transport aviation policies generally, we do not believe that it provides the intermodal approach that is specifically required by European transport policy.

Q4—Do we need a step-change in UK aviation capacity? Why?
(a) What should this step-change be? Should there be a new hub airport? Where?

57. Advocates of a step-change increase in capacity appear to focus largely on an unfavourable comparison of Heathrow’s two runways with Frankfurt and Charles de Gaulle’s four runways, and Schiphol’s six. We believe this is highly misleading and only partly relevant to the real issues of capacity and demand.

58. By comparison, there has been relatively little debate on a proper assessment of the extent to which Heathrow’s capacity constraints suppress demand. Frontier Economics 2011 “Connecting for Growth” report for BAA69 is therefore helpful in comparing Heathrow’s capacity and demand with its European competitors;

“Another way to think about Heathrow’s potential is to consider what it would look like if it was not capacity constrained at all. Paris Charles de Gaulle provides a useful benchmark for this thought exercise, since Paris and London are comparable as global centres (albeit of different economic scale) and have similar geographical locations. The difference is that Heathrow is capacity constrained whereas Charles de Gaulle is not. If Heathrow could fulfil its potential it might operate on a similar scale relative to the London economy as Charles de Gaulle does relative to Paris. We have assessed this by comparing the ratio of long-haul seats flown relative to GDP of the city. Charles de Gaulle flies 81 long haul seats per million EUR of Paris GDP. Heathrow flies only 68 long haul seats per million EUR of London GDP. If Heathrow could achieve a similar seat to GDP ratio, this would imply 31 million long haul seats out of Heathrow each year instead of 26 million; an uplift of 18%.”

59. BAA suggest that air/rail substitution could release between 45,000–91,000 ATM’s.70 The higher of this range is equivalent to a ca. 18% increase in Heathrow’s capacity, exactly the shortfall suggested above. This would increase passenger numbers from ca. 70 million pa currently to ca. 113 million passengers pa (assuming BAA’s forecast of 198 passengers per ATM (Air Transport Movement) by 2030.71 This is equivalent to 87% of the additional capacity that a third runway was forecast to provide (ca. 130 million passengers pa).

60. In addition, there is evidence that growth, particularly in business travel, is slowing, with a 25% decline in business flights since 200072—perhaps reflecting cost cutting, increasing availability of teleconferencing but also initiatives such as WWF’s One in Five campaign that seeks to reduce businesses carbon emissions.73 This suggests that there may not be a case for the drastic step-change in airport capacity that is suggested by the Mayor.

61. Clearly, there must be a direct relationship between demand, a function of an airport’s catchment, and the capacity required to meet that demand. This is illustrated by actual numbers of ATM’s, (Air Transport Movements), at Heathrow’s European competitors, which are within a much narrower range than runway capacity alone might suggest. For example, in 2011, Heathrow handled 476,197 ATM’s,74 Schiphol 420,249,75 Frankfurt 487,16276 and Charles de Gaulle 514,059.77

62. Whilst Heathrow is constrained by number of runways, its competitors also have their own constraints whether as a result of local noise controls (as at Schiphol)78 or configuration of runways (eg; Schiphol79 or Charles de Gaulle).80

63. The importance of a large catchment, with a high propensity to fly, is seen in the importance attached, and investment in, surface transport infrastructure at Heathrow’s competitors. These have led to integrated air/rail interchanges, located on through high speed and classic rail routes rather than branches or spurs, allowing high frequency services to a wide range of destinations. Schiphol (33m people accessible by rail within 200km)81 Frankfurt, (35m within 200km)82, Charles de Gaulle and Brussels, see a commercial imperative in expanding their markets by direct connection to both classic and high speed rail services serving a cross-border hinterland.83 In Belgium, Infrabel’s Project Diabolo has converted the former spur serving Brussels airport into a new through high speed line between France, Germany and the Netherlands, solely in order to improve connectivity.84

64. Meanwhile, in the UK, 11.5% of Heathrow’s UK origin and destination passengers come from the local area of Berkshire and Buckinghamshire, whereas only 2.8% come from the major conurbations of Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield, Newcastle, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Cardiff and Bristol combined.85 Bristol, only 90 miles west and in what should be Heathrow’s core market, instead sees 10,000 passengers a week interline through competing European hubs.86

65. European experience is clear87 and demonstrates the benefits of airport interchanges directly located on high speed rail lines.88 Direct interchanges assist in expanding airport catchments89 and encourage modal shift to rail.90 Interchanges in an airport access journey act as a very significant deterrent to rail use91 and appear contrary to the intent of European transport policy.92

66. We suggest that a detailed analysis of the impact of improved surface access to Heathrow, and the effect on both capacity (modal shift from air to rail) and demand, (increasing the airport’s catchment), is a necessary first step in accurately assessing the UK’s hub airport capacity.

67. Expanding Heathrow’s market catchment by better surface access would also maintain the feeder and transfer traffic that is essential to sustain high frequencies of flights serving a wide range of destinations.93 This would also protect the viability of hub operations in a competitive market by providing economies of scale94 and supporting higher yields.95 Frankfurt’s experience demonstrates how such intermodality strengthens an airport’s hub function,96 and which could be replicated at Heathrow.97

68. It would additionally assist the UK’s competitiveness,98 increasingly important as the combination of a declining number of domestic air routes serving Heathrow, and the legacy of poor or non-existent rail surface access to the country’s hub, increase the peripherality of UK regions.

69. A separate exercise is required to model catchment and demand for any new hub airport locations. This should also consider the potential impact on the UK economy, where economic success is a result, at least in part, of proximity to Heathrow. For example, the Thames Valley ranks 7th in Europe for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita,99 contains the European HQ of 11 of the top 30 global brands, has the UK’s highest density of IT professionals and generates £30 billion annual output (19% of the South East).100

70. It seems likely that at least some businesses would re-consider their future in the Thames Valley if the UK’s hub airport was no longer readily accessible. An Isle of Grain site for a new airport, for example, would be ca. 160km from Reading, (measured as a straight line distance). In reality, access would either require circumnavigation of the M25 motorway, adding time and uncertainty, or by the new orbital rail link proposed by the Foster scheme.101 Even assuming that, as the scheme report suggests, “up to 60% of airport passengers will arrive using fast, frequent services from across the country,” the remaining 40% of the 150 million passengers envisaged as using the airport would presumably rely on road access. It is difficult to see how the South East’s road network could accommodate this amount of additional traffic.

71. Some businesses may choose to relocate to be closer to any new airport—but some may relocate elsewhere in Europe, particularly as the Thames Estuary does not offer the skilled labour pool, easy access to UK regional markets or attractive living environment that the Thames Valley and surrounding areas offer.

72. There is evidence of real damage already being inflicted on the UK economy as a result of the way in which transport strategies are being developed. Merely the suggestion that Heathrow might be closed or downgraded is already proving to have a severely detrimental effect on potential inward investment in the Thames Valley.102

73. Equally important, but more difficult to quantify, are the impacts on long term investment decisions by businesses currently located in the UK and dependent on Heathrow’s unique connectivity, and by airlines, who are of course able to make global decision on employment of scarce and valuable assets.

74. The Mayor appears now to suggest that Heathrow could remain open following development of a new hub airport, abeit downgraded to a “single runway, premium leisure” airport.103 Setting aside the question of the Mayor’s powers to specify the layout, capacity and market segment of Heathrow, this raises the question of which airlines would therefore choose to leave Heathrow.

(b) What are the costs and benefits of these different ways to increase UK aviation capacity?

75. Government’s current planning approach makes it almost impossible to compare alternative ways of increasing capacity. Without an integrated intermodal approach, it is, for example, impossible to properly assess the benefits of an HS2 route directly via Heathrow, in terms of enabling air/rail substitution, releasing airport capacity, or expanding the airport’s catchment.

76. There are many factors that fall to be considered in assessing the costs and benefits of proposals for new airport capacity.

77. If Heathrow, with its excellent location and established market, can only support ca. 18% additional capacity, it is extremely doubtful that a new airport to the east of London, with a much poorer location relative to UK markets, and a much smaller catchment area, (effectively halved as a result of its coastal location), could be economically viable, (even if Heathrow were to be closed or downgraded).

78. Instead, Heathrow Hub provides the necessary capacity increase to maintain Heathrow’s competitiveness and the UK’s global connectivity. The direct connection which we propose between Heathrow and the high speed rail network allows rail to replace short haul domestic and European flights, releasing ca. 18% of Heathrow’s capacity for new long haul routes.

79. In addition, BA’s recent acquisition of Bmi also effectively increases Heathrow’s capacity, providing BA with 46 additional daily slot pairs, some of which, serving formerly duplicated routes, allow new destinations to be served.

80. It is clear that an entirely new airport east of London, as promoted by the Mayor, would suffer from a number of major disadvantages. Its catchment area would be inevitably reduced by perhaps 50%, simply as a result of its coastal location resulting in half its hinterland being in the sea. Its remaining catchment would be far less attractive to airlines, since it lacks the range and density of business that has, over time, been attracted to areas around Heathrow.

81. In addition, the cost of a new airport would be so great, even assuming the public purse meets the £30 billion cost of road and rail access identified by the Mayor, that airline user charges would be likely to be far higher than Heathrow’s. The airport’s Regulated Asset Base of £13.8 billion at December 2011 generates the 4th highest user charges of any airport in the world. A new airport costing ca. £20 billion would be likely to be the most expensive airport in the world for airlines to use, inevitably needing to be reflected in fare increases which, together with the relative inaccessibility of the airport, would lower demand.

82. If Heathrow were to be closed or downgraded, in order to improve the viability of a new airport, the UK could suffer a catastrophic decline in GDP if businesses dependent on ease of access to global markets choose to relocate overseas, rather than to a new Thames estuary location. The impact could be particularly severe on South Wales and regions such as the South West, which are already remote from Heathrow, but whose peripherality would be further increased if Heathrow were to close.

83. The likely result of Heathrow’s closure would be passengers choosing, for reasons of cost and convenience, to fly from regional airports to interline at mainland Europe hub airports. Far from the UK gaining new hub airport capacity, the result could be the loss of a UK hub airport altogether.

84. Alternatively, if Heathrow remained open, as the Mayor now suggests, then it is impossible to envisage a scenario where Heathrow’s existing airlines would choose to relocate to a new airport, remote from markets and with very high user charges. It is also difficult to see new airline entrants to UK markets establishing a scale of operations adequate to justify the cost of a new airport, as well as its surface access and associated infrastructure.

85. This is particularly the case where new entrants are more likely to have a low cost, point to point business model, rather than that of a legacy network carrier. Only the latter require a very high capacity—and high cost—hub model, able to support the waves of incoming and departing aircraft at peak periods.

86. A Thames Estuary airport therefore faces severe challenges, even before issues of, for example, airspace design, environmental impact and birdstrike are considered.

87. It is also, we believe, highly unlikely that any alternative proposal for a totally new airport on an inland site, requiring less new infrastructure and located closer to markets, is deliverable in the context of increasingly onerous statutory designations to protect landscape and habitats and a growing public awareness of, and sensitivity to, environmental issues. It is also relevant that attempts to create dual hubs in the UK have not been successful, as seen in BA’s attempt to integrate operations between Heathrow and Gatwick.

88. Yet another proposal has been made for “Heathwick”, connecting Heathrow and Gatwick by a dedicated high speed railway paralleling the M25, to allow both airports to operate together as a single unified hub.104 In addition to the vast capital and operating cost of a railway serving airport passengers alone, and its environmental impact, it is difficult to see how linking two capacity constrained airports, some 45 miles apart, could offer additional capacity or compete with, for example, the attractive 30 minute airside connections offered between flights at competing European hubs.

89. We do not therefore believe that there are credible alternative proposals to retaining Heathrow as the UK’s hub airport.

90. Proposals for additional capacity in the form of a “third runway” outside the existing airport, whether at Sipson, as promoted by BAA, or Northolt,105 as now suggested, also face very serious challenges, particularly in exposing entirely new areas to aircraft noise as described earlier. We believe that the political sensitivity of this issue, as well as the seriousness of the environmental impacts, makes such proposals effectively undeliverable and, to a significant extent, is responsible for recent support for a new airport to the east of London.

19 October 2012

1 Heathrow site area 1227ha compared to Charles de Gaulle’s 3309ha and Schiphol’s 2147ha—Heathrow Airport Interim Masterplan, BAA June 2005

2 “Delays caused by airport operations, (lack of gates etc), accounted in 2006–07 for eight percentage points of the 33% of flights which were delayed. Even when controlling for congestion in air traffic with respect to runways (ATM’s per runway), the proportion of delays at Heathrow is relatively high”—p. 20/21, Imagine a World Class Heathrow, London First, June 2008

3 “We’re getting to the point where we can’t maintain the movement rate, not because we can’t use the runway but because we don’t have the taxiways”—Richard Smith, BAA, Air & Space Magazine, 1 January 2007

4 “The lack of space for taxiways due to the restricted size of Heathrow means that it is usually impossible to re-order aircraft before they reach the runway holding points. The physical holding point structure is an important constraint on the departure system at Heathrow as it determines both how much reordering is possible in the holding point and the cost of achieving the reordering in terms of pilot and controller time and effort. By better control, a decrease in the delay of between 10% and 25% is possible”—Departure runway scheduling at Heathrow airport, Atkin, Burke, Greenwood and Reeson 2004

5 High Speed Rail, Tenth report of session 2010–12, House of Commons Transport Committee, November 2011

6 “Better choices will result from greater integration of the modal networks: airports, railway, metro and bus stations should increasingly be linked and transformed into multimodal connection platforms for passengers. Airport Capacity Initiatives—develop an approach to deal with future capacity problems including better integration with the railway network”—White Paper, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area—Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system, European Commission 2011

7 “For rail to be a viable alternative to the aircraft, and an alternative to the car to get to/from the airport, airports, certainly the main one, must have a station on the line, not a spur from it. Viewed from a rail planning perspective, with currently over 40 million non-transfer passengers a year needing to travel to/from it, it is hard to understand how a ‘city’ like Heathrow might be bypassed”—Dr Moshe Givoni, Oxford University Transport Studies Unit, The House, Parliament’s Weekly Magazine, 31st January 2011

8 “The key really, as far as we could see from what has happened in France, is to make the airport station a station call en route”—Q147, evidence by Jim Steer, Director, Greengauge 21 to Commons Transport Select Committee, 11 November 2009

9 (Through) “services will have high load factors because they are connecting a number of different markets. Their usage is not dependent on the single market at Heathrow, and their load factors and overall economics will be attractive. They will justify their place on the highly valuable capacity offered by the national HSR network in a way that far fewer services would do if they were just to serve Heathrow on a spur”—The Heathrow Opportunity, Greengauge 21 2010

10 “The interchange with Heathrow should be considered as through services will not be able to run from all points, both because demand would not be sufficient and because every Heathrow train would take a path on the new line which could be used for London bound trains”—DfT New Line Capacity Study—Cost Estimate July 2007

11 “It is currently unclear what level of modal shift a completed Crossrail is likely to provide, although a one per cent increase in mode share has been suggested. HAL has estimated that withdrawal of the Heathrow Express service would reduce the rail mode share by 3%”—Plane Speaking: Air and Noise Pollution around a growing Heathrow Airport, March 2012

12 “61% of passenger travel emissions are generated by kiss & fly, taxi and minicab journeys which all generate four trips per return flight”—Heathrow Carbon Footprint & Surface Access Strategy, BAA 2009

13 “Katla’s eruption in 1918 produced five times as much ash as the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull one”—

14 “London Borough of Hillingdon UDP Adopted September 1998


16 “Heathrow contributes 0.9% of the UK’s GDP—significantly more than any other single site in the UK”—Heathrow Expansion, London Assembly 2005

17 Aviation Services and the City, 2011 Update, York Aviation for the City of London Corporation—

18 The Future of Aviation—First report of Session 2009-10, House of Commons Transport Committee—

19 “The UK regions are at a major disadvantage in terms of access from major world markets. This hampers the ability to attract inward investment and regional economic growth”—Economic Impacts of Hub Airports, British Chambers of Commerce 2009

20 Heathrow “is vital to the UK’s competiveness: easy access to Heathrow is often a major factor for businesses in deciding where to locate”—DfT Factsheet Connecting to Heathrow, 2011

21 “It is clear to me that faster and simpler connectivity to a location is vital, particularly for inward investors. In places like Manchester and Leeds it may not be the way you like to think about it, but the reality is that for most people outside the UK they think about the UK through the prism of Heathrow. That is how they arrive. The question is not, ‘Where is it?’ The question is, ‘How long does it take for me to get there from Heathrow?’”—Philip Hammond, Oral Evidence to Transport Select Committee, 13 September 2011

22 Evening Standard, 27 September 2012

23 John Redwood, 24 January 2012

24 Reinventing the airport ecosystem, Amadeus May 2012–-reinventing-the-airport-ecosystem-2/

25 “The UK Government’s focus goes beyond single nations; hence our decision to build the Western Extension to Heathrow, which will for the first time connect South Wales to the UK’s main air hub and ensure faster journey times between Cardiff and Heathrow”—Wales Office press release, 12 July 2012

26 “BA understands the difference between a time penalty versus an interchange penalty. As a network airline, our passengers are generally prepared to pay more to travel on a direct flight rather than a connecting flight. This applied to rail as well as air”—Para 5.3, Second Response to the Heathrow Airport High Speed Rail Access Review, British Airways June 2010–-Second-response-to-the-Heathrow-Airport-High-Speed-Rail-Access-Review

27 “Research, and our experience, clearly shows that even one interchange in an airport access journey acts as a significant disincentive to choosing rail”—Star Alliance submission to Commons Transport Select Committee Inquiry on HS2, May 2011

28 “Previous studies have demonstrated that an interchange in a rail access journey to the airport suppressed demand by approximately 50%”—High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008–09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra for Greengauge 21

29 “Passengers travelling to or from airports, particularly for international journeys, have particular characteristics that set them aside from other rail users. For example, they are likely to place greater value upon the reliability of the service, especially when accessing the airport. They may be particularly deterred by interchange, partly because of the added risk of delay, but also due to difficulties associated with changing trains while carrying baggage”—Model Development Report, A Report for HS2 Ltd, Atkins February 2010

30 “It is not clear to BA whether HS2 have applied standard rail industry time penalties for interchanges at Old Oak Common for Heathrow passengers. It appears HS2 have underestimated the negative impact of routing airport passengers via Old Oak Common in their analysis”—Second Response to the Heathrow Airport High Speed Rail Access Review, British Airways, June 2010

31 “What is clear is this: there has to be a form of connection to Heathrow that makes sense to air travellers, that feels like a proper rail to air connection of the type that many major European airports have. Frankfurt, Paris, to a lesser extent Schipol, have excellent rail to air connections. It is about the passenger experience. There has to be a connection which feels right to airline travellers, which will encourage as it were interlining between air and train. That cannot be lug your heavy bags down a couple of escalators, along 600 metres of corridor and then change trains at a wet, suburban station somewhere in north west London. That is not an option. It is also clear that there could be options that involved a transfer point that was remote from the airport itself, provided the seamlessness of the service was of a type that airline passengers would find acceptable.”—Q48, Philip Hammond, Secretary of State, Evidence to House of Commons Transport Select Committee on the Secretary of State’s Priorities for Transport, 26 July 2010

32 “The £32 billion price tag of HS2 will be the largest UK public investment made in a single project. The proposed replacement of Trident the government estimates as costing between £15 billion and £20 billion; although groups such as Greenpeace have estimated the cost as being nearer £34 billion, which would therefore make that the largest single project”—Nick Hayns, Institute of Economic Affairs, email correspondence 29 February 2012

33 “We recommend that a White Paper be published, clarifying the Government’s objectives for all transport spending and the criteria it will use for deciding between different claims on the available resources”—Recommendation 5, Transport and the Economy, Third Report of Session 2010–12, House of Commons Transport Committee

34 “The absence of a transport strategy makes it hard to assess how HS2 relates to other major transport infrastructure schemes, regional planning and wider objectives, such as bridging the north-south divide. The biggest single transport investment proposed in this Parliament should be grounded in a well thought- through strategic framework and we are disappointed that the Government has not developed a strategy for transport, particularly after it rejected our earlier recommendation to publish a White Paper on transport and the economy”—Recommendation 1, High Speed Rail, Tenth Report of Session 2010–12

35 “In our report on Transport and the economy we called for the DfT to publish a strategy to explain what the Government aims to achieve by spending money on transport and how its policies support these aims. The department dismissed our recommendation, pointing us to the lists of actions in the business plan. The business plan is a useful and informative document but it does little more than list transport policies and target dates for implementation. It sits in a strategic vacuum and can easily be overtaken by events. Our scrutiny of the DfT’s annual report and the financial information it publishes reinforces our view that an overall strategy for transport is needed. We were pleased to see that the new Secretary of State saw the force in our argument and is considering the benefits of drawing up an overall strategy. We recommend that the DfT publish an overall strategy for transport, preferably in or alongside the next departmental annual report.”—“Counting the cost: financial scrutiny of the Department for Transport 2011–12”, Fifteenth Report of Session 2010–12, House of Commons Transport Committee

36 “We have set out in our Business Plan a clear vision for a transport system … and we have explained how we plan to achieve this. This provides a clear context in which the Government’s high speed rail plans are being developed. However, in the light of points raised in consultation, as the HS2 project is developed, the Government will seek to provide further information over the role that high speed rail will play in its wider objectives and strategies”—Para. 3.7, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future—Decisions and Next Steps Jan 2012

37 Business Plan 2012–15, DfT, 31 May 2012

38 Para. 3.7, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britains Future—Decisions and Next Steps Jan 2012

39 “The National Policy Statement on national networks … will set the context in which HS2 will be considered”—para. 1.2.10, High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by High Speed Two Ltd. December 2009

40 “The Transport Networks and Aviation National Policy Statements have not yet been published in draft for consultation”—National Infrastructure Planning website accessed 18 October 2012

41 “It is critical that the government enforces a strong, strategic approach to option generation, so that it can avoid momentum building up behind particular solutions and the UK can avoid costly mistakes which will not be the most effective way of delivering on its strategic priorities. The risk is that transport policy can become the pursuit of icons. Almost invariably such projects—’grands projets’—develop real momentum, driven by strong lobbying. The momentum can make such projects difficult—and unpopular—to stop, even when the benefit/cost equation does not stack up, or the environmental and landscape impacts are unacceptable.
The approach taken to the development of some very high-speed rail line options has been the opposite of the approach advocated in this study. That is, the challenge to be tackled has not been fully understood before a solution has been generated. Alternative options do not, therefore, appear to have been fully explored so it is not clear what the highest return solution to a problem would be; nor indeed is the challenge clear.”—
Paras. 1.140–1.142 The Eddington Transport Study, DfT December 2006

42 “£500 million towards a western rail link to Heathrow”—DfT Press Release, 12 July 2012

43 Para 1.1.10, High Speed Rail—London to the West Midlands and Beyond—Report to Government, HS2 Ltd, December 2009

44 “The key car modal shift gain is likely to be in respect of access to Heathrow from London, the west and Thames Valley, facilitated by the Heathrow interchange (and local rail enhancements)”—Letter from Sir David Rowlands to Lord Adonis, 13 February 2009

45 “Better modal choices will result from greater integration of the modal networks: airports, railway, metro and bus stations should increasingly be linked and transformed into multimodal connection platforms for passengers. Airport Capacity Initiatives—develop an approach to deal with future capacity problems including better integration with the railway network”—White Paper, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area—Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system, European Commission 28 March 2011

46 “There are some particularly remarkable examples of HS stations operating along intermodal lines with airports. Frankfurt International Airport is a pioneer in this. Opened in 1972, traffic increased considerably following the introduction of the Frankfurt–Cologne HSL in 2002. According to Deutsche Bahn, two thirds of train passengers are either leaving or have arrived by plane. In France, the station at Paris Charles-de-Gaulle Airport is located at the interconnection between the North HSL and the South-East HSL. It is served by 52 HSTs a day, linking the main towns in France, and by five HSTs serving northern Europe (Brussels and Amsterdam). In Belgium, Brussels National Airport will be linked to all the main Belgian cities and to several European cities, such as Paris, Amsterdam, Cologne and Frankfurt, by 2012”—European Commission High-speed Europe, a sustainable link between citizens, 2010

47 High speed rail services to Heathrow from Scotland and the North would provide an alternative to domestic and other short-haul aviation”—Para 4.38, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future—Decisions and Next Steps, DfT January 2012

48 HS2 Ltd’s external Challenge Groups failed to include any representation from the aviation industry—High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A report to Government by HS2 Ltd, 2009

49 “The current HS2 proposal is to connect Heathrow to HS2 via a spur to the north of the airport. We believe that a spur would not maximise all the benefits that an en-route station would do”—London (Heathrow) Airline Consultative Committee (LACC) airlines and the Heathrow Airline Operators Committee (AOC) submission to the HS2 consultation, July 2011

50 Secretary of State for Transport written statement, 17 July 2012

51 Developing a sustainable framework for UK aviation: Scoping document, DfT March 2011

52 Investing in Britain’s Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011

53 “A link (from Heathrow) to the high speed network would be of significant value to the airport operator and airlines, and a private sector contribution to the costs would reduce the cost to Government”—HS2 options for connecting to Heathrow, HS2 Ltd, September 2009

54 “Significant numbers of individuals and organisations would stand to benefit from the construction of new high speed rail lines. This could include airport operators, businesses close to high speed rail stations and local authorities. The Government expects that such parties would therefore make a contribution to the cost of those links”—High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011

55 “Heathrow has recently moved from being the world’s 20th most expensive airport in the world to the 4th, following user charges increasing 46% in 2007–08. Whilst this may represent legitimate pricing of scarce demand, and might be argued as necessary to fund much needed airport improvements, it is important that this, and any future private and public decisions on charging and taxation, are considered in the wider context of the UK economy and inward investment decisions. Heathrow was one of only two airports in the top 30 busiest airports worldwide to report a decline in traffic in 2010, (the other being Las Vegas/McCarren International in 22nd place). Heathrow’s continued pre-eminence amongst its European competitors cannot be taken for granted”—Submission to Transport Select Committee Inquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail, Bow Group May 2011

56 “It is important to note that while we recognise the potential national strategic value of connecting Heathrow directly into the high speed rail network—ie to deliver Government objectives on mode shift and carbon savings—our commercial evaluation of the various options showed a limited investment case from a Heathrow perspective”—Heathrow Airport Limited submission to Commons Transport Select Committee HS2 Inquiry, May 2011

57 “Over the likely HSR construction period, airlines will continue to fund a significant capital expenditure programme at Heathrow designed to renew and develop the UK’s hub airport. In this context the airline community will not be able to support funding for HSR as their primary focus and responsibility is to the airport itself”—British Airways submission to Commons Transport Select Committee HS2 Inquiry, May 2011

58 “Already the UK Government places more costs on the airport owner than is the case internationally—eg surface access projects”—DfT Review of Regulatory Framework for UK Airports, submission from the Chartered Institute of Logistics & Transport, 2008

59 “A link from HS2 to HS1 should not be progressed before Heathrow is directly linked to the HS2 network and is able to connect to HS1 services. Connecting HS1 to HS2 will enable through-running rail services between the UK regions and continental Europe. This will give major European airports direct access to UK air passengers, without a reciprocal benefit for Heathrow. The airport must be able to compete for air passengers in the UK and in Europe too, which requires equivalent access to both HS2 and HS1 services”—British Airways submission to Transport Select Committee Inquiry into HS2, May 2011

60 “Overall, by 2030 the presently untapped market from which the interchange could induce traffic to shift to rail contains up to 36m road journeys and 10m air journeys per year”—Improving Rail Connectivity to Heathrow—Implications for the Development of the Heathrow International Interchange, BAA/Arup October 2009

61 Air transport Movements 2001–11, CAA

62 A comparative analysis of the application and use of public service obligations in air transport within the EU George Williams, Romano Pagliari, Centre for Air Transport in Remoter Regions, Cranfield University, 2004

63 “Improved surface access to Heathrow would … help to maintain the necessary economies of scale to provide a viable hub route network”—Review of the Impact of Aviation within the Greater London Area, SKM for London Sustainable Development Commission, December 2003

64 “It may be more financially beneficial for BAA to see bigger, fuller airplanes, but the airlines maintain that to support this operation, they still need the connections to group people together and fill up the big planes”—David Stewart, IATA 28 March 2008

65 “Organisations outside London were concerned about the impacts on international investment in the regions as a result of the limited and reducing number of services to Heathrow from airports within the UK”—Transport and the Economy, Transport Select Committee 2011

66 “The UK regions are at a major disadvantage in terms of access from major world markets. This hampers the ability to attract inward investment and regional economic growth”—Economic Impacts of Hub Airports, British Chambers of Commerce 2009

67 Heathrow “is vital to the UK’s competiveness: easy access to Heathrow is often a major factor for businesses in deciding where to locate”—DfT Factsheet Connecting to Heathrow, 2011

68 “An A320 aeroplane would waste about 14kg of fuel (equivalent to 44kg CO2) and produce about 70g NOx for every minute it had to wait. For a B767, the corresponding values would be 22kg fuel (68kg CO2) and 105g NOx”—Response to Consultation on Adding Capacity at Heathrow Airport, February 2008

69 Connecting for growth: the role of Britain’s hub airport in economic recovery, Frontier Economics September 2011

70 Heathrow Airport Limited evidence to the Transport Committee’s Inquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail, June 2011

71 Southeast Airport Expansion, Airportwatch June 2012$FILE/meetings_120821_localauthorities26June2012.pdf

72 Global and UK travel trends 2010, Travel and Migrant Health Section Health Protection Services, Colindale, Health Protection Agency February 2012


74 Heathrow Facts and Figures

75 Traffic Review Schiphol

76 Frankfurt Airport Air Traffic Statistics

77 Union des Aeroports Francais

78 From 2003, controlled by total noise volume and maximum noise levels in Lden—

79 Three active runways in use at any one time, Zwanenburgbaan and Polderbaan runways can’t be used simultaneously, and restrictions on runway crossings—eg: to reach 18R/36L

80 Close parallel runways require dependent operations, runway crossings degrade outer runway pair capacity

81 “For Schiphol, landside accessibility is of essential importance. The construction of the HSL South line will place Schiphol on the European HSL high-speed rail network. The HSL will extend Schiphol’s catchment area towards Antwerp and Brussels”—Long term vision for Schiphol Group 2009

82 “A catchment area within a radius of 200 kilometres with 35 million consumers (43% of Germany’s population) optimally connected by air, rail and road”—

83 “In addition to deregulation of the air transportation markets, one reason for the growing competition among the hubs is that their catchment areas increasingly overlap. The impetus here comes from the high-speed rail systems (ICE, TGV) permitting a fast journey to the airport”—Fraport

84 “Conversion of the existing underground terminus station to a through station is crucial for the development of Brussels airport. The Diabolo project creates a more accessible airport with direct connection to the international axes to Paris, Amsterdam, Cologne, Frankfurt and other European cities”—Infrabel Mobility Projects 2009

85 CAA 2007 UK O&D passenger survey data

86 “More than ten thousand passengers a week are turning their backs on direct flights from London airports and instead travelling between Bristol International and hubs such as Amsterdam-Schiphol, Frankfurt, Paris Charles de Gaulle, Brussels and Oslo, from where they can access connections to hundreds of destinations worldwide”—Bristol Airport press release 13 June 2008 ,

87 “There are some particularly remarkable examples of HS stations operating along intermodal lines with airports. Frankfurt International Airport is a pioneer in this. Opened in 1972, traffic increased considerably following the introduction of the Frankfurt–Cologne HSL in 2002. According to Deutsche Bahn, two thirds of train passengers are either leaving or have arrived by plane. In France, the station at Paris Charles-de-Gaulle Airport is located at the interconnection between the North HSL and the South-East HSL. It is served by 52 HSTs a day, linking the main towns in France, and by five HSTs serving northern Europe (Brussels and Amsterdam). In Belgium, Brussels National Airport will be linked to all the main Belgian cities and to several European cities, such as Paris, Amsterdam, Cologne and Frankfurt, by 2012”—European Commission High-speed Europe, a sustainable link between citizens, 2010

88 “International evidence illustrates that airports can successfully be served by high speed rail services and other long distance trains in order to increase airlines’ passenger catchment areas. Examples include Paris CDG, Amsterdam Schiphol and Copenhagen”—High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008/09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra for Greengauge 21

89 “Some 16% of all Frankfurt airport passengers now come to and from the airport by ICE from destinations across Germany. This experience needs to be studied carefully as High Speed Two assesses options for serving Heathrow.”—Lord Adonis

90 “Long distance trains doubled (surface access) market share between 1998 and 2000, and since 2004 high speed long distance services have carried more passengers than local services. 19% of originating passengers used high speed services in 2009, and this is projected to increase to 30% by 2015”—Frankfurt Intraplan 2010

91 “Evidence for the Committee for Climate Change found that 38% of existing interlining passengers would transfer from air to HSR for the domestic leg of their journey if there was a direct HSR service to the airport, but only 1% would do so if there was a need to make an interchange en route. The Transport Select Committee has recently made its views known: it is essential, in their view that Heathrow is directly connected to the high-speed rail network”—The Heathrow Opportunity, Greengauge 21 2010

92 “Better modal choices will result from greater integration of the modal networks: airports, ports, railway, metro and bus stations should increasingly be linked and transformed into multimodal connection platforms for passengers”—White Paper, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area—Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system COM(2011) March 2011

93 “It may be more financially beneficial for BAA to see bigger, fuller airplanes, but the airlines maintain that to support this operation, they still need the connections to group people together and fill up the big planes”—David Stewart, IATA 28 March 2008

94 “Improved surface access to Heathrow would … help to maintain the necessary economies of scale to provide a viable hub route network”—Review of the Impact of Aviation within the Greater London Area, SKM for London Sustainable Development Commission, December 2003

95 “Strong local demand is beneficial to help underpin a wide range of services and frequencies. Because there is generally less competition for non-stop flights, this helps support higher yields”—The Future of Hubbing in London, Rigas Doganis & Associates

96 “Airports with intermodal capabilities have an edge on their competitors because intermodality generates additional traffic: Integration of Frankfurt Airport in Deutsche Bahn’s high-speed rail network has expanded the airport’s catchment area compared to airports without Long-distance Train Stations. It strengthened the hub function, raised passenger figures, and given us important competitive edges. At the same time, moving air traffic to the rail eases some of the strain on flight capacity. For example, landing and departure slots that are freed-up by shifting short-haul flights to the rail can be used for the urgently needed expansion of intercontinental flight services”—

97 “An HSR network serving Heathrow would encourage those who currently interline at Paris CDG, Amsterdam or Frankfurt to use Heathrow, thus strengthening Heathrow’s competitiveness compared to other European airports for long haul flights”—High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008–09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra for Greengauge 21

98 “Organisations outside London were concerned about the impacts on international investment in the regions as a result of the limited and reducing number of services to Heathrow from airports within the UK”—Transport and the Economy, Transport Select Committee 2011

99 European Cities and Regions of the Future 2010–11

100 Thames Valley Chamber of Commerce

101 “A four-track, high-speed passenger and freight Orbital Rail route around London, which links London’s radial lines, a future high-speed rail line to the Midlands and the North, the Thames Estuary ports, High Speed 1 (Channel Tunnel to London), and European networks”—Thames Hub, An Integrated Vision for Britain

102 “Thames Valley Chamber of Commerce have already experienced a reluctance to invest in the Thames Valley by foreign businesses owing to the uncertainty which exists around future aviation provision in the region”—Report to Cabinet, Slough Borough Council 16 July 2012

103 “Mr Moylan outlined a scenario that saw Heathrow becoming ‘a smaller point-to-point airport serving the West London and Home Counties premium leisure market’. Relocation of major airlines, including BA, to the new hub would see Heathrow passenger volumes fall from 70 million to 20 million a year”—Daily Telegraph, 6 October 2012


105 Daily Telegraph, 7 April 2012

Prepared 24th May 2013