Conclusions and recommendations
Russian Forces
1. The
Russian deployment of asymmetric tactics represents a new challenge
to NATO. Events in Ukraine demonstrate in particular Russia's
ability to effectively paralyse an opponent in the pursuit of
its interests with a range of tools including psychological operations,
information warfare and intimidation with massing of conventional
forces. Such operations may be designed to slip below NATO's threshold
for reaction. In many circumstances, such operations are also
deniable, increasing the difficulties for an adversary is mounting
a credible and legitimate response. (Paragraph 29)
The UK and NATO's capacity to respond
2. We
believe that the Armed Forces needs to ensure that its training
covers all types of warfare and responses to threats beyond counter
insurgency actions. For instance, has the wide-wet gap crossing
capacity been preserved? (Paragraph 44)
3. The failure of
national military forces to provide sufficient staff resources
has left NATO command structures depleted. It is disappointing
that the UK is continuing to fail to fill the posts expected of
it. (Paragraph 50)
4. We recommend
that the UK (and US) practice the deployment of forces at least
to divisional scale to Poland and the Baltic States via Germany.
(Paragraph 51)
5. We recommend
that the NATO Summit sets out plans to ensure: (Paragraph
52)
· dramatic
improvements to the existing NATO rapid reaction force; and
· the re-establishment
of large-scale military exercises including representatives from
all NATO Member States. These exercises must involve both military
and political decision-makers.
6. The
willingness, ability and readiness to act against common threats
are vital for the future existence of NATO. This requires a collective
view of Russian actions and possible responses should the situation
in Ukraine worsen or repeat itself in a NATO country. The absence
of a collective view risks perpetrating the Russian perception
that NATO is divided and lacks the political will to respond to
aggression, undermining NATO's deterrent posture. (Paragraph 65)
7. We recommend
that the NATO Summit sets out plans to ensure: (Paragraph
66)
· the
pre-positioning of equipment in the Baltic States;
· a continuous
(if not technically 'permanent') presence of NATO troops, on exercise
in the Baltic.
· the establishment
of headquarters structures, at divisional and corps level to focus
on Eastern Europe and the Baltic
· consideration
of the reestablishment of a NATO standing reserve force along
the lines of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force-Land, involving
all Member States.
8. The
combination of substantial Russian minorities (which constitute
a majority in some areas) and the influence of the Russian media
could make Estonia and Latvia in particular vulnerable to the
type of information warfare and inciting of disturbances that
have caused such chaos in Ukraine. (Paragraph 69)
9. We recommend
that NATO is tasked and mandated to plan, train and exercise for
a cyber attack to ensure the necessary resilience measures are
in place. The use of asymmetric warfare tactics present a substantial
challenge to a political military alliance such as NATO. These
tactics are designed to test the lower limit of the Alliance's
response threshold, are likely to involve deniable actors, and
work to exploit political division. They also bring in to question
the operation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO's cornerstone.
(Paragraph 86)
10. Russia's actions
in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine illustrate the immediate (although
not the only) reasons for reconsideration of Article 5 in relation
to'deniable' actions. Cyber attacks—where attribution is
often difficult but of central importance before any offensive
targeted responses are considered—will increase. The use
of airliners hijacked for attacks in New York and the Pentagon
in the USA in 2001 were considered sufficient to invoke a NATO
Article 5 response, even though not immediately attributable to
any nation state but to non-state actors. That NATO Article 5
declaration (the only one since the inception of NATO) was used
in conjunction with Chapter 7 UN Resolutions to form the ISAF
missions and take military action against the nation state of
Afghanistan for harbouring those non-state actors and their promoters.
Attribution therefore—even if of vicarious or 'deniable'
promotion by nation states, such as in the situation in Ukraine—illustrates
the developing need for NATO to re-examine the criteria and doctrines,
both legal and military, for the declaration and use of Article
5 for collective defence and the declaration and use of associated
Article 4 (itself only invoked four times) for collective security.
(Paragraph 87)
11. In particular,
NATO must resolve the contradiction between the specifications
in Article 5 that a response should be to an "armed attack"
and the likelihood on the other hand of an "unarmed attack"
(such as a cyber attack or other ambiguous warfare). NATO must
consider whether the adjective "armed" should be removed
from the definition of an Article 5 attack. (Paragraph 88)
12. The breadth of
the Russian unconventional threat, stretching into economic and
energy policy makes it clear that NATO cannot counter all of the
specific threats posed by Russia. Responding to these specific
threats will be a matter for national Governments and the EU.
However, NATO must ensure that its response to any such operation
perpetrated against a Member State is timely and robust. This
also requires investment in new capabilities to address the new
threats. (Paragraph 89)
13. We recommend
that the NATO Summit also address the Alliance's vulnerabilities
in the face of asymmetric (ambiguous warfare) attacks. In particular
it should consider (Paragraph 90)
· What
steps it needs to take to deter asymmetric threats;
· How it should
respond in the face of an imminent or actual such attack;
· The circumstances
in which the Article 5 mutual defence guarantee will be invoked
in the face of asymmetric attack;
· How it can,
as a matter of urgency, create an Alliance doctrine for "ambiguous
warfare" and make the case for investment in an Alliance
asymmetric or "ambiguous warfare" capability.
14. Given
questions raised by Russian actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine,
we recommend that the Government fundamentally reviews its priorities
as defined in the National Security Strategy. In particular, we
note that state-on-state conflict was designated a low, tier 3,
threat. We therefore suggest that substantial reworking of the
National Security Strategy is required immediately.
(Paragraph 97)
15. The nature of
the reappearance of the threat from Russia, and its likely manifestation
in asymmetric forms of warfare underline the importance of high
quality, independent analysis of developments in Russia and in
Russian military doctrine. The closure of the Advanced Research
and Assessment Group has led to a drastic denuding of capability
in this area. The MoD needs a new Conflict Studies Research Centre
(which ARAG subsumed). (Paragraph 98)
16. There may be an
argument that lack of MoD capacity doesn't matter given Foreign
and Commonwealth Office's presence in the region. However, given
cuts in the budget of the FCO; the level of ambassadorial representation
in the Baltic States; the lack of designated language posts (and
therefore a lack of language speakers in the Baltic region); and
the minimal size of the FCO desk dealing with Ukraine before the
conflict, we believe that this capability gap is not unique to
the MoD but represents a significant strategic gap for the Government.
(Paragraph 99)
17. We recommend
that the Ministry of Defence address, also as a matter of urgency,
its capacity to understand the nature of the current security
threat from Russia and its motivations. Ensuring that there are
sufficient numbers of Defence Attachés to provide the analysis
and expertise required is one measure which would help to address
this issue. In particular we recommend the appointment of additional
Defence Attachés to cover the Baltic States and in Central
and Eastern Europe and reverse the cutbacks in Russia and Ukraine.
We further recommend that the Government ensure that there is
adequate representation in Poland which may be of critical importance
in the future. We also recommend the creation of a "red team"
in the Ministry of Defence to provide a challenge to existing
orthodoxy from a specifically Russian perspective.
(Paragraph 100)
18. We recommend
that the NATO Summit also address the Alliance's vulnerabilities
in the face of asymmetric (ambiguous warfare) attacks. In particular
it should consider: (Paragraph 101)
· How
to establish the intelligence processes and an "Indicators
and Warning" mechanism to alert Allies to the danger or imminence
of such an attack
Recommendations
19. The
NATO alliance has not considered Russia as an adversary or a potential
territorial threat to its Member States for twenty years. It is
now forced to do so as a result of Russia's recent actions. Events
in Ukraine this year, following on from the cyber attack on Estonia
in 2007 and the invasion of Georgia by Russia in 2008, are a "wake-up
call" for NATO. They have revealed alarming deficiencies
in the state of NATO preparedness, which will be tough to fix.
The UK Government should take the lead in ensuring that the NATO
Summit addresses these threats in the most concrete and systematic
fashion. (Paragraph
102)
20. We recommend
that the NATO Summit sets plans to ensure: (Paragraph
103)
· dramatic
improvements to the existing NATO rapid reaction force;
· the pre-positioning
of equipment in the Baltic States;
· a continuous
(if not technically 'permanent') presence of NATO troops, on training
and exercise in the Baltic;
· the re-establishment
of large-scale military exercises including representatives from
all NATO Member States. These exercises must involve both military
and political decision-makers;
· the establishment
of headquarters structures, at divisional and corps level to focus
on Eastern Europe and the Baltic;
· consideration
of the re-establishment of a NATO standing reserve force along
the lines of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force-Land, involving
all Member States; and,
· re-examination
of the criteria, doctrine and responses to calls under Article
4 for 'collective security' support against asymmetric attacks,
especially, but not limited to, cyber attacks where attribution
is difficult.
21. We
recommend that the NATO Summit also addresses the Alliance's vulnerabilities
in the face of asymmetric (ambiguous warfare) attacks. In particular
it should consider (Paragraph
104)
· How
to establish the intelligence processes and an "Indicators
and Warning" mechanism to alert Allies to the danger or imminence
of such an attack;
· What steps
it needs to take to deter asymmetric threats;
· How it should
respond in the face of an imminent or actual such attack;
· The circumstances
in which the Article 5 mutual defence guarantee will be invoked
in the face of asymmetric attack;
· How it can,
as a matter of urgency, create an Alliance doctrine for "ambiguous
warfare" and make the case for investment in an Alliance
asymmetric or "ambiguous warfare" capability.
22. We
recommend that the Ministry of Defence address, also as a matter
of urgency, its capacity to understand the nature of the current
security threat from Russia and its motivations. Ensuring that
there are sufficient numbers of Defence Attachés to provide
the analysis and expertise required is one measure which would
help to address this issue. In particular we recommend the appointment
of additional Defence Attachés to cover the Baltic States
and in Central and Eastern Europe and reverse the cutbacks in
Russia and Ukraine. We further recommend that the Government ensure
that there is adequate representation in Poland which may be of
critical importance in the future. We also recommend the creation
of a "red team" in the Ministry of Defence to provide
a challenge to existing orthodoxy from a specifically Russian
perspective. (Paragraph
105)
23. We recommend
that, in opening the NATO Summit, the Prime Minister and the Secretary
of State should make a commitment to the UK maintaining defence
spending at or above 2% of GDP. Increasing levels of spending
amongst European NATO Member States and the collective efficiency
of such spending must be made a priority of the Summit as a demonstration
of NATO's political will and its commitment to collective defence.
(Paragraph 106)
24. This report does
not deal with the detail of emerging events in the non-NATO state
of Ukraine but it would be wrong to publish a report on NATO relations
and responses to Russia without expressing our sympathies and
condolences to all the families, friends and nations who have
experienced the deaths of relatives, friends and citizens from
the downing of Malaysian Airlines civilian flight MH17 with military
rockets near the borders of Ukraine and Russia. Our condolences
are extended to all affected but especially to the relatives and
friends of the UK citizens killed and to our allies who suffered
such a heavy toll of innocent lives. (Paragraph
107)
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