Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Written evidence submitted by the Henry Jackson Society (SC 07)

The Henry Jackson Society (HJS) is a London-based think-tank founded to support the global promotion of the rule of law, liberal democracy and civil rights. HJS specialises in the study of international terrorism, counter-terrorism and radicalisation. This submission is a corporate view of the society, based on original research and institutional expertise.

Part 6 of the Bill would provide for extra-territorial jurisdiction for two offences under the Terrorism Act 2006: preparation of terrorist acts and training for terrorism

1. The provision is designed to more effectively prosecute terrorism-related activities abroad. Conferring extra-territorial jurisdiction for preparation of terrorist acts (section 5) and extending the limited extra-territorial jurisdiction that currently applies to training for terrorism (section 6) would close a legislative gap in the government’s capacity to respond to the domestic threat from individuals entering or returning to the UK with terrorist training or combat experience by enabling prosecutions for such activity when undertaken overseas. [1]

2. In a speech to Parliament on 1 September 2014, Prime Minister David Cameron acknowledged that the provision is a response to the substantial threat to the UK from terrorist activity in Syria and Iraq. [2] At least 600 British nationals and residents have travelled to these conflict zones, with many joining the proscribed terrorist organisations Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) [3] and up to 300 already back on British soil. [4] The security services’ foremost concern is that some will engage in terrorism, with the Director General of MI5 confirming that "British extremists who have travelled to Syria…have already tried to carry out acts of terrorism" in the UK. [5] The provision of extra-territorial jurisdiction would expand the investigative and prosecutorial abilities of the police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) with regards those returning from the conflict in Syria and Iraq.

3. Over the past two years, the CPS has increasingly sought prosecutions for Syria-related offences. [6] While individuals can be prosecuted for offences carried out in the UK, two offences relevant to overseas activities – preparation of terrorist acts and training for terrorism – are constrained by the limits of British jurisdiction. This constraint is best demonstrated by the conviction of two returning fighters in July 2014 of preparing for terrorism on the basis of plans made in the UK prior to their departure. This is despite the men having spent eight months in Syria, being arrested at the airport on return with a digital camera containing images of themselves with guns and satellite imaging showing they had been in Aleppo, Syria. [7]

4. Preparation of terrorist acts and training for terrorism are useful offences for the police and CPS in disrupting and prosecuting terrorism, evidenced by the frequency of their usage. Of a total of 227 principal offences convicted under terrorism legislation since 11 September 2001, preparation of terrorist acts was the single most frequent; while of the 75 principal offence convictions under the Terrorism Act 2006, the majority (56) have been for preparation of terrorist acts, with a further seven being terrorist training-related (Sections 6 and 8). [8]

5. Foreign fighting and terrorist training are not new issues. For almost three decades, small numbers of British Muslims have fought for Islamist terrorist groups abroad and/or travelled to receive training from terrorist groups. Many of the British detainees held at Guantanamo Bay admitted to attending training camps abroad; in 2008, senior security officials estimated that up to 4,000 individuals had attended terrorist training camps in Afghanistan before returning to the UK; [9] and in 2010, MI5 warned that a "significant number" of UK citizens were training in Somalia with the proscribed terrorist group, al-Shabaab. [10] Prior to the conflict in Syria, the CPS failed to convict anyone entering or returning to the UK for actions or training undertaken as part of jihadist conflict overseas.

6. The domestic threat from returning fighters is demonstrated by the prevalence of individuals with prior combat experience or terrorist training in the most serious Islamism-inspired terrorism offences. [11] A 2011 HJS study of all such offences and attacks in the UK between 1999 and 2010 found that almost one in every five (19%) individuals either convicted or killed in suicide attacks had attended foreign terrorist training camps and/or obtained combat experience abroad prior to their offence. This prevalence increases to 41% among those involved in the eight major bomb plots identified during this time, [12] all of which involved at least one cell member with prior combat experience or training overseas.

7. In addition, the British security services recognise that the "experience of fighting overseas with terrorist groups can also promote radicalisation". [13] The ideological reach of British veterans of the Afghan and Bosnian wars in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, was evident in subsequent terrorism cases during the 2000s; [14] and extended to the gunmen who carried out the attack on the satirical French magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015. [15] The impact of perceived legitimacy gained through foreign combat experience could be limited, however, by prosecuting individuals for preparing and training for terrorism while abroad.

8. Finally, conferring extra-territorial jurisdiction provides legal recourse to disrupt and deter terrorist activity in open court, the most effective and transparent way of challenging terrorism. Prosecution, therefore, is preferable to a number of other current counter-terrorism measures, including the restrictions placed on terrorism suspects, Terrorism Prevention Investigatory Measures (TPIMs), and the forthcoming temporary exclusion orders for returning fighters, both of which advocates acknowledge are imperfect and carry reputational risk. [16]

January 2015