Appendix: Government response
We note the report on the situation in Iraq and Syria
and the response to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq al-Sham (DAESH);
Seventh Report of Session 2014-15, published on 5 February 2015.
The Government endorses the Committee's conclusions
that: the UK is right to seek to respond actively to the threat
posed by ISIL; that it is necessary to develop a clear understanding
of the situation as a basis for our actions; that we must play
a full role in developing an international strategy; and that
the strategy must adopt a comprehensive approach.
The Government, however, rejects the Committee's
conclusions that the UK's contribution has been 'strikingly modest'[1]
since the September 2014 vote. The UK has been and remains at
the forefront of the international diplomatic and military effort
to support the Iraqi Government and moderate Syrian Opposition
to defeat ISIL.
Militarily, we have played a major role since the
beginning of operations but unfortunately the Committee's conclusions
are based on out of date or inaccurate information which fails
to recognise this.
In August 2014, UK C130s conducted 7 humanitarian
aid drops onto the Sinjar mountains to provide relief to displaced
Yazidis.
In September 2014, the UK began strike operations
against ISIL in Iraq. We have increased our efforts to match coalition
requirements as they have evolved and as our resources have become
available. This has included the deployment of an additional two
Tornado GR4s to Cyprus, bringing the total to eight, and additional
assets such as RIVET JOINT, E3-D Sentry and REAPER remotely-piloted
aircraft. The Committee stated the UK has only conducted 6% of
strikes. This is based on figures for Iraq and Syria and the Committee
will be aware that we only have parliamentary permission to conduct
strikes in Iraq. As of 16 March 2015, we have conducted 190 strikes
against targets in Iraq, second only, to the United States. We
are one of the few nations that deploys such advanced strike,
Intelligence, Surveillance Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR) capabilities, as well as air-to-air refuelling. Our coalition
partners have acknowledged the beneficial effect these contributions
are having to the campaign.
In addition to ISTAR and strike capabilities, we
have provided equipment and training to Iraq and are contributing
to the coalition's Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programme.
We have trained over 1,000 Peshmerga in Infantry and Heavy Machine
Gun skills. We have supported the delivery of nearly 400 tonnes
of equipment and ammunition. As a world leader in countering improvised
explosive devices (C-IED) we are leading the coordination and
development of the coalition's C-IED training programme, including
through the provision of C-IED training at the BPC site in Erbil,
which has now begun. We also intend to make a substantial contribution
to the planned US-led programme to train Syrian moderates at regional
training centres. The UK now has approximately 500 military personnel
supporting operations against ISIL, including over 140 in Iraq.
The Government's contribution to the stability of
Iraq has extended beyond its military efforts.
Diplomatically, on 22 January 2015, the Foreign Secretary
hosted the London Conference, co-chaired with US Secretary of
State John Kerry during which 21 members of the Global Coalition
to Counter ISIL met and created Working Groups to address not
just military efforts, but the flow of foreign fighters, countering
ISIL's finances, countering ISIL's messaging, and assisting the
Government of Iraq's stabilisation planning.
We are contributing £39.5 million in humanitarian
support to respond to the significant humanitarian needs in Iraq.
We welcome the steps Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has taken
towards political reconciliation and economic reform. Effective
Sunni engagement—both regionally and domestically—will
be crucial for the success of Prime Minister Abadi's government,
and the fight against ISIL. Prime Minister Abadi has made good
initial progress on improving relations with Iraq's neighbours
and we will continue to press for the necessary economic and political
reform, and encourage Iraq's Sunni neighbours to engage with and
support Prime Minister Abadi.
Further detailed responses to the Committee's recommendations
and conclusions are laid out below.
1. It is our considered view, that the UK are
right to wish to respond actively to the threat and horrors represented
by DAESH and the current instability in Iraq. Failing to do so,
would mark a substantial departure from the UK's long-term security
partnership with both the United States and its partners in the
Middle East. It would heighten perceptions that the UK has stepped
back from its international role and could risk undermining wider
commitment to the US-led coalition, possibly weakening the effort
against DAESH. It would also make it harder for the UK to influence
political developments thereafter. Furthermore, it would undermine
the UK's national security interests through destabilisation of
the region, and through DAESH's sponsorship of terrorist attacks
and training of British foreign fighters in military tactics which
could be used upon the UK public following their return home.
We, therefore, believe that the UK should actively look for more
ways to contribute constructively to the stability of Iraq. (Paragraph
83)
The Government welcomes the report's recognition
that the UK should respond to the threat ISIL poses. The Government
also agrees that international and regional partners expect the
UK to play a leading international role and that our contribution
to military operations enhances our influence in political developments.
If ISIL is to be defeated in Iraq, it will be important that the
military campaign is supported by comprehensive stabilisation
planning, addressing security, governance and provision of basic
services.
2. The first priority is for the UK to develop
a clear assessment of the situation on the ground, and to be able
to provide a clearly formulated strategy and campaign plan. We
were shocked by the inability or unwillingness of any of the Service
Chiefs to provide a clear, and articulate statement of the UK's
objectives or plan in Iraq. We were troubled by the lack of clarity
over who owned the policy—and indeed whether such a policy
existed. (Paragraph 86)
The Government rejects this assertion that the UK
lacks a clear strategy for the fight against ISIL. This was set
out in the Department's evidence to the Committee as follows:
"The Government is working closely with international
partners to address the situation in Iraq and Syria and the threat
posed by ISIL. The Government's first priority is to minimise
the threat to UK security and UK interests in the Middle East
by defeating ISIL, in conjunction with international coalition
partners. We seek to achieve this by pursuing three objectives:
i) Disrupting threats to the UK mainland and
interests overseas;
ii) As part of an international coalition,
defeating ISIL, including discrediting its violent ideology in
Iraq and Syria; and
iii) Mitigating the impact of ISIL and other
violent extremist groups on regional stability".
A cross-Government ISIL Task Force was set up in
September 2014 in order to develop the UK's anti-ISIL strategy
and coordinate delivery of it across all Government Departments.
The National Security Council (NSC) has overseen the UK's involvement,
with weekly NSC (Officials) meetings to maintain progress.
The Department does not endorse the Committee's criticism
of the Service Chiefs' evidence. This is based around an outdated
understanding of their role within Defence. The Defence Operating
Model set out a clear governance structure for how the Department
formulates military strategy for Ministers. Responsibility for
such advice to the Defence Secretary does not lie with the Service
Chiefs but with the Director General Security Policy and the Deputy
Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategic Operations) through
the Chief of Defence Staff.
3. We believe it is unacceptable for the United
Kingdom simply to 'sign-up' to providing military support for
a campaign plan entirely developed and owned by another coalition
partner—in this case, apparently, the United States—without
having any independent assessment or analysis of the assumptions,
detail and viability of that campaign plan. (Paragraph 89)
The MOD agrees with the Committee's conclusion that
it would be unacceptable to simply sign up to providing military
support for a campaign plan entirely developed and owned by another
coalition partner. We are not doing this.
As set out above, the UK has played a leading role
in the Global coalition, including hosting the London conference
on 22 January 2015. The coalition is focused on five lines of
effort:
· Supporting
military operations, capacity building, and training;
· Stopping
the flow of foreign terrorist fighters;
· Cutting
off ISIL's access to financing and funding;
· Addressing
associated humanitarian relief and crises; and
· Exposing
ISIL's true nature (ideological delegitimisation).
The UK is playing a significant role in each strand
and is jointly leading work on ideological delegitimisation. The
UK is fully engaged in the development of the coalition military
campaign plan as it evolves and has contributed a number of military
officers to the coalition's headquarters staff who are undertaking
influential roles in the formulation and delivery of the coalition
strategy and effect. This includes the Deputy Commander for the
Coalition Joint Task Force, which commands the mission.
4. While Australia, Spain and Italy have committed
troops to the new training package, the UK is yet to do so. Such
a deployment—to a remote desert base for counter-IED training—does
not involve UK troops in combat, provides useful skills to the
Iraqi Forces, saves lives, and ensures that the UK retains some
involvement in the overall mission and some 'equity' and influence
in shaping future decisions. (Paragraph 94)
The Government agrees the importance of training
and the particular requirement for C-IED training. The Defence
Secretary stated the UK's intention to assist on further training
to Iraqi forces in December 2014 and once the plans were developed
with the Government of Iraq and the Coalition we confirmed our
deployment. Regrettably the Committee has inaccurately and misleading
compared the UK's commitment with that of other countries, for
example by stating in the press release launching the report that
there were 400 Australian military personnel outside of Kurdish
regions compared to only 3 UK military personnel. This is inaccurate—there
were not and are not 400 Australians in Iraq. In the report this
is actually presented as Australia having "offered up"
or "committed" 400 troops. This is a markedly different
position. To date the Australians have deployed to Iraq a similar
number to the UK's current deployment of 140 military personnel.
As set out above, the UK has already made a significant contribution
to training Iraqi forces that are taking the fight to ISIL. The
Defence Secretary announced to Parliament on 10 February 2015
that the UK will be the coalition lead for the C-IED element of
the broader BPC programme, including deploying a team of up to
30 personnel to deliver C-IED training in Erbil and a team of
8 in Baghdad who are designing and coordinating the C-IED training
across all the BPC sites. Those personnel are now in post. This
effort is being supported with a gift from the UK of 1,000 VALLON
metal detectors which is expected to equip 6 battalions and a
number of specialist EOD units.
5. At the very least any training of the Iraqi
Security Forces should be related to institutional reform. The
Iraqi Security Forces have already been trained and equipped extravagantly
and repeatedly in the past decade. To do so again, without first
addressing the structural issues, would be a total waste of time
and money. (Paragraph 96)
The Government agrees with the Committee's assessment
that further military capacity building of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) should be accompanied by institutional reform. The
ISF has suffered from widespread corruption, low morale and overdependence
on militia forces. The UK Government has promoted security sector
reform in Iraq for a number of years. Since 2012, the UK has funded
the UN Development Programme to facilitate the Office of the National
Security Advisor in developing an Iraqi National Security Strategy
and high level Security Sector Reform.
We welcome the significant reforms taken by Prime
Minister al-Abadi since assuming office in August 2014. He has
enhanced the democratic accountability of the ISF by strengthening
the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and abolishing the office of the
Commander in Chief set up by former Prime Minister Maliki. He
has also replaced senior military figures with commanders that
are more competent and tackled corruption among the security forces.
The UK continues to discuss reform of the ISF with the Government
of Iraq, and encourage the adoption of the proposed National Guard
law that aims to incorporate militias and tribal forces into the
security forces.
6. We recommend that once the Iraqi Security Forces
and the Peshmerga show increased capability and are ready for
major offensives against DAESH, the UK should be prepared to provide
an increased level of support to those operations from the air.
This in turn relies on the UK providing the planes and resources
to be able to expand and maintain air support for the military
campaign. (Paragraph 98)
The UK has already deployed a capable and enduring
package of strike, ISTAR, air-to-air refuelling and transport
aircraft to enhance the coalition's air capabilities and, as set
out above, we have significantly increased those capabilities
as the operation and the requirements evolved since the Committee's
report. The coalition has and will continue to provide air support
to the ISF offensive operations against ISIL.
7. Arguably, the most powerful contribution which
the UK could make to the Peshmerga is in structural reform:
· firstly,
the unification of the Peshmerga in to a central, cohesive fighting
force with a stated allegiance to the Kurdish Regional Government;
· secondly,
the confirmation that Peshmerga fighters would be made available
to be trained; and
· thirdly
that the Peshmerga are willing to cooperate with the Iraqi Security
Forces. If such commitments are set and adhered to, we believe
that the UK Government is capable of providing much greater support
to the Iraqi Government and for the Kurdish Regional Government
than it has done to date. The level of that support should increase
exponentially in terms of both gifting and sale of equipment and
the number of UK troops provided for training, particularly in
the area of command and control. (Paragraph 103)
We endorse the Committee's conclusion regarding the
importance of unification of Peshmerga forces. We have worked
closely with the Government of Iraq, and Global Coalition, to
understand the needs of the Kurdistan Security Forces (KSF) and
ISF and identify where UK support can add most value. All the
support provided to date has been provided or conducted with the
approval of the Government of Iraq (GoI). We will continue to
explore options for the provision of additional support to the
GoI, including the KSF.
8. Special Forces operations will be of great
use to the Iraqi Government and a counterterrorism strategy is
highly relevant to the UK's national security. The UK Government
must ensure, however, that such operations are not undermining
any political strategy and are in accordance with the law. (Paragraph
107)
It is longstanding UK Government policy not to comment
on any issues related to Special Forces.
9. We recommend that there be an increase in analytical
capability in Iraq and at home, with the priority being placed
on a member of staff to monitor the progress of the Sunni outreach
programme on the ground. This is vital to ensure that the conditions
which have led to the current situation are not recreated in the
future. (Paragraph 111)
The Government agrees that political unity in Iraq
is critical to Coalition efforts to defeat ISIL. The Government
continues to support political initiatives by Prime Minister Abadi
that promote inclusive politics and national reconciliation, of
which engagement with the Sunni community is a key part. Through
our diplomatic engagement in Iraq, the region and London, we are
encouraging all parties to work together to advance national reconciliation
and deliver the political reforms which we all want to see. The
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is also in the process of
deploying to Iraq additional staff to monitor and engage with
Sunni outreach in support of the coordinated coalition effort.
10. We recommend that the UK Government radically
increase their diplomatic and defence engagement with the key
regional powers—particularly Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran—to
develop a much more detailed picture of the potential benefits
and challenges of a regional solution. (Paragraph 116)
The Government agrees that regional relations, co-operation
and leadership by the region have an extremely important role
to play in efforts to counter ISIL. The Secretary of State has
made three visits to the region in recent months, most recently
between 2 to 4 March 2015 to meet with Saudi Arabian, Omani and
Jordanian Ministers, as well as the Coalition Commander, Lieutenant
General James Terry, based in Kuwait. Other Ministers and senior
officials have also visited frequently.
The Government acknowledges the recommendation that
there should be an increase in diplomatic engagement to focus
on developing a detailed picture of the benefits and challenges
of a regional solution. The UK has a long-standing friendship
with many of the key regional powers, and we engaged with them
at all levels through our wider defence presence and network in
the region who are engaging continuously on issues of common interest,
particularly the ISIL threat.
As previously stated in our evidence to the committee:
"To support the objective of reducing ISIL's
impact on regional stability, the UK has increased its commitment
to Jordan's capacity building programme with much of the focus
centred on Urban Operations Training and the development of a
Quick Reaction Force (QRF) headquarters. There is a permanent
British Military Advisory Training Team of 20 personnel currently
focusing support on the QRF as it is the part of the Jordanian
Armed Forces most likely to be used against ISIL in the future.
We are planning to spend about £1M to provide deployable
infrastructure to the QRF to help it respond to internal and external
threats ranging from humanitarian crises to stabilisation, terrorism
and border security operations.
We have also increased support to Lebanon, which
is confronted by several thousand ISIL fighters inside its borders
in the mountains above Arsal. Short-term training teams have been
deployed to train Lebanese soldiers, create Land Border Regiments
and help construct and equip border forts. This activity has helped
the Lebanese Armed Forces gain influence over 30% of Lebanon's
previously ungoverned border with Syria. The UK is also providing
a capacity-building programme including explosive-search working
dogs, and working with the Lebanese Navy, Crime Scenes Investigation,
Search and Rescue and Military Intelligence."
11. The first step of the UK must be to develop
a serious independent assessment of the situation on the ground
in Iraq (including individual specialists posted immediately to
Iraq to focus separately on the Sunni communities, the Iraqi Security
Forces, the Peshmerga, the Shia militia, and DAESH). It must develop
a much more complete picture of the current coalition strategy,
and be in a position to assess its costs, benefits and risks and
to use this understanding to influence that strategy, and ensure
that it is more than simply a repeat of the 2007 'surge' strategy
conducted with a fraction of the resources. (Paragraph 123)
As set out above, the Government agrees the importance
of developing a good understanding of the situation on the ground.
However, the Committee's conclusions appear to be based on a fundamental
misunderstanding of the UK's presence in Iraq and leading role
in the international Coalition. The British Embassy in Baghdad,
Consulate-General in Erbil and UK military personnel deployed
to Iraq and across coalition headquarters contribute to the UK's
understanding and analysis of the situation, enabling the UK to
advise, assist and shape coalition strategy. Our relationships
with key Iraqi political and military interlocutors, alongside
our participation in the coalition, also contribute to the detailed
information we need to be able to inform UK policy.
As well as the Sunni outreach officers described
above, the FCO is in the process of deploying to Iraq additional
staff to strengthen our capacity on political reform and reconciliation
and outreach, respectively, in support of the coordinated coalition
effort.
12. There is no demand from the Iraqi Government
for combat troops; nor any question of the UK deploying such troops.
But Iraqi forces continue to have significant requirements for
air support and training in IED awareness and disposal. Both the
Peshmerga and the Iraqi Security Forces are in need of structural
reform, which the UK is in a position to support. In the absence
of such reform, we question whether broader training is worthwhile.
There is a pressing need to study, analyse, and reach out to Sunni
communities, and integrate them into the fight against DAESH.
It is essential that the Iraqi Government reins in the influence
of the Shia militia. We fear, however, that Sunni reconciliation
and the taming of the Shia militia may prove impossibly difficult.
There is considerable scope for Special Forces operations provided
that they are able to operate within the increasingly stringent
legal constraints. And there is an urgent requirement for regional
support for Iraq, both politically and militarily. (Paragraph
124)
The Government agrees the Iraqi government has significant
requirements for air support and C-IED training. The UK contribution
to the Coalition is set out above. The Government also agrees
that political reconciliation will be difficult and that political
unity in Iraq is critical to military efforts to defeat ISIL.
The Government continues to support political initiatives by Prime
Minister Abadi that promote inclusive politics and national reconciliation,
of which engagement with the Sunni community is a key part. Through
our diplomatic engagement in Iraq, the region and London, we are
encouraging all parties to work together to advance national reconciliation
and deliver the political reforms which we all want to see.
13. These are all areas in which the UK can assist.
And they are an ideal opportunity for a broader 'comprehensive
approach', bringing in the best of UK international development
expertise, intelligence, Special Forces, and diplomacy; all with
an aim of decreasing the probability of an ongoing civil war,
and increasing the chances of a political settlement, however
distant these objectives may be. (Paragraph 125)
14. Such activities would require only the deployment
of a few hundred personnel, the cost would be relatively modest,
and it would not entail the risks inherent in deploying UK troops
in combat roles. These roles are also consistent with the scale
of the £38 billion Defence budget, commensurate with its
global presence, the expectations of Iraq and the Kurdistan region
of Iraq, its status as a P5 member of the Security Council, and
its traditionally close relationship to the United States. (Paragraph
126)
15. We are not calling for combat troops, still
less for an attempt to repeat the counterinsurgency and state-building
agendas of Iraq in 2007. Any contemporary intervention must be
far more focused and incremental. But this is not a reason for
the UK to lurch from over-intervention to complete isolation.
We face a situation in Iraq, where we have significant interests,
history, and obligations, where our closest allies have requested
our assistance, and where we have the expertise, and resources
to influence the country in a positive direction. Given the deep
polarisation and structural weaknesses of the Iraqi State, we
wonder whether containment and suppression of DAESH would not
be a more realistic goal than total elimination. There are, however,
many highly constructive tasks we could be performing, which do
not entail combat operations. The foreword to the 2010 SDSR begins
with the lines "Our country has always had global responsibilities
and global ambitions. We have a proud history of standing up for
the values we believe in and we should have no less ambition for
our country in the decades to come." We question whether
the UK actions in Iraq begin to match such ambitions. (Paragraph
127)
We agree with the Committee's recommendations that
the Coalition must adopt a comprehensive approach, complementing
military action with diplomatic and development and reform efforts,
and that there are particular areas in which the UK can assist.
The Coalition effort, and the UK contribution, is designed to
address the full range of political, security, humanitarian and
development challenges which we face in Iraq and to set them within
a broad regional context. The UK is supporting Iraq at the request
of the GoI and we will continue to assist them for as long as
they have a need to counter ISIL. The Government agrees that the
UK has significant interests in Iraq and that our contribution
there should be commensurate with those interests and the UK's
global responsibilities as a member of the UN Security Council.
The Government continues to believe that we should meet such responsibilities
and stand up for the values we believe in. We believe our contribution
to Iraq matches those ambitions. We believe our key international
partners, in allocating the UK the Deputy Commander post in the
military coalition, and in recognising the UK chairmanship of
the recent London conference, share that assessment.
1 Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2014-15,The
situation in Iraq and Syria and the response to al-Dawla al-Islamiya
fi al-Iraq al-Sham (DAESH), HC 690, page 4 Back
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