2 SDSR Process and content
A national strategy
2. It is essential that an entirely fresh National
Security Strategy (NSS) is created before consideration begins
on the next SDSR. This new strategy should involve a fundamental
reassessment of the UK's role in the world, in the light of the
new and unexpected threats to National Security since 2010. The
Strategy should explain the position that the UK seeks to maintain
in the world. It should set out the criteria, which will determine
how the UK's power is deployed. The Joint Committee on the National
Security Strategy has previously insisted (contrary to the Government's
assertion) that the NSS must plan for a curtailment of the UK's
strategic ambition, saying that:
expecting there to be no shrinkage in the UK's
influence is wholly unrealistic. Any national security strategy
based on this is wishful thinking rather than credible strategy.[…]
no amount of spending money carefully can change the overall picture;
in the long term, the UK and its allies are in relative decline
on the global stage.[3]
We favour a more confident vision of the UK's global
role, but the NSS must be honest about its vision of UK influence,
and the resources it will provide to sustain this influence.
3. The SDSR should then follow the NSS's definition
of UK interests and objectives. It should set out the combinations
of hard and soft power at the UK's disposal as the "ways"
of achieving the "ends", defined in the NSS.[4]
4. Given the new threats in the world, the SDSR too
should be an ambitious and fundamental reassessment of the nation's
defence and force structures, conducted with ample time to allow
for fundamental reconsideration. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review
process provides a good example for the kind of timeframe (18
months), and the inclusion of key outside voices, required in
such a process. Needless to say, it is imperative that defence
spending is retained at current proportions of GDP while that
reassessment is conducted.
5. Amongst many other things, the review must state
when and whether the UK would intervene to maintain stability
overseas and it must define how success should be measured in
international defence engagement and stabilisation operations.
It should also focus more rigorously on the UK's key military
alliances and partnerships (particularly with the US, France and
NATO). The Government must ensure that it obtains the input of
key allies in preparing the SDSR. We expect the following questions
to be addressed in the next SDSR and NSS:
6. What is the UK national strategy? Should it
be global or regional in focus?
7. Does the Government maintain the assertion
of no strategic shrinkage? If so, how is this to be achieved with
Armed Forces that are reducing in size?
8. What regional partnerships should we develop
to help to deliver the UK's national security objectives? What
capacity do our allies have to contribute to our security and
what is the UK's capacity to provide reciprocal support?
9. How will the instruments of national power
be deployed to advance UK interests?
10. We also believe that the strategy needs to be
open to revision. As we said in Towards the next Defence and
Security Review: Part One
The allocation of resources will be based on
national spending priorities set to meet the nation's security
needs. Once the national strategy has been articulated in the
NSS, the process of agreeing the ways and the means is therefore
an iterative one.[5]
As the nature of threats to the UK changes, so too
should the resources deployed to tackle them. The relationship
between the "ways" of implementing the strategy and
the allocation of the "means" to do so should, therefore,
be dynamic not static, iterative not linear. The NSS and SDSR
cannot remain untouched between the five-year periods of review;
strategy must be constantly open to amendment to accommodate unforeseen
events while remaining focused on long-term objectives. What process
is there for review of the SDSR and NSS within the five-year period
before the next scheduled review?
11. What consultation and challenge was incorporated
into the process of preparation of the SDSR?
12. How will the Government ensure that there
is an iterative process in place which allows for revisions between
SDSRs? How will consultation and challenge be incorporated into
these processes?
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
13. One of the greatest strategic threats to the
UK Armed Forces remains a disconnect with the public.[6]
As General Sir Nick Houghton, Chief of the Defence Staff told
us:
The armed forces have never been held in higher
respect by the nation, but perhaps the purposes towards which
we have most recently been put have never been more deeply questioned
[…] I sometimes feel that rather than being understood we
are sympathised with. I sometimes feel that we are the object
of our nation's charity rather than its deep sympathetic understanding
with what armed forces are about and their relevance.[7]
14. Recent operations and commemorations have risked
the development of an unhealthy perception of the Armed Forces
as simply "victims" in conflict. The next Defence and
Security Review should play an important role in explaining to
the public the role of the Armed Forces and the importance of
defence in protecting UK values and society. It should also consider
the ways in which force structures, (such as the Reserves, or
Short Service Limited Commissions) or military activities (including
public displays and tattoos), could bind the military more closely
to the civilian population.[8]
15. The will of the population and its government
to respond to attack, and its attitude towards the military, is
crucial for the deterrence of potential adversaries. The nation's
ability to deter threats will be crucially undermined if there
is deep public antipathy to the use of force. We expect that the
next DSR and NSS should address the following questions:
16. How can the SDSR be used to communicate to
the public the role of the Armed Forces?
17. How will it be used to bridge the disconnect
with the public?
18. Has the SDSR sought to engage the public in
thinking about the implications of geo-political developments
for UK security and the capabilities that we require?
Governance
19. The next SDSR, like the last, is expected to
be produced by the Cabinet Office, representing the cross-government
nature of the enterprise. This helps the integration of all aspects
of security and defence into the review. But its disadvantage
is that it significantly weakens the military voice, and military
expertise in the formulation of national strategy. This has been
made worse by the marginalisation of the role of the Chiefs of
Staff in providing strategic advice during progressive structural
reforms at the MoD, leaving strategy in the hands of the Chief
of the Defence Staff.
20. The NSC has also failed to harness real expertise
and deep knowledge. This is partly a weakness of government institutions
which have increasingly cut back on deep country expertise. It
is partly a reflection of an unwillingness to fully incorporate
external voices. There is an insufficient culture of informed
challenge and of learning lessons within the system. Proper challenge
must be incorporated into the process of preparing for the next
SDSR, and we have advocated the establishment of a "red team"
to contribute to this challenge.[9]
21. More needs to be done to educate the key decision-makers,
and train them to think more strategically. The NSC itself does
not seem to be adequately staffed or resourced to provide deep
expertise or challenge. The tone, and time-limits of the meetings,
does not seem to provide the right environment in which to accurately
define problems, prioritise objectives, evaluate alternatives,
or manage the risk of tentative decisions. Its implementation
capacity is weak. It appears still to struggle to incorporate
expertise or critical viewpoints and too often it seems to be
functioning more as a crisis response centre, rather than a body
forecasting long term changes. We expect the following questions
to be addressed in the next SDSR:
22. What improvements will be made to decision-making
structures within Government to ensure better formulation and
implementation of defence and security strategy?
23. How will deep expertise, knowledge and strategic
thought be improved in the Ministry of Defence, the military and
other government departments?
24. How will the Chiefs of Staff be able to play
a fuller role in strategy formulation?
3 The work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in 2013-14,
First Report of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy,
Session 2013-14, HL169 HC1257, para 47. Back
4
Seventh Report, Session 2013-14, HC 197, para 32. Back
5
Seventh Report, Session 2013-14, HC 197, para 67 Back
6
Ibid, para 24 Back
7
Evidence from General Sir Nick Houghton on The work of the Chief of Defence Staff,
16 October 2013, HC 740, Q1 Back
8
We note for example, in this context, the abolition of the Short
Service Limited Commission-a one year commission introduced by
Field Marshal Lord Templar, to introduce "society leaders"
to the military. Many serving MPs, senior officials, and businesspeople
have benefited from the commission. It was comparatively cheap
to run. Its removal means that parliament, government and the
private sector will in the future have even less exposure to the
military. Back
9
Seventh Report, Session 2013-14, HC 197, para 87 Back
| 
