These programmes are not about being soft on terrorism. On the contrary, as I said at the beginning, they are an add-on to, rather than a substitute for, good counter-terrorism laws. I hope that Members will join me in

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calling for a review of deradicalisation and counter-radicalisation best practice in order that we might equip ourselves as effectively as possible for the substantial challenges we face from jihadi and other terrorist groups.

Pete Wishart: It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Weir—the more Scottish National party Members we see in such positions, the better—and to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas). She made several pertinent points, particularly on the need to look at experiences from across Europe, and I shall listen carefully to the Minister’s response. It struck me that there is an attempt to look at some of the measures that other countries are adopting to try to tackle this serious issue, but there are also different things being done across the United Kingdom. I wish to focus my remarks on what we are trying to achieve in Scotland.

We are absolutely committed to ensuring that law enforcement agencies and other bodies have all the tools they need to tackle terrorism effectively. We take that particularly seriously in Scotland. We believe that we have robust but different measures in place to tackle these issues. We have massive concerns about what is proposed in the Bill, particularly in part 5. We are concerned that it might cut across some of the initiatives in our Prevent strategy.

It is natural that in Scotland we look at things differently from the rest of the United Kingdom. We face a different range of issues, we have smaller ethnic minority communities, and we have not had the same sort of tensions within our communities, so obviously we look at things differently. I like to think that we therefore look at things a little more holistically, and certainly more holistically than a Conservative-led Government would, or even—if I may be so brave as to say it—than a new Labour Government would.

Our Scottish Prevent strategy shares the same objectives as Prevent across the rest of the United Kingdom, but it differs in some pretty serious and significant ways, particularly in how it is delivered. I think that it does all it can to reflect our Scottish context. Our approach uses Prevent though a safeguarding lens, with an emphasis on keeping people safe, on community cohesion, on participative democracy and on making sure that it is consistent with the needs of, and risks to, all our communities. The Scottish Government’s Prevent strategy for tackling violent extremism works with and through key sectors, including higher and further education, the NHS, the Scottish Prison Service and local authorities. Prevent delivery also benefits from Police Scotland’s model of community engagement and the strength of the relationship between our Muslim communities and the police service.

We sometimes ignore the cultural context, but it is important. One of the most impressive features of Scotland’s Asian community is its willingness and eagerness to adopt what is seen as Scottish identity. We have what is called the bhangra and bagpipe culture. Particularly in Glasgow, where we have a large Muslim community, it is striking how eager the community is to take on board some of the central, defining features of Scottish culture and to get involved. We saw that during the referendum campaign, as Mr Weir in particular knows. One of the fastest growing groups in the movement was Scottish

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Asians for independence, because there was a natural affinity with what we were trying to achieve as a nation, and there was something about what we were trying to do in order to transform society that proved attractive to many people who had come from countries such as India and Pakistan, which had in their own way secured their independence from the United Kingdom at some time in history.

This feature in Scotland differs significantly from the rest of the United Kingdom. Efforts have been made by the Scottish Government, Ministers and colleagues to try to ensure that the cultural context is taken into account when we approach issues such as radicalisation. I am sure the Minister has seen on his trips to Scotland how the Muslim community, particularly from south Asia, has been integrated in our society and our community. We should all be impressed by that, and perhaps the Minister can learn from our experience.

My hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion made a powerful point about how we start to approach these matters and look at some of the community dimensions. We cannot be prescriptive. We cannot talk down to communities or expect them to respond to our stimuli, our suggestions and our objectives. I shall not dwell on what my hon. Friend said, but we have to work with communities. This process has to be organic, a conversation within communities and groups, to ensure that we come to the right conclusions.

The one thing that I want to add to what my hon. Friend said is that we must also look at the external environment. We have to try to understand what motivates people to get involved in what the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) rightly describes as barbaric activity. There is one thing that this Government have never done, and it surprises me how little work has been done on it. I encourage the Minister to look more closely at it: there is very little profiling of people who have gone out to the middle east to get involved in such activity. We do not have a sense of the pull factors, the reasons why people go there and get involved, because we do not ask them. We are too busy locking people up and all the other things that go with that.

We spend very little time trying to understand what it is that drags people to engage in such awful behaviour and activity, and I suspect that our reluctance to do that has much to do with the results that we are likely to find. When we see people being interviewed about their involvement in such activity, they are not people who would concern the Government on a day-to-day basis—people who have just emigrated from Pakistan or the middle east. They tend to be second or third generation who have been here for a long time. The ideology has not been brought here; it is an ideology that has emerged and grown within our communities.

When we listen to people being interviewed by broadcasters trying to understand what informs the way they behave, they all seem to be pretty respectable, cultured, almost middle class, standard citizens of the United Kingdom. They do not seem to conform to the traditional vision, if I may say that, of jihadists, and the caricatures that develop around that. We fail to get that right, to understand and to do the necessary work to profile—

Hazel Blears: I have some sympathy with the argument that the hon. Gentleman is developing on working with communities, which is the approach that I have always wanted to emphasise. Does he accept that one of the

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reasons that many of the people who are born and brought up in this country and have lived here for very many years then decide to go to Syria, or to create a terrorist plot here in Britain, is that they have been influenced by an ideology based on hatred and a complete rejection of other people unless they agree 100% with their very narrow world view? We have debated whether we use the word “combating” or “countering” in relation to this ideology, which has its roots in Salafi thinking. It is about a violent version of Islam that supposedly justifies this kind of terrorist activity. There is quite a lot of research on this, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware of some of it.

Pete Wishart: Indeed. The right hon. Lady is partly correct. There is something that draws people in, but our failure to understand some of the motivations and pull factors is a fault that we have.

I do not want to labour my next point because I had an exchange about it with the hon. Member for New Forest East on Second Reading. It is that people feel such a sense of injustice and frustration about not being able to use the traditional, normal political process to exert some sort of change that they are driven to get involved in these activities. People are not born genetically programmed to become jihadists and terrorists: something fundamental and significant happens during their journey that influences them and makes them get involved. We fail to understand that.

We also fail to take responsibility for what we may have done in setting the external stimuli in this regard. For example, we fail to acknowledge the disaster that was the Iraq war and how that cause became a recruiting sergeant for a generation of young Muslims who, with their perverted sense of justice, saw no alternative but to get involved in these terrorist activities. We do not even need to debate this: we can see the line going all the way back to when it started. Yes, there were issues before Iraq and before some of the other difficulties in the middle east, particularly in relation to Palestine, but it is when we get to the invasion of Iraq that we can see the exponential growth in these activities.

We have to take responsibility for that. We have to acknowledge that the decisions we have made and the environment we have created perhaps give rise to some of the massive frustrations that people have. People are not born predisposed to be terrorists, to be jihadists, to be the most barbaric type of murderers. Something happens along the way and a frustration develops. Unless we address our responsibility for creating these conditions, we fail.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Gentleman and I have debated this on previous occasions. Does he think that ISIS is killing Yazidis and Christians because it has a grievance about British foreign policy?

Pete Wishart: No, of course not. If I may put it ever so gently to the right hon. Lady, that question is not worthy of her. There are conflicts right across the middle east that we fail to understand but only condemn, but in some way we are the major power in all this. We are the interveners in these types of activities, and we therefore have responsibilities in that regard. Of course this does not reflect UK foreign policy, other than perhaps at the margins.

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Mr Mike Hancock: I apologise for not being here when the hon. Gentleman started his speech. I agree that the Iraq war was undoubtedly the tipping point, and most people now recognise that it was a mistake, but that has not stopped young Muslim men becoming radicalised. All the baring of our chests and saying “We were wrong and it was a terrible thing to do” has not changed what has happened by one iota.

Pete Wishart: The hon. Gentleman is right. Of course it has not changed behaviour, but we owe it to ourselves to acknowledge this issue. It is a flaw that runs all the way through a lot of the programmes to counter, or combat, radicalisation that we embark on. Unless we understand the external stimuli and the environment that were created, I am afraid we will not have any great success in these things.

There is another factor that informs this and it is some of the debates that we have in this House. If I were a young Muslim listening to some of the poisonous debate about immigration that takes place nowadays, I do not know what I would make of being told, “You’ve got to stay away from here; you’ve got to be kicked out, or sent back, or whatever”—all the inflammatory language that this House hears almost on a day-to-day basis when we debate these things. We have got to be careful, for goodness’ sake. We cannot just believe that it will all of a sudden be reasonably accepted and adopted, and that nobody will mind that this language is employed when such debates take place. Again, let us just be careful about what we do to contribute to the environment that has been created or the conditions leading to such frustration.

4.15 pm

Mark Durkan: The hon. Gentleman is exactly right to warn of the dangers of hon. Members helping to feed the very things they say they want to fight. If there are those who are out to sow the seeds of radicalism, extremism, cynicism and alienation, people should take care not to propagate those seeds by measures that, in relation to international policy, only feed the cynicism of those who see them as double standards, or in relation to this country, even propose to create a twilight zone around the very concept of citizenship. How does that help to counter the very disillusionment of which the hon. Gentleman speaks?

Pete Wishart: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman because he is right to say that we must see this in the round. That is one of the reasons why I have difficulties with what is suggested in the Bill. I will not support the amendment moved by the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears), as I think she knows, because I just do not like this type of language. It does not really address the difficulties we face and the things we have to take on. In looking at anti-radicalisation or ensuring that our communities are resilient in fighting against such messages, as the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) set out so eloquently, we must work holistically—in the round—and ensure that that is combined and merged with all other community issues that would help us.

We are trying to work towards that in Scotland. Historically, we have taken that approach. We have had responsibility for the Prevent programme for eight to 10 years, and I believe that we have made real progress.

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With our distinct legal system, we have our own means of doing this sort of thing, and we are making great attempts and efforts to do so. We just take a different view of such things: we have a different type of community and a different approach to the issues that have emerged during the past few years.

The Minister for Security and Immigration is now deep in conversation, but I hope he will allow us to pursue our agenda on such matters. Scottish public bodies that were initially listed in schedules 3 and 4 are no longer included, so I hope that the Minister, when he finishes his conversation, might be of a mind to allow us to make our own progress when it comes to such things. The Minister is now back with us. I was saying—I know he missed this—that Scotland has been excluded from the schedules of public bodies. I know that there have been conversations with the relevant Scottish Minister, and that the Minister for Security and Immigration understands that we have our own particular agenda for this sort of thing.

I hope that in time—perhaps amendments tabled during the remaining stages of the Bill will help him to come to this conclusion—we can have our own strategy without the combat and the fighting language that we do not like. We do not think it works or believe that it adds much to achieving the objective that we in this place all want, which is to make our communities safer and resilient enough to ensure that we get the right type of result and response. I hope that the Minister will be open to further suggestions that will exclude Scotland from part 5 and allow us to pursue our own agenda. We do not like some of the language, and we do not believe it works. Perhaps even in his response, he could satisfy me and my colleagues that we will be allowed to pursue our own agenda and do this our own way.

Mr Mike Hancock: I come to this debate with a great deal of sadness about what has happened in my own city. Six young men went out, of whom four are now dead, and one returned to the UK and is now starting a very lengthy prison sentence.

One of the saddest moments in my 45 years’ experience of politics was reading the letter that one of the lads wrote to his parents and left for them when he went to Syria. His parents sat in front of me in the office not saying that they wanted us to fight back, but really begging for something to happen or for someone to take the initiative. They could not understand how this very well educated young man, who was at university—he had a glittering career before him—could walk away from university and go to Syria without discussing it with anyone, not his local peer group or, most importantly, his parents. The last words of the letter were, “Don’t worry about what’s going to happen to me when I come back because I have no intention of coming back.” His parents read into that that he had every intention of fighting, wherever it took him. How sad it was for his mother to read that letter.

We have tried desperately hard with the community in Portsmouth. We have a large Bangladeshi community and four mosques. Portsmouth has a great, integrated society. Everyone was horrified that our city was highlighted in the way that it was and nobody could understand how it had happened. The imams in the mosques did

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not know, the people who run the madrassah did not know and the extended families of the young men did not know how it came about that these young men were radicalised in such a way that they were prepared to walk away from everything they had in front of them, put their lives on the line and even put it in writing that they did not believe they would be coming back. Some sort of fightback is required on the part of all of us who care about the young men and women who have done that.

I do not share the view that giving disproportionately long prison sentences to people who come back will help the situation. I do not know whether other Members have spoken to young Muslim boys who have been in prison or whether they understand the pressure that those boys are put under in prison by much older members of the faith and the other issues that they raise. We need to find a mechanism to sort that out. I am in favour of the various things that the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) exposed so eloquently. The Bradford example is a fine one. However, none of them offers an easy solution to finding the right role model who can put the alternative case to these young men and women, and do so in the right place.

Nobody has yet suggested that there is an easy way out of this situation. I have first-hand experience of the pitiful state of the families who are devastated when their young sons or daughters are killed and taken away from them. Surely the Bill goes some way towards starting the process that the mother who sat opposite me in my surgery called for when she said, “For goodness’ sake, Mike, we’ve got to find a way of preventing this. I’ve got an 11-year-old son and I’m worried about what will happen to him. What is he thinking? How will it affect him and his peer group when they talk about their brothers who have been killed fighting in a war in Syria?” It is no good just saying that they were mistaken and that they did not believe in what they were going to do. They were believers in what they were going to do and they knew the risks they were taking. They were so certain about it that they were still prepared to do it. We ignore that at our peril.

Again, I agree entirely with the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles that we have to start lower down the age range. We need to find a mechanism for very young people.

Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab): I apologise for missing the beginning of the debate; I was in Westminster Hall. Does the hon. Gentleman not think that there is an issue with the general narrative in our society and in our media, where there is a high degree of Islamophobia, with throwaway comments being made on television programmes the whole time? It is regrettable, and on some people—on a very small minority, maybe—it has the beginnings of a very bad effect.

Mr Hancock: It is more than regrettable that that has happened—it is despicable. Of course the hon. Gentleman is right that it must have an effect on people. It would have an effect on me if I had that sort of problem. I know what it is like to have abuse thrown at me. I know what effect it had on me. Goodness knows how other people feel when they have abuse thrown at them day after day. I hate the thought that people in my constituency

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have stooped to cutting off a pig’s head and sticking it on the gatepost of an Islamic school. What sort of message does it send to young children going to school if there is a dead pig’s head stuck on a railing outside that school? It is appalling, and the hon. Gentleman is right to say that we must combat such things and be more realistic about allowing certain comments to go unchallenged. It is important that that message comes over loud and clear in debates such as this.

I hope that the Bill gets the support it deserves and that the promised resources are forthcoming and go to the right places. All of us involved in this issue for one reason or another must work hard with our communities and, most important, with those who are prepared to step out and say the right things, and encourage young men and women to think that there is an alternative to what they believe in. However, it is no good suggesting for one minute that those young men and women do not believe 100% in what they are doing at the present time, because they certainly do.

Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab): I will make a couple of brief points on amendment 20 and the impact of clauses 21 to 27 on universities, and I do so as someone who represents Sheffield’s two universities and more students than any other Member of the House.

Some 28 years ago, in my previous career in the university sector, I remember preparing a draft code of practice on freedom of speech in universities, to entrench further something that has traditionally always had a strong place in our higher education sector. I did so in response to the Education (No.2) Act 1986, introduced by the then Conservative Government, which sought to ensure that universities maintained that commitment to freedom of speech.

As I am sure the Minister is aware, that Act imposed a duty on universities to ensure that the use of their premises is

“not denied to any individual or body of persons on any ground connected with the beliefs or views of that individual”.

Universities have always taken this issue seriously and sought to fulfil their legal responsibilities, but it is not clear how that provision sits alongside new responsibilities in the Bill. What potential legal quagmire might a university find itself in if, for example, an action is brought by a third party to challenge a decision made under the provisions of this Bill, on the basis of the university’s responsibilities in the 1986 Act? That issue needs clarity so that we do not find ourselves in a very big mess.

My second point relates to the general, sweeping nature of the Government’s new powers in the Bill, and the potential for direct intervention in the governance of universities that it establishes. Amendment 20 deals with that issue, but the House would be making a big mistake to allow such a measure to proceed without ensuring proper parliamentary scrutiny. I understand that universities have been reassured by the Home Office that guidance is being prepared, but our difficulty is that we have not yet seen that guidance and do not know how the Government intend to proceed. It seems a fairly fundamental principle that Parliament ought to be able to scrutinise the initial guidance, and any subsequent guidance that the Government might issue should they feel that universities are not complying with requirements in the Bill. Amendment 20, which I hope the Minister is

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able to embrace, seeks to strengthen confidence in what the Government are trying to achieve by ensuring proper parliamentary scrutiny of the process, and that links to some of the imprecision in the language and description of terms in the Bill.

4.30 pm

The Minister will be familiar with a recent case, which has been well documented in the press, where Christchurch university in Canterbury found itself in conflict with the police over an unwillingness to provide information on its students in relation to a fracking debate. There is a concern within the university sector that the shifting balance of relationships that might be implicit in the Bill could add to the pressure on universities to co-operate or provide information on a much wider range of issues than is the Government’s intention. I recognise that that is not what the Government are seeking to do. The importance of ensuring proper parliamentary scrutiny in the guidance that might be issued is something we should endorse today.

Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab): I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) for opening the debate and making a compelling case, along with the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), for why the amendments are important to today’s debate on Prevent. I agree with her sentiments about the appalling events in Sydney. Our thoughts are with the families and friends of the people who died. We stand in solidarity with the Australian people. We stand, too, with the people of Pakistan, where dreadful events have unfolded this morning, with hundreds murdered.

Part 5 introduces a series of obligations on public bodies and local authorities to deliver the Prevent agenda. I hope the Minister will respond to the issue raised by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) on part 5 not covering Northern Ireland, and to the issue raised by the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) in relation to Prevent in Scotland.

Most of the Bill is taken up with tough measures to tackle those who are thought to be involved in terrorism, but part 5 deals with preventing people becoming involved in the first place. The previous Labour Government introduced the Prevent agenda and we remain absolutely committed to supporting and strengthening it where necessary. However, before we look in detail at the measures to strengthen the delivery of the Prevent programme, I want to point out two areas where I think there are gaps in the Bill. First, there needs to be a much clearer commitment from central Government to do more to support and facilitate the Prevent agenda. A lot of additional duties are being put on to local authorities and public bodies, but there is more of a role for central Government to support them in fulfilling that duty. Secondly, in the past four years there has been some confusion in relation to the Prevent agenda and the roles of the Home Office and the Department for Communities and Local Government. It would be helpful if the Minister is able to enlighten us on the problems that have arisen due the confused situation relating to Prevent.

We all agree that Prevent should be about local delivery, but, as I said, there have been some problems because of a mixed approach by central Government.

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For example, it was a Government decision early on to reduce the number of priority areas for Prevent from 90 to 23. The Government then realised that leaving areas such as Greenwich out of the priority areas was a mistake, so a number of local authority areas had their funding reinstated. Even within those priority areas, however, I do not think the Government have been paying enough attention to whether the Prevent agenda is being successfully delivered with evaluations. Only four of the 30 priority areas provided evaluations to the office for security and counter-terrorism last year. That is obviously of concern when public money is being spent, because we want to know that it is being used effectively.

There has also been a marked decline in funding streams for Prevent: funding is down from £17 million to £1 million a year. Some of that has been part of a conscious decision about reallocating funding, but questions are raised by the fact that, while £5.1 million has been allocated every year for local delivery, over the past six years more than 60% of it has gone unclaimed by local authorities.

Jeremy Corbyn: My hon. Friend is making a very good point about funding. Does she agree that it is also important, from the point of view of a public message, that we place a strong emphasis on preventing extreme right-wing racism in our society, and on combating it as vigorously as we combat any other kind of issue?

Diana Johnson: My hon. Friend makes a very important point as part of the debate about Prevent spending on combating extremism across the piece.

On the Government’s record with Prevent, it is striking that, while overall spending has gone up—it reached £40 million last year—spending on local delivery accounts for barely 10% of the total. Will the Minister confirm whether those figures are correct?

Local authorities are not the only bodies captured by the new duty. Universities will also be covered and my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) has just addressed some of the concerns relating to the university sector. However, just because universities are included in this particular duty does not mean that they have not previously been included. My hon. Friend referred to work that was done many years ago to tackle these issues. A significant section of the Prevent agenda is devoted to universities, which are asked to agree Prevent action plans with local police forces. I have repeatedly asked parliamentary questions to find out how many universities actually have a Prevent plan in place, but the Government have repeatedly refused to provide an answer. I do not understand why, because it is not a matter of national security: the information requested is simply a number. Do the Government refuse to answer the question because they do not actually know how many universities have agreed a plan or because they are not willing to tell Parliament? Why are we not allowed to know?

The Bill also extends obligations on schools, which were also not excluded from the previous Prevent agenda. A significant thread of Prevent has always been aimed at schools. Indeed, the 2011 Prevent review identifies a significant number of threats to schools and suggests

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measures to counter those threats. Given the conclusions of Oftsted’s investigations into Birmingham and Tower Hamlets, the 2011 review seems remarkably prescient. It identified a series of risks facing schools, including that posed by people with radical beliefs who were attempting to obtain positions in schools—that is, on school governing bodies.

The review also identified some challenges that needed immediate action in schools. For example, 70% of schools felt that they needed more training and information to build resilience to radicalisation. To address those issues, the Department for Education committed to a nine-point plan of action to prevent radicalisation in schools. However, it has provided no evidence on the delivery of that plan. I have asked it numerous questions—both written and on the Floor of the House—about the overall implementation of the Prevent agenda and the specific commitments contained in the 2011 review, but I have received no evidence in response to my inquiries. I have asked the Department to provide a general update on its work delivering the Prevent agenda, but to no avail. Will the Minister tell the House whether the measures in the Bill that relate to schools are a response to the failure of the DFE to deliver on previous commitments?

Also missing from the Bill are measures to address radicalisation outside public institutions. Local councils can of course try to counter radicalisation in public places and public bodies, and universities can try to counter it on campus, but as my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles said, much more work needs to be done on broadcasting and the internet industries to reduce hate speech and extremism arriving directly into homes through social media and satellite television.

Last week, the Prime Minister announced international efforts in partnership with industry to tackle online child abuse. We all welcome those. However, equivalent measures on terrorist propaganda are in their infancy. Although the Internet Watch Foundation has forged vital links with industry to actively prohibit the dissemination of abusive images, my understanding is that the Home Office’s counter terrorism internet referral unit has never received a referral from a communications service provider about extremist conduct. I will be interested to hear from the Minister whether that is correct. Although we welcome the measures in the Bill, which are about the Government telling other authorities to do more, we should remember that there are areas where the Government themselves could do more and have failed to deliver so far.

I turn now to the specific provisions in the Bill, starting with clause 21, which puts a general duty on various public bodies to tackle terrorism; the bodies are numerous and are listed in schedule 3. The clause is complemented by the provisions in clause 24, which allow the Secretary of State to introduce guidance on how authorities should implement their obligations. The Secretary of State’s power in this area is strengthened still further by the provisions in clause 25 for her to direct public bodies to act in a certain way.

Parliament’s scrutiny of the Bill has been constrained, once again, because we are debating the principle without getting to see the specifics. It is extremely unfortunate that the Government have not published draft guidance to aid our considerations. We have no problem with the principle of a general duty to prevent terrorism, but

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that could mean a number of things. It is therefore essential that we have access to the guidance, so that we can debate what is in it.

For that reason, the Opposition have tabled amendment 19, which would ensure that the Government must use their powers to issue guidance, and amendment 20, which would ensure that Parliament could scrutinise the guidance under the affirmative procedure. I would like to hear the Minister’s views on those amendments, but if he is not able to accept amendment 20 I will test the opinion of the House on giving Parliament an opportunity specifically to debate the guidance.

The Secretary of State could introduce guidance of potentially enormous scope, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central said, could have a bearing on free speech and academic freedoms—I would go so far as to say it could even affect patient-doctor relationships—yet at the moment Parliament would have no role in debating that guidance. My understanding is that only one set of guidance will be issued. It will apply to the numerous bodies set out in schedule 3, and will therefore have to apply in disparate settings. It is important that the implications of the guidance are discussed fully in Parliament to allow the potential implications for different sectors to be raised and debated fully.

The guidance will also be important in ensuring that the policies implemented are both efficient and effective. Thousands of similar bodies will be implementing policies under clause 21, and it is important that they do not all start from scratch in deciding how to comply with their new duty. The issues that bodies will need to address are complex and disparate, ranging from the far right, as my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) just mentioned, to the intra-religious issues that have been discussed this afternoon. The Home Office needs to support organisations in dealing with those disparate issues, particularly intra-religious conflicts of the sort we see in Syria, which are the driving force behind the rise of ISIL. They are particularly difficult to address, and public bodies need full support in tackling them.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles talked earlier about the counter-narrative issue and the Muslim community is trying very hard to combat sectarianism with a narrative of peace and unity. Public bodies should be supporting community bodies in doing that, but they need guidance on how best to achieve it. That is why the Opposition think we must have guidance and that it must be properly and effectively scrutinised. I hope that the Minister will therefore agree to accept amendments 19 and 20.

4.45 pm

I want now to turn to the cost of the Government’s approach. The impact assessment presumes that a local authority with high risk will face costs of about £40,000. It also estimates that about a third of local authorities will be in this high-risk category—that is, just about the 90 local authorities that Labour deemed priority areas when Prevent was introduced. As I said at the outset, that number reduced when the Government had their review in 2011. I want to be clear whether the Minister is now acknowledging that the 2011 Prevent review got the numbers wrong and that 90 is nearer the mark for the number of areas at high risk. The £40,000 compliance cost is about the level of support provided to those

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areas under Labour, so will the Minister confirm whether the Home Office will meet those costs? Or is it a cost that local authorities will have to meet?

I have spoken about the problems in the Department for Education in delivering on the Prevent agenda and I want to talk a little about the cost to schools. The impact assessment now seems to put the onus on schools to bring in people to help with training and says that that will cost £62 for every 20 people trained. That seems a rather low figure to me. For example, if a school in my constituency wanted to bring in an individual to provide Prevent training in Hull it would probably need to bring in someone from an area with expertise—let us say Leeds. That person would have to travel for an hour from Leeds and then deliver the programme. A cost of £62 to cover the travel costs, travel time, the presentation and the preparation seems very low for 20 people. Will the Minister explain how he reached the figures for the additional costs that will be put on the police, prisons and the probation service?

Schedule 3 lists the bodies to which the duty will apply and clause 22 gives the Secretary of State powers to add to that list. Schedule 3 is extensive and includes health bodies, education bodies, prisons and probation services. I note that local NHS trusts and foundation trusts are included but there is no mention of the clinical commissioning groups. Why has no duty been put on the commissioners of services to fulfil their duties on Prevent? I also note that there is no mention of general practitioners, or some of the social enterprises that have been set up to deliver NHS services, such as community health partnerships. We know that more privatisation is coming into the NHS, so will the Minister explain how private health care providers will be covered by this provision? Similarly, the Government are in the process of privatising probation services, so will the Minister explain how G4S, Serco and others will be covered by this duty?

In theory, the Government can extend the duty to other bodies as they see fit subject to the limitations of clause 22(2), which lists legislative and judicial bodies as exempt, as are the Secret Intelligence Service and the Security Service. Why cannot the intelligence bodies be included in a duty to prevent people being drawn into terrorism? It seems the type of provision destined to fuel conspiracy theorists.

More importantly, I want to turn to the implications of clauses 21 and 22 for the devolved Administrations in Wales and Scotland. While counter-terrorism is a retained power, clause 21 will cover a number of bodies that are otherwise entirely accountable to the Welsh Assembly or the Scottish Parliament. The Opposition welcome provisions in clauses 23 and 24 that would demand consultation with the Scottish and Welsh Governments, but can the Minister confirm that, regardless of the specific set-ups in Scotland and Wales, devolved bodies will be covered by the same guidance as English bodies? It is noticeable that no Scottish institution is included in schedule 3. Presumably that is because consultation with the Scottish authorities has not yet concluded. Is the Minister expecting, or intending, to add to schedule 3 while the Bill is going through the remaining stages?

Pete Wishart: I presume from her comments that the hon. Lady does not want Scotland included in this. I am sure that she has heard about the different, more holistic

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approach that we have. Could she help us to persuade the Minister to allow us to do our thing uninterrupted by what has been proposed in the Bill?

Diana Johnson: We are at the Committee stage of the Bill, looking specifically at the Government’s provisions. Scotland is covered by Prevent. I am concerned that within schedule 3, which lists the bodies that are covered by the duty, there is nothing from Scotland. That worries me. I want to hear from the Minister why that is and what discussions are being held. As the rest of the Bill applies, I assume that there is a gap that needs to be filled.

On Northern Ireland, when the Government introduced the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, they neglected to consult the Northern Ireland Executive. The result is that, after four years, the National Crime Agency still does not have a remit to work in Northern Ireland. I am concerned that we could end up with a similar situation with Prevent and the agenda in Scotland.

Lady Hermon: I am grateful to the hon. Lady but I just want to correct a tiny detail. The National Crime Agency’s full remit does not extend to Northern Ireland because Sinn Fein and the Social Democratic and Labour party refused to allow that. It is not about consultation with the rest of the parties or with the Northern Ireland Executive; they all want it. The people of Northern Ireland want it, but two parties are holding the rest of us hostage, so to speak.

Diana Johnson: I am grateful to the hon. Lady for that comment and for putting the record straight.

Although clause 38 is not covered by this group, I want to refer to it as it confers upon the Secretary of State the power to make amendments to any piece of legislation that interferes with the operations of the Bill, including Acts of the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly. If I have read this correctly, if the Home Secretary thinks, for example, that the setting up of a new type of school in Scotland by the Scottish Parliament is affecting not just the implementation of clause 21 but the specific policies provided for under clause 24, she can change the devolved legislation on its operation. She can even do that without consulting the relevant Government, which is why I have tabled amendment 18, which we will discuss in the next group.

Similar issues exist with the Channel programme. It would be placed on a statutory footing alongside the rest of Prevent. As with Prevent, this is a policy area of enormous importance and the Opposition support efforts to strengthen it. Once again, however, the Government are putting obligations on local authorities without ensuring that there are provisions to make sure that they are fully supported by central Government. Clause 28 provides for the creation of local assessment and support panels in every local authority. According to clause 33, this includes county councils, district councils and unitary authorities in England and Wales. Again it seems that the Government have not yet reached agreement with the Scottish Government on how this would be implemented in Scotland. I am sure that the Minister will respond to that point. In addition, the legislation is not clear on which local authorities are meant to have a

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panel when there are multiple tiers of local government. Does the responsibility rest with district or county councils? What happens where there are unitary authorities and district councils? Has this yet been decided and thought through? The impact assessment says that local authorities will be able to combine to create support panels, but can the Minister explain why that is not provided for in the Bill?

Many panels should already exist and comply with the current guidance provided by the Home Office. Will the Minister tell the Committee how many councils have created these boards and what assessment has been made of their operation? What evidence led the Government to decide that the current system was not working? I have asked parliamentary questions about this in the past, but the Government have refused to give details or even to confirm that a monitoring framework is in place. Will the Minister provide further information about how well these panels are working?

Under clause 28(3), a chief officer of police must make the referral to the local support panel. The current system allows numerous local bodies, including schools, colleges, universities, youth offending teams, local authority troubled families teams, charities and voluntary groups to be able to refer to the police, who can then conduct a screening process. Will the Minister confirm that this process will be allowed to continue, and will he explain why this particular aspect was not put on a statutory footing as well?

My first concern is with the level of expertise that these panels must have, which is why I tabled amendment 21. As provided for in the Bill, local support panels have to assess the individual’s risk of radicalisation and tailor a support package to address those risks. The issues are complex: the current guidance cites 22 vulnerability indicators that may lead to a Channel referral. The panel must weigh up these factors and tailor a support package, which could have any number of elements. In some areas, the panel will be addressing issues it has not faced before, such as sectarian hatred, which can be exacerbated by poorly provided support.

This is why we feel the Home Office needs to support local panels by providing an approved list of support providers who are able to give the specialist interventions needed to address the specific issues facing the individual. The panel is tasked with assessing the progress the individual makes, but it does not necessarily have the ability to assess the quality of support provided by other agencies, which is why we want the Home Office to assess providers.

The Government have repeatedly claimed to be stepping up efforts to stop Prevent funding going to organisations that could be radicalising people. That cannot be done unless the Home Office takes a lead in vetting those bodies. Under clause 32, the Home Secretary may indemnify Channel providers, so it seems quite reasonable for her to assess them as well. Indeed, it is my understanding that the Home Office, along with regional groups of police forces, do provide this level of support. It is our view that this role should be in the Bill, alongside the responsibilities given to local authorities. I hope that the Minister will be able to accept this amendment. We both want to see support working better to provide locally led interventions, but the Home Office needs a stronger role in supporting local authorities.

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The second amendment I shall speak to is amendment 22, which seeks to expand the membership of panels provided for under clause 29. At present, the Bill provides for just two statutory members of the panel: the local authority and the local police force. The local authority may, according to the explanatory notes, appoint other members. This contrasts sharply with current best practice as set out in the Home Office guidance, which suggests panels of up to 14 members. We do not think all need to be on every panel, and indeed many of them are part of the local authority, so they could be brought in as and when necessary, but we do think that both probation and health professionals should always be on the panel.

There are two advantages to increasing the expertise on the panel. First, the panel will be in a better position to assess the 22 vulnerability indicators that I mentioned and to make a correct decision. Secondly, it ensures that more of the bodies that will provide the support have a role in determining that support. If we look at the existing guidance, we find that it may include: life skills, anger management, cognitive and behavioural contact, health awareness contact and drug and alcohol awareness. Each of those categories would obviously need to be tailored, and would come with a cost. We therefore think it is important for probation and health professionals to be included as statutory members of the panel.

5 pm

I want to raise three more issues with the Minister. First, will he tell us who will be responsible for monitoring the duty given to public bodies, which would potentially lead to the issuing of a direction by the Home Secretary? The Bill refers to a mandatory order, which I assume the Home Secretary can seek when she wishes to enforce a direction, but will an appeal process be available to a public body that considers a direction to be unfair or unfounded?

My second question concerns co-operation. Clause 30 gives various bodies, as listed in schedule 4—again, Scottish bodies are absent—a duty to co-operate with the directions of the panel, which, as I have said, could take a number of forms. Who will bear the cost of providing the support, and how will disputes between the panel and the provider on questions such as cost, proportionality and effectiveness be settled?

Thirdly, there is the issue of compulsion. The programmes for which chapter 2 of part 5 provides are—rightly—voluntary. Will the Minister tell us how the police, or indeed the panel, would respond if an individual rejected support, or if support were deemed to be ineffective?

Although we support the measures in this part of the Bill, we have a number of concerns, to which I hope the Minister will return. They relate to burden-sharing between local agencies and central Government, practical support for local authorities, implementation in devolved areas, and the level of scrutiny. I hope that the Minister will feel able to accept the modest improvements that we have suggested, and to give assurances on other matters. If he does not, we will reserve our position, and may return to the issues at a later stage.

James Brokenshire: We have had a good and wide-ranging debate that has touched on powerful and important themes relating to how we should confront some of the extremism and terrorism that sadly resides in many of our communities.

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The right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) rightly drew attention to the very direct context in which the debate takes place. I referred last night to the unfolding events in Australia, but we have now learnt that Katrina Dawson and Tori Johnson lost their lives in that appalling incident, and I know that the Committee will wish to send its kindest wishes and thoughts to the families and friends of those involved. We also learnt today of a shocking further attack in Peshawar, where innocent children who were simply going about their studies in north-west Pakistan were brutally killed. That news is deeply shocking. It is horrifying that children should be killed simply for going to school. I think that we all share an utter revulsion at and condemnation of those who were responsible for these despicable acts.

We have had a useful debate on part 5, and the nature of seeking to put the Prevent strand of our Contest counter-terrorism strategy on a statutory footing. Of course, Prevent aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism—it deals with all forms of terrorism, including terrorism associated with far-right extremists—but resources are focused on the areas of highest threat. The most significant of those threats currently comes from al-Qaeda, from the so-called Islamic State, or ISIL—which is neither Islamic nor a state—and from other terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq. However, terrorists associated with neo-Nazis and far-right extremist groups pose a continued threat to our safety and security, and remain very much a focus of our work.

Lady Hermon: Before the Minister moves further into singing the praises of part 5, with which I actually agree, I do think he owes the people of Northern Ireland, and indeed this House, an explanation or some justification for the omission of Northern Ireland from the application of part 5. We in Northern Ireland suffer not just from those who leave Northern Ireland to be radicalised in Syria and come back into Northern Ireland; we also have to deal with the current recruitment by dissident republicans such as the Real IRA and Continuity IRA. The Minister must explain why part 5 does not extend to us.

James Brokenshire: Of course I absolutely recognise the continuing challenge and threats in Northern Ireland and commend the work of our various agencies and the Police Service of Northern Ireland in keeping people in Northern Ireland safe from Northern Irish-related terrorism. What I would say to the hon. Lady is that Prevent does not currently extend to Northern Ireland. Different measures are put in place in Northern Ireland and the intent of the Bill is to put on a statutory footing the programmes and arrangements that currently exist under the Prevent strand, but that is not in any way to undermine the very important work taking place in Northern Ireland to confront the terrorist threat there.

Lady Hermon: I rise with some sense of exasperation because with the greatest respect to the Minister, for whom I have a very high regard, he will know that the only mention of the Prevent strategy is in the explanatory notes, which are not part of the Bill. The terms of the Bill, and clause 21 which is under consideration, provide that there is a duty to have

“regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.”

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That applies to Northern Ireland and should apply to Northern Ireland. The word “Prevent” is not in clause 21.

James Brokenshire: As I have sought to explain to the hon. Lady, the clause seeks to give effect to the Prevent strategy. That is why it has been formulated in the way it has. As I have underlined, these provisions are about placing the existing programmes on a statutory footing. Currently Northern Ireland does not have programmes equivalent to, for example, Channel, which is available in England and Wales, and that is why the Bill has been constructed in this manner, but that is not in any way to resile from the exceptionally important work that continues to be undertaken in seeking to arrest or to disrupt terrorist threats in Northern Ireland and work seeking to counter people being drawn into terrorism. We have taken that different approach in respect of Northern Ireland. I recognise that the hon. Lady does not accept or agree with that response, and obviously I respect her perspective, but this is the manner in which the Bill has been advanced.

Lady Hermon rose—

James Brokenshire: I will give way one last time to the hon. Lady, but then I will need to make some progress.

Lady Hermon: I am grateful to the Minister. I need him to put on the record whether or not the Home Office has capitulated to any overtures made to it by Sinn Fein or other political parties that this part of the Bill should not extend to Northern Ireland. I am glad the Minister is shaking his head.

James Brokenshire: I can give a categorical no to the hon. Lady’s question. This is rather about the manner in which the Prevent strategy has been advanced and, indeed, the separate arrangements with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who has the lead responsibility in relation to a number of these matters.

I want to come back to the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles, who opened the debate, and her direct challenge in relation to where the focus should lie and the underpinning of terrorism. I draw her attention to objective one of the Prevent strategy, which is the ideological challenge. That is absolutely at the heart of the Prevent strategy—the work we do as central Government and the work undertaken at a local level in communities. It says in terms:

“All terrorist groups have an ideology. Promoting that ideology, frequently on the internet, facilitates radicalisation and recruitment”,

and

“Challenging ideology and disrupting the ability of terrorists to promote it is a fundamental part of Prevent.”

I will come on to respond—

Hazel Blears rose—

James Brokenshire: I will respond, if I am given a chance, to the amendment the right hon. Lady has tabled and to a number of points other Members have made.

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It is worth underlining that we have made it clear that we will work with all sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation, including, as we have heard, those in education, health care providers and the wider criminal justice system. In legislating, our intention is to spread the many examples of good practice that have developed and to ensure that across the country specified authorities understand the risk from radicalisation in their area, and take proportionate steps to confront and deal with it. What that will mean in practice will be set out in statutory guidance, which I will go on to talk about.

One area that has attracted comment is the power in clause 25 for the Secretary of State to issue directions to a specified authority to enforce the performance of the Prevent duty. Directions may be given only where the Secretary of State is satisfied that the specified authority has failed to discharge that duty. The Secretary of State must consult the Welsh or Scottish Ministers before giving a direction where the direction relates to the devolved functions of a Welsh or Scottish specified authority.

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson), speaking for the Opposition, asked what challenge process there would be. In essence, there is an escalation process. The guidance will set out certain responsibilities for each of the different agencies and institutions. If an agency or institution is then not meeting that, the Government will seek to work with that body to put in place appropriate guidance and steps that may be necessary. I chair a Prevent oversight board—Lord Carlile is a member of it—which seeks to assess our delivery. It would seek to assess that process and perhaps make a recommendation to the Secretary of State in those circumstances. The Secretary of State then has to give a direction, which is open to challenge by way of judicial review. For the Secretary of State to enforce it, she would have to get the specific order from the court and the court would need to enforce it. So there is a clear escalation process. Reaching the end of it would be highly unlikely, but it is absolutely right that we reserve that ability to give directions in that way and provide that escalation process.

That is an important point for the universities sector to understand, and it was certainly in the evidence I gave to the Joint Committee on Human Rights in highlighting some good practices. There is good guidance to be found among individual universities and in other sectors—indeed, I could cite the guidance of the National Union of Students. Many examples of good practice highlight where the duty needs to go, in ensuring that good practice is put in place and in sharing it. So a number of safeguards and limitations are built into these proposals to ensure that the powers are dealt with appropriately, with multiple layers of protection, including judicial oversight. It is important to restate that.

Let me deal with amendments 30 and 31 to chapter 1 of part 5, which stand in the names of the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles and my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). I listen carefully to their recommendations and contributions, because I know the passion they hold for this subject matter, the knowledge they have and their intent to ensure that the Government and society as a whole are doing the right thing when seeking to prevent terrorism and in confronting the narrative, and the perverted and twisted justification

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that may lie behind it. She made some good points in drawing the Committee’s attention to the work of Sara Khan and We Will Inspire, and I am very aware of its work. It is a good example of a civil society group taking action, underlining the role British Muslim women play and empowering people. Other organisations such as Families Against Stress and Trauma are looking at the role of family and seeking to ensure that families feel able to come forward to seek assistance.

Hazel Blears: One issue that has been of deep concern to me for the past few years has been the lack of support for communities more generally to build their resilience to the extremist message. The Government seem now to be making a distinction between their work with individuals and Channel, and their work with families, but what I do not see is the broader work with communities more generally that can help to create a climate within which this ideology is not tolerated, the discourse is not acceptable and work is done on a broader framework. I am concerned about this and I would like to hear from the Minister that communities are not excluded from this programme of work.

James Brokenshire: They absolutely are not. Those communities are very much a core strand of the work. If we look at what Prevent has achieved over the period from 2011, we can see that approval has been granted to 180 projects, reaching out to 55,000 people. This year we are supporting more than 70 projects, and with the engagement of our co-ordinators we are actively building the capability of communities and civil society organisations and providing them with the skills to campaign against extremist material, including that which is available online. I recognise the point that the right hon. Lady makes, but it is absolutely our intent that Prevent will continue to do that work.

5.15 pm

The Prime Minister has announced an additional £130 million to be made available for increased counter-terrorism work, which will include Prevent activity. I can assure the right hon. Lady that although there is still work to do on how the funding is to be allocated between different aspects of our Contest strategy, Prevent will clearly be an important part of the support and indeed will help to meet the obligations that are contemplated in the Bill.

On the counter-terrorism internet referral unit, the right hon. Lady made a point about challenging extremism online, as did the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North. I underline the fact that since the CTIU was set up, 65,000 pieces of unlawful terrorist-related content have been taken down, with 46,000 items being taken down since December 2013. There is the ability to report that. The general point has been made about the role of industry, and there is more that industry can do. That is a point that we as a Government have underlined very clearly. It is also a message that this House has underlined, reflecting as it has on the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee in its recent report.

Let me move now to the specifics of the right hon. Lady’s amendment. In respect of the duties in the Bill, confronting extremism that can lead to terrorism is not some implicit aspect of this but absolutely intrinsic to the work. That was why we did not see the necessity of

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placing this matter in an explicit way in the Bill, because it is so intrinsic in meeting that obligation. We believe that that is adequately covered in the duty, but obviously I will continue to reflect on the clear message that the right hon. Lady has given on this. I recognise the sincerity and the manner in which she has advanced her amendment.

I certainly recognise that extremism goes much wider than terrorism and includes behaviour that it would not be appropriate to target in counter-terrorism legislation or work, and that we must not consider that wide-ranging work solely through the lens of counter-terrorism. That is why the Home Secretary has announced that the Home Office is developing and leading a new extremism strategy across Government, recognising that it is not simply the Home Office that should be involved, as a number of different Departments also have roles and responsibilities. We plan to publish the new strategy in the spring.

Amendment 19 would change clause 24 to say that the Secretary of State “must” instead of “may”

“issue guidance to specified authorities about the exercise of their duty”.

We have publicly committed to issuing guidance at the same time as we commence these provisions. We will be publishing a draft version of that guidance for consultation very shortly. The guidance will set out the type of activity that we expect specified authorities to consider when complying with the duty. The draft guidance will set out a risk-based approach to the Prevent duty. As a starting point, all specified authorities should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area, institution or body. It will also address the circumstances in which it is appropriate to share information and make it clear that neither the Prevent programme nor this duty will involve any covert activity.

I want to take on board the point about universities and freedom of speech. As I have said previously, universities’ commitment to freedom of speech and the rationality underpinning the advancement of knowledge mean that they represent one of our most important safeguards against extremist views and ideologies. The duty is not about restricting freedom of speech.

Diana Johnson: We have not had the advantage of seeing that guidance. Is the Minister saying that there will be just one set of guidance covering all the bodies we have been discussing this afternoon?

James Brokenshire: It is intended to be one set of guidance covering all the relevant public bodies, but our intention is not simply to publish it; we also intend to hold a public consultation. It is not simply about the House being satisfied with the guidance; we intend to consult widely so that these issues can be examined carefully. The hon. Lady also mentioned clinical commissioning groups. Certainly, as part of the consultation, we will want to receive inputs regarding whether any other bodies should be brought within the ambit of the Bill.

Hazel Blears: When we were discussing the need to counter ideology, I asked whether that would be included in the guidance. I think it is absolutely essential that we have that guidance before we debate the Bill on Report, because so much hangs on its contents. It will be impossible for us to take that broader view without it.

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James Brokenshire: I hear that message loud and clear. I hope that the right hon. Lady will receive further reassurance when she reads the guidance.

We shared the details of our proposals with the devolved Administrations at the earliest opportunity, subject to ongoing discussions within the Government. I have spoken and written to the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Justice and the Welsh First Minister about the Bill. The Home Secretary also had the opportunity to discuss these matters with the First Minister in the Joint Ministerial Committee on Monday, which was chaired by the Prime Minister. We continue to work closely with counterparts in the Scottish and Welsh Governments, at both ministerial and official level, but the Government’s intention is that the provisions will apply to Scotland. We are discussing that with the Scottish and Welsh Governments.

I heard the comments from the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart), but this is a reserved matter and many of the specified authorities that will be subject to the duty in Wales and Scotland will exercise devolved functions, so it is important that they continue to work in that way. The clear point is that this is about national security. I think that we can learn in both directions. He said that lessons could be learned from practice in Scotland, and I am sure he would recognise that equally there might be very good lessons—we have heard some examples today—that could be learned from practice in England and Wales.

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North mentioned amendment 20 and the requirement that it be considered. I hope she understands that it is still to be considered by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. We shall wait to hear what it says before making a change of the sort she contemplates. I recognise the need for appropriate examination of these matters and note the comments she has made. We will certainly reflect upon that point in the light of any further considerations and recommendations.

Amendment 21 would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance to support panels in carrying out their functions. As I have explained, clause 28 already includes provision for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance to support a panel in respect of its functions. Guidance already exists for local partnerships. We will consult relevant bodies on how that should be updated and then issue new statutory guidance. The amendment also seeks to provide the panel with a list of approved providers of deradicalisation programmes and ensure that they are subject to monitoring. The list of approved providers is already made available to key members of the panel so that they can determine who might be best placed to deliver a theological or ideological intervention. It is the role of the chair to use the panel’s expertise to identify the most appropriate support package for an individual.

Amendment 22 would amend clause 29 to add the local health care commissioning group and a local representative of the National Offender Management Service as required members. These organisations are listed in schedule 4 as partners of local panels under the duty to co-operate. It is key to the success of the programme that panels have access to the right information and have the most appropriate attendance. I agree that it is essential that partners from health and NOMS co-operate under these provisions, and I believe they

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will. It is not necessary to express that in the terms of the amendment. It may not be appropriate for them to take part in all aspects of the meeting, but we need to keep the matter under review.

Clause 30 places a duty on partners of a panel to co-operate with the panel and the police in carrying out their functions and supporting people who might be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. This will include the giving of information.

Finally—[Hon. Members: “Ah!”] Thank you. Finally, on new clause 12, I say again to the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) that we consult closely with our European partners and that is kept under close review. We take international best practice firmly to heart. Her new clause, which specifies certain European countries, is not needed because of that over-arching requirement.

On the basis of the assurances that I have provided, I ask right hon. and hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.

Hazel Blears: I thank the Minister for his customary good manners, politeness and attention to detail on these issues. I have no doubt that he will consider in great depth the amendments that were tabled.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) for supporting the amendments today, and I thank members of my own Front-Bench team for their attention to detail, helping to raise the profile of Prevent and Channel and countering radicalisation, which is so important to all of us not just in this country, but across the world.

I do not want to ruin the Minister’s Christmas, but he has given me a solemn undertaking that he will continue to consider the substance of our amendments. If, indeed, countering the ideology is intrinsic to all the Prevent work, I still cannot understand why there is a reluctance to make that commitment explicit in the Bill. I accept that it might not be implicit. I accept now that it is intrinsic. I would like the Minister to move just that one step forward from intrinsic to explicit, and if he was able to do that, I would be extremely grateful.

The Minister has also given us an undertaking that the guidance under clause 24 will be available for consideration on Report in this House. That is essential. I am delighted to have that commitment on the record today. On that basis I am happy to withdraw the amendment, reserving my right to come back on Report.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 21 to 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Amendment proposed: 20, page 15, line 21, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

‘(5) Before giving guidance under this section, or revising guidance already given, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—

(a) the proposed guidance or proposed revisions, and

(b) a draft of an order providing for the guidance, or revisions to the guidance, to come into force.

(6) The Secretary of State must make the order, and issue the guidance or (as the case may be) make the revisions to the guidance, if the draft of the order is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(7) Guidance, or revisions to guidance, come into force in accordance with an order under this section.

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(8) Such an order—

(a) is to be a statutory instrument, and

(b) may contain transitional, transitory or saving provision.” .—(Diana Johnson.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided:

Ayes 216, Noes 299.

Division No. 118]

[

5.28 pm

AYES

Abrahams, Debbie

Alexander, Heidi

Allen, Mr Graham

Ashworth, Jonathan

Austin, Ian

Bailey, Mr Adrian

Bain, Mr William

Balls, rh Ed

Banks, Gordon

Barron, rh Kevin

Bayley, Hugh

Beckett, rh Margaret

Begg, Dame Anne

Benn, rh Hilary

Berger, Luciana

Betts, Mr Clive

Blackman-Woods, Roberta

Blears, rh Hazel

Blenkinsop, Tom

Blomfield, Paul

Bradshaw, rh Mr Ben

Brennan, Kevin

Brown, Lyn

Brown, rh Mr Nicholas

Bryant, Chris

Burden, Richard

Burnham, rh Andy

Byrne, rh Mr Liam

Campbell, Mr Ronnie

Carswell, Douglas

Caton, Martin

Chapman, Jenny

Clarke, rh Mr Tom

Clwyd, rh Ann

Coaker, Vernon

Cooper, Rosie

Cooper, rh Yvette

Corbyn, Jeremy

Creagh, Mary

Creasy, Stella

Cruddas, Jon

Cryer, John

Cunningham, Alex

Cunningham, Mr Jim

Cunningham, Sir Tony

Danczuk, Simon

David, Wayne

Davidson, Mr Ian

De Piero, Gloria

Denham, rh Mr John

Docherty, Thomas

Donohoe, Mr Brian H.

Doran, Mr Frank

Doughty, Stephen

Dowd, Jim

Doyle, Gemma

Dromey, Jack

Dugher, Michael

Durkan, Mark

Eagle, Ms Angela

Eagle, Maria

Edwards, Jonathan

Elliott, Julie

Ellman, Mrs Louise

Esterson, Bill

Field, rh Mr Frank

Fitzpatrick, Jim

Flello, Robert

Flint, rh Caroline

Flynn, Paul

Fovargue, Yvonne

Francis, Dr Hywel

Gapes, Mike

Gilmore, Sheila

Glass, Pat

Glindon, Mrs Mary

Goodman, Helen

Greatrex, Tom

Green, Kate

Greenwood, Lilian

Griffith, Nia

Hain, rh Mr Peter

Hamilton, Fabian

Hanson, rh Mr David

Havard, Mr Dai

Healey, rh John

Hepburn, Mr Stephen

Hermon, Lady

Heyes, David

Hillier, Meg

Hilling, Julie

Hodge, rh Margaret

Hodgson, Mrs Sharon

Hoey, Kate

Hopkins, Kelvin

Hosie, Stewart

Howarth, rh Mr George

Hunt, Tristram

Irranca-Davies, Huw

Jackson, Glenda

James, Mrs Siân C.

Jamieson, Cathy

Jarvis, Dan

Johnson, rh Alan

Johnson, Diana

Jones, Graham

Jones, Helen

Jones, Mr Kevan

Jones, Susan Elan

Kane, Mike

Keeley, Barbara

Kendall, Liz

Khan, rh Sadiq

Lammy, rh Mr David

Lavery, Ian

Lazarowicz, Mark

Lewell-Buck, Mrs Emma

Llwyd, rh Mr Elfyn

Love, Mr Andrew

Lucas, Caroline

Lucas, Ian

MacNeil, Mr Angus Brendan

Mactaggart, Fiona

Mann, John

Marsden, Mr Gordon

McCabe, Steve

McCann, Mr Michael

McCarthy, Kerry

McClymont, Gregg

McDonagh, Siobhain

McDonald, Andy

McDonnell, John

McGovern, Alison

McGovern, Jim

McGuire, rh Mrs Anne

McInnes, Liz

McKechin, Ann

McKenzie, Mr Iain

Meale, Sir Alan

Mearns, Ian

Miller, Andrew

Mitchell, Austin

Moon, Mrs Madeleine

Morden, Jessica

Morrice, Graeme

(Livingston)

Morris, Grahame M.

(Easington)

Munn, Meg

Murphy, rh Paul

Murray, Ian

Nandy, Lisa

Nash, Pamela

O'Donnell, Fiona

Onwurah, Chi

Osborne, Sandra

Owen, Albert

Pearce, Teresa

Perkins, Toby

Phillipson, Bridget

Pound, Stephen

Powell, Lucy

Raynsford, rh Mr Nick

Reckless, Mark

Reed, Mr Steve

Reynolds, Emma

Reynolds, Jonathan

Riordan, Mrs Linda

Ritchie, Ms Margaret

Robertson, Angus

Robertson, John

Robinson, Mr Geoffrey

Rotheram, Steve

Roy, Mr Frank

Roy, Lindsay

Ruane, Chris

Ruddock, rh Dame Joan

Sarwar, Anas

Sawford, Andy

Seabeck, Alison

Shannon, Jim

Sharma, Mr Virendra

Sheridan, Jim

Shuker, Gavin

Skinner, Mr Dennis

Slaughter, Mr Andy

Smith, Angela

Smith, Nick

Smith, Owen

Spellar, rh Mr John

Straw, rh Mr Jack

Stringer, Graham

Stuart, Ms Gisela

Sutcliffe, Mr Gerry

Tami, Mark

Thomas, Mr Gareth

Timms, rh Stephen

Turner, Karl

Twigg, Derek

Twigg, Stephen

Umunna, Mr Chuka

Vaz, rh Keith

Vaz, Valerie

Walley, Joan

Watson, Mr Tom

Watts, Mr Dave

Whiteford, Dr Eilidh

Whitehead, Dr Alan

Williams, Hywel

Williamson, Chris

Wilson, Phil

Winnick, Mr David

Winterton, rh Ms Rosie

Wishart, Pete

Wood, Mike

Woodcock, John

Wright, David

Wright, Mr Iain

Tellers for the Ayes:

Mr David Hamilton

and

Nic Dakin

NOES

Adams, Nigel

Afriyie, Adam

Aldous, Peter

Alexander, rh Danny

Arbuthnot, rh Mr James

Bacon, Mr Richard

Baker, Steve

Baldry, rh Sir Tony

Baldwin, Harriett

Barker, rh Gregory

Baron, Mr John

Barwell, Gavin

Bebb, Guto

Beith, rh Sir Alan

Bellingham, Mr Henry

Benyon, Richard

Beresford, Sir Paul

Berry, Jake

Bingham, Andrew

Blackwood, Nicola

Boles, Nick

Bone, Mr Peter

Bottomley, Sir Peter

Bradley, Karen

Brady, Mr Graham

Bray, Angie

Brazier, Mr Julian

Bridgen, Andrew

Brine, Steve

Brokenshire, James

Brooke, rh Annette

Bruce, Fiona

Bruce, rh Sir Malcolm

Buckland, Mr Robert

Burns, Conor

Burns, rh Mr Simon

Burrowes, Mr David

Burstow, rh Paul

Burt, rh Alistair

Burt, Lorely

Byles, Dan

Cairns, Alun

Carmichael, Neil

Cash, Sir William

Chishti, Rehman

Chope, Mr Christopher

Clappison, Mr James

Clark, rh Greg

Clarke, rh Mr Kenneth

Clegg, rh Mr Nick

Clifton-Brown, Geoffrey

Coffey, Dr Thérèse

Collins, Damian

Colvile, Oliver

Cox, Mr Geoffrey

Crabb, rh Stephen

Crockart, Mike

Crouch, Tracey

Davey, rh Mr Edward

Davies, David T. C.

(Monmouth)

Davies, Glyn

Davies, Philip

Davis, rh Mr David

de Bois, Nick

Dinenage, Caroline

Djanogly, Mr Jonathan

Dorrell, rh Mr Stephen

Doyle-Price, Jackie

Duncan, rh Sir Alan

Duncan Smith, rh Mr Iain

Ellis, Michael

Ellison, Jane

Elphicke, Charlie

Evans, Graham

Evans, Jonathan

Evans, Mr Nigel

Evennett, Mr David

Fabricant, Michael

Fallon, rh Michael

Farron, Tim

Featherstone, rh Lynne

Field, Mark

Foster, rh Mr Don

Fox, rh Dr Liam

Francois, rh Mr Mark

Freeman, George

Freer, Mike

Fullbrook, Lorraine

Fuller, Richard

Gale, Sir Roger

Garnier, Sir Edward

Garnier, Mark

Gauke, Mr David

George, Andrew

Gibb, Mr Nick

Gilbert, Stephen

Glen, John

Goldsmith, Zac

Goodwill, Mr Robert

Graham, Richard

Grant, Mrs Helen

Gray, Mr James

Grayling, rh Chris

Green, rh Damian

Grieve, rh Mr Dominic

Griffiths, Andrew

Gummer, Ben

Gyimah, Mr Sam

Halfon, Robert

Hames, Duncan

Hammond, Stephen

Hancock, rh Matthew

Hancock, Mr Mike

Hands, rh Greg

Harper, Mr Mark

Harrington, Richard

Harris, Rebecca

Harvey, Sir Nick

Haselhurst, rh Sir Alan

Hayes, rh Mr John

Heald, Sir Oliver

Heath, Mr David

Heaton-Harris, Chris

Hemming, John

Henderson, Gordon

Hendry, Charles

Herbert, rh Nick

Hinds, Damian

Hoban, Mr Mark

Hollingbery, George

Hollobone, Mr Philip

Holloway, Mr Adam

Hopkins, Kris

Howarth, Sir Gerald

Howell, John

Hughes, rh Simon

Hunt, rh Mr Jeremy

Hunter, Mark

Hurd, Mr Nick

Jackson, Mr Stewart

Jenkin, Mr Bernard

Jenrick, Robert

Johnson, Gareth

Johnson, Joseph

Jones, Andrew

Jones, rh Mr David

Jones, Mr Marcus

Kawczynski, Daniel

Kelly, Chris

Knight, rh Sir Greg

Kwarteng, Kwasi

Lamb, rh Norman

Lancaster, Mark

Latham, Pauline

Leadsom, Andrea

Lee, Jessica

Leech, Mr John

Lefroy, Jeremy

Leigh, Sir Edward

Leslie, Charlotte

Letwin, rh Mr Oliver

Lewis, Brandon

Lewis, Dr Julian

Lilley, rh Mr Peter

Lloyd, Stephen

Lopresti, Jack

Loughton, Tim

Luff, Sir Peter

Lumley, Karen

Macleod, Mary

Main, Mrs Anne

Maude, rh Mr Francis

Maynard, Paul

McCartney, Jason

McCartney, Karl

McIntosh, Miss Anne

McLoughlin, rh Mr Patrick

McPartland, Stephen

McVey, rh Esther

Menzies, Mark

Metcalfe, Stephen

Miller, rh Maria

Mills, Nigel

Milton, Anne

Mitchell, rh Mr Andrew

Moore, rh Michael

Mordaunt, Penny

Morgan, rh Nicky

Morris, Anne Marie

Morris, David

Morris, James

Mosley, Stephen

Mowat, David

Mundell, rh David

Munt, Tessa

Murray, Sheryll

Neill, Robert

Newmark, Mr Brooks

Newton, Sarah

Nokes, Caroline

Norman, Jesse

Nuttall, Mr David

O'Brien, rh Mr Stephen

Offord, Dr Matthew

Ollerenshaw, Eric

Opperman, Guy

Ottaway, rh Sir Richard

Parish, Neil

Patel, Priti

Paterson, rh Mr Owen

Pawsey, Mark

Penning, rh Mike

Penrose, John

Percy, Andrew

Perry, Claire

Phillips, Stephen

Pickles, rh Mr Eric

Pincher, Christopher

Poulter, Dr Daniel

Prisk, Mr Mark

Pugh, John

Randall, rh Sir John

Redwood, rh Mr John

Rees-Mogg, Jacob

Reevell, Simon

Reid, Mr Alan

Robathan, rh Mr Andrew

Robertson, rh Sir Hugh

Robertson, Mr Laurence

Rosindell, Andrew

Rudd, Amber

Ruffley, Mr David

Russell, Sir Bob

Rutley, David

Sanders, Mr Adrian

Sandys, Laura

Scott, Mr Lee

Selous, Andrew

Shapps, rh Grant

Sharma, Alok

Shelbrooke, Alec

Simpson, Mr Keith

Skidmore, Chris

Smith, Chloe

Smith, Henry

Smith, Julian

Smith, Sir Robert

Soames, rh Sir Nicholas

Soubry, Anna

Spelman, rh Mrs Caroline

Spencer, Mr Mark

Stanley, rh Sir John

Stephenson, Andrew

Stevenson, John

Stewart, Bob

Stewart, Iain

Stewart, Rory

Stride, Mel

Stunell, rh Sir Andrew

Sturdy, Julian

Swales, Ian

Swayne, rh Mr Desmond

Swinson, Jo

Swire, rh Mr Hugo

Syms, Mr Robert

Thurso, rh John

Timpson, Mr Edward

Tomlinson, Justin

Tredinnick, David

Truss, rh Elizabeth

Turner, Mr Andrew

Uppal, Paul

Vaizey, Mr Edward

Vara, Mr Shailesh

Vickers, Martin

Walker, Mr Charles

Walker, Mr Robin

Walter, Mr Robert

Ward, Mr David

Watkinson, Dame Angela

Wharton, James

Wheeler, Heather

White, Chris

Whittaker, Craig

Whittingdale, Mr John

Wiggin, Bill

Willetts, rh Mr David

Williams, Mr Mark

Williams, Roger

Williams, Stephen

Williamson, Gavin

Willott, Jenny

Wilson, Mr Rob

Wollaston, Dr Sarah

Wright, rh Jeremy

Wright, Simon

Yeo, Mr Tim

Young, rh Sir George

Zahawi, Nadhim

Tellers for the Noes:

Tom Brake

and

Mr Ben Wallace

Question accordingly negatived.

16 Dec 2014 : Column 1348

16 Dec 2014 : Column 1349

16 Dec 2014 : Column 1350

Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 25 to 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Clauses 31 to 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

16 Dec 2014 : Column 1351

New Clause 12

Review of international best practice around deradicalisation

‘(1) The Secretary of State Shall, within three months of this Act coming into force, lay before both Houses of Parliament a review into international best practice around deradicalisation.

(2) The review under subsection (1) shall include in particular—

(a) examination of best practice in—

(i) Germany;

(ii) Denmark;

(iii) Sweden;

(iv) other countries as determined by the Secretary of State.

(b) the role of community-based organisations in developing and delivering strategies to prevent radicalisation and to deradicalise individuals.

(c) evidence-based recommendations for the rapid implementation of a comprehensive deradicalisation programme in the UK.’—(Caroline Lucas.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee divided:

Ayes 217, Noes 296.

Division No. 119]

[

5.40 pm

AYES

Abrahams, Debbie

Alexander, Heidi

Allen, Mr Graham

Ashworth, Jonathan

Austin, Ian

Bailey, Mr Adrian

Bain, Mr William

Balls, rh Ed

Banks, Gordon

Barron, rh Kevin

Bayley, Hugh

Beckett, rh Margaret

Begg, Dame Anne

Benn, rh Hilary

Berger, Luciana

Betts, Mr Clive

Blackman-Woods, Roberta

Blears, rh Hazel

Blenkinsop, Tom

Blomfield, Paul

Blunkett, rh Mr David

Bradshaw, rh Mr Ben

Brennan, Kevin

Brown, Lyn

Brown, rh Mr Nicholas

Bryant, Chris

Burden, Richard

Burnham, rh Andy

Byrne, rh Mr Liam

Campbell, Mr Ronnie

Carswell, Douglas

Caton, Martin

Chapman, Jenny

Clarke, rh Mr Tom

Clwyd, rh Ann

Coaker, Vernon

Cooper, Rosie

Cooper, rh Yvette

Creagh, Mary

Creasy, Stella

Cruddas, Jon

Cryer, John

Cunningham, Alex

Cunningham, Mr Jim

Cunningham, Sir Tony

Dakin, Nic

Danczuk, Simon

David, Wayne

Davidson, Mr Ian

Davis, rh Mr David

De Piero, Gloria

Denham, rh Mr John

Docherty, Thomas

Donohoe, Mr Brian H.

Doran, Mr Frank

Doughty, Stephen

Dowd, Jim

Doyle, Gemma

Dromey, Jack

Dugher, Michael

Durkan, Mark

Eagle, Ms Angela

Eagle, Maria

Edwards, Jonathan

Elliott, Julie

Ellman, Mrs Louise

Esterson, Bill

Field, rh Mr Frank

Fitzpatrick, Jim

Flello, Robert

Flint, rh Caroline

Flynn, Paul

Fovargue, Yvonne

Francis, Dr Hywel

Gapes, Mike

Gilmore, Sheila

Glass, Pat

Glindon, Mrs Mary

Goodman, Helen

Greatrex, Tom

Green, Kate

Greenwood, Lilian

Griffith, Nia

Hain, rh Mr Peter

Hamilton, Mr David

Hamilton, Fabian

Hanson, rh Mr David

Havard, Mr Dai

Healey, rh John

Hepburn, Mr Stephen

Hermon, Lady

Heyes, David

Hillier, Meg

Hilling, Julie

Hodgson, Mrs Sharon

Hoey, Kate

Hopkins, Kelvin

Hosie, Stewart

Howarth, rh Mr George

Hunt, Tristram

Irranca-Davies, Huw

Jackson, Glenda

James, Mrs Siân C.

Jamieson, Cathy

Jarvis, Dan

Johnson, rh Alan

Johnson, Diana

Jones, Graham

Jones, Helen

Jones, Mr Kevan

Jones, Susan Elan

Kane, Mike

Keeley, Barbara

Kendall, Liz

Khan, rh Sadiq

Lammy, rh Mr David

Lavery, Ian

Lazarowicz, Mark

Lewell-Buck, Mrs Emma

Llwyd, rh Mr Elfyn

Love, Mr Andrew

Lucas, Caroline

Lucas, Ian

MacNeil, Mr Angus Brendan

Mactaggart, Fiona

Mann, John

Marsden, Mr Gordon

McCabe, Steve

McCann, Mr Michael

McCarthy, Kerry

McClymont, Gregg

McDonagh, Siobhain

McDonald, Andy

McDonnell, John

McGovern, Alison

McGovern, Jim

McGuire, rh Mrs Anne

McInnes, Liz

McKechin, Ann

McKenzie, Mr Iain

Meale, Sir Alan

Mearns, Ian

Miller, Andrew

Mitchell, Austin

Moon, Mrs Madeleine

Morden, Jessica

Morrice, Graeme

(Livingston)

Morris, Grahame M.

(Easington)

Munn, Meg

Murphy, rh Paul

Murray, Ian

Nandy, Lisa

Nash, Pamela

O'Donnell, Fiona

Onwurah, Chi

Osborne, Sandra

Owen, Albert

Pearce, Teresa

Perkins, Toby

Phillipson, Bridget

Pound, Stephen

Powell, Lucy

Raynsford, rh Mr Nick

Reckless, Mark

Reed, Mr Steve

Reynolds, Emma

Reynolds, Jonathan

Riordan, Mrs Linda

Ritchie, Ms Margaret

Robertson, Angus

Robertson, John

Robinson, Mr Geoffrey

Rotheram, Steve

Roy, Mr Frank

Roy, Lindsay

Ruane, Chris

Ruddock, rh Dame Joan

Sarwar, Anas

Sawford, Andy

Seabeck, Alison

Shannon, Jim

Sharma, Mr Virendra

Sheridan, Jim

Shuker, Gavin

Skinner, Mr Dennis

Slaughter, Mr Andy

Smith, Angela

Smith, Nick

Smith, Owen

Spellar, rh Mr John

Straw, rh Mr Jack

Stringer, Graham

Stuart, Ms Gisela

Sutcliffe, Mr Gerry

Tami, Mark

Thomas, Mr Gareth

Timms, rh Stephen

Turner, Karl

Twigg, Derek

Twigg, Stephen

Umunna, Mr Chuka

Vaz, rh Keith

Vaz, Valerie

Walley, Joan

Watson, Mr Tom

Watts, Mr Dave

Whiteford, Dr Eilidh

Whitehead, Dr Alan

Williams, Hywel

Williamson, Chris

Wilson, Phil

Winnick, Mr David

Winterton, rh Ms Rosie

Wood, Mike

Woodcock, John

Wright, David

Wright, Mr Iain

Tellers for the Ayes:

Pete Wishart

and

Jeremy Corbyn

NOES

Adams, Nigel

Afriyie, Adam

Aldous, Peter

Alexander, rh Danny

Arbuthnot, rh Mr James

Bacon, Mr Richard

Baker, Steve

Baldry, rh Sir Tony

Baldwin, Harriett

Barker, rh Gregory

Baron, Mr John

Barwell, Gavin

Bebb, Guto

Beith, rh Sir Alan

Bellingham, Mr Henry

Benyon, Richard

Beresford, Sir Paul

Berry, Jake

Bingham, Andrew

Blackwood, Nicola

Boles, Nick

Bone, Mr Peter

Bottomley, Sir Peter

Bradley, Karen

Brady, Mr Graham

Bray, Angie

Brazier, Mr Julian

Bridgen, Andrew

Brine, Steve

Brokenshire, James

Brooke, rh Annette

Bruce, Fiona

Bruce, rh Sir Malcolm

Buckland, Mr Robert

Burns, Conor

Burns, rh Mr Simon

Burrowes, Mr David

Burstow, rh Paul

Burt, rh Alistair

Burt, Lorely

Byles, Dan

Cairns, Alun

Carmichael, Neil

Cash, Sir William

Chishti, Rehman

Chope, Mr Christopher

Clappison, Mr James

Clark, rh Greg

Clarke, rh Mr Kenneth

Clegg, rh Mr Nick

Clifton-Brown, Geoffrey

Coffey, Dr Thérèse

Collins, Damian

Colvile, Oliver

Cox, Mr Geoffrey

Crabb, rh Stephen

Crockart, Mike

Crouch, Tracey

Davey, rh Mr Edward

Davies, David T. C.

(Monmouth)

Davies, Glyn

Davies, Philip

de Bois, Nick

Dinenage, Caroline

Djanogly, Mr Jonathan

Dorrell, rh Mr Stephen

Doyle-Price, Jackie

Duncan, rh Sir Alan

Duncan Smith, rh Mr Iain

Ellis, Michael

Ellison, Jane

Elphicke, Charlie

Evans, Graham

Evans, Jonathan

Evans, Mr Nigel

Evennett, Mr David

Fabricant, Michael

Fallon, rh Michael

Farron, Tim

Featherstone, rh Lynne

Field, Mark

Foster, rh Mr Don

Fox, rh Dr Liam

Francois, rh Mr Mark

Freeman, George

Freer, Mike

Fullbrook, Lorraine

Fuller, Richard

Gale, Sir Roger

Garnier, Sir Edward

Garnier, Mark

Gauke, Mr David

George, Andrew

Gibb, Mr Nick

Gilbert, Stephen

Glen, John

Goldsmith, Zac

Goodwill, Mr Robert

Graham, Richard

Grant, Mrs Helen

Gray, Mr James

Grayling, rh Chris

Green, rh Damian

Grieve, rh Mr Dominic

Griffiths, Andrew

Gyimah, Mr Sam

Halfon, Robert

Hames, Duncan

Hammond, Stephen

Hancock, rh Matthew

Hancock, Mr Mike

Hands, rh Greg

Harper, Mr Mark

Harrington, Richard

Harris, Rebecca

Harvey, Sir Nick

Haselhurst, rh Sir Alan

Hayes, rh Mr John

Heald, Sir Oliver

Heath, Mr David

Heaton-Harris, Chris

Hemming, John

Henderson, Gordon

Hendry, Charles

Herbert, rh Nick

Hinds, Damian

Hoban, Mr Mark

Hollingbery, George

Hollobone, Mr Philip

Holloway, Mr Adam

Hopkins, Kris

Howarth, Sir Gerald

Howell, John

Hughes, rh Simon

Hunt, rh Mr Jeremy

Hunter, Mark

Hurd, Mr Nick

Jackson, Mr Stewart

Jenkin, Mr Bernard

Jenrick, Robert

Johnson, Gareth

Johnson, Joseph

Jones, Andrew

Jones, rh Mr David

Jones, Mr Marcus

Kawczynski, Daniel

Kelly, Chris

Knight, rh Sir Greg

Kwarteng, Kwasi

Lamb, rh Norman

Lancaster, Mark

Latham, Pauline

Leadsom, Andrea

Lee, Jessica

Leech, Mr John

Lefroy, Jeremy

Leigh, Sir Edward

Leslie, Charlotte

Letwin, rh Mr Oliver

Lewis, Brandon

Lewis, Dr Julian

Lilley, rh Mr Peter

Lloyd, Stephen

Lopresti, Jack

Loughton, Tim

Luff, Sir Peter

Lumley, Karen

Macleod, Mary

Main, Mrs Anne

Maude, rh Mr Francis

Maynard, Paul

McCartney, Jason

McCartney, Karl

McIntosh, Miss Anne

McLoughlin, rh Mr Patrick

McPartland, Stephen

McVey, rh Esther

Menzies, Mark

Metcalfe, Stephen

Miller, rh Maria

Mills, Nigel

Milton, Anne

Mitchell, rh Mr Andrew

Moore, rh Michael

Mordaunt, Penny

Morgan, rh Nicky

Morris, Anne Marie

Morris, David

Morris, James

Mosley, Stephen

Mowat, David

Mundell, rh David

Munt, Tessa

Murray, Sheryll

Neill, Robert

Newmark, Mr Brooks

Newton, Sarah

Nokes, Caroline

Norman, Jesse

Nuttall, Mr David

O'Brien, rh Mr Stephen

Offord, Dr Matthew

Ollerenshaw, Eric

Opperman, Guy

Ottaway, rh Sir Richard

Parish, Neil

Patel, Priti

Paterson, rh Mr Owen

Pawsey, Mark

Penning, rh Mike

Penrose, John

Percy, Andrew

Perry, Claire

Phillips, Stephen

Pickles, rh Mr Eric

Pincher, Christopher

Poulter, Dr Daniel

Prisk, Mr Mark

Pugh, John

Randall, rh Sir John

Rees-Mogg, Jacob

Reevell, Simon

Reid, Mr Alan

Robathan, rh Mr Andrew

Robertson, rh Sir Hugh

Robertson, Mr Laurence

Rosindell, Andrew

Rudd, Amber

Ruffley, Mr David

Russell, Sir Bob

Rutley, David

Sanders, Mr Adrian

Sandys, Laura

Scott, Mr Lee

Selous, Andrew

Shapps, rh Grant

Sharma, Alok

Shelbrooke, Alec

Simpson, Mr Keith

Skidmore, Chris

Smith, Chloe

Smith, Henry

Smith, Julian

Smith, Sir Robert

Soames, rh Sir Nicholas

Soubry, Anna

Spelman, rh Mrs Caroline

Spencer, Mr Mark

Stanley, rh Sir John

Stephenson, Andrew

Stevenson, John

Stewart, Bob

Stewart, Iain

Stewart, Rory

Stride, Mel

Stunell, rh Sir Andrew

Sturdy, Julian

Swales, Ian

Swayne, rh Mr Desmond

Swinson, Jo

Swire, rh Mr Hugo

Syms, Mr Robert

Thurso, rh John

Timpson, Mr Edward

Tomlinson, Justin

Tredinnick, David

Truss, rh Elizabeth

Turner, Mr Andrew

Uppal, Paul

Vaizey, Mr Edward

Vara, Mr Shailesh

Vickers, Martin

Walker, Mr Charles

Walker, Mr Robin

Walter, Mr Robert

Ward, Mr David

Watkinson, Dame Angela

Wharton, James

Wheeler, Heather

White, Chris

Whittaker, Craig

Whittingdale, Mr John

Wiggin, Bill

Willetts, rh Mr David

Williams, Mr Mark

Williams, Roger

Williams, Stephen

Williamson, Gavin

Willott, Jenny

Wilson, Mr Rob

Wollaston, Dr Sarah

Wright, rh Jeremy

Wright, Simon

Yeo, Mr Tim

Young, rh Sir George

Zahawi, Nadhim

Tellers for the Noes:

Tom Brake

and

Mr Ben Wallace

Question accordingly negatived.

16 Dec 2014 : Column 1352

16 Dec 2014 : Column 1353

16 Dec 2014 : Column 1354

16 Dec 2014 : Column 1355

Clause 34

Insurance against payments made in response to terrorist demands

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Temporary Chair (Mr Gary Streeter): With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Clause 35 stand part.

Schedule 5 stand part.

James Brokenshire: Clauses 34 and 35 address two discrete but important aspects. Clause 34 amends the Terrorism Act 2000, so that an offence is committed if an insurer or reinsurer reimburses a payment that they know, or have reasonable cause to suspect, has been made in response to a terrorist demand. Like other terrorist-financing offences, the measure will have extraterritorial effect. As a result of the measure, we will ensure and put beyond any doubt that UK insurance companies do not form part of a terrorism ransom chain, and that those who make payments to terrorist entities cannot be reimbursed for the payment.

Clause 35 introduces schedule 5, which contains amendments to the power to examine goods at ports contained in schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, as well as amendments to other enactments relating to that power. Those changes follow on from a number of recommendations that David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, highlighted in terms of the need for certain clarifications in respect of the specific schedule 7 power. The purpose of these changes is to clarify the legal position in relation to where goods may be examined and the examination of goods that comprise items of post, and to put beyond doubt the basis in law for this vital investigative capability.

Mr David Hanson (Delyn) (Lab): I thank the Minister for his helpful explanation. It is right that we do not pay ransoms and that insurance companies are not allowed to do so. The Bill proposes to make it illegal to make payments on ransom insurance policies, and that is an argument I support and do not wish to argue against this evening. However, I do want to ask him a couple of questions.

Will the Minister tell the Committee how he has consulted insurance companies on the impact and implementation of these measures? The Government’s own impact assessment makes it clear that there is a risk that:

“UK insurers/reinsurers may lose business. Overseas insurers may be able to offer the same product as UK insurers but without this restriction. Based on consultation, we estimate…UK insurers/reinsurers’ annual gross premium income from kidnap and ransom insurance policies to be between £60 and £160 million.”

16 Dec 2014 : Column 1356

a year. There are two issues I want to raise. What response has he had from insurers on their potential loss of £160 million? I am particularly concerned about whether the measure will simply transfer that insurance risk to companies that operate abroad.

I want clarity on clause 34, which makes it a criminal offence for people in the UK to take out ransom insurance. If a UK citizen insured themselves through a foreign company, would the provisions still apply? The Minister has mentioned extraterritorial reach, but I want to be clear that the Bill does not deny UK insurance companies the premiums of £60 million to £160 million by simply transferring the fund to foreign companies. Will the provision apply to a company based in the UK but whose policy could be placed with an insurance underwriter based in America, France or Rome? I would be interested to know whether all those aspects are covered. I am sure the Minister will be able to allay my concerns and fears.

As an Opposition spokesman I continue to support the straightforward principle—I supported it when I was a Minister—that we do not pay ransom demands, because they simply encourage further kidnappings and associated activity. Does the Bill cover other areas, such as a kidnapped oil worker? We may not pay a ransom, but there might be insurance issues related to covering his loss of salary or his mortgage payments. I want to be clear that the measures cover the issue of ransom, as opposed to other insurance matters that a responsible company would want to implement.

Finally, the Bill has a clear definition of terrorism, but I would welcome the Minister’s view of, for example, Somali pirates. They are not terrorists, but does the definition cover the payment of ransoms in general, or is its focus on terrorism alone? If the Minister wishes to table further amendments, I would be happy to support measures that address other types of ransom, because it is a cardinal principle that we do not pay ransoms in any way, shape or form for individuals who have been kidnapped. I do not quite understand the Minister’s approach to insurance payments, helpful though it is, and I would welcome an explanation of his position on other types of kidnap ransoms.

We support clause 35, which is a sensible measure. I do not need to say anything else. I hope the Minister will respond to my comments.

James Brokenshire: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his support. It is a sobering fact that ISIL alone made $35 billion to $45 billion between September 2013 and September 2014. There is no doubt that that has boosted its capability. Simply put, money paid to terrorists equals an increased threat to the safety of UK citizens. The right hon. Gentleman understands that, as he made clear in his speech.

We consulted leading representatives of the insurance industry and its regulators, the police and operational and international partners about the measure. We have had constructive discussions with the industry. This is a niche part of the wider insurance market and it makes up only a small part of the business of those insurers. Insurance companies have been clear that their policies exclude reimbursement of ransoms paid to proscribed groups in any case. The point of the measure is to make that absolutely clear and put it beyond doubt. Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2000 centres on what constitutes arrangements and we are seeking to provide complete

16 Dec 2014 : Column 1357

clarity. The measures are framed in the context of terrorism, although there are various insurance policies that operate in the market, because they are intended to prevent money going to terrorist groups.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about extraterritorial jurisdiction. The measures are intended to govern insurance companies based in the UK, so that they cannot offshore those payments; if they have some other insurance company with links to the UK, that company will be caught by the measures. It is therefore important that the legislation is framed in that manner.

6 pm

There is no suggestion that UK insurance companies have been paying or facilitating the payment of terrorist ransoms. The UK insurance industry conducts itself professionally and with due regard to UK legislation and regulations. However, we do not want insurance companies to be put in a position in which they reimburse payments that have gone to terrorist groups, which does represent a real risk. It is important that we underline the due diligence that both insurance companies and their customers should undertake in such situations.

We believe that this legislation will give a clear message that kidnap for ransom is deplorable. The focus of the Bill is countering terrorism, and ransom payments can provide terrorist groups with huge injections of money, which they can then use in threatening the public. That is why the measures are required.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clause 36

Privacy and Civil Liberties Board

Diana Johnson: I beg to move amendment 24, page 22, line 14, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

“(1) The Secretary of State shall by regulations made by statutory instrument establish a body to—

(a) provide advice and assistance to the persons appointed under—

(i) section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006,

(ii) section 31(1) of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing &c. Act 2010, and

(iii) section 20(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011,

in the discharge of their statutory functions;

(b) review the operation, effectiveness and implications of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, the CounterTerrorism Act 2008, this Act, and any other law or prerogative power to the extent that it relates to counter-terrorism;

(c) consider whether such legislation contains appropriate safeguards, is proportionate and remains necessary;

(d) review intelligence-sharing guidance and practice to the extent that it relates to counter-terrorism and the functions of the Board;

(e) make recommendations to any public authority about the exercise of its statutory functions relating to the prevention of terrorism;

(f) undertake inquiries relating to counter-terrorism when

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invited to do so by the Home Secretary, the Treasury or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, or on the initiative of the Board;

(g) encourage good practice in the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of terrorism.

(h) provide advice and assistance to Government on the development and implementation of policy relating to the prevention of terrorism.”

This expands the remit of the body to match that which is described in the Government‘s Terms of Reference for this

body

.

The Temporary Chair (Mr Gary Streeter): With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 23, page 22, line 22, leave out “Privacy and Civil Liberties Board” and insert “Counter Terrorism Oversight Panel”.

This would rename the body created by Clause 36.

Amendment 25,  page 22, line 25, at end insert

“in accordance with the Code of Public Appointments”.

Amendment 26,  page 22, line 32, at end insert—

“(i) the information-gathering powers of the board;

(j) reporting requirements, and the formulation of and consultation on an annual work plan;

(k) the access to such relevant classified material as may be required in order for the board to undertake its functions under subsection (1);”

This increases the points that have to be included in regulation brought forward by the Secretary of State to include information gathering powers, formulation of an annual work plan and relevant to classified material.

Amendment 8, page 22, line 32, at end insert—

“(3A) Regulations under section (3) shall include provision requiring the board to undertake an inquiry into the retention of and access to data relating to professions that operate under a duty of confidentiality.”

Amendment 9, page 22, line 34, at end insert—

“(4A) Regulations under section (3) shall provide for the membership of the board to include representatives of professions who operate under a duty of confidentiality.”

Amendment 10, page 23, line 9, at end insert—

““professions who operate under a duty of confidentiality” shall include, but not be limited to, journalists, legal representatives, medical professionals and Members of Parliament.”

Clause 36 stand part.

Clause 37 stand part.

Amendment 18, in clause 38, page 23, line 31, at end insert—

“(4A) The Secretary of State must consult with Welsh Ministers before making provisions under subsection (1) so far as relating to any Measure or Act of the National Assembly of Wales.

(4B) The Secretary of State must consult with Scottish Ministers before making provisions under subsection (1) so far as relating to any Act or instrument of the Scottish Parliament.

(4C) The Secretary of State must consult with the Northern Ireland Executive before making provisions under subsection (1) so far as relating to any Act or instrument of the Northern Ireland Assembly.”

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This would ensure that the Secretary of State could not amend legislation from the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly or Northern Ireland Assembly without first consulting with the Scottish or Welsh Governments or the Northern Ireland Executive.

Clauses 38 to 41 stand part.

Government amendment 12.

Clauses 42 and 43 stand part.

New clause 3—Intercept Evidence—use in legal proceedings—

“(1) Section 18 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c.23) is amended as follows.

(2) After paragraph 1(f) insert—

“(g) any proceedings relating to an offence which, if committed in England and Wales at the time of the conviction, would have constituted an offence triable only on indictment (“an indictable-only offence”) under section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.””

This new Clause removes the exclusion of intercept evidence from legal proceedings in criminal prosecutions.

New clause 7—Review of Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament resources and powers—

“The Secretary must, within a reasonable time period, consult the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament and lay a report before Parliament within six months of the commencement of this Act, on the resources and powers of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.”

Diana Johnson: This group of amendments relates to the Government’s plans to create a privacy and civil liberties board. Clause 36 does not actually tell us very much—it is an enabling clause—so I have tabled amendments 24 and 25 to allow us to debate what the board will actually do.

As the clause is drafted, we have a name for the board, and there are three possible ways it could go. First, we have an idea of what a privacy and civil liberties board could look like from its name, which invokes the idea of a body with a wide remit of work on privacy and civil liberties issues in the United Kingdom, and which would safeguard human rights. Such a body would be very similar to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which was created by a Labour Government.

Secondly, the Home Office has published terms of reference, which suggest a body that will support the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in providing oversight of counter-terrorism legislation in the UK and investigating the operation of that legislation. We think that what is contained in the terms of reference is sensible and would provide both capacity and openness in the oversight of counter-terrorism policy. However, as I have said, clause 36 is quite an empty provision at the moment.

The third possible version of the board is as currently constituted in clause 36, which gives the Home Secretary powers to create—in future, if she wishes to do so—procedures, membership and the work plan for the board and provisions on publishing of reports. All those details are left to future secondary legislation.

If the body is created it is important that it has strong powers. Our amendments 23 to 26 would help achieve that. The post of independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has been around for over 40 years and its current formulation was created by a Labour Government. The post works well, and both holders of it since 2001 have served with real distinction. That does not mean that we are opposed to further strengthening of the

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oversight arrangements. Earlier this year, the current independent reviewer, David Anderson, QC, identified the limitations of his reviewer role, including the fact that it was restricted to certain statutes and the fact that significant powers, including those in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, were excluded and were therefore going unreviewed. He also pointed out that as a part-time reviewer without proper administrative support, he has extremely limited capacity.

Mr David Davis: I guess that the precursor of the proposal is the organ with exactly the same name in the United States, which was activated only after the Snowden events, when information was not just put in the public domain but became controversial and raised issues in Washington. The danger is that the body becomes toothless, does not have investigatory powers and cannot pre-empt a future Snowden. It seems to me that the most important aspect of that is the investigatory powers, not the rest.

Diana Johnson: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will contribute to the debate, and I certainly have things to say about the title of the body and what it will be doing.

It is important to note what David Anderson said about being a part-time reviewer without proper administrative support and limited capacity. If the proposals on clause 36 were meant to address those concerns, they do not achieve that. They do nothing to address the areas of counter-terrorism legislation excluded from the remit of the commissioners, such as those in the 2008 Act, the powers in this Bill or use of the royal prerogative. David Anderson notes:

“These omissions reduce confidence in counter-terrorism law and are hard to understand, particularly after the Home Secretary agreed, as recently as March 2013, that ‘the scope of the Independent Reviewer’s responsibilities should keep pace with changes to primary legislation’, and accepted in principle my recommendation that the 2001 and 2008 Acts ‘should be examined with a view to extending your statutory functions to include the review of relevant sections of those Acts’. Indeed, as initially proposed in July, the functions of the PCLB would have extended to both these Acts.”

The Bill does not address issues of capacity and resources for the independent reviewer, either, although the impact assessment suggests that the board will receive far greater resources than those given to the independent reviewer. The cost of members of the board seems to take up much of that, and the impact assessment anticipates that the rate will be £897 a day. Is that correct and will the Minister comment on it?

The work that members of the board will do is not clear, either. The current reviewer describes the relationship between the independent reviewer and the proposed new board as

“ill-defined and potentially problematic”

and goes on to say that

“the idea is…for the Board ‘to provide advice and assistance’ to the Independent Reviewer. Both advice and assistance are always welcome: but the former, including from the most eminent and knowledgeable quarters, is already frequently sought and freely given, whereas the latter is critically lacking. To require the Independent Reviewer to chair a Board…will make further claims on the Independent Reviewer’s time and could easily lead to competing priorities and inefficiencies. For there to be a net benefit, commensurate with the cost of resourcing the Board, its

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members will have to be doers rather than talkers, willing to accept direction in relation to often unglamorous researching and writing tasks.”

The Bill does not make provision for this, nor does the impact assessment’s description explain who will undertake the research and assistance roles that are so badly needed.

Finally, there is an issue about access to documents. Will the panel be security-cleared to the same standard as the independent reviewer? Will the staff? What will be the procedures for redacting documents either before they are passed on to the board or before they are published? These are the issues we are trying to address with our amendments.

Amendment 24 has been tabled to ensure a board with a statutory remit that includes the areas that the independent reviewer does not cover. It will also ensure that the board could respond to other areas of considerable and understandable public concern about the operations of counter-terror policy. We want the board to consider not just privacy but other human rights impacts, as well as the effectiveness of counter-terror policy. As David Anderson points out, counter-terrorism oversight in the past has taken strength from not being limited. If the office of the independent reviewer has influence with the authorities, it is in part because the reviewer can make recommendations to improve not just the fairness, but the effectiveness of counter-terrorism law.

Importantly, especially given the earlier discussions about the breadth of public bodies going to implement Prevent, we also want the board to be allowed to make recommendations to public bodies and public authorities. We tabled amendment 25 in particular to ensure that appointments to this body are made in line with the code of public appointments. We want the board to include real experts who will be able to access materials and provide real insight. We do not want a body compiled through patronage. We tabled amendment 26 to ensure that the statutory instrument creating this body addresses key questions about information gathering, reporting and access to documents.

We would rename the body to give it a title that reflects the nature of what it will actually do. As I said, the current name is misleading. As David Anderson has pointed out, the name not only offers little clue as to the function of the proposed body, but suggests a pure civil liberties watchdog, which this is not. It is not clear why privacy is singled out. Other important human rights are potentially infringed by counter-terrorism law, including the right to liberty, the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression. Mr Anderson takes issue with the word “board”, which he feels is better suited to the historical management of waterways than to the rigorous exercise of scrutiny under the direction of an independent reviewer. So Labour would call the board “a counter-terrorism oversight panel”, and we would give it the powers to back that up.

If the Government are genuinely committed to creating the body they outline in the terms of reference, they should accept these amendments without any hesitation. Of course, this is only part of the oversight package that we require. When the Justice and Security Bill was before the House, the Opposition suggested a number

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of ways of strengthening the Intelligence and Security Committee to give it a stronger, more independent and more open remit. We remain absolutely committed to the ISC and want it to continue to play a vital role in the oversight of the security agencies alongside a more prominent role for the intelligence commissioners, which is why we tabled new clause 7.

Let me turn briefly to the miscellaneous provisions, particularly clause 38, to which I have tabled amendment 19. Under clause 38, the Secretary of State can make changes that are

“consequential on any provision of this Act”

in any piece of legislation made by any UK legislative body, including the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. This is important because under part 5, and particularly under clauses 21, 24 and 30, the Bill creates obligations on a range of bodies that are otherwise entirely devolved. As I mentioned in speaking to an earlier group of amendments, I do not think the Home Secretary should be able to amend devolved legislation without first consulting the relevant Government. That is why we tabled amendment 19, which I hope the Minister will feel able to accept.

Mr David Davis: I shall speak to new clause 3, tabled in my name. It is entitled “Intercept Evidence—use in legal proceedings”. It is a probing amendment and I do not propose to press it to the vote on this occasion. If I had wanted to press it, I would have included in the new clause the relevant legal machinery required, which is complex but not difficult to achieve if I wanted to do so. My aim is to provoke some sort of non-partisan debate on what is the cornerstone of counter-terrorism strategy—the legal treatment of intercept evidence. If need be, depending on what the Minister says and what the Government do in the meantime, I shall come back to the issue on Report.

The United Kingdom is unique among major western powers—common law powers and European Union countries—in not allowing the use of intercept evidence in court. I shall come on to the few exceptions in a moment. Why is that the case? It is difficult to know. GCHQ and its predecessor has always resisted putting any intercept evidence into the public domain. Frankly, this has probably been the case since the invention of the telephone. In the early days, I suspect it happened because gentlemen thought it ungentlemanly to listen in on other people’s conversations. Today, however, the argument advanced by the agencies concerns the protection of technique and capacity. Their attitude is very different from that of every other agency of its sort in the world. All our allies in the “five eyes” countries and beyond are equally concerned about protecting capability, but they also give high priority to the prosecution and conviction of terrorists and those who commit serious crimes. They manage to square that circle, but we do not appear to be able to do so at present.

6.15 pm

The fact that we cannot use intercept evidence makes it more difficult for us to secure convictions in court in terrorism and serious crime cases. Lord Lloyd of Berwick has talked of the

“difficulty of obtaining evidence on which to charge and convict terrorists, particularly those who plan and direct terrorist activities without taking part in their…execution”.

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Obtaining such evidence is incredibly important to those who must deal with the al-Qaeda style of terrorist operation, in which the bit players disappear in a cloud of vapour as they carry out their evil tasks.

I pay attention to Lord Lloyd because he is an appeal judge, a past Interception Commissioner, the man whom the last Conservative Government put in charge of reviewing all terrorism legislation, and a strong advocate of the use of intercept evidence in court—as, indeed, are the past Director of Public Prosecutions Ken Macdonald and the past Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith, along with a large number of senior police officers who are in charge of counter-terrorism.

The result of not being able to use intercept evidence in court is the greater difficulty of securing convictions. That in turn has been used to justify indefinite detention under part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, control orders and terrorism prevention and investigation measures, and the proposals for first 90, then 42, then 28 days of detention without charge. I am glad to say that all those proposals were defeated, or have subsequently been revoked.

What is perhaps worst of all is that the difficulty of securing convictions encourages our counter-terrorism agencies—both the intelligence agencies and the police agencies—to rely too much on disruption rather than prosecution. As the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) is present, let me add that that approach patently failed in Northern Ireland. It leaves too many terrorists on the streets, and leaves the agencies with a bigger job and a very difficult, perhaps impossible, task of assessment. That is clear from the report from the Intelligence and Security Committee on the Lee Rigby murder. The agencies fell down on the assessment of the murderers, who were known to them. The 7/7 bombers were also known to the agencies, but were judged to be too far down the list of 2,000 suspects. The problem is made worse by the failure to prosecute terrorists and to imprison terrorists after their convictions, and the lack of intercept evidence makes it worse still.

GCHQ told the Chilcot inquiry, and the subsequent Privy Council committee, that the use of intercept evidence would not deliver many extra convictions, but it is very hard to square that with evidence from other countries. When I was looking into the matter seven or eight years ago, I went to America to speak to all the various “three letters of the alphabet” agencies over there, as well as—most important in this context—the Department of Justice, about their use of intercept evidence. The man who was the second-highest-ranking representative of the Department of Justice—the highest-ranking non-political appointee—said that not a single terrorism or organised crime case had been successfully prosecuted in the United States without the use of intercept evidence, which was a major part of its massively successful counter-terrorism and counter-Mafia operations.

I have mentioned the Mafia and counter-organised crime operations because the problems involved are quite similar. Obtaining witnesses is difficult, as is obtaining intelligence. Those people kill their witnesses, and they are very clever about their use of communications. The organised crime syndicates in America are better advised than the likes of al-Qaeda by lawyers and technical people. The Americans have something called a CIPA process—CIPA stands for “Confidential Information Protection Act”. There is a CIPA court, which is a bit

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like the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. It involves security-cleared prosecution and defence counsel and a security-cleared judge, and all its hearings take place in secret.

That court decides on what evidence can be put to the main trial. This is a big battle that goes on. It prevents malevolent fishing expeditions by malevolent or badly judged lawyers, but it ensures that both sides of the case get proper treatment and proper justice is delivered. The Department of Justice representative said: “If we win the CIPA case, the main case goes straight to plea bargaining”—in other words, the other side gives in and accepts the outcome. He viewed the British approach as “incomprehensible.”

It is not just the Americans; all the other English-speaking peoples in the “five eyes” do much the same. In 2006, Australia, under its intercept arrangements delivered just short of 1,500 convictions—a combination of serious crime and counter-terrorism work. Its director of public prosecutions was even fiercer. His words at that time were: “If you don’t use intercept against terrorists, you are not being serious.” There are various problems in the UK under the European Court of Human Rights regime which make things a little bit more risky for us than for others, but there are nevertheless issues that can be dealt with.

The agencies talk about protecting methods or techniques and operations. They are both perfectly legitimate concerns and we need to deal with them. Let us deal first with methods or techniques. GCHQ is good but it is no better than the National Security Agency and it is tiny in comparison with the NSA. The techniques that are used to intercept are commonly in the public domain in court in all of the “five eyes” countries—in America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In the days of the internet, we can get court records from around the world, and if we are worried about al-Qaeda knowing what we are doing, it can know by looking at every other country in our alliance, because they do the same things. So I do not think that that argument—the argument of technique—stands up much at all, but we can protect it.

The second question is about protecting individual operations and agents and I will come back to that. This is manageable, too. All the countries—the USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Israel—have techniques for certification and warranting that explicitly protect operations and operational security, again from malevolent defence lawyers going on fishing expeditions. I will cite the example later.

Before I go any further, we should be clear that there is a range of exceptions to the ban on intercept evidence in court. One exception is intercepts carried out in other countries. We have this extraordinary arrangement in our law that means we can use intercepts arrived at abroad but not in the UK, so quite how we deal with the issues of protection of technique and operations in that regard is interesting and debatable. A number of the suspects who were charged after the Heathrow bomb plot were not convicted and the lack of some of those convictions were critical. Three in particular—Ali, Sarwar and Hussain—were so critical that they were retried. The evidence that convicted them was e-mail intercept evidence obtained from Yahoo! in California. It led to their conviction in 2008. That demonstrates straight away the value of intercept in difficult cases. Those intercept data were not initially released because the US

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felt at first that it compromised an existing operation—against a man called Rashid Rauf in Pakistan. He disappeared or died—we do not know which—under strange, mysterious circumstances, and the information was then available because that operation was no longer sensitive. That is a simple example of both the effectiveness of the mechanism and the fact that we can control the information using American or other “five eyes” processes to release it when appropriate, and do it safely.

There are two other exceptions to the use of intercept evidence in court that the House should be aware of. The first is the intercept of telephone and other communications out of prisons, which is open. For example, the Soham killer, Ian Huntley, was convicted largely on the basis of intercept evidence arrived at from there. The second is bugging. If we bug a phone, we can use the information, but if we intercept the phone we cannot. That is an extraordinary distinction, particularly given that if we put a physical bug in the phone I am holding, we could use the data, but if we put a software bug in it, we cannot. That is an astonishing piece of out-of-date law and it needs to be brought up to date.

As I said, the intercept ban inevitably pushes agencies towards disruption rather than prosecution, which, of course, is inevitably less effective and leads to a progressively more difficult problem for agencies over time. The Privy Council committee very nearly recommended allowing a tentative use of intercept evidence some time ago, after Chilcot, but it appeared to be put off by one case that came up at the last minute—Natunen v. the Finnish Government. The ECHR stepped into that case, which revolved around intercept, and struck down the conviction. Natunen had been convicted as a drugs smuggler and some intercept evidence had been used in the case. It turned out that the police had destroyed some other intercept evidence that could have been—may have been—exculpatory. That case shocked the Privy Council committee. The reason for the change of stance at the last minute, as I understand it, was that Chilcot laid out five principles, a couple of which said, “The agencies have at all times to control the recording, transcription, storage and, by implication, the possible destruction of any evidence, and this should only be under the agencies’ control, not under judicial control.” Of course that leads to a problem—if they destroy evidence without judicial control, the balance in a court case may be changed—and so that cannot be done. It seems to me that we need to revisit that issue and start to try to copy some of the techniques used by other countries.

This matter is very technical on one level but straightforward on another, and I go back to what I said about how the Americans do it. They have a court that goes through this information and sifts out what is available to put before the court, which is fair to both sides and does not allow the compromising of proper intelligence operations. That court is very like SIAC, a court we already use and which can hear intercept evidence. Although SIAC has had its rulings overturned from time to time by the ECHR, it has never been given any sort of instruction to put that intercept evidence in the public domain or make it available to people who are perhaps not responsible. So this issue is capable of resolution. We have been overly nervous and overly attentive to the understandable worries of GCHQ and the other agencies in the past. That is why those who work with this, including the police, are more—

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Lady Hermon: I have listened intently to the right hon. Gentleman’s contribution. Will he reflect on the fact that when we had Diplock courts in Northern Ireland they were supported by one section of the community and despised by another. We do not have Diplock courts in Northern Ireland any longer. If his proposal were to be legislated upon and we have a secret court that sits and hears all the evidence, including the intercept evidence, which I agree should be allowed into court, how does he think that would be received in Northern Ireland?

Mr Davis: I speak as probably one of the last people to give evidence at a Diplock court. It was against a terrorist who was convicted and then, under the Good Friday agreement, promptly released—it was a very frustrating process. Of course there is a problem of acceptability with any secret court. The hon. Lady will know that I fight vigorously against the idea of secret justice, but what we are talking about here is not secret justice; it is about a decision to let into the public domain more than is currently let into the public domain. Sometimes that information is exculpatory. One of the problems that has arisen with SIAC is that the agencies have not been good at their evidence discipline. At least one case has been struck down. A special advocate called Nichol, who is now a judge, discovered that MI5 was claiming that one person against whom it was bringing a case had used a passport to cross a border one week, and then the next week had brought a case against somebody else claiming that he used the same passport on the same day in a different place. So the agencies have their weaknesses. Nevertheless, the tool is significantly better than what we have at the moment. We may use intercept evidence in terrorism prevention and investigation measures and control orders. I happen to think that TPIMs and control orders are completely ludicrous, because they people who should be inside prison leave out on the streets. They should perhaps be called non-control orders, because all the dangerous ones disappear. Of course, it is not easy and there is an issue of presentation, but if there is fair representation from both sides to decide on what information should be put in the public domain, it is as close as we can get to public justice. That is the point.

6.30 pm