5 Recommendations
102. The NATO alliance has not considered Russia
as an adversary or a potential territorial threat to its Member
States for twenty years. It is now forced to do so as a result
of Russia's recent actions. Events in Ukraine this year, following
on from the cyber attack on Estonia in 2007 and the invasion of
Georgia by Russia in 2008, are a "wake-up call" for
NATO. They have revealed alarming deficiencies in the state of
NATO preparedness, which will be tough to fix. The UK Government
should take the lead in ensuring that the NATO Summit addresses
these threats in the most concrete and systematic fashion.
103. We recommend that the NATO Summit sets plans
to ensure:
· dramatic
improvements to the existing NATO rapid reaction force;
· the pre-positioning
of equipment in the Baltic States;
· a continuous
(if not technically 'permanent') presence of NATO troops, on training
and exercise in the Baltic;
· the re-establishment
of large-scale military exercises including representatives from
all NATO Member States. These exercises must involve both military
and political decision-makers;
· the establishment
of headquarters structures, at divisional and corps level to focus
on Eastern Europe and the Baltic;
· consideration
of the re-establishment of a NATO standing reserve force along
the lines of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force-Land, involving
all Member States; and,
· re-examination
of the criteria, doctrine and responses to calls under Article
4 for 'collective security' support against asymmetric attacks,
especially, but not limited to, cyber attacks where attribution
is difficult.
104. We recommend that the NATO Summit also addresses
the Alliance's vulnerabilities in the face of asymmetric (ambiguous
warfare) attacks. In particular it should consider
· How
to establish the intelligence processes and an "Indicators
and Warning" mechanism to alert Allies to the danger or imminence
of such an attack;
· What steps
it needs to take to deter asymmetric threats;
· How it should
respond in the face of an imminent or actual such attack;
· The circumstances
in which the Article 5 mutual defence guarantee will be invoked
in the face of asymmetric attack;
· How it can,
as a matter of urgency, create an Alliance doctrine for "ambiguous
warfare" and make the case for investment in an Alliance
asymmetric or "ambiguous warfare" capability.
105. We recommend that the Ministry of Defence
address, also as a matter of urgency, its capacity to understand
the nature of the current security threat from Russia and its
motivations. Ensuring that there are sufficient numbers of Defence
Attachés to provide the analysis and expertise required
is one measure which would help to address this issue. In particular
we recommend the appointment of additional Defence Attachés
to cover the Baltic States and in Central and Eastern Europe and
reverse the cutbacks in Russia and Ukraine. We further recommend
that the Government ensure that there is adequate representation
in Poland which may be of critical importance in the future. We
also recommend the creation of a "red team" in the Ministry
of Defence to provide a challenge to existing orthodoxy from a
specifically Russian perspective.
106. We recommend that, in opening the NATO Summit,
the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State should make a commitment
to the UK maintaining defence spending at or above 2% of GDP.
Increasing levels of spending amongst European NATO Member States
and the collective efficiency of such spending must be made a
priority of the Summit as a demonstration of NATO's political
will and its commitment to collective defence.
107. This report does not deal with the detail
of emerging events in the non-NATO state of Ukraine but it would
be wrong to publish a report on NATO relations and responses to
Russia without expressing our sympathies and condolences to all
the families, friends and nations who have experienced the deaths
of relatives, friends and citizens from the downing of Malaysian
Airlines civilian flight MH17 with military rockets near the borders
of Ukraine and Russia. Our condolences are extended to all affected
but especially to the relatives and friends of the UK citizens
killed and to our allies who suffered such a heavy toll of innocent
lives.
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