1 Introduction
1. For two decades the UK—and
NATO's—security priorities have focused on terrorism and
failed states. The UK still has significant commitments to the
draw-down in Afghanistan, and to address the threat from terrorism
following recent events in Syria and Iraq and the increase in
the number and reach of self-styled jihadist groups in the growing
number of ungoverned spaces across the world. These remain very
important priorities.
2. However, events in Crimea and
Ukraine represent a "game changer" for UK defence policy.
They have provoked a fundamental re-assessment of both the prioritisation
of threats in the National Security Strategy and the military
capabilities required by the UK. The UK's Armed Forces will need
now also to focus on the defence of Europe against Russia and
against asymmetric forms of warfare. This will have significant
implications for resources, force structures, equipment and training.
3. The Committee's report on Deterrence
in the twenty-first century, published in March this year, concluded
that
The 2015 National Security Strategy
must reflect that threats to UK security include the re-emergence
of state threats that we may have been tempted to think had diminished
with the end of the Cold War. These state threats may become manifest
in a range of ways, including through attack with CBRN weapons,
conventional forces, terrorist proxies or cyber capabilities.[1]
4. This inquiry is the Committee's
latest in a series aiming to inform the next Strategic Defence
and Security Review (SDSR) and National Security Strategy (NSS).
We have also timed publication of this report to inform the NATO
summit taking place in Wales in September. It is clear that NATO
is not the only international organisation with an interest in
events in Ukraine. Both the EU and the UN have condemned the annexation
of Crimea. The economic tools possessed by the EU will be an important
element in deterring military actions against Member States. Whilst
Ukraine and Georgia are not NATO members, it is our contention
that events in Ukraine, seen in the context of the massive cyber-attack
on Estonia in 2007 and the invasion of Georgia in 2008, represent
the existence of a strategic threat to NATO, a threat that many
had thought had disappeared with the end of the Cold War. NATO
was founded upon three principles: deterring Soviet expansionism,
forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through
a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging
European political integration. Therefore Member States must now
be prepared to invest in NATO capabilities to enable the Alliance
to deter, and if necessary counter, this threat.
5. During the course of this inquiry
we have visited NATO and SHAPE and both Latvia and Estonia. We
are grateful to the UK Permanent Representation to NATO and DSACEUR
for hosting our visit to NATO and SHAPE. We would also like to
thank the UK Embassies in Riga and Tallinn for putting together
excellent programmes for us and to thank those who took the time
to meet with us during our visits.
6. This report will focus first
on Russian forces-their strengths and weaknesses in relation to
conventional and unconventional warfare. Then it will analyse
the strength and weaknesses of NATO forces, in relation to a potential
Russian threat. It will conclude with specific recommendations
to address deficiencies.
1 Defence Committee, Eleventh Report of Session 2013-14,
Deterrence in the twenty-first century, HC 1066 , paragraph 75. Back
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